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HISTORY OF EUROPE

DURING

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

“**BELLUM** maxime omnium mēmorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scrip-
turum; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere.
Nam neque validiores opibus ulæ inter se civitates gentesquē contulerunt
arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit : et haud ig-
notas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant belli; odiis
etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna,
aucepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt.”— Liv. lib. 21.

HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

VOLUME THE SEVENTH.

SEVENTH EDITION.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS,
EDINBURGH AND LONDON.

M.DCCC.XLVII.

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HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1799—PART II.

FROM THE BATTLE OF THE TREBBIA TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

SINCE the period when the white flag waved at Saumur, and the tricolor was displaced at Lyons and Toulon, the Republic had never been in such danger as after the first pause in the campaign of 1799. It was, in truth, within a hairbreadth of destruction. If the Allied forces in 1793 were nearer her frontier, and the interior was torn by more vehement dissensions, on the other hand the attacking powers in 1799 were incomparably more formidable, and the armies they brought into the field greatly superior both in military prowess and moral vigour. The war no longer languished in affairs of posts, or indecisive actions, leading to retreat on the first reverse. A hundred thousand men no longer fought with the loss of three or four thousand to the victors and the vanquished. The passions had been roused on both sides, and battles were not lost or won without a desperate effusion of human blood. The military ardour of the Austrians, slow of growth, but tenacious of purpose, was now thoroughly awakened, from the reverses the monarchy had undergone, and the imminent perils to which it had been exposed; the steady valour of the Russians had been roused to the highest pitch by the ardent genius and enthusiastic courage of

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1.
Dangerous
position of
the Repub-
lic at this
juncture.

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Suwarroff; and Great Britain, taught by past misfortunes, was preparing to abandon the vacillating system of her former warfare, and put forth her strength in a manner worthy of her present greatness and ancient renown. From the bay of Genoa to the mouth of the Rhine, nearly three hundred thousand veteran troops were advancing against the Republic, flushed by victory, and conducted by consummate military talent; while the Revolution had destroyed the capacity which directed, as well as worn out the energy which sustained its fortunes. The master spirit of Carnot had ceased to guide the movements of the French armies; the genius of Napoleon languished on the sands of Egypt; the boundless enthusiasm of 1793 had exhausted itself; the resources of the assignats were at an end; the terrible Committee of Public Salvation no longer was at the helm to wrench out of public suffering the means of victory. An exhausted nation, and a dispirited army had to withstand the weight of Austria and the vigour of Russia, guided by the science of the Archduke Charles and the energy of Suwarroff.

2.
Enormous consumption of human life since the opening of the campaign.

¹ Dum. i.
434.

Though the war had lasted for so short a time since its recommencement, the consumption of human life had already been prodigious; the contending parties fought with unprecedented exasperation, and the results gained had outstripped the calculations of the most enthusiastic speculators. In little more than four months, the French and Allied armies had lost nearly a half of their effective force—those cut off or irrecoverably mutilated by the sword being above one hundred and sixteen thousand;¹ while the means of supplying these vast chasms were much more ample on the part of the Allied Monarchs than of the French Directory. Never in ancient or modern times had such immense armies contended on so extensive a field. The right of the Allies rested on the Maine; their centre was posted in Switzerland; while their left stretched over the plain of Lombardy to the foot of the Apennines; and a shock was felt all along this vast line, from the rocks of Genoa to the marshes of Holland. The results hitherto had been, to an unprecedented degree, disastrous to the French. From being universally victorious, they had every where become unfortunate; at the point of the bayonet they had been

driven back, both in Germany and Italy, to the frontiers of the Republic; the conquests of Napoleon had been lost as rapidly as they had been won; and the power which recently threatened Vienna, now trembled lest the Imperial standards should appear on the summits of the Jura or the banks of the Rhone.

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It was now apparent what a capital error the Directory had committed in overrunning Switzerland, in extending their forces through the Italian peninsula, instead of concentrating them to bear the weight of Austria on the Adige; and in exiling their best army and greatest general to Africa, at the very time when the Allies were summoning to their aid the forces of a new monarchy and the genius of a hitherto invincible conqueror. But these errors had been committed; their consequences had fallen like a thunderbolt on France; the return of Napoleon and his army seemed impossible; Italy was lost; and nothing but the invincible tenacity and singular talents of Massena enabled him to maintain himself in the last defensive line to the north of the Alps, and avert invasion from France in the quarter where its frontier is most vulnerable. To complete its misfortunes, internal dissension had paralysed the Republic at the very time when foreign dangers were most pressing, and a new government added to its declining fortunes the weakness incident to every infant administration.

3.
Clear proof
thus afford-
ed of the
error of
attacking
Switzerland
and Italy.

The preparations of the Allies to follow up this extraordinary flow of prosperous affairs were of the most formidable kind. The forces in Italy amounted to one hundred and fifteen thousand men; and after deducting the troops required in the siege of Mantua, Alexandria, and other fortresses in the rear, Suwarroff could still collect above fifty thousand men to press on the dispirited army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, which could not muster twenty thousand soldiers round its banners. This army was destined to clear the Maritime Alps and Savoy of the enemy, and turn the position of Massena, who still maintained himself with invincible obstinacy on the banks of the Limmatt. The Archduke had not under his immediate orders at that period above forty-three thousand men, twenty-two thousand having been left in the Black Forest, to mask the garrisons in the *têtes-du-pont* which

4.
Military pre-
parations of
the Allies

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XXVIII.

1799.

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 2, 92.
Dum. i. 223,
225. Jom.
xii. 60, 72.

the French possessed on the Upper Rhine, and sixteen thousand in the Grisons and the central Alps, to keep possession of the important ridge of the St Gothard. But a fresh Russian army of twenty-six thousand men was approaching under Korsakoff, and was expected in the environs of Zurich by the middle of August; and something was hoped from the insurrection of the Swiss who had been liberated from the French armies.¹

5.
And of the
Republi-
cans.

To meet these formidable forces, the French, who had directed all the new levies to the north of Switzerland, as the chiefly menaced point, had seventy-five thousand men, under Massena, on the Limmat, and the utmost efforts were made in the interior to augment to the greatest degree this important army. The English and Russians had also combined a plan for the descent of forty thousand men on the coast of Holland, for which purpose seventeen thousand men were to be furnished by his Imperial Majesty and twenty-five thousand by Great Britain. This force, it was hoped, would not only liberate Holland, but paralyse all the north of France, as General Brune had only fifteen thousand French troops in the United Provinces, and the native soldiers did not exceed twenty thousand. Thus, while the centre of the French was threatened with an attack from overwhelming forces in the Alps, and an inroad preparing, by the defenceless frontier of the Jura, into the heart of their territory, their left was menaced by a more formidable invasion from the northern powers than they had yet experienced, and their right with difficulty maintained itself with inferior forces on the inhospitable summits of the Maritime Alps.²

² Jom. xii.
60, 178, 182.
Ann. Reg.
301. Arch.
Ch. ii. 2, 92.

6.
Objects of
the contend-
ing generals.

But although the plan of the Allies was so extensive, the decisive point lay in the centre of the line, and it was by the Archduke that the vital blow was to be struck, which would at once have opened to them an entrance into the heart of France. This able commander impatiently awaited the arrival of the Russians under Korsakoff, which would have conferred a superiority of thirty thousand men over his opponent, and enabled him to resume the offensive with an overwhelming advantage. The object of Massena, of course, was to strike a blow before this great reinforcement arrived; as, though his army was rapidly augmenting by conscripts from the

interior, he had no such sudden increase to expect as awaited the Imperial forces. It was equally indispensable for the Republicans to resume the offensive without any delay in Italy, as the important fortresses of Mantua and Alexandria were now hard pressed by the Allies, and if not speedily relieved, must not only, by their fall, give them the entire command of the plain of Lombardy, but enable them to render the position of Massena untenable to the north of the Alps.¹

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1799.

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 79, 86.
Dum. i. 226.

To meet these accumulating dangers, the French government exhibited an energy commensurate to the crisis in which they were placed. The imminence of the peril induced them to reveal it without disguise to both branches of the legislature. General Jourdan proposed to call out at once all classes of the conscripts, which, it was expected, would produce an increase of two hundred thousand men to the armies, and to levy a forced loan of 120,000,000 francs, or £4,800,000, on the opulent classes, secured on the national domains. Both motions were at once agreed to by the Councils. To render them as soon as possible available, the conscripts were ordered to be formed into regiments, and drilled in their several departments, and marched off, the moment they were disposable, to the nearest army on the frontier, while the service of Lisle, Strasburg, and the other fortresses, was, in great part, entrusted to the national guards of the vicinity. Thus, with the recurrence of similar circumstances in the affairs of the Republic, the revolutionary measures which had already been found so efficacious were again put in activity. Bernadotte, who at this crisis was appointed minister at war, rapidly infused into all the departments of the military service his own energy and resolution; and we have the best of all authorities, that of his political antagonist—Napoleon himself—for the assertion, that it was to the admirable measures which he set on foot, and the conscripts whom he assembled round the Imperial standards, that not only the victory of Zurich, at the close of the campaign, but the subsequent triumph of Marengo, were in a great degree owing.²

7.
Great levy
of troops by
the Direc-
tory.

² Nap. in
Las Cases, ii.
241. Goh. i.
90. Jom.
xii. 18, 20.
Th. x. 336,
337.

In order to counteract as far as possible the designs of the Allies, it was resolved to augment to thirty thousand men the forces placed on the summit of the Alps, from

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1799.

8.

Their measures to reinforce the armies.

the St Bernard to the Mediterranean ; while the army of Italy, debouching from the Apennines, should resume the offensive, in order to prevent the siege of Coni, and raise those of Mantua and Alexandria ; and Massena should execute a powerful diversion on the Limmat ere the arrival of the Russians under Korsakoff. For this purpose, all the conscripts on the eastern and southern departments were rapidly marched off to the armies at Zurich and on the Alps, and the fortresses of Grenoble, Briançon, and Fenestrelles, commanding the principal entrances from Piedmont into France, armed and provisioned. At the same time the direction of the troops on the frontier was changed. Championet, liberated from prison, was intrusted with the command of the army of the Alps, while that of the army of Italy was taken from Moreau, under whom, notwithstanding his great abilities, it had experienced nothing but disaster, and given to Joubert ; a youthful hero, who joined heroic valour to great natural abilities, and who, though as yet untried in the separate command of large armies, had evinced such talents in subordinate situations as gave the promise of great future renown, if he had not been cut off in the very outset of his career on the field of Novi.¹

¹ Jom. xii. 25, 26. St Cyr, i. 221, 222.

9.

The Aulic Council injudiciously restrain Suwarroff from active operations.

Suwarroff, who was well aware of the inestimable importance of time in war, was devoured with anxiety to commence operations against the army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, now not more than twenty thousand strong, before it had recovered from its consternation, or was strengthened by the arrival of Macdonald's forces, which were making a painful circuit by Florence and Pisa in its rear. But the Aulic Council, who looked more to the immediate concerns of Austria than the general interest of the common cause, and was invincibly attached to a slow and methodical system of war, insisted upon Mantua being put into their hands before any thing was attempted either against Switzerland, Genoa, or the Maritime Alps ; and the Emperor again wrote to Suwarroff positively forbidding any enterprise until that important fortress had surrendered. The impetuous marshal, unable to conceal his vexation, and fully aware of the disastrous effects this resolution would have upon the general fate of the campaign, exclaimed, " Thus it is that armies are

ruined;" but nevertheless, obeying the orders, he dispatched considerable reinforcements and a powerful train of artillery by the Po, to aid the siege of Mantua, and assembled at Turin the stores necessary for the reduction of Alexandria. Disgusted, however, with the subordinate part thus assigned to him, the Russian general abandoned to General Ott the duty of harassing the retreat of the army of Naples, and encamped with his veterans on the Bormida, to await the tedious operations of the besieging forces.¹

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

¹ Chastel-
lar's Me-
moirs, 137.
Jom. xii. 27,
28. Hard.
vii. 250, 251.
Laverne,
Mém. de
Souvaroff,
268, 274.

This circumstance contributed to induce an event, attended ultimately with important effects on the fate of the campaign, viz., the separation of the Austrian and Russian forces, and the rupture of any cordial concert between their respective governments. The cabinet of Vienna was too desirous of the exclusive sovereignty of the conquests in Italy, to be willing to share their possession with a powerful rival; while the pride of the Russians was hurt at beholding their unconquered commander, whom they justly regarded as the soul of the confederacy, subjected to the orders of the Aulic Council, who could not appreciate his energetic mode of conducting war, and frequently interrupted him in the midst of the career of conquest. At the same time, the English government were desirous of allowing the Russian forces to act alone in Switzerland, aided by the insurrection which they hoped to organise in that country, and beheld with satisfaction the removal of the Muscovite standards from the shores of the Mediterranean, where their establishment in a permanent manner might possibly have occasioned them some uneasiness, and where they saw no cordial co-operation with the Austrians was to be expected. These feelings on all sides led to an agreement between the Allied Powers, in virtue of which it was stipulated, that the whole Russian troops, after the fall of Alexandria and Mantua, should be concentrated in Switzerland under Marshal Suwarroff; that the Imperialists should alone prosecute the war in Italy, and that the army of the Archduke Charles should act under his separate orders on the Upper Rhine. This plan itself was highly advisable, as it tended to remove the jealousies consequent on the troops of different nations acting together; but, from the

10.

Leads to an
agreement
for a disas-
trous separ-
ation of the
Russian and
Austrian
forces.

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1799.

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 83, 84.11.
Resumption
of hostilities
by the Im-
perialists
around
Genoa.
Progress of
the siege of
Mantua.
July 29.

time at which it was carried into execution, it led to the most calamitous results. The whole forces of the Republic at this period actually on foot, did not exceed 220,000 combatants; and although the new conscription was pressed with the utmost vigour, it could not be expected that it would add materially to the efficiency of the defending armies for several months, in the course of which, to all appearance, their fate would be decided.¹

The arrival of the army of Naples at Genoa in the end of July having raised the French force to forty-eight thousand men, including three thousand cavalry and a powerful artillery, it was deemed indispensable on every account to resume offensive operations, in conjunction with the army of the Alps, which had now been augmented to a respectable amount. Every thing, accordingly, was put in motion in the valleys of the Alps and Apennines; and the French army, whose headquarters were at Cornegliano, occupied at Voltri, Savona, Vado, and Loano, nearly the same position which Napoleon held previous to his memorable descent into Italy in March 1796. But it was too late: all the activity of Moreau and Joubert could not prevent the fall of the bulwarks of Lombardy and Piedmont. The siege of Mantua, which had been blockaded ever since the battle of Magnano, was pressed in good earnest by General Kray after the victory of the Trebbia. The capture of Turin having placed at the disposal of the Allies immense resources, both in artillery and ammunition, and the defeat of Macdonald relieved them from all anxiety as to the raising of the siege, thirty thousand men were soon collected round its walls, and the batteries of the besiegers armed with two hundred pieces of cannon. The garrison originally consisted of nearly eleven thousand men; but this force, barely adequate at first to man its extensive ramparts, was now considerably weakened by disease. The peculiar situation of this celebrated fortress rendered it indispensable, that, at all hazards, the exterior works should be maintained, and this was no easy matter with an insufficient body of troops. The soldiers were provisioned for a year; but the inhabitants, thrice impoverished by enormous contributions, were in the most miserable condition, and the famine, with which they were menaced,² joined to the

² Dum. i.
256, 258,
260. Jom.
xii. 29, 35.
St Cyr, i.
222.

natural unhealthiness of the situation during the autumnal months, soon produced those contagious disorders ever in the rear of protracted war, which, in spite of every precaution, seriously weakened the strength of the garrison.

Mantua, situated in the middle of a lake formed by the Mincio in the course of its passage from the Alps to the Po, depends entirely for its security upon its external works, and the command of the waters which surround its walls. Two chaussées traverse its whole extent on bridges of stone; the first leads to the citadel, the second to the faubourg St George. Connected with the citadel are the external works and intrenched camp, which surround the lake, and prevent all access to its margin. These works, with the exception of the citadel, are not of any considerable strength; the real defence of Mantua consists in the command which the garrison has of the waters in the lake, which is formed by three locks. That of the citadel enables them at pleasure to augment the upper lake; that of Pradella gives them the command of the entrance of its waters into the Pajolo; while that of the port Ceresè puts it in their power to dam up the canal of Pajolo, and let it flow into inundations to obstruct the approach to the place. But, on the other hand, the besiegers have the means of augmenting or diminishing the supply of water to the lake itself, by draining off the river which feeds it above the town; and the dykes which lead to Pradella are of such breadth as to permit trenches to be cut and approaches made along them. Upon the whole, an exaggerated idea had been formed both of the value and strength of Mantua, by the importance which it had assumed in the campaign of 1796, and the result of the present siege revealed the secret of its real weakness.¹

Kray, taking advantage with ability of all the means at his disposal, had caused his flotilla to descend by Peschiera and Goito from the lake of Guarda, and brought up many gunboats by the inferior part of the Mincio into the lower lake. By means of these vessels, which were armed with cannon of the heaviest calibre, he kept up an incessant fire on the dykes, and at the same time established batteries against the curtain between the citadel and fort St George. These were intended merely as feints, to divert the attention of the besiegers from the

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12.
Description
of that for-
tress.

¹ Personal
observa-
tion. *Jom.*
xii. 34, 35.
Dum. i. 262.

13.
Commence-
ment of the
siege by
Kray, and
surrender
of the place.

- CHAP. real point of attack, which was the front of fort Pradella.
XXVIII. On the night of the 14th July, while the garrison were
1799. reposing, after having celebrated by extraordinary rejoic-
July 14. ings the anniversary of the taking of the Bastile, the
trenches were opened, and after the approaches had been
continued for some days, the tower of Ceresse was carried
by assault, and the besiegers' guns rapidly brought close
up*to the outworks of the place. On the night of the
July 24. 24th, all the batteries of the besiegers being fully armed,
they opened their fire, from above two hundred pieces,
with such tremendous effect that the defences of the for-
tress speedily gave way before it; in less than two hours
the outworks of fort Pradella were destroyed; while the
guns intended to create a diversion against the citadel,
soon produced a serious impression. Nothing could stand
against the vigour and sustained weight of the Allied
fire; their discharges gradually rose from six thousand
cannon-shot to twelve thousand in twenty-four hours, and
the loss of the garrison from its effects was from five to
six hundred a-day. Under the pressure arising from so
terrible an attack, the fort of St George and the battery of
Pajolo were successively abandoned; and at length the
garrison, reduced to seven thousand five hundred men,
surrendered, on condition of being sent back to France,
and not serving again until regularly exchanged. Hardly
July 30. were the terms agreed to, when the upper lake flowed
with such violence into the under, through an aperture
which the governor had cut to let in the waters, that sixty
feet of the dyke were carried away, and the inundation of
Pajolo deepened to such a degree, that it might have pro-
longed for at least eight days his means of defence, and
possibly, by preventing the besieging force taking a part
in the battle of Novi, which shortly followed, altered the
fate of the campaign.¹

¹ Jom. xii.
37, 47.
Dum. i. 262,
272.

4.
Fall of Alex-
andria, and
commence-
ment of the
siege of
Tortona.
July 8.

While the bulwark of Lombardy was thus falling, after an unexpectedly short resistance, into the hands of the Imperialists, Count Bellegarde was not less successful against the citadel of Alexandria. Trenches were opened on the 8th July; in a few days, eighty pieces of cannon were placed in battery; and such was the activity with which they were served,* that in seven days they discharged no less than forty-two thousand projectiles. On

the 21st, the garrison, consisting of sixteen hundred men, surrendered at discretion. This conquest was of great importance to the future projects of Suwarroff; but it was dearly purchased by the loss of General Chastellar, his chief of the staff, who was severely wounded soon after the first trenches were opened; an officer whose talents and activity had, in a great degree, contributed to the success of the campaign. After the fall of Alexandria and Mantua, Suwarroff, faithful to the orders he had received from Vienna, to leave no fortified place in the enemy's hands in his rear, drew his forces round Coni, and commenced the siege of Tortona. His army was soon augmented by the arrival of General Kray, with twenty thousand men from the siege of Mantua, who entered into line on the 12th August. The trenches were opened before Tortona on the 5th August, and on the 7th, the castle of Seravalle, situated at the entrance of one of the valleys leading into the Apennines, was taken after a short cannonade. But the French army, which was now concentrated under Joubert on the Apennines, was preparing an offensive movement, and the approaches to Genoa were destined to be the theatre of one of the most bloody battles on record in modern times.¹

The republicans at this epoch occupied the following positions. The right wing, fifteen thousand strong, under St Cyr, guarded the passes of the Apennines from Pontremoli to Torrignio, and furnished the garrison of Genoa. The centre, consisting of ten thousand, held the important posts of the Bochetta and Campo Freddo at the summit of the mountains; while the left, twenty-two thousand strong, was encamped on the reverse of the range, on the side of Piedmont, from the upper end of the valley of Tanaro, and both guarded the communications of the whole army with France, and kept up the connexion with the corps under Championet, which was beginning to collect on the higher passes of the Alps. On the other hand, the Allies could only muster forty-five thousand men in front of Tortona: General Kaim, with twelve thousand, being at Cherasco to observe the army of the Alps; Klenau in Tuscany, with seven thousand combatants; and the remainder of their great army occupied in keeping up the communications between their widely scattered forces.²

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July 21.

Aug. 2.

Aug. 12.

¹ Jom. xii.
48, 54, 98.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 70, 71.
Dum. i. 254,
255, 317.

15.
Position of
the Republic-
ans in front
of Genoa.

² Arch. Ch.
ii. 71. Jom.
xii. 96, 97.
St Cyr, i.
221, 222.

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1799.

16.
Magnani-
mous con-
duct of
Moreau on
Joubert's
assuming
the com-
mand.

The arrival of Joubert to supersede him in the command of his army, had no tendency to excite feelings of jealousy in the mind of his great predecessor. Moreau was incapable of a personal feeling when the interest of his country was at stake; and with a magnanimity truly worthy of admiration, he not only gave his youthful successor the full benefit of his matured counsel and experience, but offered to accompany him for some days after he opened his campaign; contributing thus, by his advice, to the glory of a rival who had just supplanted him in the command. Joubert, on his side, not only profited by the assistance thus generously proffered, but deferred on every occasion to the advice of his illustrious friend; and to the good understanding between these great men, the preservation of the Republican forces after the defeat at Novi and the death of Joubert is mainly to be ascribed. How different from the presumption of Laseuillade, who, a century before, had caused the ruin of a French army near the same spot, by neglecting the advice of Marshal Vauban before the walls of Turin!¹

¹ Jom. xii.
97. Dum. i.
319, 320.
St Cyr, i.
222.

17.
Advance of
the French
to raise the
siege of Tor-
tona. Posi-
tions of the
Allies and
French.

Aug. 14.

On the 9th of August, the French army commenced its forward movement: and after debouching by the valleys of the Bormida, the Erro, and the Orba, assembled on the 13th at Novi, and blockaded Seravalle, in the rear of their right wing. A fourth column, under the orders of St Cyr, destined to raise the siege of Tortona, descended the defiles of the Bochetta. Suwarroff no sooner heard of this advance, than he concentrated his army, which, on the evening of the 14th, occupied the following positions: Kray, with the divisions of Bellegarde and Ott, was encamped in two lines on the right, near the road from Novi to Bosco; the centre, consisting of the divisions of Forster and Schwiekowsky, commanded by Derfelden, bivouacked in rear of Pozzolo-Formigaro; while Melas, with the left, consisting of the Austrian divisions of Frœlich and Lichtenstein, occupied Rivolta. The army of Joubert was grouped on the plateau in the rear of Novi, with his right on the Scrivia, his centre at Novi, and his left at Basaluzzo; a position which enabled him to cover the march of the columns detached from his right, which were destined to advance by Cassano to effect the deliverance of Novi. The French occupied a semicircle on the

northern slopes of the Monte Rotondo; the left, composed of the divisions Grouchy and Lemoine, under the command of Perignon, extended itself, in a circular form, around Pacturana; in the centre, the division Laboissière, under St Cyr, covered the heights to the right and left of Novi; while the division Watrin, on the right, guarded the approaches to the Monte Rotondo from the side of Tortona, and Dombrowsky, with the Polish division, blockaded Seravalle. The position was strong, and the concentrated masses of the Republicans presented a formidable front among the woods, ravines, slopes, and vineyards with which the foot of the Apennines was broken. On the side of the French, forty-three thousand men were assembled; while the forces of the Allies were above fifty-five thousand; a superiority which made the first desirous of engaging upon the rugged ground at the foot of the hills, and the latter anxious to draw their opponent into the plain, where their great superiority in cavalry might give them a decisive advantage.¹

Joubert, who had given no credit to the rumours which had reached the army of the fall of Mantua, and continually disbelieved the asseverations of St Cyr, that he would have the whole Allied army on his hands, received a painful confirmation of its truth, by beholding the dense masses of Kray encamped opposite to his right wing. He was thrown by this unexpected discovery into the utmost perplexity; to engage with so great an inferiority of force was the height of temerity, while retreat was difficult in presence of so enterprising an enemy. In these circumstances, he resolved, late on the night of the 14th, after such irresolution as throws great doubts on his capacity as general-in-chief, whatever his talents as second in command may have been, on retiring into the fastnesses of the Apennines, and only waited for the arrival of his scouts in the morning to give the necessary orders for carrying it into effect; when the commencement of the attack by the Allies compelled him to accept battle in the position which he occupied. Suwaroff's order of battle at Novi was highly characteristic of that singular warrior. It was simply this: "Kray and Bellegarde will attack the left, the Russians the centre, Melas the right." To the soldiers he said, "God wills, the

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¹ Personal observation. Arch. Ch. ii. 71, 72. Jom. xii. 98, 103. Dum. i. 321, 322. Th. x. 349, 350. St Cyr, i. 227, 234.

18. Joubert had resolved to retreat on learning the fall of Mantua.

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¹ Hard. vii.
271. St Cyr,
i. 236, 237.
Jom. xii.
103.

Emperor orders, Suwarroff commands, that to-morrow the enemy be conquered." Dressed in his usual costume, in his shirt down to the waist, he was on horseback at the advanced posts the whole preceding evening, attended by a few horsemen, minutely reconnoitring the Republican position. He was recognised from the French lines by the singularity of his dress, and a skirmish of advanced posts in consequence took place.

19.
He is attack-
ed before
doing so by
Suwarroff.
Death of
Joubert.
Aug. 15.

Suwarroff's design was to force back the right of the French, by means of the corps of Kray, while Bagrathion had orders to turn their left, and unite in their rear, under cover of the cannon of Seravalle, with that corps. At the same time, Derfelden was to attack Novi in the centre, and Melas commanded the reserve, ready to support any part of the army which required his aid. In pursuance of these orders, Kray commenced the attack at five in the morning; Bellegarde assailed Grouchy, and Ott Lemoine; the Republicans were at first taken by surprise; and their masses, in great part in the act of marching, or entangled in the vineyards, received the fire of the Austrians without being able either to deploy or answer it. Notwithstanding the heroic resistance of some brigades, the Imperialists sensibly gained ground, and the heads of their columns were already mounting the plateau on which Novi stands, when Joubert hurried in person to the spot, and received a ball in his breast, when in the act of waving his hat, and exclaiming, "Forward, let us throw ourselves among the tirailleurs!" He instantly fell, and with his last breath exclaimed, "Advance, my friends, advance!" ²

² Jom. xii.
105, 107.
Dum. i. 323.
Th. x. 351.
St Cyr, i.
245, 246.

20.
Battle of
Novi. The
Allies are at
first re-
pulsed.

The confusion occasioned by this circumstance would have proved fatal, in all probability, to the French army, had the other corps of the Allies been so far advanced as to take advantage of it; but by a strange fatality, though their attacks were all combined and concentric, they were calculated to take place at different times; and while this important advantage was gained on their left, the Russians in the centre were still resting at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and Melas had merely dispatched a detachment from Rivolta to observe the course of the Scrivia. This circumstance, joined to the opportune arrival of Moreau, who assumed the command and harangued the troops, restored order,

and the Austrians were at length driven down to the bottom of the hill on their second line. During this encounter, Bellegarde endeavoured to gain the rear of Pasturana by a ravine which encircled it, and was on the point of succeeding, when Perignon charged him so vigorously with the grenadiers of Partonneaux and the cavalry of Richepanse, that the Imperialists were driven back in confusion, and the whole left wing rescued from danger. Hitherto the right of the Republicans had not been attacked, and St Cyr availed himself of this respite to complete his defensive arrangements. Kray, finding the whole weight of the engagement on his hands, pressed Bagrathion to commence an attack on Novi; and though the Russian general was desirous to wait till the hour assigned by his commander for his moving, he agreed to commence, when it was evident that, unless speedily supported, Kray would be compelled to retreat. The Russians advanced with great gallantry to the attack; but a discharge from the division Laboissière of musketry and grape, at half gunshot, threw them into confusion; and, after an obstinate engagement, they were finally broken by a charge by Watrin, with a brigade of infantry, on their flank, and driven back with great loss to Pozzolo-Formigaro.¹

The failure of these partial attacks rendered it evident that a combined effort of all the columns was necessary. It was now noon, and the French line was unbroken, although the superiority of numbers on the part of the Allies was nearly fifteen thousand men. Suwarroff, therefore, combined all his forces for a decisive movement. Kray, whom nothing could intimidate, received orders to prepare for a fresh attack; Derfelden was destined to support Bagrathion in the centre, Melas was directed to break up from Rivolta to form the left of the line, while Rosenberg was ordered in all haste to advance from Tortona to support his movement. The battle, after a pause, began again with the utmost fury at all points. It was for long, however, most obstinately disputed. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Kray, who returned above ten times to the charge, the Imperialists could make no impression on the French left; in vain column after column advanced to the harvest of death; nothing could

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¹ Dum. i.
323. Jom.
xii. 106, 109.
110. Th. x.
352. St Cyr,
i. 248, 250.

21.
Combined
attack of all
their forces.

CHAP.
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1799.

¹ Th. x. 353.
Jom. xii.
112, 113.
Dum. i. 324,
325. St Cyr,
i. 252, 254.

break the firm array of the Republicans; while Bagrathion, Derfelden, and Miloradowitch, in the centre, after the most heroic exertions, were compelled to recoil before the terrible fire of the infantry and batteries which were disposed around Novi. For above four hours the action continued with the utmost fury, without the French infantry being any where displaced, until at length the fatigue on both sides produced a temporary pause, and the contending hosts rested on their arms amidst a field covered with the slain.¹

22.
The advance
of Melas
decides the
victory.

The resolution of any other general but Suwarroff would have been shaken by so terrible a carnage without any result; but his moral courage was of a kind which nothing could subdue. At four o'clock the left wing of the Allies came up under Melas, and preparations were instantly made to take advantage of so great a reinforcement. Melas was directed to assail the extreme right of the Republicans, and endeavour, by turning it, to threaten the road from Novi to Genoa, while Kray again attacked the left, and Suwarroff himself, with the whole weight of the Russians, pressed the centre. The resistance experienced on the left was so obstinate, that, though he led on the troops with the courage of a grenadier, Kray could not gain a foot of ground; but the Russians in the centre, after a terrible conflict, succeeded in driving the Republicans into Novi, from the old walls and ruined towers of which, however, they still kept up a murderous fire. But the progress of Melas on the right was much more alarming. While one of his columns ascended the right bank of the Scrivia and reached Seravalle, another by the left bank had already turned the Monte Rotondo, and was rapidly ascending its sides; while the general himself, with a third, was advancing against the eastern flank of the plateau of Novi. To make head against so many dangers, Moreau ordered the division Watrin to move towards the menaced plateau; but finding itself assailed during its march, both in front and rear, by the divisions of Melas, it fell into confusion, and fled in the utmost disorder, with difficulty cutting its way through the enemy on the road in the rear of the French position.²

² Dum. i.
324, 327.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 72. St
Cyr, i. 254,
259. Jom.
xii. 104, 112.

It now became indispensable for the Republicans to retire; for Lichtenstein, at the head of the Imperial cavalry

and three brigades of grenadiers, was already established on the road to Gavi; his triumphant battalions, with loud shouts, were sweeping round the rear of the Republicans, while the glittering helmets of the horsemen appeared on every eminence behind their lines, and no other way of communication remained open but that which led by Pasturana to Ovada. Suwarroff, who saw his advantage, was preparing a last and simultaneous attack on the front and flanks of his opponent, when Moreau anticipated him by a general retreat. It was at first conducted in good order; but the impetuous assaults of the Allies soon converted it into a rout. Novi, stripped of its principal defenders, could no longer withstand the assaults of the Russians, who, confident of victory, and seeing the standards of the Allies in the rear of the French position, rushed forward with resistless fury and deafening cheers, over the dead bodies of their comrades, to the charge; Lemoine and Grouchy with difficulty sustained themselves, in retiring, against the impetuous attacks of their unwearied antagonist Kray, when the village of Pasturana in their rear was carried by the Russians, whose vehemence increased with their success, and the only road practicable for their artillery cut off. Despair now seized their ranks; infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and fled in tumultuous confusion across the vineyards and orchards which adjoined the line of retreat; Colli and his whole brigade were made prisoners; and Perignon and Grouchy, almost cut to pieces with sabre-wounds, fell into the hands of the enemy. The army, in utter confusion, reached Gavi, where it was rallied by the efforts of Moreau, the Allies being too much exhausted with fatigue to continue the pursuit.¹

The battle of Novi was the most bloody and obstinately contested that had yet occurred in the war. The loss of the Allies was 1800 killed, 5200 wounded, and 1200 prisoners; but that of the French was much more considerable, amounting to 1500 killed, 5500 wounded, and 3000 prisoners, besides 37 cannons, 28 caissons, and 4 standards. As the war advanced, and fiercer passions were brought into collision, the carnage became daily greater; the officers were more prodigal of their own blood and that of their soldiers; and the chiefs themselves, regardless of life,

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1799.

23.

The French
retreat.

¹ *Jom. xii.*
104, 120.
Th. x. 351.
354. *Dum.*
i. 324, 327.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 72, 73.
St Cyr, i.
255, 264.

24.
Great loss on
both sides.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

¹ Dum. i.
328, 330.
Jom. xii.
121. St Cyr,
i. 264, 270.
Th. x. 355.

at length led them on both sides to the charge, with an enthusiasm which nothing could surpass. Joubert was the victim of this heroic feeling; Grouchy charged with a standard in his hand, and when it was torn from him in the *mêlée*, he raised his helmet on his sabre, and was thrown down and wounded in the shock of the opposing squadrons; and Kray, Bagrathion, and Melas led on their troops to the mouth of the enemy's cannon, as if their duty had been that of merely commanding grenadier battalions.¹

25.
Moreau continues to maintain himself on the Apennines, and the victorious army separates.

The consequences of the battle of Novi were not so great as might have been expected from so desperate a shock. On the night of the 15th, Moreau regained in haste the defiles of the Apennines, and posted St Cyr, with a strong rearguard, to defend the approaches to the Bochetta. In the first moments of consternation, he had serious thoughts of evacuating Genoa, and the artillery was already collected at St Pietro D'Arena for that purpose; but, finding that he was not seriously disquieted, he again dispersed his troops through the mountains, nearly in the position they held before the battle. St Cyr was intrusted with the right, where a serious attempt was chiefly apprehended, and an attack which Klenau made on that part of the position with five thousand men was repulsed, with the loss of seven hundred men to the Imperialists. Suwarroff himself, informed of the successes of the French in the small cantons of Switzerland, immediately detached Kray, with twelve thousand men, to the Tessino; while he himself, in order to keep an eye on Championet, whose force was daily accumulating on the Maritime Alps, encamped at Asti, where he covered at once the blockade of Coni and the siege of Tortona.²

Aug. 20.
Jom. xii.
127, 128.
Dum. i. 334,
335. St Cyr,
ii. 1, 3.

26.
Operations of Championet in the Alps during this time.
Fall of Tortona.
Aug. 10.

During the concentration of the Allied forces for the battle of Novi, this active commander so ably disposed his little army, which only amounted to sixteen thousand combatants, instead of thirty thousand, as he had been promised by the Directory, that he succeeded in forcing the passage of the Little St Bernard, and driving the Imperialists back to Susa. These successes continued even after the Russian commander took post at Asti; and in a variety of affairs of posts in the valleys of the Alps, he succeeded in taking fifteen hundred prisoners and four

Aug. 14, 15.

pieces of cannon. But these advantages were more than counterbalanced by the fall of Tortona, which capitulated on the 25th August, on condition that, if not relieved by the 11th September, the place should be surrendered to the Allies. This conquest was the only trophy which they derived from the bloody battle of Novi. Moreau made an ineffectual attempt to relieve the blockade, and, finding it impossible to effect the object, retired into the fastnesses of the Apennines; while Suwarroff, who had received orders to collect the whole Russians in the Alps, set out, agreeably to the plan fixed on, with seventeen thousand men, for the canton of the Tessino.¹

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Sept. 11.

¹ *Jom. xii.*
129, 133, 138.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 74, 77.
Dum. i. 336,
337.

While these great events were passing to the south of the Alps, events of still more decisive importance occurred to the north of those mountains. Immediately after the capture of Zurich and the retreat of Massena to Mount Albis, the Archduke established the bulk of his forces on the hills which separate the Glatt from the Limmat, and placed a chain of posts along the whole line of that river and the Aar, to observe the movements of the Republicans. Each of the opposing armies in Switzerland numbered about seventy-five thousand combatants; but the French had acquired a decided superiority on the Upper Rhine, where they had collected forty thousand men, while the forces of the Imperialists amounted in that quarter only to twenty-two thousand. Both parties were anxiously waiting for reinforcements; but as that expected by the Archduke, under Korsakoff, was by much the most important, Massena resolved to anticipate his adversary, and strike a decisive blow before that dreaded auxiliary arrived. For this purpose he commenced his operations by means of his right wing in the higher Alps, hoping, by the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountainous regions, to dispossess the Imperialists from the important position of the St Gothard, and separate their Italian from their German armies by the acquisition of these elevated ridges, which were universally at that period deemed the key to the seat of war.²

27.
Situation of
Massena and
the Arch-
duke at
Zurich.

² *Arch. Ch.*
ii. 77, 81.
Jom. xii. 55,
58. *Dum. i.*
296.

At the very time when the French general was making preparations for these important movements, the Aulic Council gave every possible facility to their success, by

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1799.

28.

Insane dis-
location of
the Allied
forces at this
period by
the Aulic
Council.

compelling the Archduke to depart with his experienced troops for the Rhine, and make way for the Russians under Korsakoff, equally unskilled in mountain warfare, and unacquainted with the French tactics. In vain that able commander represented that the line of the Rhine, with its double barrier of fortresses, was equally formidable to an invading as advantageous to an offensive army; that nothing decisive, therefore, could be expected in that quarter, while the chances of success were much greater from a combined attack of the Russians and Austrians on the frontier of the Jura, where no fortresses existed to impede an invading force; that fifty thousand Russians in Switzerland could not supply the place of seventy thousand Austrians; and the chances, therefore, were that some serious disaster would occur in the most important part of the line of operations; and that nothing could be more hazardous than to make a change of troops and commanders in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy, at the very time that he was meditating offensive operations. These judicious observations produced no sort of effect, and the court of Vienna ordered "the immediate execution of its will, without further objections."¹*

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 80, 91.
Th. x. 407,
408.

29.

Description
of the thea-
tre of war.

To understand the important military operations which followed, it is indispensable to form some idea of the ground on which they took place. The St Gothard, though inferior in elevation to many other mountains in Switzerland, is nevertheless the central point of the country, and from its sides the greatest rivers in Europe take their rise. On the east, the Rhine, springing from the glaciers of Disentis and Hinter-Rhin, carries its waters, by a circuitous course, through the vast expanse of the lake of Constance to the German Ocean; on the north, the Reuss and the Aar, descending in parallel ravines, through rugged mountains, feed

* The relative situation and strength of the two armies at this period is thus given by the Archduke Charles:—

French.		Infantry.	Cavalry.
From Huningen to the mouth of the Aar,	-	10,991 ¹	3,208
From the mouth of the Aar to Mount Uetli,	-	23,792	3,239
From Mount Albis to the lake of Lucerne,	-	11,761	564
From the lake of Lucerne to the valley of Oberhasli,	-	7,732	
In the Valais, from Brieg to St Maurice,	-	10,886	554
In the interior of Switzerland,	-	2,088	1,126
Total,		67,250	8,691
		—75,941	

the lakes of Lucerne, Thûn, and Briefitz, and ultimately contribute their waters to the same majestic stream. On the west, a still greater river rises in the blue and glittering glacier of the Rhone, and descending through the long channel of the Valais, expands into the beautiful lake of Geneva; while to the south, the snows of the St Gothard nourish the impetuous torrent of the Tessino, which, after foaming through the rocks of Faïdo, and bathing the smiling shores of the Italian bailiwicks, swells out into the sweet expanse of the Lago Maggiore, and loses itself in the classic waves of the Po. The line of the Limmat, which now separated the hostile armies, is composed of the Linth, which rises in the snowy mountains of Glarus, and, after forming in its course the lake of Zurich, issues from that great sheet of water, under the name of the Limmat, and throws itself into the Aar at Brück. Hotze guarded the line of the Linth; the Archduke himself that of the Limmat. Korsakoff was considerably in the rear, and was not expected at Schaffhausen till the 19th August.¹

One road, practicable for cavalry, but barely so for artillery at that period, crossed the St Gothard from Bellinzona to Altdorf.* Ascending from Bellinzona on the southern side, it passes through a narrow defile close to the Tessino, between immense walls of rock between Faïdo and Airolo; climbs the steep ascent above Airolo to the inhospitable summit of the St Gothard; descends, by a torrent's edge, its northern declivity, to the elevated mountain-valley of Urseren, from whence, after traversing the dark and humid gallery of the Unnerloch, it crosses the foaming cascade of the Reuss by the celebrated Devil's Bridge, and descends, through the desolate and rugged valley of Schollenen, to Altdorf on the lake of Lucerne. But there all vestige of a

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¹ Personal
observa-
tion. Th.
x. 409, 410.
Arch. Ch. i.
96.

30.
The roads
through it.

Allies.		Infantry.	Cavalry.
Between Weiss and Wutach,	- - -	4,269	1,329
From the mouth of the Aar to the lake of Zurich,	- - -	37,053	10,458
Between the lake of Zurich and Lucerne,	- - -	8,722	834
From the lake of Lucerne to the St Gothard,	- - -	4,184	175
On the St Gothard, the Grimsel, and the Upper	- - -		
Valais,	- - -	5,744	150
In the Grisons,	- - -	1,188	355
Swiss,	- - -	3,453	
Total,		64,613	13,301

* The magnificent chaussée which now traverses this mountainous and romantic region, was not formed till the year 1819.

-77,914

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¹ Personal
observa-
tion.31.
Plan of the
Allies, and
of Massena.

Aug. 14.

² Th. x. 411.
Arch. Ch.
H. 100, 103.

practicable road ceases ; the sublime lake of Uri lies before the traveller, the sides of which, formed of gigantic walls of rock, defy all attempt at the formation of a path, and the communication with Lucerne is carried on by water along the beautiful lake of the four cantons. The only way in which it is possible to proceed on land from this point, is either by shepherd's tracks towards Stantz and the canton of Underwalden, or by the rugged and almost impracticable pass of the Schächenthal, by which the traveller may reach the upper extremity of the canton of Glarus. From the valley of Urseren, in the heart of the St Gothard, a difficult and dangerous path leads over the Furca and the Grimsel, across steep and slippery slopes, where the most experienced traveller can with difficulty keep his footing, to Meyringen, in the valley of Oberhasli.¹

The plan of the Allies was, that Hotze, with twenty-five thousand Austrians, should be left on the Linth ; and at the end of September a general attack should be made on the French position along the whole line. Korsakoff was to lead the attack on the left with his Russian forces ; Hotze in the centre with the Austrians ; while Suwarroff, with seventeen thousand of his best troops, flushed with the conquest of Italy, was to assail the right flank of the Republicans, and by the St Gothard throw himself into the rear of their position on the Limmat. This design might have been attended with success, if it had been undertaken with troops already assembled on the theatre of operations ; but when they were to be collected from Novi and Bavaria, and undertaken in presence of a general perfectly master of the ground, and already occupying a central position in the midst of these converging columns, it was evidently attended with the most imminent hazard, as, if any of the columns did not arrive at the appointed time, the whole weight of the enemy might be expected to fall on the first which appeared. Massena entrusted to Lecourbe, whose skill in mountain warfare had already been amply evinced, the important duty of throwing forward his right wing, and expelling the Imperialists from the higher Alps ; while he himself, by a false attack along the whole line, and especially upon Zurich in the centre, distracted the attention of the enemy,² and pre-

vented him from perceiving the accumulation of force which was brought to bear on the St Gothard.

Early on the morning of the 14th August, his troops were every where in motion. On the left, the Allied outposts were driven in along the whole line; and in the centre the attack was so impetuous that the Austrians were forced back almost to Zurich, where the Archduke rapidly collected his forces to resist the inroad. After considerable bloodshed, as the object was gained, the Republicans drew off, and resumed their positions on the Limmat. The real attack of Lecourbe was attended with very different results. The forces at his disposal, including those of Thureau in the Valais, were little short of thirty thousand men, and they were directed with the most consummate ability. General Gudin, with five battalions, was to leave the valley of the Aar, force the ridge of the Grimsel, and, forming a junction with General Thureau in the Valais, drive the Austrians from the source of the Rhone and the Furca. A second column of three battalions, commanded by Loison, received orders to cross the ridge of the Steinen between Oberhasli and the valley of Schollenen, and descend upon Wasen; while a third marched from Engelberg upon Erstfeld, on the lake of Lucerne; and a fourth moved direct by the valley of Issi upon Altdorf. Lecourbe himself was to embark from Lucerne on board his flotilla, make himself master of Brunen and Schwytz on its eastern shore, and combine with the other corps for the capture of Altdorf and all the posts occupied by the enemy in the valley of the Reuss.¹

These attacks all proved successful. The Republican parties, under Lecourbe and Oudinot, advanced by land and water against Schwytz, and after an obstinate combat, the united Swiss and Imperialists were driven from that canton into the Muttenthal. From Brunen, the harbour of Schwytz on the lake, Lecourbe conducted his flotilla under the chapel of William Tell, through the sublime scenery of the lake of Uri, beneath precipices fifteen hundred feet high, to Fluellen, where he landed with great difficulty, under a heavy fire from the Austrian troops; and, after a warm engagement, forced General

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32.

Commence-
ment of the
attack by
Lecourbe
on the St
Gothard.
Aug. 14.

¹ Dum. i.
299 304, 305.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 100, 103.
Jom. xii. 77,
78.

33.

The Imperi-
alists are
forced back
at all points.
Aug. 14.

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¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 107, 108.
Jom. xii. 78,
80. Dum. i.
305, 307.

Simbschen, who defended Altdorf, to retire further up the valley of the Reuss. Meanwhile Loison, after encountering incredible difficulties, had crossed the Steinerberg and the glaciers of Susten, and not only forced the enemy back into the valley of Reuss, but, after five assaults, made himself master of the important elevated post of Wasen, in the middle of its extent, so as to expose the troops who had been driven up from Altdorf to be assailed in rear as well as front. In this extremity they had no resource but to retire by the lateral gorge of Maderaner, from whence they reached by Tavitch the valley of the Rhine.¹

34.
They are
driven from
the Grimsel
and the
Furca.

Meanwhile successes still more decisive were achieved by the Republicans in the other part of their mountain line. General Thureau at the same hour attacked Prince Rohan, who was stationed in the Valais, near Brieg, to guard the northern approach to the Simplon; and defeated him with such loss, that he was constrained to evacuate the valley of the Rhone, and retired by the terrific gorges of the Simplon to Duomo d'Ossola, on the Italian side of the mountains. This disaster obliged Colonel Strauch, who guarded, amidst snow and granite, the rugged sides of the Grimsel and the Furca with eight battalions, to fly to the relief of the Imperialists in the Upper Valais, leaving only fifteen hundred to guard the summit of that mountain. He succeeded in stopping the advance of the Republicans up the Valais; but during his absence the important posts of the Grimsel and Furca were lost: General Gudin, at the head of three thousand men, set out from Goultauen, in the valley of the Aar, and after climbing up the valley, and surmounting with infinite difficulty the glaciers of Ghelmen, succeeded in assailing the corps who guarded, amidst ice and snow, the rugged summit of the Grimsel, from a higher point than that which they occupied. After a desperate conflict, in which a severe loss was experienced on both sides, the Imperialists were driven down the southern side of the mountain into the Valais; and Colonel Strauch, finding himself now exposed on both flanks, had no alternative but to retire by the dangerous pass called the Pas de Nufenen, over a slippery glacier, to Faido on the Tessino,² from whence he rejoined

² Arch. Ch.
ii. 105, 107.
Jom. xii. 80.
81. Dum. i.
308, 309.
Ebel Manuel
de Voyager
en Suisse,
325.

the scattered detachments of his force, which had made their escape from the Valais, by paths known only to chamois hunters, through the Val Formazza at Bellinzona.

Lecourbe, ignorant of the successes of his right wing, on the succeeding day pursued his career of victory in the valley of the Reuss. Following the retiring columns of the Imperialists up the dark and shaggy pass of Schollenen, he at length arrived at the Devil's Bridge, where a chasm thirty feet wide, formed by the blowing up of the arch, and a murderous fire from the rocks on the opposite side of the ravine, arrested his progress. But this obstacle was not of long duration. During the night the Republicans threw beams over the chasm; and the Austrians, finding themselves menaced on their flank by General Gudin, who was descending the valley of Urseren from the Furca by Realp, were obliged to evacuate that almost impregnable post, and retire to the heights of the Crispalt, behind the Oberalp, near the source of the Rhine. There they maintained themselves, with great resolution, against the Republican grenadiers till the evening; but on the following day, being assailed by the united forces of Lecourbe and Gudin, they were finally broken and driven back to Ilantz, with the loss of a thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. At the same time, a detachment took possession of the summit of the St Gothard, and established itself at Airolo, on the southern declivity of the mountain.¹

While Lecourbe was gaining these great successes on the right, his left, between the lakes of Lucerne and Zurich, was equally fortunate. General Chabran, on the extreme left, cleared the whole western bank of the lake of Zurich as far as Weggis, the central columns drove the Imperialists from Schwytz into the Muttenthal, and defeated Jellachich at Ensiedlen; and on the following day, aided by Chabran, who moved against his flank by the Wiggisthal, they totally routed the Austrians, who fell back, with the loss of twelve hundred prisoners, by the lake of Klonthal, into the canton of Glarus. Thus, by a series of operations, as ably executed as they were skilfully conceived, was the whole left wing of the Imperialists routed and driven back in less than forty-eight hours, with the loss of ten pieces of cannon,² four thousand prisoners, and two thousand in

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35.
And the St
Gothard.

Aug. 15.

Aug. 16.
1 Arch. Ch.
ii. 108, 110
Jom. xii. 81,
82. Dum. i.
308, 309.

36.
Successes of
the French
left, who
drive the
Imperialists
into Glarus.

2 Arch. Ch.
ii. 212, 213.
Jom. xii. 82,
84. Dum. i.
305.

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37.
Unsuccessful attempt
of the Archduke to
cross the
Limmat below
Zurich.

killed and wounded, and the important post of the St Gothard, with all its approaches and lateral valleys, wrested from their hands.*

These brilliant successes, however, were only gained by Massena through the great concentration of his forces on the right wing. To accomplish this he was obliged to weaken his left, which, lower down in the plain, guarded the course of the Aar. The Archduke resolved to avail himself of this circumstance to strike a decisive blow against that weakened extremity; in which he was the more encouraged by the arrival of twenty thousand Russians of Korsakoff's corps at Schaffhausen, and the important effect which success in that quarter would have in threatening the communications of the Republican army with the interior of France. For this purpose, thirty thousand men were assembled on the banks of the river, and the point selected for the passage at Gross Dettingen, a little below the junction of the Reuss and the Aar. Hotze was left in Zurich with eight thousand men, with which he engaged to defend it to the last extremity; while Korsakoff promised to arrive at Ober Endingen, in the centre of the line, with twenty-three thousand men. The march of the columns was so well concealed, and the arrangements made with such precision, that this great force reached the destined point without the enemy being aware of their arrival, and every thing promised a favourable issue to the enterprise, when it proved abortive from the difficulties of the passage, and the want of skill and due preparation in the Austrian engineers. The bridges for the crossing of the troops were commenced under such a violent fire of artillery as speedily cleared the opposite banks, but it was found impossible to anchor the pontoons in the rocky bed of the stream, and the rapidity of the current rendered it hopeless to construct the bridges in any other manner. Thus, from the want of a little foresight and a few precautions on the part of the engineers, did a project fail, as ably conceived as it was accurately executed by the military officers, and which promised to

Aug 16 and
17.

* Many readers will recognise, in the theatre of these operations, the scenes indelibly engraven on their memory by the matchless sublimity of their features. The author traversed them on foot in 1816, and again in 1821; the lapse of twenty years has taken nothing from the clearness of the impressions left on his mind during these delightful excursions

have altered the fate of the campaign, and perhaps of the war. Had the passage been effected, the Archduke, with forty thousand men, would have cleared all the right bank of the Aar, separated the French left wing on the Rhine from their centre and right in Switzerland, compelled Massena to undertake a disastrous retreat into the canton of Berne, exposed to almost certain destruction the small corps at Bâle, and opened to immediate invasion the defenceless frontier of the Jura, from the united troops of the Archduke, Korsakoff, and Suwarroff. The want of a few grappling-irons defeated a project on which perhaps the fate of the world depended. Such is frequently the fortune of war.¹

Desirous still of achieving something considerable with his veteran troops before leaving the command in Switzerland, the Archduke, after his troops had resumed their position, again concentrated his left under Hotze. But the usual jealousies between the troops and commanders of rival nations prevented his projects from being carried into execution; and before the end of the month the Austrians, under their able commander, were in full march for the Upper Rhine, leaving twenty-five thousand men under Hotze, as an auxiliary force to support Korsakoff until the arrival of Suwarroff from the plains of Piedmont. This change of commanders and weakening of the Allied forces, presented too great chances of success to escape the observation of so able a general as Massena, whose army was now augmented, by reinforcements from the interior, to above eighty thousand men. The movement commenced with an attack by Soult, with the right wing of the Republicans, upon Hotze, who occupied the canton of Glarus, and, after several sharp skirmishes, a decisive action took place near Nacfels, in which the Austrians were defeated, and compelled to fall back to a defensive line in their rear, extending from the lake of Zurich, by Wasen through the Wallenstadter See, by Sargans, to Coire in the Grisons. It was at this critical moment that the Archduke, yielding to the pressing commands of the Aulic Council, was compelled to abandon the army with the great body of his troops, leaving the united force of Korsakoff and Hotze, fifty-six thousand strong, scattered over a line forty miles in length,² to sus-

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¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 119, 126.
Dum. i. 311,
312. Jom.
xii. 87, 92.

38.
Being foiled,
he marches
to the Upper
Rhine. The
Austrian
left defeated
in Glarus.
Aug. 19.

² Arch. Ch.
ii. 129, 135,
139. Th. i.
412, 413
Jom. xii.
227, 231, 294.

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1799.

39.
Successful
expedition
of the Arch-
duke against
Manheim.

Aug. 26.

Sept. 6.

Sept. 14.

Sept. 18.

¹ Jom. xii.
238, 241.
Arch. Ch. ii.
149, 161.

40.
Plan of the
Allies for a
combined
attack by
Suwarroff
and Korsakoff, on
Massena.

tain the weight of Massena, who could bring sixty-five thousand to bear upon the decisive point around the ramparts of Zurich.

The arrival of the Archduke was soon attended with important effects upon the Upper Rhine. The French had crossed that river at Manheim on the 26th August with twelve thousand men, and driving General Muller, who commanded the Imperialists, before them, laid siege to Philipsburg, on which they had commenced a furious bombardment. But the approach of the Austrian Prince speedily changed the state of affairs. The columns of that commander rapidly approaching, threatened to cut off their retreat to the Rhine, and they were obliged hastily to raise the siege and retire to Manheim. The insufficient state of defence of that important place, inspired the Archduke with the design of carrying it by a *coup de main*. Its fortifications had, some months before, been levelled by the Republicans; but since that time, they had been indefatigable in their endeavours to restore them, and they were already in a respectable state of defence. On the 17th, the Austrians, in two columns, one of fourteen thousand men, the other of seven thousand, with a reserve of eight thousand, moved towards Manheim, and on the following day gave the assault. A thick fog favoured the enterprise; the Austrians got into the redoubts almost before the French were aware of their approach, and drove them over the Rhine, with the loss of eighteen hundred prisoners, and twenty-one pieces of cannon. This success threw a momentary lustre over the expedition, for which the Allies were about to pay dear by the disasters experienced before Zurich.¹

After the departure of the Archduke, it was concerted between Suwarroff, Korsakoff, and Hotze, that the former of these commanders should set out from Bellinzona on the 21st September, and attack the Republican positions near Airolo on the Tessino. On the 25th, he expected to be at Altdorf, after having made himself master of the St Gothard. From thence he was to form a junction with Korsakoff at Zurich, and with their united forces assail the position of Massena on the Limmat in front, while Hotze attacked it in flank. By this means they flattered themselves that they would be able to march on the Aar

with the mass of their forces, and drive the French back upon the frontier of the Jura and their own resources. This project was well conceived, in so far as the turning the French position by the St Gothard was concerned, and if it had been executed as vigorously and accurately by all the commanders engaged as it was by Suwarroff, the result might have been very different from what actually occurred. But it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution, from the rugged nature of the country in which the principal operations were to be conducted, the difficulty of communicating between one valley or one part of the army and another, and the remote distances from which the corps which were to combine in the operation were to assemble. It would have been more prudent with such detached bodies, to have chosen the Misocco and the Bernardine for the field-marshal's march, as that would have brought him down, by roads practicable for artillery, through the Via-Mala into the heart of the Austrian army, under cover of the posts which they still occupied in the Grisons; but it did not promise such brilliant results in the outset as that which he adopted, and it was more suitable to the impetuous character of the Russian veteran to throw himself at once through the narrow ravines of the St Gothard upon the flank of his adversary's line.¹

Meanwhile Korsakoff collected the greater part of his forces in the neighbourhood of Zurich, where they were encamped between the ramparts of the town and the banks of the Sill. The position which they occupied, and the necessity of striking a decisive blow before the arrival of Suwarroff, suggested to Massena a plan which he conceived and executed with the most consummate ability. He had a superiority, until the arrival of Suwarroff, of six thousand over the Allies; but the corps which that commander brought with him would turn the balance still further the other way.* Now, therefore, was the moment, by a decisive blow in the centre, to ruin the Allied army before the junction of that dreaded commander. But the distribution of these troops rendered this superiority still more important;² for Massena could assemble thirty-nine thousand on the decisive line of the Limmat, while Korsakoff

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¹ Dum. ii.
58, 61.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 172, 178.
Jom. xli.
241, 242.

41.
Relative
situations of
the French
and Russian
centres at
Zurich.

² Jom. xli.
245, 246.
Arch. Ch. ii.
183, 185.

* The French army in the field was 76,000; that of the Allies, without Suwarroff, 70,000; with him 88,000.—Jomini, xii. 245.

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42.
Unfounded
confidence
of the latter.

could only collect twenty-five thousand, the bulk of whom were grouped together under the cannon of Zurich, where their numbers were of no avail, and their crowded state in a narrow space only impeded any military movements.

The temper and feeling of the Russian troops, even more than their defective position, rendered them the ready victims of a skilful and daring adversary. Justly proud of their long series of victories over the Turks, and of the decisive impression which Suwarroff had made in the Italian campaign, they had conceived both an unreasonable confidence in their own strength, and an unfounded contempt for their enemies. This feeling was not the result of a course of successes over an antagonist with whom they had repeatedly measured their strength, but of a blind idea of superiority, unfounded either in reason or experience, and likely to lead to the most disastrous consequences. In presence of the first general then in Europe, at the head of a greatly superior force, Korsakoff thought it unnecessary to adopt other measures or take greater precautions than if he had been on the banks of the Dniester, in front of an undisciplined horde of barbarians. Thus every thing, both on the French and Allied side, prepared the great catastrophe which was approaching. The presumption and arrogance of Korsakoff were carried to such a pitch, that, in a conference with the Archduke Charles, shortly before the battle, when that great general was pointing out the positions which should in an especial manner be guarded, and said, pointing to the map, "Here you should place a battalion."—"A company, you mean," said Korsakoff. "No," replied the Archduke, "a battalion."—"I understand you," rejoined the other, "an Austrian battalion, or a Russian company."¹

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 181, 182.
Hard. vii.
287.

43.
Massena's
able plan of
attack. The
passage is
surprised
below
Zurich.

Having minutely reconnoitred the position of the enemy, Massena resolved to make only a feigned attack on Zurich, and to cross with the bulk of his forces further down the river at Closter-Fahr, where it was slenderly guarded; and thus to turn the position under the ramparts of that town, and attack Korsakoff both in front and rear, at the same time that the Republicans had cut him off from his right wing further down the river, and the lake of Zurich separated him from his left in the mountains. The

execution of this plan was as able as its conception was felicitous, on the part of the French commander. By great exertions the French engineers collected, by land-carriage, twelve pontoons and thirty-seven barks at Dietikon, on the evening of the 24th September, where they were concealed behind an eminence and several hedges, and brought down to the margin of the river at daybreak on the following morning. The French masked batteries then opened their fire; by the superiority of it the opposite bank was speedily cleared of the feeble detachments of the enemy who occupied it, and the passage commenced. Six hundred men, in the first instance, were ferried over, and the French artillery, directed by General Foy, protected this gallant band against the attacks of the increasing force of the enemy, till the boats returned with a fresh detachment. Meanwhile the pontoons arrived at a quick trot, from Dietikon; the bridge began to be formed, and the troops, ferried over, attacked and carried the height on the opposite side, from whence seven pieces of cannon had hitherto thundered on their crossing columns, though defended with the most obstinate valour by three Russian battalions. By seven o'clock the plateau of Closter-Fahr, which commanded the passage, was carried with the artillery which crowned it, and before nine the bridge was completed, and Oudinot, with fifteen thousand men, firmly established on the right bank of the river.¹

While this serious attack was going on in the centre, General Menard on the left had, by a feigned attack, induced the Russian commander, Durassoff, to collect all his forces to resist the threatened passage on the lower Limmat, and Mortier, by a vigorous demonstration against Zurich, retained the bulk of the Russian centre in the neighbourhood of that city. His troops were inadequate to produce any serious impression on the dense masses of the Russians who were there assembled; but while he was retiring in confusion, and Korsakoff was already congratulating himself on a victory, he was alarmed by the increasing cannonade in his rear, and intelligence soon arrived of the passage of Closter-Fahr, the disaster of Markoff, and the separation of the right wing under Durassoff from the centre, now left to its own resources at Zurich. Shortly after, he received the most alarming

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Sept. 24.

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 190, 193.
Th. x. 414,
416. Jom.
xii. 247, 250,
252.

44.
Feigned
attacks on
Zurich and
the Lower
Limmat.

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¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 194, 196.
Th. x. 416,
418. ² Jom.
xii. 254, 256.

accounts of the progress of Oudinot: he had made himself master of Hong, and the heights which surround Zurich on the north-west; and, in spite of a sally which the Russian general made towards evening, at the head of five thousand men, which compelled the enemy to recede to the foot of the heights to the north of the town, they still maintained themselves in force on that important position, barred the road of Winterthur, the sole issue to Germany, and all but surrounded the Allied army within the walls of the city. Before nightfall, Massena, fully sensible of his advantages, summoned the Russian commander to surrender, a proposal to which no answer was returned.¹

45.
Dreadful
confusion in
the town of
Zurich.

During these disasters the confusion in Zurich rose to the highest pitch. The immense confluence of horsemen, artillery, and baggage-waggons, suddenly thrown back upon the city, and by which its streets were soon completely blocked up; the cries of the wounded brought in from all quarters; the trampling of the cavalry and infantry, who forced their way through the dense mass, and mercilessly trod under foot the wounded and the dying, to make head against the enemy threatening to break in from all sides, formed a scene hitherto unexampled in the war, and for which a parallel can only be found in the horrors of the Moscow retreat. When night came, the extensive watch-fires on all the heights to the north and west of the city, showed the magnitude of the force with which they were threatened in that quarter; while the untruffled expanse of the lake offered no hope of escape on the other side, and the bombs which already began to fall in the streets, gave a melancholy presage of the fate which awaited them if they were not speedily extricated from their perilous situation.²

² Jom. xii.
254, 256.
Arch. Ch. ii.
195, 196.
Th. x. 417,
418.

46.
Brave reso-
lution of
Korsakoff
to force
his way
through.

In these desperate circumstances, Korsakoff evinced resolution as worthy of admiration as his former presumptuous confidence had been deserving of censure. Disdaining the proposal to surrender, he spent the night in making arrangements for forcing, sword in hand, a passage on the next morning through the dense masses of the Republicans. Fortunately, considerable reinforcements arrived during the night; two strong battalions detached by Hotze, and the whole right wing under Durassoff, successively made their

appearance. The latter had been detained till late in the evening by the feigned attacks of Menard; but having at length learned the real state of affairs, he lost no time in rejoining his commander at Zurich, by a long circuit which enabled him to avoid the French outposts. Strengthened by these reinforcements, Korsakoff resolved to attempt the passage through the enemy on the following day.¹

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¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 197. Th.
x. 418, 419.

At daybreak on the 28th, the Russian columns were formed in order of battle, and attacked with the utmost impetuosity the division Lorges and the brigade Bonterns, which had established themselves on the road to Winterthur, the sole line of retreat which remained to them. The resistance of the French was obstinate, and the carnage frightful; but the Russians fought with the courage of despair, and at length succeeded in driving the Republicans before them and opening a passage. The whole army of Korsakoff was then arranged for a retreat; but contrary to every rule of common sense,* as well as the military art, he placed the infantry in front, the cavalry in the centre, and the *artillery and equipages in the rear*, leaving only a slender rearguard, to defend the ramparts of Zurich until the immense mass had extricated itself from the city.* Massena, perceiving his intention, collected his forces to prevent or distress his retreat; but the intrepidity of the Russian infantry overthrew all his efforts, and the head of the column cut its way through all the troops which could be collected to oppose its progress. But the efforts of the Republicans against the cavalry in the centre were more successful. The divisions Lorges and Gazan, by reiterated charges on the moving mass, at length succeeded in throwing it into confusion; the disorder soon spread to the rear; all the efforts of the generals to arrest it proved ineffectual; the brave SACKEN, destined to honourable distinction in a more glorious war, was wounded and made prisoner, and amidst a scene of unexampled confusion, a hundred pieces of cannon, all the ammunition, waggons, and baggage of the army, and the

47.
He cuts his way through the enemy, but loses all his baggage and artillery. Sept. 28.

* Cæsar's principle was just the reverse: "Quum ad hostes appropinquabat, consuetudine sua, Cæsar sex legiones expeditas ducebat; post eos totius exercitus impedimenta collocarat; inde duæ legiones, quæ proxime conscriptæ erant, totum agmen claudébant, prasidioque impedimentis erant." — CÆSAR de Bell. Gall. ii. 19. The principles of war are the same in all ages, whatever may be the difference of the arms with which the combatants engage: Cæsar's rule would have saved Korsakoff's defeat.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

¹ Th. x. 419,
420. Arch.
Ch. ii. 199.
201. Jom.
xii. 257, 258.
Hard. vii.
292.

military chest, fell into the hands of the victors. Meanwhile the fire approached Zurich on all sides. Mortier was thundering from the other side of the Limmat, while Oudinot, carrying every thing before him, pressed down from the Heights on the north; the garrison defiled after the main army in confusion; soon the gates were seized; a mortal struggle ensued in the streets, in the course of which the illustrious Lavater, seeking to save the life of a soldier threatened with death, was barbarously shot. At length all the troops which remained at Zurich laid down their arms; and Korsakoff, weakened by the loss of eight thousand killed and wounded, and five thousand prisoners, besides his whole artillery and ammunition, was allowed to retire without further molestation by Eglisau to Schaffhausen.¹

48.
Success of
Soult against
Hotze above
the lake, and
his death.

Sept. 26.

² Jom. xii.
259, 263.
Arch. Ch. ii.
203, 209.
Dum. ii. 61,
63.

While Zurich was immortalised by these astonishing triumphs, the attack of Soult on the Imperial right, on the upper part of the line above the lake, was hardly less successful. Hotze had there retained only two battalions at his headquarters of Kaltbrun; the remainder were dispersed along the vast line, from the upper end of the lake of Zurich, by Sargans, to Coire in the Grisons. Accumulating his forces, Soult skilfully and rapidly passed the Linth, at three in the morning of the 25th. One hundred and fifty volunteers first swam across the river, with their sabres in their teeth, during the darkness of the night, and, aided by the artillery from the French side, speedily dispersed the Austrian posts on the right bank, and protected the disembarkation of six companies of grenadiers, who soon after made themselves masters of Schenis. Wakened by the sound of the cannon, Hotze ran, with a few officers and a slender escort, to the spot, and fell dead by the first discharge of the Republican videttes. This calamitous event threw the Austrians into such consternation, that they fell back from Schenis to Kaltbrun, from which they were also dislodged before the evening. At the same time the French had succeeded in crossing a body of troops over the river, a little lower down, at Shemersken, and advanced to the bridge of Gryneau, where a desperate conflict ensued. These disasters compelled the Austrians to retreat to their position at Wescott, where they were next day assaulted by Soult,² and driven first

behind the Thiers, and at length over the Rhine, with the loss of three thousand prisoners, twenty pieces of cannon, all their baggage, and the whole flotilla, constructed at a great expense, on the lake of Wallenstadt.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1759.

While these disasters were accumulating upon the Allied force, which he was advancing to support, Suwarroff was resolutely and faithfully performing his part of the general plan. He arrived at Taverno on the 15th August, and dispatching his artillery and baggage, by Como and Chiavenna, towards the Grisons, set out himself, with twelve thousand veterans, to ascend the Tessino and force the passage of the St Gothard; while Rosenberg, with six thousand, was sent round by the Val Blegno, to turn the position by the Crispalt and Disentis, and so descend into the valley of Urseren by its eastern extremity. On the 21st September the Russian main body arrived at Airolò, at the foot of the mountain, where General Gudin was strongly posted, with four thousand men, covering both the direct road over the St Gothard and the path which led diagonally to the Furca. Two days after, the attack was commenced with the utmost resolution by the Russian troops; but in spite of all their efforts, they were arrested in the steep zigzag ascent above Airolò by the rapid and incessant fire of the French tirailleurs. In vain the Russians, marching boldly up, answered by heavy platoons of musketry; their fire, however sustained, could produce little impression on detached parties of sharpshooters, who, posted behind rocks and scattered fir-trees, caused every shot to tell upon the dense array of their assailants. Irritated at the unexpected obstacles, the old marshal advanced to the front, lay down in a ditch, desired his soldiers to dig a grave, and declared his resolution "to be buried there, where his children had retreated for the first time." Joining generalship to resolution, however, he dispatched detachments to the right and left to turn the French position; and when their fire began, putting himself at the head of his grenadiers, at length drove the Republicans from their position, and pursued them, at the point of the bayonet, over the rugged summit of the St Gothard to the valley of Urseren. At the same time, Rosenberg had assailed the French detachment on the summit of the Crispalt, and,¹ after destroying the

49.
Operations
of Suwar-
roff on the
Tessino
Forcing of
the St
Gothard.

Sept 23.

¹ Th. x. 421,
422. Jom.
xii. 265, 266.
Dum. i. 51.
Arch. Ch. ii.
227, 228.
Personal ob-
servation.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

50.
Dreadful
struggle at
the Devil's
Bridge.

Sept. 24.

Sept. 26.
1 Jom. xii.
267, 269.
Th. x. 422
Dum. ii. 52,
53. Arch.
Ch. ii. 229,
235. Per-
sonal obser-
vation.51.
Arrived at
Aldorf,
Suwarroff
is forced to
ascend the
Schächen-
thal. Diffi-
cult passage
of the ridge
of Mitten.

greater part, driven them down in great disorder into the eastern extremity of the same valley; while a detachment under Auffenberg, dispatched from Disentis, was proceeding through the Maderanthal to Amsteg, to cut off their retreat by the valley of Schollenen.

Assailed by such superior forces, both in front and flank, Lecourbe had no alternative but a rapid retreat. During the night, therefore, he threw his artillery into the Reuss, and retired down the valley of Schollenen, breaking down the Devil's Bridge to impede the progress of the enemy, while Gudin scaled the Furca by moonlight, and took post on the inhospitable summit of the Grimsel. On the following morning the united Russian forces approached the Devil's Bridge; but they found an impassable gulf, two hundred feet deep, surmounted by precipices above a thousand feet high, which stopt the leading companies, while a dreadful fire from all the rocks on the opposite side swept off all the brave men who approached the edge of the abyss. Hearing the firing in front, the column of Bagrathion pressed on, in double quick time, through the dark passage of the Unnerloch, and literally, by their pressure, drove the soldiers in front headlong over the rocks into the foaming Reuss. At length the officers, tired of the fruitless butchery, dispatched a few companies across the Reuss to scale the rocks on the left, by which the post at the bridge was turned, and beams being hastily thrown across, the Russian troops, with loud shouts, passed the terrific defile, and pressing hard upon the retiring column of the Republicans, effected a junction with Auffenberg at Wasen, and drove the enemy beyond Altdorf to take post on the sunny slopes where the Alps of Surenen descend into the glassy lake of Lucerne.¹

The capture of the St Gothard by the Russians, and the expulsion of the French from the whole valley of the Reuss, was totally unexpected by Massena, and would have been attended with important results upon the general fate of the campaign, if it had not been simultaneous with the disaster of Korsakoff at Zurich, and the defeat of Hotze's corps by the Republicans on the Linth. But, coming as it did in the midst of these misfortunes, it only induced another upon the corps whose defeat was about to signalise the Republican arms. Arrived at Alt-

dorf, Suwarroff found his progress in a direct line stopped by the lake of Lucerne, the perpendicular sides of which precluded all possibility of a further advance in that direction; while the only outlet to join the Allied forces on his right lay through the horrible defile of the Shächenthal, in which even the audacious Lecourbe had not ventured to engage his troops, however long habituated to mountain warfare. There was now, however, no alternative, and Suwarroff, with troops exhausted with fatigue, and a heart boiling with indignation, was compelled to commence the perilous journey. No words can do justice to the difficulties experienced by the Russians in this terrible march, or the heroism of the brave men engaged in it. Obligated to abandon their artillery and baggage, the whole army advanced in single file, dragging the beasts of burden after them, up rocky paths, where even an active traveller can with difficulty find a footing. Numbers slipped down the precipices, and perished miserably; others, worn out with fatigue, lay down on the track, and were trodden under foot by the multitude who followed after them, or fell into the hands of Lecourbe, who closely hung upon their rear. So complete was the dispersion of the army, that the leading files had reached Mitten before the last had left Altdorf; the precipices beneath the path were covered with horses, equipages, arms, and soldiers unable to continue the laborious ascent. At length the marshal reached Mitten, where the troops, in a hospitable valley, abounding with cottages and green fields, hoped for some respite from their fatigues; and where, in conformity to the plan agreed on, they were to have met the Austrian corps of Jellachich and Linken, to threaten the right of the Republicans.

But it was too late: the disasters of the Imperialists deprived them of all hope of relief from this quarter. Jellachich, faithful to his instructions, had broken up from Coire and the valley of the Rhine on the 25th with eight battalions, made himself master of the village of Mollis, and driven the Republicans back to Naefels, at the bridge of which, however, they resolutely defended themselves. But on the following day, the French, issuing from Wasen, menaced the retreat of the Austrians by the side of the Wallenstädter See; and Jellachich, informed of the dis-

Sept. 28.

¹ Personal observation.
Jom. xii.
269, 270, 271.
Th. x. 423.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 236, 237.
Dum. ii. 54,
55.

52.
He finds none of the expected reinforcements there.
Sept. 25.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 212, 220.
Jom. xii.
271, 272.
Dum. ii. 68,
69.

asters at Zurich, the death of Hotze, and the retreat of his corps, made haste to fall back behind the Rhine. On the same day, Linken, who had crossed from the valley of the Rhine by the valley of Sernst and the sources of the Linth, after making prisoners two battalions whom he encountered, appeared in the upper part of the valley of Glarus, so as to put Molitor between two fires. The situation of the latter now appeared all but desperate, and by a little more vigour on the part of the Russians might have been rendered so; but the retreat of Jellachich having enabled Molitor to accumulate his forces against this new adversary, he was obliged to retreat, and after remaining inactive for three days at Schwanden, recrossed the mountains, and retired behind the Rhine.¹

53.
And is there
surrounded
on all sides,
and reluctantly
forced to
retreat.

Suwarroff thus found himself in the Muttenthal in the middle of the enemy's forces, having the whole of Massena's army on one side, and that of Molitor on the other. Soon the masses of the Republicans began to accumulate round the Russian marshal. Molitor occupied Mont Bragel and the Klonthal, the summit of the pass between the Muttenthal and Glarus, while Mortier entered the mouth of the valley towards Schwytz, and Massena himself arrived at Fluellen, to concert with Lecourbe a general attack on the Russian forces. In this extremity, Suwarroff having, with the utmost difficulty, assembled his weary troops in the Muttenthal, called a council of war, and following only the dictates of his own impetuous courage, proposed an immediate advance to Schwytz, in the rear of the French position at Zurich, and wrote to Korsakoff, that he would hold him answerable with his head for one step further that he continued his retreat. The officers, however, perceiving clearly the dangerous situation in which they were placed, after Korsakoff's defeat, strongly urged the necessity of an immediate retreat into Glarus and the Grisons, in order to strengthen themselves by that wing of the Allied army which alone had escaped a total defeat. At length, with the utmost difficulty, the veteran conqueror was persuaded to alter his plans, and, for the first time in his life, he ordered a retreat, weeping with indignation at thus finding the reputation of invincibility, which his marvellous successes had won for him,² lost in the close of his career by the absurd combinations of the

² Arch. Ch.
ii. 239, 240.
Jom. xii.
273, 275.
Dum. ii. 67,
68.

Aulic Council, and the faults of the generals placed under his command.

CHAP.
XXVIM.

1799.

54.

He crosses
the moun-
tains into
Glarus.
Desperate
struggle at
Naefels.
Sept. 30.

Preceded by the Austrian division under Auffenberg, the Russians ascended Mont Bragel, and chasing before them the detachment of Molitor, great part of whom were made prisoners near the lake Klonthal, threw back that general upon the banks of the Linth. It was now the turn of the French general to feel alarm; but calm in the midst of dangers which would have overturned the resolution of an ordinary commander, he made the most resolute defence, disputing every inch of ground, and turning every way to face the adversaries who assailed him. Determined to block up the passage to the Russians, he ultimately took post at Naefels, already immortalised in the wars of Swiss independence, where he was furiously attacked, for a whole day, by Prince Bagrathion. Both parties fought with the most heroic courage, regardless of ten days' previous combats and marches, in which they had respectively been engaged. But all the efforts of the Russian grenadiers could not prevail over the steady resistance of the Republicans, and towards evening, having received reinforcements from Wasen, they sallied forth, and drove the assailants back to Glarus. On the same day Massena, with a large force, attacked the rearguard of the Russians, which was winding, encumbered with wounded, along the Muttenthal; but Rosenberg halting, withstood their attack with such firmness, that the Republicans were compelled to give way, and then breaking suddenly from a courageous defensive to a furious offensive, he routed them entirely, and drove them back as far as Schwytz, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, a thousand prisoners, and as many killed and wounded.¹

Oct. 1.

¹ Jom. xii.
276, 277.
Arch. Ch. i.
48.

Unable to force the passage at Naefels, the Russian general, after giving his troops some days' repose at Glarus, which was absolutely indispensable after the desperate fatigues they had undergone, resolved to retreat over the mountains into the Grisons by Engi, Matt, and the valley of Sernst. To effect this in presence of a superior enemy, pressing on his footsteps both from the side of Naefels and the Klonthal, was an enterprise of the utmost hazard, as the path over the arid summits of the Alps of Glarus, was even more rugged than that through

55.

Dreadful
passage of
the Alps of
Glarus to
Hantz on
the Rhine.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

Oct. 5.

¹ Personal
observation.
Arch. Ch. ii.
249. Jom.
xii. 277.

56.
Terrible de-
scent into
the Grisons.
Oct. 6.

the Shächenthal, and the horses and beasts of burden had all perished under the fatigues of the former march. Nothing could exceed the difficulties which presented themselves. Hardships, tenfold greater than those which all but daunted the Carthaginian conqueror in the outset of his career in the Pennine Alps, awaited the Russians, at the close of a bloody and fatiguing campaign, among mountains to which they were entire strangers. On the morning on which the army set out from Glarus, a heavy fall of snow both obliterated all traces of a path, and augmented the natural difficulties of the passage. With incredible difficulty the wearied column wound its painful way amongst inhospitable mountains in single file, without either stores to sustain its strength, or covering to shelter it from the weather. The snow, which, in the upper parts of the mountains, was two feet deep, and perfectly soft from being newly fallen, rendered the ascent so fatiguing, that the strongest men could with difficulty advance a few miles in a day. No cottages were to be found in these dreary and sterile mountains; not even trees were to be met with to form the cheerful light of the bivouacs; vast grey rocks starting up amongst the snow alone broke the mournful uniformity of the scene, and under their shelter, or on the open surface of the mountain, without any covering or fire, were the soldiers obliged to lie down, and pass a long and dreary autumnal night. Great numbers perished of cold, or sunk down precipices, or into crevices from which they were unable to extricate themselves, and where they were soon choked by the drifting of the snow.¹

With incredible difficulty the head of the column, on the following day, at length reached, amidst colossal rocks, the summit of the ridge; but it was not the smiling plains of Italy which there met their view, but a sea of mountains, wrapped in the snowy mantle which seemed the winding-sheet of the army, interspersed with cold grey clouds which floated round their higher peaks. Winter, in all its severity, had already set in on those lofty solitudes; the mountain sides, silent and melancholy even at the height of summer, when enamelled with flowers and dotted with flocks, presented then an unbroken sheet of snow; the blue lakes, which are interspersed over the

level valley at their feet, were frozen over, and undistinguishable from the rest of the dreary expanse; and a boundless mass of snowy peaks arose on all sides, presenting apparently an impassable barrier to their further progress. The Alps of Tyrol and the Grisons, whose summits stretched as far as the eye could reach in every direction, seemed a vast wilderness, in the solitudes of which the army was about to be lost, while not a fire nor a column of smoke was to be seen in the vast expanse to cheer the spirits of the soldiers. The path, long hardly visible, now totally disappeared; not a shrub or a bush was to be met with; the naked tops of the rocks, buried in the snow, no longer served to indicate the position of the precipices, or rest the exhausted bodies of the troops. On the southern descent the difficulties were still greater; the snow, hardened by a sharp freezing wind, was so slippery, that it became impossible for the men to keep their footing; whole companies slipped together into the abysses below, and numbers were crushed by the beasts of burden rolling down upon them from the upper parts of the ascent, or the masses of snow which became loosened by the incessant march of the army, and fell down with irresistible force upon those beneath. All the day was passed in struggling with these difficulties, and with the utmost exertions the advanced-guard reached the village of Panix, in the Grisons, at night, where headquarters were established. The whole remainder of the columns slept upon the snow, where the darkness enveloped them without either fire or covering. But nothing could overcome the unconquerable spirit of the Russians. With heroic resolution and incredible perseverance they struggled on, through hardships which would have daunted any other soldiers; and at length the scattered stragglers were rallied in the valley of the Rhine, and headquarters established at Ilantz on the 10th, where the troops obtained some rest after the unparalleled difficulties which they had experienced.¹

Meanwhile Korsakoff, having reorganised his army, and recovered in some degree from his consternation, halted his columns at Busingen, and turning fiercely on his pursuers, drove them back to Trullikon; but the enemy having there received reinforcements, the combat was

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 249, 251.
Jom. xii.
277, 279.
Personal observation.

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XXVIII.

1799.

57.

Bloody conflict with
Korsakoff
near Con-
stance.
Archduke
hastens to
his aid.

renewed with the utmost obstinacy, and continued, without any decisive result on either side, till nightfall. On the same day, a body of Russian and Austrian cavalry, three thousand strong, posted in the vineyards and gardens which form the smiling environs of Constance, were attacked by a superior body of Republicans, under the command of General Gazan; a furious combat commenced, in the course of which the town was three times taken and retaken, barricades were thrown up in the streets, and the unhappy citizens underwent all the horrors of a fortress carried by assault. The Archduke Charles, informed of these circumstances, hastened with all his disposable forces from the environs of Mannheim. From the 1st to the 7th of October, twenty-seven battalions and forty-six squadrons arrived in the neighbourhood of Villingen, and the Prince himself fixed his headquarters at Donaschingen, in order to be at hand to support the broken remains of Korsakoff's army. The Allies were withdrawn from the St Gothard and all the posts they yet occupied in Switzerland, to the Grisons, and the Rhine formed the boundary between the hostile armies, the Russians being charged with its defence from Petershausen to Dieneshausen, and the Austrians with the remainder of the line.¹

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 259, 264.
Jom. xii.
283, 286.

58.

Treaty
between
Russia and
England for
an expedi-
tion to Hol-
land.

While these desperate conflicts were going on in the south of Europe, England, at length rousing its giant strength from the state of inactivity in which it had so long been held by the military inexperience and want of confidence in its prowess on the part of government, was preparing an expedition more proportionate than any it had yet sent forth to the station which it occupied in the war. Holland was the quarter selected for attack, both as being the country in the hands of the enemy nearest the British shores, and most threatening to its maritime superiority, and as the one where the most vigorous co-operation might be expected from the inhabitants, and the means of defence within the power of the Republicans were most inconsiderable. By a treaty, concluded on the 22d June, between England and Russia, it was stipulated that the former of these powers was to furnish 13,000, and the latter 17,000 men, towards a descent in Holland, and that £44,000 a-month should be paid by England for the

expenses of the Russian troops, and her whole naval force be employed to support the operations. To re-establish the stadtholder in Holland, and terminate the revolutionary tyranny under which that opulent country groaned; to form the nucleus of an army which might threaten the northern provinces of France, and restore the barrier which had been so insanely destroyed by the Emperor Joseph; to effect a diversion in favour of the great armies now combating on the Rhine and the Alps, and destroy the ascendancy of the Republicans in the maritime provinces and naval arsenals of the Dutch, were the objects proposed in this expedition; and these, by efforts more worthy of the strength of England, might unquestionably have been attained.¹

The preparations for this expedition, both in England and the Baltic, were pushed with the utmost vigour; and the energy and skill with which the naval departments and arrangements for disembarkation were made in the British harbours, were such as to extort the admiration of the French historians. In the middle of July, Sir Home Popham sailed for the Baltic to receive on board the Russian contingent; while twelve thousand men, early in August, were assembled on the coast of Kent, and twelve thousand more were preparing for the same destination. All the harbours of England resounded with the noise of preparation; it was openly announced in the newspapers that a descent in Holland was in contemplation; and the numerous British cruisers, by reconnoitring every river and harbour along the Channel, kept the maritime districts in constant alarm from Brest to the Texel. The best defensive measures which their circumstances would admit were adopted by the Directory, and Brune, the French general, was placed at the head of the forces of both nations; but he could only collect fifteen thousand French, and twenty thousand Dutch troops to resist the invasion.²

On the 13th August, the fleet, with the first division of the army, twelve thousand strong, set sail from Deal, and joined Lord Duncan in the North Sea. Tempestuous weather, and a tremendous surf on the coast of Holland, prevented the disembarkation from being effected for a fortnight; but at length, on the 26th, the fleet was

CHAP.
XXVIII

1799.

¹ *Jom.* xii.
178, 179.
Ann. Reg.
301, and
State Papers,
216, 217.
Dum. ii. 348,
349.

50.
Vigorous
preparations
for the expe-
dition in
England.

² *Jom.* xii.
180, 182, 183.
Ann. Reg.
301. *Dum.*
ii 349, 351,
352.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

69.

The expedi-
tion sails,
and lands on
the Dutch
coast.
Action at
the Helder.
Aug. 27.

anchored off the Helder, in North Holland, and preparations were immediately made for a descent on the following morning. At daylight on the 27th the disembarkation began, the troops led with equal skill and resolution by Sir RALPH ABERCROMBY,* and the landing covered by the able exertions of the fleet under Admiral Mitchell; and never was the cordial co-operation of the land and sea forces more required than on that trying service. The naval strength of England was proudly evinced on this occasion; fifteen ships of the line, forty-five frigates and brigs, and one hundred and thirty transport vessels covered the sea, as far as the eye could reach, with their sails. General Daendels, who was at the head of a division of twelve thousand men in the neighbourhood, marched rapidly to the menaced point; and when the first detachment of the British, two thousand five hundred strong, was landed, it found itself assailed by a much superior force of Batavian troops; but the fire from the ships carried disorder into their ranks, and they were driven back into the sandhills on the beach, from which, after an obstinate conflict, they were expelled before six in the evening, and the debarkation of the remaining divisions effected without molestation. In the night, the enemy evacuated the fort of the Helder, which was taken possession of next day by the English troops.¹ In this affair the loss of the

¹ Ann. Reg.
302. Journ.
xii. 188, 189.
Dum. ii. 365,
369.

Early biogra-
phy of Aber-
cromby.

* Ralph Abercromby, afterwards Sir Ralph, was born in the year 1743, the eldest son of George Abercromby, Esq. of Tullibody, an old and respectable family in Stirlingshire. He first entered the army as a cornet, in the 3d regiment of guards, in 1766. In that regiment he gradually rose, and in 1773 was its lieutenant-colonel. In 1781 he was made colonel of the 103d regiment of infantry; in 1787 was promoted to the rank of major-general, and next year obtained the command of the 69th foot. Subsequently, in 1797 he was moved to the command of the 7th dragoons, which he held to his death. He served with distinction in the campaign of 1794, in Flanders, especially at the brilliant affair of Cateau, on 16th April of that year, when the French general Chapny, and thirty pieces of cannon, were taken by the British. The masterly manœuvres which followed, on the part of Abercromby, who was second in command, more than once saved the English army from destruction: and in the dreadful retreat through Holland in the winter of 1794-5, his coolness, intrepidity, and indomitable resolution were of the most essential service. In 1796 he did good service in the command of the expedition which effected the reduction of St Lucie, St Vincents, and Grenada, as well as of Guiana, Demerara, and Berbice. In February 1797, he commanded the land forces in an important expedition which effected the reduction of Trinidad and the destruction of four Spanish sail of the line in that island; and soon after made an unsuccessful attack on Puerto Rico. Nearly all these important colonies still remain to Great Britain, and these great services led to Abercromby being made a knight of the bath, and employed in 1799 in the command of a division in the expedition to Holland.—CHAMBERS' *Scottish Biography*, i. 5, 6, and *Biog. Univ.* i. 77.

different parties was singularly at variance with what might have been expected; that of the British did not exceed five hundred, while that of the Dutch was more than thrice that number.

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XXVIII.
1799.

This success was soon followed by another still more important. The position at the Helder having been fortified, and a reinforcement of five thousand fresh troops arrived from England, the British fleet entered the Texel, of the batteries defending which they had now the command by the occupation of the Helder, and summoned the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Story, consisting of eight ships of the line, three of fifty-four guns, eight of forty-four, and six smaller frigates, who had retired into the Vlietich canal, to surrender. At the sight of the English flag, symptoms of insubordination manifested themselves in the Dutch fleet; the admiral, unable to escape, and despairing of assistance, surrendered without firing a shot; and immediately the Orange flag was hoisted on all the ships, and on the towers and batteries of the Helder and Texel. By this important success the Dutch fleet was finally extricated from the grasp of the Republicans, a circumstance of no small moment in after times, when England had to contend, single-handed, with the combined maritime forces of all Europe.¹

61.
Capture of
the Dutch
fleet at the
Texel.

¹ Dum. ii.
369, 372.
Ann. Reg.
303. Jom.
xii. 190.

The Russian troops not having yet arrived, the British commander, who was only at the head of twelve thousand men, remained on the defensive, which gave the Republicans time to assemble their forces; and having soon collected twenty-four thousand, of whom seven thousand were French, under the orders of VANDAMME,* General Brune, who had assumed the command-in-chief, resolved to anticipate the enemy, and resume the offensive. On the 10th of September all the columns were in motion;

62.
The British
are attacked
by the Re-
publicans,
but repulse
them with
great loss.

* Dominique Vandamme was born of humble parents at Cassel, in the department of the North, in 1771. He early took to the profession of arms as a private soldier, and served several years in that capacity, in one of the colonial regiments, but returned to France in 1789 at the time of the meeting of the States-General. He then formed in his native town a company of volunteers, known under the name of the chasseurs of Mount Cassel, of which he was elected captain. It was at the head of this company that he went through the campaign of 1792; and so rapid was military promotion in those days of popular election of officers, to those who were favourites with the soldiers, that before the end of the campaign he had already risen to the rank of General of Brigade. In 1793 he served with the army of the North, and was engaged both in the capture of Furnes and the blockade of Nieuport in that campaign. In spring 1794 he gained some success

Early history
of Vandamme.

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Vandamme, who commanded the right, was directed to move along the Langdyke, and make himself master of Ennsgrinberg; Dumonceau, with the centre, was to march by Schorlham upon Krabbenham, and there force the key of the position; while the left was charged with the difficult task of chasing the enemy from the Sand-dyke, and penetrating by Kampt Petten. The contest, like all those which followed, was of the most peculiar kind. Restricted to dikes and causeys, intersecting in different directions a low and swampy ground, it consisted of detached conflicts at insulated points rather than any general movements; and, like the struggle between Napoleon and the Austrians in the marshes of Arcola, was to be determined chiefly by the intrepidity of the heads of columns. The Republicans advanced bravely to the attack, but they were every where repulsed. All the efforts of Vandamme were shattered against the intrepidity of the English troops which guarded the Sand-dyke; Dumonceau was defeated at Krabbenham, and Daendels compelled to fall back in disorder from before Petten. Repulsed at all points, the French resumed their position at Alkmaer, with a loss of two thousand men, while that of the British did not exceed three hundred.¹

¹ Dum. ii.
378, 380.
Journ. xii.
192, 193.
Ann. Reg.
303. Personal observation.

63.
The English, joined by the Russians, at length advanced.

Instructed by this disaster as to the quality of the troops with which he had to deal, General Brune remained on the defensive at Alkmaer, while the remainder of the expedition rapidly arrived to the support of the British army. Between the 12th and the 15th September, the Russian contingent, seventeen thousand strong, and seven thousand British, arrived, and the Duke of York took the command. The English general, finding himself now at the head of thirty-five thousand men, and being aware that extensive reinforcements were advancing to the sup-

with the same army in conjunction with General Moreau, and having been afterwards transferred to the army of the Sambre and Meuse, performed under Jourdan the whole campaign in that quarter. In the memorable campaign of 1796 he was attached to the army of the Upper Rhine under Moreau; and distinguished himself in several affairs, especially the passage of the Lech and the attack on the heights of Frudberg. In the opening of the campaign of 1797 he displayed undaunted gallantry at the celebrated passage of the Rhine by Moreau, and not less so in the subsequent combats of Hanau and Diersheim. In February 1799 he was raised to the rank of General of Division, and in that capacity commanded in the left wing of the army of the Danube, till the invasion of Holland by the English caused him to be transferred to the defence of the Batavian plains.—See *Bibliographie des Contemporains*, (VANDAMME,) xx. 134, 135.

port of the Republicans from the Scheldt and the Meuse, resolved to move forward and attack the enemy. As the nature of the ground precluded the employment of large masses, the attacking force was divided into four columns. The first, under the command of General Hermann, composed of eight thousand Russians and a brigade of English, was destined to advance by the Sand-dyke and the Slapper-dyke against the left of Brune, resting on the sea; the second, under the orders of General Dundas, consisting of seven thousand men, of whom five thousand were English, was charged with the attack on Schorldam and the French centre; the third, under Sir James Pulteney, which required to advance along the Langdyke, which was defended by powerful intrenchments, was intended rather to effect a diversion than make a serious attack, and was not to push beyond Oude Scarpell, at its head, unless in the event of unlooked-for success; while the fourth, consisting of ten thousand choice troops, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, was destined to turn the enemy's right on the Zuyder Zee.¹

The action commenced at daybreak on the 19th September with a furious attack by the Russians, under Hermann, who speedily drove in the advanced-guard of the Republicans at Kamp and Groot, and pressing forward along the Sand-dyke, made themselves masters of Schorldam and Bergen, and forced back Vandamme, who commanded in that quarter, to within half a league of Alkmaer. But the assailants were not supported with equal vigour by the British; they fell into disorder in consequence of the rapidity of their advance, and Brune, having speedily moved up the division of Daendels and considerable reinforcements from his centre to the support of his left, Vandamme was enabled to resume the offensive. Thus the Russians were attacked at once in front and both flanks in the village of Bergen, from whence, after a murderous conflict, they were driven at the point of the bayonet. Their retreat, which at first was conducted with some degree of order, was soon turned into a total rout by the sudden appearance of two French battalions on the flank of their column. Hermann himself was taken prisoner, with a considerable part of his division, and General Essen, his second in command,² who had

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¹ Ann Reg.
304. Jom.
xii. 198, 199,
Dum. ii. 384,
385.

64.
Disaster of
the Russians
on the right.

² Jom. xii.
200, 303.
Dum. ii. 387,
388. Anu.
Reg. 304,
305.

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65.
Success of
the British
in the cen-
tre and left.
But the
Russians
continue
their re-
treat, and
the British
are at length
repulsed.

advanced towards Schorlдам, was obliged to seek shelter, under cover of the English reserve, behind the Allied intrenchments of Zyp.

While the Russians were undergoing these disasters on the right, the Duke of York was successful in the centre and left. Dundas carried the villages there, after an obstinate resistance; Dumonceau was driven back from Schorlдам, and two of his best battalions were made prisoners. At the same time Sir James Pulteney, having been encouraged, by the imprudence of Daendels in pursuing too warmly a trifling advantage, to convert his feigned attack into a real one, not only drove back the Dutch division, but made a thousand prisoners, and forced the whole line, in utter confusion, towards St Pancras, under the fire of the English artillery. Abercromby had not yet brought his powerful division into action; but every thing promised decisive success in the centre and left of the Allies, when intelligence was brought to the Duke of York of the disaster on the right, and the rapid advance of the Republicans in pursuit of the flying Russians. He instantly halted his victorious troops in the centre, and marched with two brigades of English and three Russian regiments, upon Schorl, which was speedily carried, and if Essen could have rallied his broken troops, decisive success might yet have been attained. But all the efforts of that brave general could not restore order or rescue the soldiers from the state of discouragement into which they had fallen; and the consequence was, that as they continued their retreat to the intrenchments of Zyp, the Republicans were enabled to accumulate their forces on the Duke of York, who, thus pressed, had no alternative but to evacuate Schorl, and draw back his troops to their fortified line. In this battle the Republicans lost 3000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; but the British lost 500 killed and wounded, and as many prisoners, while the Russians were weakened by 3500 killed and wounded, twenty-six pieces of cannon, and seven standards.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
305, 306.
Jom. xii.
199, 205.
Dum. ii. 387,
389.

66.
Removal of
the Dutch
fleet to Eng-
land.

While these events were in progress, the Dutch fleet was conveyed to the British harbours. It is remarkable that this measure gave equal dissatisfaction to the sailors on both sides. The Dutch loudly complained that their ships, instead of being employed in their own country,

under Orange colours, should be taken as prizes to Great Britain; while the English sailors lamented, that a fleet which could not escape had not fallen into their hands as glorious trophies, like those at St Vincent's or Camperdown. The officers on both sides were anxious to preserve a good understanding between their respective crews; but the sailors kept up a sullen distrust;—so much more easy is it to accommodate differences between rival cabinets than heal the national animosity which centuries of warfare have spread among their subjects. Holland, however, had no reason in the end to complain of British generosity; after a decided, though unwilling hostility of twenty years, she obtained a lavish accumulation of gifts in Flanders and Java from her ancient rival, such as rarely rewards even the steadiest fidelity of an allied power.¹

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¹ Dum. ii.
381, 382.

The Duke of York was not discouraged by the issue of the attack on the 19th September. Having been reinforced, a few days after, by a fresh brigade of Russians and some English detachments, he arranged his army, as before, in four columns; and although the heavy rains for long prevented the projected operation from taking place, yet he was enabled to resume the offensive on the 2d October. The recollection of the success which had every where crowned their efforts in the preceding action, animated the English troops; while the Russians burned with anxiety to wash out the stain which their disasters on that occasion had affixed to the Imperial eagles. The Allied army on this occasion was about thirty thousand strong, and the Republicans nearly of equal force. At six in the morning the attack was commenced at all points. The Russian division of Essen, anxious to efface its former disgrace, supported by the English division of Dundas, advanced to the attack in the centre with such impetuosity, that the villages of Schorl and Schorldam were quickly carried, and the Republicans driven in confusion to the downs above Bergen. An attack was there projected by the Duke of York; but Essen, who recollected the consequence of the former eagerness of the Russians on the same ground, refused to move till the advance of Abercromby on the right was ascertained; a circumstance which paralysed the success of the Allies in that quarter. Meanwhile Abercromby, who commanded nine thousand men, ad-

67.
The Duke
of York
renews the
attack, and
is success-
ful.

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vanced gallantly at the head of his troops along the Sand-dyke which adjoined the sea ; and notwithstanding a hot fire of musketry and grape, by which he had two horses shot under him, succeeded in forcing the French left, and expelling them from the sandhills and downs on which they rested. On the left, Sir James Pulteney had made little progress, and his measures were confined to demonstrations ; but as the English centre and right were victorious, and they had completely turned the French left, Brune retired in the night from the field of battle, and took up a fresh position, abandoning Alkmaer and all his former line. The loss sustained by the Republicans in this contest was above three thousand men and seven pieces of cannon ; that of the Allies about fifteen hundred. Already the attention of the French was attracted by the courage and address of the Highland regiments, arrayed in the tartan and plumes of their mountains, who bravely fought up to the knees in water, and rapidly overcame the strongest obstacles, in their attack on the flank of the Republicans.¹

¹ Dum. ii.
85, 86. Jom.
xii. 207. 211.
Ann. Reg.
308.

68.
His critical
situation
notwith-
standing.

But although he had gained this success, the situation of the Duke of York's army was far from encouraging. The enemy's force was daily increasing, while for his own no further reinforcements could be expected ; the autumnal rains, which had set in with more than usual severity, rendered the roads almost impassable for artillery or chariots ; the insalubrity of the climate at that period of the year was already beginning to affect the health of the soldiers ; and none of the expected movements of the inhabitants or Batavian troops in favour of the house of Orange had taken place. In these circumstances it was evident that, unless some important place could be captured, it would be impossible for the Allies to retain their footing in North Holland, and Haarlem was pitched on as most likely to furnish the necessary supplies. To achieve the conquest of this important city, the Allied forces were put in motion to attack the French position, which occupied the narrow isthmus between Beverwick and the Zuyder Zee, by which it was necessary to pass to approach Haarlem, which was not more than three leagues distant.²

² Ann. Reg.
308, 309.
Dum. ii. 308,
309. Jom.
xii. 211, 212.

The action commenced at seven in the morning, and was obstinately contested during the whole day. In the

centre the Allies were, in the first instance, successful; Essen bore down all opposition, and Pacthod, who commanded the Republicans, was on the point of succumbing, when Brune strengthened him with the greater part of a fresh division, and a vigorous charge threw back the Allies in confusion towards their own position. In their turn, however, the victorious Republicans were charged, when disordered with success, by an English regiment of cavalry, thrown into confusion, and driven back with great loss to Kastrium, where they were with difficulty rallied by Vandamme, who succeeded in checking the advance of the pursuers. The action was less obstinately contested on the right, as Abercromby, who commanded in that quarter, was obliged to detach a considerable part of his troops to reinforce Essen; while on the left the immense inundations which covered the front of the Republican position, prevented Pulteney from reaching the French right under Daendels. The loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about two thousand in killed, wounded, and prisoners. That of the English alone was twelve hundred men.¹

The barren honours of this well-contested field belonged to the Allies, who had forced back the French centre to a considerable distance from the field of battle: but it is with an invading army as an insurrection; an indecisive success is equivalent to a defeat. Haarlem was the object of the English general, without the possession of which he could not maintain himself in the country during the inclement weather which was approaching, and Haarlem was still in the hands of the Republicans. The enemy's force was hourly increasing; two days after the action, six thousand infantry arrived to strengthen their already formidable position on the isthmus, by which alone access could be obtained to the interior of the country; and the total absence of all the necessary supplies in the corner of land within which the army was confined, rendered it impossible to remain there for any length of time. In these circumstances, the Duke of York, with the unanimous concurrence of a council of war, resolved to fall back to the intrenchments at Zyp, there to await reinforcements or further commands from the British cabinet;² a resolution which was strengthened by the intelligence

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69.
Indecisive
action.
Oct. 6.

¹ Jom. xii.
212, 216
Ann. Reg.
309. Dum.
ii. 89.

70.
Which leads
to the re-
treat of the
British.

² Jom. xii.
215, 217.
Dum. ii. 90,
91. Ann.
Reg. 310.

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which arrived, at the same time, of the disasters which had befallen the Russians at Zurich. On the day after the battle, therefore, the Allies retired to the position they had occupied before the battle of Bergen.

Brune lost no time in following up the retreating army.

71.
The British
first retire,
and at last
agreed to
evacuate
Holland.

On the 8th the Republicans resumed their position in front of Alkmaer, and several sharp skirmishes ensued between the British rearguard and the advanced posts of their pursuers. The situation of the Duke of York was now daily becoming more desperate: his forces were reduced by sickness and the sword to twenty thousand men; the number of those in hospital was daily increasing; there remained but eleven days' provisions for the troops, and no supplies or assistance could be looked for from the inhabitants for a retreating army. In these circumstances, he rightly judged that it was necessary to lose no time in embarking the sick, wounded, and stores, with such of the Dutch as had compromised themselves by their avowal of Orange principles, and proposed a suspension of arms to General Brune, preparatory to the evacuation of Holland by the Allied troops. Some difficulty was at first experienced from the French insisting, as a *sine quâ non*, that the fleet captured at the Texel should be restored; but this the British commander firmly resisted, and at length the conditions of the evacuation were agreed on. The principal articles were, that the Allies should, without molestation, effect the total evacuation of Holland by the end of November; that eight thousand prisoners, whether French or Dutch, should be restored; and that the works of the Helder should be given up entire, with all their artillery. A separate article stipulated for the surrender of the brave De Winter, made prisoner in the battle of Camperdown. Before the 1st of December all these conditions were fulfilled on both sides: the British troops had regained the shores of England, and the Russians were quartered in Jersey and Guernsey.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
218, 219.
Dum. ii. 94,
96. Jom.
xii. 216, 219.

72.
Effects of
this disaster
on the na-
tion.

Such was the disastrous issue of the greatest Expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbours during the war, and the only one at all commensurate to the power or the character of England. Coming, as it did, after the hopes of the nation had been highly excited by its early successes, and when the vast conquests of the Allies in

the first part of the campaign had led to a very general expectation of the fall of the Jacobinical power in France, it produced the most bitter disappointment, and contributed, in a signal degree, both on the Continent and at home, to confirm the general impression that the English soldiers had irrecoverably declined from their former renown; that the victors of Cressy and Azincour were never destined to revive; and that it was at sea alone that any hope of successful resistance remained to Great Britain against the power of the Republic. The Opposition, as usual, magnified the public disasters, and ascribed them all to the rashness and imbecility of the Administration; while the credulous public, incapable of just discrimination, and ever governed by the event, overlooked the important facts that the naval power of republican Holland had been completely destroyed by the expedition; and that in every encounter the English soldiers had asserted their ancient superiority over those of France. Instead, therefore, of ascribing the failure of the expedition to its real causes, inadequacy of means and the jealousies incident to an allied force unaccustomed to act together, they joined the general chorus, and loudly proclaimed the utter madness of any attempts, by land at least, to resist the overwhelming power of France.¹ The time was not yet arrived when a greater commander, wielding the resources of a more courageous and excited nation, was to wash out these stains on the British arms, and show to the astonished world that England was yet destined to take the lead, even on the Continent, in the deliverance of Europe, and that the blood of the victors of Poitiers and Blenheim yet flowed in the veins of their descendants.

¹ Ann. Reg.
312. Journ.
xii. 221, 222.

While the campaign was thus checkered with disaster to the north of the Alps, the successes of the Allies led to more durable consequences on the Italian plains. The Directory, overwhelmed by the calamitous result of the battle of Novi, gave the command of both the armies of Italy and Savoy to General Championet, who could only assemble fifty-four thousand men under his banners, exclusive of six thousand conscripts, who guarded the summits of the Alps. On the other hand, General Melas, who, after the departure of Suwarroff, had assumed the chief

73.
Affairs of
Italy after
the battle of
Novi.

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¹ Jom. xii.
313, 317.
Dum. ii. 262,
263. Arch.
Ch. ii. 307,
308. St Cyr,
ii. 10, 11.

command, had sixty-eight thousand men under his orders, independent of fifteen thousand in garrisons in his rear, and seven thousand who marched towards the Arno and the Tiber. In despair at the unpromising condition of his troops, occupying the circular ridge of mountains from the sources of the Trebbia to the great St Bernard, the French general at first proposed to repass the Alps, and after leaving such a force in the Maritime Alps as might secure the south of France from insult, proceed, with the bulk of his forces, to join General Thureau in the Valais. But the Directory refused to accede to this wise proposition; and instead, prescribed to the French general to maintain his position, and exert his utmost efforts for the preservation of Coni, which was evidently threatened by the Imperialists.¹

74.
The Imperialists draw round Coni.

Sept. 17.

Sept. 25.

Sept. 29.

² Arch. Ch.
ii. 309, 310.
Jom. xii.
318, 322.
Dum. ii. 263,
264. St Cyr,
ii. 12, 15.

The cautious and minute directions of the Aulic Council having completely fettered the Austrian general, his operations were confined to the reduction of this fortress, the last bulwark in the plain of Italy still held by the Republicans, and justly regarded as an indispensable preliminary to the conquest of Genoa, from its commanding the chief communication of that city with the plain of Piedmont. With this view, both generals drew their troops towards Coni; the Austrians encircling its walls with a chain of posts in the plain, and the French accumulating their forces in the mountains which overlook it. In the desultory warfare which followed, the Imperialists were ultimately successful. Melas, with the centre, twenty thousand strong, defeated Grenier at Savigliano, while Kray threw back their left through the valley of Suza to the foot of Mont Cenis. At the same time, the Republicans were equally unsuccessful in the valley of Aosta, where the united forces of Kray and Haddick expelled them successively from Ivrea and Aosta, and forced them to retire over the Great St Bernard to Martigny in Switzerland. Relieved by these successes from all inquietude for his right flank, Melas gradually drew nearer to Coni, and began his preparations for the siege of that place.²

Pressed by the reiterated orders of the Directory, Championet now resolved to make an effort for the relief of the menaced fortress. His disposable force for this enterprise, even including the army of the Alps under Grenier, did

not exceed forty-five thousand men; but by a vigorous and concentric effort, there was some reason to hope that the object might be effected. St Cyr in vain represented to the Directory that it was the height of temerity to endeavour to maintain themselves in a mountainous region, already exhausted of its resources, and that the wiser course was to fall back, with the army yet entire, to the other side of the Alps, and there assemble it in a central position. How clear soever may have been the justice of this opinion, they had not strength of mind sufficient to admit the loss of Italy in a single campaign; and the French general, finding his counsel overruled, bravely set about the difficult task of keeping his ground, with an inferior and dispirited army, on the Italian side of the mountains. With this view, the divisions of Victor and Lemoine, forming the centre of the army, sixteen thousand strong, were directed to move upon Mondovi; while St Cyr, with the right, received orders to descend from the Bocchetta, and effect a diversion on the side of Novi. The movement commenced in the end of September. Vico was taken by a brigade of the Republicans; but, finding the Imperialists too strongly posted at Mondovi to be assailed with success, Championnet contented himself with placing his troops in observation on the adjacent heights; while St Cyr gained a trifling advantage in the neighbourhood of Novi.¹

But intelligence having at this time been received of the decisive victory of Massena in Switzerland, more vigorous operations were undertaken. St Cyr, abandoning the route of Novi, threw himself towards Bracco on the rear of the Austrians, and attacked them with such celerity, that he made twelve hundred prisoners, and spread consternation through their whole line. Melas, thus threatened, concentrated the forces under his immediate command, consisting of thirty thousand men, in the finest condition, on the Stura; upon which a variety of affairs of post took place around Coni, with checkered success, which gradually consumed the strength of the Republican forces. There was an essential error in these measures on the part of Championnet; for the Imperialists, grouped around the fortress where they occupied a central position, could at pleasure accumulate masses sufficient to

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75.

Championnet is compelled to attempt its relief, and his measures for that purpose.

Sept 28.
1 St Cyr, ii.
15, 17.
Dum. ii. 296,
267.

76
Actions
around
Coni.

Oct. 12.

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overwhelm any attack made by the Republicans, whose detached columns, issuing from the mountains, and separated by a wide distance, were unable to render any effectual assistance to each other. Nevertheless, the great abilities of St Cyr on the right wing obtained some brilliant advantages. On the 23d of October, he put himself in motion, at the head of twelve thousand men, with only a few pieces of cannon and no cavalry, defeated the Austrians at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and occupied Marengo, taking a thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon.

¹ Dum. ii.
266, 268, 273.
Arch. Ch. ii.
312, 313.
Jom. xii.
326, 335.
St Cyr, ii.
15, 19, 25, 29.

Alarmed at these repeated checks on his left, Melas withdrew the division of Haddick from the valley of Aosta, where the possession of the fort of Bard and the fall of snow in the Great St Bernard, relieved him from all disquietude, and with that reinforcement strengthened his left wing on the Bormida.¹

77.
Prepara-
tions for a
decisive
battle.

Meanwhile both parties gradually accumulated their forces for the important object which the one strove to effect, the other to prevent, the delivery of Coni. The French had assembled thirty-five thousand men for that purpose; but the central position of Melas long prevented them from obtaining any advantage; and in an attack of Grenier on the Austrian centre, he was repulsed with the loss of a thousand men. Having at length resolved on a decisive action, Championnet made his dispositions. One column was to descend from Mont Cenis by the valley of Perouse; another to advance by the left of the Stura; and a third to assail the enemy in front. By this means the French general hoped that, while he engaged the attention of the Austrians in front, he would, at the same time, turn both their flanks; forgetting that in such an attempt, with columns converging from such remote and divided quarters, the chances were that the Imperialists, from their central position, would be able to defeat one column before another could arrive to its assistance.²

² Arch. Ch.
ii. 313, 315
Jom. xii.
337, 341.
Dum. ii. 273,
275. St Cyr,
ii. 39, 41.

78.
Battle of
Genola, in
which the
French are
defeated.

Perceiving that the plan of his adversary was to attack him on all sides, Melas wisely resolved to anticipate his movement, and with his concentrated masses assail one of the French divisions before the others could come up. By a rapid accumulation of force he could, in this way, bring above thirty thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry, to bear on the French centre, under

Victor, who could not assemble above sixteen thousand to resist them. His dispositions were rapidly and ably made, and on the morning of the 4th November, the Republicans were attacked at all points. Championnet was so far from anticipating any such event, that his troops were already in march to effect a junction with the right wing, under St Cyr, when they were compelled, by the sudden appearance of the Imperialists in battle array, to halt and look to their own defence. Assailed by greatly superior forces, Victor, notwithstanding, made a gallant resistance; and such was the intrepidity of the French infantry, that for long the advantage seemed to lie on their side, until at noon, Melas, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in throwing them into confusion, and drove them back towards Valdigi. Hardly was this success gained when news arrived that General Duhesme, with the Republican left, had carried the village of Savigliano in his rear; but, wisely judging that this was of little importance, provided he followed up the advantage he had gained, the Austrian general merely detached a brigade to check their advance, and continued to press on the retiring centre of the enemy. Having continued the pursuit till it was dark, he resumed it at daybreak on the following morning. The enemy, discouraged by the check on the preceding day, did not make a very vigorous opposition. Grenier and Victor, driven from a post they had taken up near Murazzo, were forced to seek safety in flight; a large part of their rearguard were made prisoners, and great numbers drowned in endeavouring to cross the Stura and regain their intrenched camp. In this decisive battle the loss of the Republicans was seven thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, while that of the Imperialists did not exceed two thousand; and Championnet, with his army cut into two divisions, one of which retired towards Genoa and the other to the Col di Tende, was obliged to seek safety in the mountains, leaving Coni to its fate.¹

While Championnet was thus defeated in the centre by the superior skill and combinations of his opponent, the talents of St Cyr again gave him an advantage on the Bormida. The Imperialists being there restored to an equality with the Republicans, Kray attacked St Cyr near Novi, and drove him back to the plateau in the rear of

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Nov. 4.

¹ Jom. xlii. 340, 348.
Dum. ii. 282, 285. Arch.
Ch ii. 314, 317.

79.
Success of
St Cyr near
Novi, and
siege and
fall of Coni.

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Nov. 10.

Dec. 4.

¹ Dum. ii.

235, 287, 304,

305. *Jom.*

xii. 348, 354.

Arch. Ch.

ii. 319, 323.

St Cyr, ii.

42, 47.

80.

Gallant con-

duct of St

Cyr in the

Bocchetta

Paas.

Dec. 6.

that city, so lately the theatre of a bloody and desperate conflict; but all the efforts of the Austrians were shattered against the invincible resistance of the French infantry in that strong position, and after a bloody conflict, they were forced to retire, leaving five pieces of artillery in the hands of the enemy. St Cyr upon this resumed his position in front of Novi, and Kray fell back towards Alexandria, to be nearer assistance from the centre of the army. But this success was more than counterbalanced by fresh disasters in the centre and on the left. On the 10th, the division Ott attacked Richepanse at Borgo San-Dalmazzo, and, after a gallant resistance, drove him into the mountains; while the other division of the Republicans was assailed at Mondovi, and after an obstinate combat, which lasted the whole day, forced to take refuge in the recesses of the Apennines. The French were now driven back, on the one side, to the foot of the Col di Tende, and in the valley of the Stura to their own frontiers; while on the other, Victor's division was perched on the summits of the Apennines at St Giacomo and St Bernardo. Nothing remained to interrupt the siege of Coni. The investment of this fortress was completed on the 18th November, and the trenches opened on the 27th. The governor made a brave defence; but the ignorance and inexperience of the garrison were soon conspicuous, and a tremendous fire on the 2d of December having destroyed great part of the town, and seriously injured the works, he at length yielded to the solicitations of the miserable inhabitants, and, to preserve the city from total destruction, agreed to a surrender. The garrison, 3000 strong, with 500 sick and wounded, who had been left in the place, were marched into the interior of Austria.¹

Meanwhile St Cyr maintained himself with extreme difficulty in the Apennines in front of Genoa. The city was in the utmost state of agitation: the supplies of provisions from the country were all intercepted by the Austrian posts; the British fleet blockaded them by sea; famine began to be felt within its walls; and the French army, encamped on the higher ridges of the mountains which encircled it on the north, already suffered extremely from cold, want, and the tempests of autumn. For long their rations had been reduced to a fourth part of their

usual amount; but even this miserable pittance, it was foreseen, could not last many days longer. Encouraged by their pitiable condition, Kray made an attack on their advanced posts at Novi and Acqui, expelled them from these stations, formed the blockade of Gavi, and forced back the Republicans to their old position on the inhospitable summits of the mountains at the Bocchetta and Campo-Freddo. Such was the panic which then seized the soldiers, that they could not be retained by their officers in that important pass, but, abandoning the intrenchments on its summit, rushed down in tumultuous crowds to Genoa, exclaiming, "What can we do here? we shall soon perish of cold and famine on these desert mountains; we are abandoned; sacrificed: to France, to France!" In this extremity, St Cyr presented himself at the gates of the city alone before the mutinous soldiery. "Whither do you fly, soldiers?"—"To France, to France!" exclaimed a thousand voices.—"Be it so," exclaimed he, with a calm voice and serene air; "if a sense of duty no longer retains you, if you are deaf to the voice of honour, listen at least to that of reason, and attend to what your own interest requires. Your ruin is certain if you persist in your present course; the enemy who pursues you will destroy you during the confusion of a tumultuous retreat. Have you forgotten that you have made a desert between your present position and France? No, your sole safety is in your bayonets; and if you indeed desire to regain your country, unite with me in repelling far from the gates of this harbour the enemy, who would take advantage of your disorder to drive you from the walls where alone the necessary convoys or security can be found." Roused by these words to a sense of their duty, the soldiers fell back into their ranks and loudly demanded to be led against the enemy.¹

It was high time that some steps should be taken to arrest the progress of the Imperialists; for they were now at the gates of Genoa, and threatened the Republicans with immediate destruction. The Austrians, under Klenau, had penetrated by the route of the Corniche as far as St Martin d'Albaro and Nervi, within sight of that city, while from the Bocchetta another column threatened to descend upon it. A heavy fall of snow, however, hav-

¹ Dum. ii.
297. 298.
St Cyr, ii.
68, 74.
Hard. vii.
321.

81.
Unsuccessful attempt of the Imperialists upon Genoa, who go into winter quarters.

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1 Jom. xii.
355, 356.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 324, 325.
Dum. ii.
300, 302.
St Cyr, ii.
76, 84, 99.
Hard vii.
321.

ing prevented the Imperialists from crossing the pass when it was deserted by the French, the rebellious troops resumed their position, and re-occupied the intrenchments; and St Cyr, now secure on that side, having turned all his forces against Klenau, the Austrians, assailed at once in front and flank, with difficulty cut their way through by Torriglio, and regained the banks of the Stura, leaving twelve hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy, where they soon after went into winter quarters. Returned to Genoa, St Cyr had still a difficult task to perform in quieting the discontents of the troops, whom long-continued privation had almost driven to desperation; but at length the long-wished-for sails whitened its splendid bay, and the Republicans, as the reward of their heroic exertions, tasted the enjoyments of plenty and repose.¹

82.
Fall of
Ancona.

While these great events were passing in the basin of Piedmont, operations of minor importance, but still conducive, upon the whole, to the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula, took place in the south of Italy. The castle of St Angelo surrendered, in the end of October, to the Neapolitan forces, whom the retreat of Macdonald left at liberty to advance to the Eternal City; and the garrison of Ancona, after a gallant defence of six weeks, four of which were with open trenches, capitulated on the 13th November to the Russians, on condition of being sent to France, and not serving till regularly exchanged. By this success the Allies were made masters of 585 pieces of cannon, 7000 muskets, three ships of the line, and seven smaller vessels. The whole peninsula of Italy, with the exception of the intrenched camp at Genoa, and the mountain roads leading to it from France, was now wrested from the Republican arms.²

2 Jom. xii.
356, 361.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 326.

83.
Position of
the respec-
tive parties
at the con-
clusion of
the cam-
paign.

The fall of Ancona terminated this campaign in Italy, the most disastrous ever experienced by the French in that country. In the respective positions which they occupied, might be seen the immense advantages gained by the Allied arms during its continuance. The Imperialists, whose headquarters were at Turin, occupied the whole plain of Lombardy and Piedmont, from the stream of the Trebbia to the torrent of the Tessino: the left, under Kray, being so cantoned as to cover the valleys of the

Bormida and Scrivia; the right, under Haddick and Rohan, occupying the valleys of Duomo d'Ossola and Aosta; and the centre, under Kaim, guarding the passes over the Alps and the important position of Mondovì. The Republicans, on the other hand, on the exterior of this immense circle, were perched on the snowy and inhospitable summits of the mountains, which stood the native guardians of the plains: the left, consisting of the divisions Grenier and Duhesme, occupying the Little St Bernard, the Mont Cenis, and the passes of the higher Alps; the centre, under Lemoine and Victor, the Col de Fenestrelles, and Col de Tende, and the passes of the Maritime Alps; while on the right, Laboissière and Watrin held the Bocchetta and other passes leading into the Genoese States.

Wider still was the difference between the comforts and resources of the two armies. Cantoned in the rich plains of Italy, on the banks of the Po, the Imperialists were amply supplied with all the comforts and luxuries of life; while its navigable waters incessantly brought up to the army the stores and supplies necessary to restore the losses of so active a campaign. On the side of the Republicans, again, thirty-eight thousand men, without magazines or stores of provisions, were stationed on the desolate summits of the Alps and the Apennines, shivering with cold, exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of clothing. For five months they had received hardly any pay; the soldiers were without cloaks; their shoes were worn out, and even wood was wanting to warm their frigid bivouacs. Overwhelmed with the horrors of his situation, Championet retired to Nice, where he died of an epidemic disorder, which soon broke out among the troops and swept off great multitudes. His death dissolved the small traces of discipline which remained in the army. The soldiers tumultuously broke up their cantonments; crowds of deserters left their colours and covered the roads to France, and it was only by one of those nervous flights of eloquence which touch, even in the greatest calamities, every generous heart, that St Cyr succeeded in stopping the return of a large body which had left Genoa, and was proceeding on the road to Provence.² Alarmed at the representations which he drew of the disastrous state of

CHAP.
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1799.

¹ Jom. xii.
363, 365.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 327, 329.
Dum. ii. 307,
311.

84.
Contrast between the comforts of the Imperialists and privations of the French.
Death of Championet.

² Dum. ii.
310, 311
Jom. xii.
363, 365.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 327, 329.
St Cyr, ii.
98, 100.

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1799.

the army, the government, which had now passed from the feeble hands of the Directory into the firm grasp of Napoleon, took the most active steps to administer relief; several convoys reached the troops, and Massena, sent to assume the supreme command, succeeded, in some degree, in stopping the torrent of desertion, and restoring the confidence of the army.

85.
Jealousy between the Russians and Austrians.

At the same time, the campaign on the Rhine was drawing to a close. Notwithstanding the brilliant successes of the Republicans at Zurich, their forces in that quarter were not so numerous as to enable them, in the first instance, to derive any considerable fruit from their victory. But no sooner were they relieved, by the failure of the expedition in North Holland, from all apprehension in that quarter, than they resolved to concentrate all their disposable force on the Lower Rhine, of which the command was given to General Lecourbe, who had been so distinguished in the mountain warfare of Switzerland. But that which the strength of the Republicans could not effect, the dissensions of their enemies were not long in producing. The Russians and Austrians mutually threw upon each other the blame of the late disasters; the latter alleging that the catastrophe at Zurich was all owing to the want of vigilance and skill in Korsakoff: and the former replying, that if Suwarroff had been supported by Hotze, as he had a right to expect, when he descended from the St Gothard, all the misfortunes of the centre would have been repaired, and a brilliant victory on his right wing dispossessed Massena from his defensive position on the line of the Limmat. In this temper of mind on both sides, and with the jealousy unavoidable between cabinets of equal power and rival pretensions, little was wanting to blow up the combustion into a flame.¹

¹ Arch. Ch. ii. 272, 271. Jom. x. 367, 370.

86.
Suwarroff retires into Bavaria.

A trivial incident soon produced this effect. Suwarroff, after he had rested and reorganised his army, proposed to the Archduke that they should resume offensive operations against the enemy, who had shown no disposition to follow up his successes at Zurich. His plan was to abandon the Grisons, blow up the works of Fort St Lucie, and advance with all his forces to Winterthur, where he was to form a junction with Korsakoff, and attack the

enemy in concert with the Imperialists. The Archduke apprehended with too much reason that the assembling of all the Russian troops on the banks of the Thur, in the centre of the enemy's line, which extended from Sargans to the junction of the Aar and Rhine, would be both difficult and perilous; and therefore he proposed instead, that the corps of Korsakoff should march by Stockach to join the marshal behind the lake of Constance, and that he himself should detach a strong Austrian column to second the operations of the Russians in Switzerland. Irritated at any alteration of his plans by a younger officer, the old marshal, already soured by the disastrous termination of the campaign in Switzerland, replied in angry terms, on the following day, that his troops were not adapted for any further operations in the mountains, and that he himself would march to join Korsakoff, and concert measures with him for the projected operations in Switzerland.* On the following day, however, he changed his resolution; for, declaring that his troops absolutely required repose, and that they could find it only at a distance from the theatre of war, he directed them to winter quarters in Bavaria, between the Lech and the Iller, where they were soon after joined by the artillery, which had come round by Verona and the Tyrol.¹

This secession of the Russian force was not produced merely by jealousy of the Austrians, or irritation at the ill success of the Allied arms in Switzerland. It had its origin also in motives of state policy, and as such was rapidly communicated from the field-marshal's headquarters to the Cabinet of St Petersburg. The alliance between Russia and Austria, even if it had not been dissolved by the mutual exasperation of their generals, must have speedily yielded to the inherent jealousy of two monarchies, equal in power and discordant in interest. The war was undertaken for objects which, at that time at least, appeared to be foreign to the immediate interests

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

Oct. 13.

Oct. 14.

Oct. 30.

i Arch. ii.
272, 274, 234,
285. Jom.
xii. 367, 379.

87.
Which leads
to a rupture
between the
cabinets of
Vienna and
St Peters-
burg.

* This letter Suwaroff terminated with the following expressions:—"I am field-marshal as well as you; commander, as well as you, of an Imperial army; old, while you are young; it is for you to come and seek me." He was so profoundly mortified by the defeat of the Russians at Zurich, that, when he reached his winter quarters, he took to bed, and became seriously ill; while the Emperor Paul gave vent to his indignation against the Austrians in angry article published in the Gazette of St Petersburg.
—HARD. vii. 297, 298.

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XXVIII.

1799.

¹ Jom. xii.
370, 371.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 272, 274.
Dum. ii. 317.

88.
Positions
assumed by
the Austri-
ans when so
abandoned,
and opera-
tions on the
Lower
Rhine.
Oct. 10.

of Russia; the danger to the balance of power by the preponderance of France seemed to be removed by the conquest of Italy; and any further successes of Austria, it was said, were only likely to weaken a power too far removed to be of any serious detriment to its influence, in order to enrich one much nearer, and from whom serious resistance to its ambitious projects might be expected. The efforts for the preceding campaign, moreover, had been extremely costly, and in a great degree, notwithstanding the English subsidies, had exhausted the Imperial treasury. In these circumstances, the exasperation of the generals speedily led to a rupture between the cabinets, and the Russian troops took no further share in the prosecution of the war.¹

Left to its own resources, however, the Austrian cabinet was far from being discouraged. The Archduke Charles had collected eighty thousand men between Offenburg and Feldkirch; but great as this force was, it hardly appeared adequate, after the departure of the Russians, to a renewal of active operations in the Alps, and therefore he kept his troops on the defensive. Massena, on his side in Switzerland, was too much exhausted by his preceding exertions to make any offensive movement. On the other hand, Lecourbe, whose forces on the Lower Rhine had been raised by the efforts of the Directory to twenty thousand men, passed that river in three columns, at Worms, Oppenheim, and Mayence, and moved forward against Prince Schwartzemberg, who commanded the advanced-guard of the right wing of the Austrians, which occupied the line of the Bergstrass from Frankfort to Darmstadt. As the French forces were greatly superior, the Austrian general was compelled to retire, and after evacuating Heidelberg and Mannheim, to concentrate his troops to cover Philipsburg, which, however, he was soon obliged to abandon to its own resources. The Archduke, though grievously embarrassed at the moment by the rupture with the Russians, turned his eyes to the menaced point, and, by rapidly causing reinforcements to defile in that direction, soon acquired a superiority over his assailants. The Republican advanced-guard was attacked and worsted at Erligheim; in consequence of which the blockade of Philipsburg was raised; but the French having been rein-

Oct. 31.

forced, it was again invested. The Archduke, however, having at length terminated his correspondence with Suwarroff, turned his undivided attention to the menaced quarter, and directed a large part of the Imperial army to reinforce his right. These columns soon overthrew the Republicans, and Lecourbe was placed in a situation of such danger, that he had no means of extricating himself from it but by proposing an armistice to Starray, who commanded the Imperialists, on the ground of negotiations being on foot between the two powers for peace. Starray accepted it, under a reservation of the approbation of the Archduke; but his refusal to ratify it was of no avail; in the interval the stratagem had succeeded; three days had been gained, during which the Republicans had leisure to defile without molestation over the Rhine.¹

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

Nov. 7.

Dec. 2.

¹ Arch. Ch.
ii. 292, 305.
Jom. xii.
376, 385.
Dum. ii. 332,
348.

This closed the campaign of 1799, one of the most memorable of the whole revolutionary war. Notwithstanding the disasters by which its latter part had been checkered, it was evident that the Allies had gained immensely by the results of their operations. Italy had been regained as rapidly as it had been lost; Germany, freed from the Republican forces, had rolled back to the Rhine the tide of foreign invasion, and the blood of two hundred thousand French soldiers had expiated the ambition and weakness of the Republican government. Not even in the glorious efforts of 1796, had the French achieved successes so important, or chained victory to their standards in such an unbroken succession of combats as the Allies had done during this campaign. The conquest of all Lombardy and Piedmont; the reduction of the great fortresses which they contained; the liberation of Naples, Rome, and Tuscany, were the fruits of a single campaign. Instead of a cautious defensive on the Adige, the Imperialists now assumed a menacing offensive on the Maritime Alps; instead of trembling for the Tyrol and the Hereditary States, they threatened Switzerland and Alsace. The Republicans, weakened and disheartened, were every where thrown back upon their own frontiers; the oppressive system of making war maintain war could no longer be carried on; and a revolutionary state, exhausted by the sacrifices of

89.
Reflections
on the vast
successes
gained by
the Allies in
the cam-
paign.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

90.

Deplorable
internal
situation of
the Republic.

nine years, was about to feel in its own territory a portion of the evils which it had so long inflicted upon others.

The internal situation of France was even more discouraging than might have been inferred from the external aspect of its affairs. In truth, it was there that the true secret of its reverses was to be found; the bravery and skill of the armies on the frontier had long concealed, but could no longer singly sustain, the internal weakness of the state. The prostration of strength which invariably succeeds the first burst of revolutionary enthusiasm, had now fallen upon France; and if an extraordinary combination of circumstances had not intervened to extricate her from the abyss, there can be no doubt she would have sunk for ever. The ardour of the Revolution had totally subsided. Distrust and despondency had succeeded to the enthusiasm of victory; instead of the patriotism of generous, had arisen the cupidity of selfish minds. "The radical vice," says General Mathieu Dumas, "of a government without a chief was now apparent. The courage and talents of the generals, the valour and intelligence of the soldiers, who, during this dreadful campaign, had sustained this monstrous species of authority, sapped by every species of abuse and the exhaustion arising from the excess of every passion, could no longer repair or conceal the faults of those at the head of affairs. Public spirit was extinguished; the resources of the interior were exhausted; the forced requisitions could no longer furnish supplies to assuage the misery of the soldiers; the veteran ranks had long since perished, and the young conscripts, destined to supply their place, deserted their standards in crowds, or concealed themselves to avoid being drawn; more than half the cavalry was dismounted: the state was in greater danger than it had ever been since the commencement of the war."¹ The losses sustained by the French during the campaign had been prodigious; they amounted to above a hundred and seventy thousand men, exclusive of those who had been cut off by sickness and fatigue, who were a hundred thousand more.* In these circumstances, nothing was wanting to have enabled the coalition to triumph over the exhausted and discordant population of

¹ Dum. ii.
335.

* See "Etat des Pertes de l'Armée Française en 1799."—HARD. vii. 473.

France, but union, decision, and a leader of paramount authority ; nothing could have saved the Republicans from the grasp of the Allies but their own divisions. These were not slow, however, in breaking out ; and, amidst the ruinous jealousies of the Allies, that mighty conqueror arose who was destined to stifle the democracy and tame the passions of France, and bring upon her guilty people a weight of moral retribution, which could never have been inflicted till the latent energies of Europe had been called forth by his ambition.

“The alliance between Austria and Russia,” says the Archduke Charles, “blew up, like most coalitions formed between powers of equal pretensions. The idea of a common interest, the illusion of confidence based on the same general views, prepares the first advances ; difference of opinion as to the means of attaining the desired objects, soon sows the seeds of misunderstanding ; and that envenomed feeling increases in proportion as the events of the war alter the views of the coalesced powers, derange their plans, and undeceive their hopes. It seldom fails to break out openly when the armies are destined to undertake any operation in concert. The natural desire to obtain the lead in command, as in glory, excites the rival passions both of chiefs and nations. Pride and jealousy, tenacity and presumption, spring from the conflict of opinion and ambition ; continual contradictions daily inflame the mutual exasperation, and nothing but a fortunate accident can prevent such a coalition from being dissolved before one of the parties is inclined to turn his arms against the other. In all the varieties of human events, there are but two in which the co-operation of such unwieldy and heterogeneous masses can produce great effects ; the one is, when an imperious necessity, and an insupportable state of oppression, induces both sovereigns and their subjects to take up arms to emancipate themselves, and the struggle is not of sufficient duration to allow the ardour of their first enthusiasm to cool ; the other, when a state, by an extraordinary increase of power, can arrogate to itself and sustain the right to rule the opinion of its allies, and make their jealousies bend to its determination. Experience has proved that these different kinds of coalitions produce different results :

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

91.
Causes of
the rupture
of the
Alliance.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.
1 Arch. Ch.
ii. 273.

almost all oppressive conquerors have been overthrown by the first; the second has been the chief instrument in the enthralling of nations."¹ In these profound remarks is to be found the secret both of the long disasters attending the coalition against France, of the steady rise and irresistible power of the alliance headed by Napoleon, and of his rapid and irretrievable overthrow. They should never be absent from the contemplation of the statesman in future times, either in estimating the probable result of coalitions in which his own country takes a part, or in calculating on the chances of its resisting those which may be formed for its subjugation.

92.
Comparison
of the Arch-
duke
Charles and
Napoleon's
military
writings.

With regret, the author must now bid adieu to the Memoirs of the Archduke Charles, so long the faithful guide in the German campaigns, as his invaluable annals do not come further down than the close of the campaign of 1799. Military history has few more remarkable works of which to boast. Luminous, sagacious, disinterested; severe in judging of himself, indulgent in criticising others; liberal of praise to all but his own great achievements, profoundly skilled in the military art, and gifted with no common powers of narrative and description, his work is a model of candid and able military disquisition. Less vehement and forcible than Napoleon, he is more circumspect and consistent; with inferior genius, he is distinguished by infinitely greater candour, generosity, and trust-worthiness. On a fact stated by the Archduke, whether favourable or adverse to his reputation, or a criticism made by him on others, the most perfect reliance may be placed. To a similar statement in the St Helena Memoirs implicit credit cannot be given, unless its veracity is supported by other testimony, or it is borne out, as is often the case, by its own self-evident justice and truth. In the military writings of these two great antagonists, may be seen, as in a mirror, the opposite principles and talents brought into collision during the revolutionary war. On the one side, judgment, candour, and honesty, without the energy requisite to command early advantage in the struggle; on the other, genius, vigour, invention, but none of the moral qualities essential to confer lasting success. Or, perhaps, a more profound or fanciful observer may trace in the German

chief the fairest specimens of the great and good qualities which, in every age, have been the characteristic of the blue-eyed children of the Gothic race ; in the French, the most brilliant assemblage that ever occurred of the mental powers of the dark-haired Celtic family of mankind.

"Prince Charles," said Napoleon, "is a man whose conduct will ever be irréprochable. His soul belongs to the heroic age, but his heart to that of gold. More than all, he is a good man, and that includes every thing when said of a prince."¹ The whole career of the Archduke, from first to last, justifies this beautiful eulogium. More, perhaps, than any commander of the age, he was "without fear and without reproach." Uniting the courtesy and dignified manners of the days of chivalry to the patriotic spirit of ancient Rome, and the upright heart of the Gothic blood, he was the general of all others, in those days of glory, who approached nearest to the standard of ideal perfection. Inferior to Napoleon in genius, to Suwarroff in daring, he was superior to either in cautious combination, scientific foresight, and the power of repairing disaster. His deliverance of Germany in 1796 was achieved by ability in strategy equal to that which gave Napoleon in the same year the empire of Italy : his able retreat through the Alps in 1797 procured for his defeated country an advantageous peace ; but for the errors of the Aulic Council he would in 1799 have achieved the subversion of the Republic. When opposed to Napoleon himself, at the head of a colossal army in 1809, he retrieved the overthrow on the Bavarian plains ; defeated the French Emperor in a pitched battle under the walls of Vienna ; and, but for the neglect of his orders by the Archduke John, would have crushed him by an overthrow as decisive as that of Waterloo, on the field of Wagram.

Four commanders, and four only, in the age of the French Revolution, have risen to the highest eminence : Napoleon, Wellington, Suwarroff, and the Archduke Charles. The two last offered a striking contrast to each other, and, like the two first, were types of the nations at the head of whose armies they respectively combated. The Archduke had more science, Suwarroff greater daring ; the former was superior in combination, the latter in execution. Fearless, vehement, and impassioned, the strokes of the Russian

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

93.
His character.

¹ D'Abr. iv.
394.

94.
Parallel between the Archduke and Suwarroff.

CHAP.
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1799.

conqueror fell like the burning thunderbolt ; but he frequently relaxed his efforts when victory was gained, and did not always reap that fruit from his victories which might have been anticipated from their brilliancy. Profound, cautious, unwearied, the conqueror of Aspern rose with the difficulties with which he was surrounded, and extracted from them the means of again recalling victory to his standards ; but by carrying too far the principle of avoiding risk, he not unfrequently lost the opportunity of achieving decisive success. Suwarroff, by the vehemence of his onset, reft in a few weeks from the Republicans the whole fruit of Napoleon's victories in Italy, but, by an undue delay of eight days at Milan, missed the opportunity of destroying their army in its retreat. The Archduke reduced the conqueror of Echemuhl to the last straits on the shores of the Danube, but, by afterwards suspending his attack on the island of Lobau, lost the chance of finishing the war at a blow. The former was greater on the field, the latter in the council. In tactics the Muscovite commander was unrivalled, the Austrian in strategy. Both were subject to the grievous bondage from which Napoleon and Frederick were happily exempt, of a council, composed of men inferior in ability to themselves, far removed from the scene of action, and who not unfrequently marred their best-laid enterprises ; yet did each, notwithstanding this disadvantage, worthily discharge the important duty he was called to by Providence and entrusted with by his country : the conqueror of Ismael, in bearing the Russian standards, conquering and to conquer, through every adjoining state ; the saviour of Germany in stemming the torrent of revolutionary invasion, and preserving unscathed for happier times the strength and fortitude of his country.

95.
Comparison
of the pas-
sage of the
St Gothard
by Suwar-
roff, and the
St Bernard
by Napo-
leon.

The passage of the St Bernard by Napoleon has been the subject of unmeasured eulogium by almost all the French historians ; but nevertheless, in the firmness with which it was conducted, the difficulties with which it had to contend, and the resolution displayed in its execution, it must yield to the Alpine campaign of the Russian hero. In crossing from Martigny to Ivrea, the First Consul had no enemies to overcome, no lakes to pass, no hostile army to vanquish, after the obstacles of nature had been surmounted ; the difficulty of the ascent and the roughness of the

road constituted the only serious impediments to the march. But in passing from Bellinzona to Altdorf by the St Gothard, Suwarroff had to encounter not merely a road of greater length and equal difficulty, but to force his way, sword in hand, through columns of the enemy, long trained to mountain warfare, intimately acquainted with the country, under a leader of pre-eminent skill in that species of tactics ; and to do this with troops as ignorant of Alpine geography as those of France would have been of the passes of the Caucasus. When he descended, like a mountain torrent, to the lake of Uri, overthrowing every thing in his course, he found his progress stopped by a deep expanse of water, shut in by precipices on either side, without roads on its shores, or a bark on its bosom, and received the intelligence of the total defeat of the army with which he came to co-operate under the walls of Zurich. Obligated to defile by the rugged paths of the Schächenthal to the canton of Glarus, he was ere long enveloped by the victorious columns of the enemy, and his front and rear assailed at the same time by superior forces, flushed by recent conquest. It was no ordinary resolution which in such circumstances could disdain to submit, and after fiercely turning on his pursuers, and routing their bravest troops, prepare to surmount the difficulties of a fresh mountain passage, and, amidst the horrors of the Alps of the Glarus, brave alike the storms of winter and the pursuit of the enemy. The bulk of men in all ages are governed by the event ; and to such persons the passage of the St Bernard, followed as it was by the triumph of Marengo, will always be the highest object of interest ; but, without detracting from the well-earned fame of the French general, it may safely be affirmed that those who know how to separate just combination from casual disaster, and can appreciate the heroism of valour when struggling with misfortune, will award a still higher place to the Russian hero, and follow the footsteps of Suwarroff over the snows of the St Gothard and the valley of Engi with more interest than either the eagles of Napoleon over the St Bernard, or the standards of Hannibal from the shores of the Rhone to the banks of the Po.¹

Suwarroff did not long survive his final ill success against the arms of the Republicans. Accustomed to a long train of victory, undefeated during his long career in a single

CHAP.
XXVIII
1799.

¹ Personal comparison of the three passages.

CHAP.
XXVIII.

1799.

95.
Last illness
and death of
Suwarroff.

battle, he became the prey of unbounded vexation, at seeing his deserved reputation for invincibility reft from him in the close of his career, by the absurd combinations or selfish jealousy of the Aulic Council. Shortly after he arrived in St Petersburg he fell under the displeasure of the Emperor Paul, whose head, never very strong, was now exhibiting unequivocal proofs of aberration. His great ground of complaint against Suwarroff was not the ill success of his later operations, but his not having informed him of the astute and selfish policy of the cabinet of Vienna, in time to have prevented the disasters from which the Muscovite arms had suffered so severely; as if it was the duty of a general to sow discord between his master and the Allied sovereigns with whom he was acting. Grief for this estrangement so preyed on the mind of the illustrious general, that his complaint resisted all the efforts of art, and he was soon on the verge of death. He awaited its approach with calm composure, but sent a message to the Emperor to say he had a last favour to request at his hands.¹

¹ Laverne,
Vie de Sou-
varoff, 430,
432.

97.
His last
request and
funeral.

The Emperor declined to visit him, but sent his grandsons, Alexander, afterwards Emperor, and Constantine, to console the last moments of the dying hero, accompanied by an assurance that his last request should be granted. When the message was delivered, he spoke long and warmly on the past lustre and present decline of his country's glory, and broke out in passionate exclamation on his eternal attachment to the great Catherine. "I was only a soldier," said he, with his last breath, "and she felt the inclination I had to serve her. I owe her more than life; she has given me the means of illustrating it. Tell her son that I receive with gratitude his Imperial word. Here is the portrait of Catherine; it has never since I received it left my bosom: the favour I ask is, that it should be buried with me in my tomb, and remain for ever attached to my heart." With these words he expired. His last favour was granted; he was laid in the tomb with the portrait of Catherine placed on his bosom. The enmity of Paul, however, continued beyond the grave; not a Russian attended him to his place of sepulture, and the whole continental corps diplomatique, influenced by his known hostility, kept aloof from the mournful ceremony.² The

² Laverne,
Vie de Sou-
varoff, 434,
435.

English ambassador* alone, with a spirit worthy of the representative of a free people, braved the wrath of the Czar in the plenitude of his power, and followed the remains of the immortal hero to his grave.

The expedition to Holland was ably conceived, and failed only from the inadequacy of the force employed, and the inherent weakness incident to an enterprise conducted by allied forces. It was the greatest armament which had been sent from Great Britain during the war, but was yet obviously inadequate both to the magnitude of the enterprise and the resources of the state mainly interested in its success. In truth, the annals of the earlier years of the war incessantly suggest regret at the parsimonious expenditure of British force, and the great results which, to all appearance, would have attended a more vigorous effort at the decisive moment. "Any person," says Mr Burke, "who was of age to take a part in public affairs forty years ago, if the intermediate space were expunged from his memory, would hardly credit his senses when he should hear, from the highest authority, that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in this island, and that in Ireland there were at least eighty thousand more. But how much greater would be his surprise, if he were told again that this mighty force was retained for the mere purpose of an inert and passive defence, and that, by its very constitution, the greater part was disabled from defending us against the enemy by one preventive stroke or one operation of active hostility! What must his reflections be on learning further, that a fleet of five hundred men-of-war, the best appointed that this country ever had upon the sea, was for the greater part employed in the same system of unenterprising defence? What must be the feelings of any one who remembers the former energy of England, when he is given to understand that these two islands, with their extensive sea-coast, should be considered as a garrisoned sea-town; that its garrison was so feebly commanded as never to make a sally; and that, contrary to all that has been hitherto seen in war, an inferior army, with the shattered relics of an almost annihilated navy, may with safety besiege this superior garrison,¹ and, with-

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1799.

98.
Deplorable
insignifi-
cance of the
part which
England
took in the
continental
struggle.

¹ Burke on
a Regicide
Peace,
Works, viii.
374.

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1799.

99.

Great results which might have followed a more vigorous warfare at land by England.

¹ Arch. Ch. ii. 165.

100.

Cause of the rapid fall of the French power in 1799.

² Jom. xii. 386.

out hazarding the life of a man, ruin the place merely by the menaces and false appearances of an attack ?”

If this was true in 1797, when the indignant statesman wrote these cutting remarks, how much more was it applicable in 1799, when France was reduced to extremities by the forces of Austria and Russia, and the extraordinary energy of the Revolution had exhausted itself? The Archduke Charles, indeed, has justly observed, that modern history presents few examples of great military operations executed in pursuance of a descent on the sea-coast; and that the difficulties of the passage and the uncertainty of the elements, present the most formidable obstacles in the way of the employment of considerable forces in such an enterprise.¹ But experience in all ages has demonstrated that they are not insurmountable, and that from a military force, thus supported, the greatest results may reasonably be expected, if sufficient energy is infused into the undertaking. The examples of the overthrow of Hannibal at Zama, of the English at Hastings, of the French at Cressy and Azincour, and of Napoleon in Spain and at Waterloo, prove what can be effected, even by a maritime expedition, if followed up with the requisite vigour. And, unquestionably, there never was an occasion when greater results might have been anticipated from such an exertion than in this campaign. Had sixty thousand native English, constantly fed by fresh supplies from the parent state, been sent to Holland, they would have borne down all opposition, hoisted the Orange flag on all the fortresses of the United Provinces, liberated Flanders, prevented the accumulation of force which enabled Massena to strike his redoubted blows at Zurich, hindered the formation of the army of reserve, and intercepted the thunder-strokes of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

The rapid fall of the French military power in 1799, was the natural result of the sudden extension of the frontiers of the Republic beyond its strength, and affords another example of the truth of the maxim, that the more the ambition of a nation in a state of fermentation leads to its extension, the more does it become difficult for it to preserve its conquests.² Such a state as France then was, with a military power extending from the mouth of the Ems to the shores of Calabria, and no solid foundation

for government' but the gratification of ambition, has no chance of safety but in constantly advancing to fresh conquests. The least reverse, by destroying the charm of its invincibility, and compelling the separation of its armies to garrison its numerous fortresses, leaves it weak and powerless in the field, and speedily dissolves the splendid fabric. This truth was experienced by the Directory in 1799; it was evinced on a still greater scale, and after still more splendid triumphs, by Napoleon in 1813. It is power slowly acquired and wisely consolidated, authority which brings the blessings of civilisation and protection with its growth, victories which array the forces of the vanquished states in willing and organised multitudes under the standards of the victor, which alone are durable. Such were the conquests of Rome in the ancient world, such are the conquests of Russia in Europe, and England in India, in modern times. The whirlwinds of an Alexander, a Timour, or a Napoleon, are in general as short-lived as the genius which creates them. The triumphs flowing from the transient ebullition of popular enthusiasm, sink with the decay of the passion from which they spring. Nothing is durable in nature but what has arisen by slow degrees; nothing in the end obtains the mastery of nations but the power which protects and blesses them.

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XXVIII.

1799.

CHAPTER XXIX.

CIVIL HISTORY OF FRANCE, FROM THE REVOLUTION OF THE
18TH FRUCTIDOR TO THE SEIZURE OF SUPREME POWER
BY NAPOLEON. SEPTEMBER 1797—NOVEMBER 1799.

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XXIX.

1798.

1.
Apathy of
the public
mind after
the revolu-
tion of 18th
Fructidor.

THE Revolution of France had now run through the usual course of universal enthusiasm, general suffering, plebeian revolt, bloody anarchy, democratic cruelty, and military despotism. There remained a last stage to which it had not yet arrived, but which, nevertheless, was necessary, to tame the passions of the people, and reconstruct the fabric of society out of the ruined fragments of former civilisation. This stage was that of a SINGLE DESPOT, and to this final result the weakness consequent on exhausted passion was rapidly bringing the country. To the fervour of democratic license there invariably succeeds in a few years a period of languor and listlessness, of blighted hope and disappointed ambition, of despair at the calamitous results of previous changes, and heedlessness to every thing but the gratification of selfish passion. The energetic, the ardent, the enthusiastic, have for the most part sunk under the contests of former factions. Few remain but the base and calculating, who, by stooping before the storms under which their more elevated rivals perished, have contrived to survive their fall. This era is that of public degradation, of external disaster and internal suffering, and, in the despair of all classes, it prepares the way for the return to a more stable order of things.

The external disasters which had rapidly accumulated upon the Republic since the commencement of hostilities, the loss of Italy, and reflux of the war to the frontiers

of France, could hardly have failed to overturn a government so dependent on the fleeting gales of popular favour as that of the Directory, even if it had not been tainted by the inherent vice of having been established by the force of military power, in opposition to the wishes of the nation and the forms of the constitution. But this cause had for long been preparing its downfall; and the removal of the armies to the frontier, upon the resumption of hostilities, rendered it impossible any longer to stifle the public voice. That inevitable scourge of all revolutionary states, *embarrassment of finance*, had, since the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, impeded all the operations of the government. Notwithstanding the confiscation of two-thirds of the public debt, it was found impossible, in the succeeding season, to pay the interest on the third which remained, without having recourse to fresh expedients. The deficit on the year was announced by the minister of finance as amounting to at least 63,000,000 francs, or £2,520,000; it was known to amount to nearly 100,000,000; and the taxes were levied slowly, and with extreme difficulty. To meet the deficiency, the duty on doors and windows was doubled; that on carriages raised tenfold, and the effects of the Protestant clergy were, as already noticed, confiscated, putting them, like the Catholics, on the footing of payment from government. Thus the Revolution, as it advanced, was successively swallowing up the property even of the humblest in the community.¹

The new elections of a third of the legislature, in March 1799, were conducted with greater order and freedom than any which had preceded them, because the army, the great support of the Directory, was for the most part removed, and the violence used on previous occasions to secure the return could not so easily be put in force. A large proportion of representatives, accordingly, were returned adverse to the government established by the bayonets of Angereau, and waited only for an opportunity to displace it from the helm. It fell to Rewbell's lot to retire from the Directory, and Siéyes was chosen by the two Councils in his stead. The people were already dissatisfied with the administration of affairs, when the disasters at the commencement of the campaign came to blow the flame into a conflagration. After these events, the public indig-

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1798.

2.

Extreme difficulties of government since that event.

¹ Th. x. 214,
215. Mig. ii.
442.

2.

Universal dissatisfaction after the new elections.

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1799.

nation could no longer be restrained. Complaints broke out on all sides; the conduct of the war, the management of the finances, the tyranny exercised over the elections, the arbitrary dispersion of the Chambers, the iniquitous removal of nearly one-half of the deputies, the choice of the generals, the direction of the armies, all were made subjects of vehement and impassioned invective. The old battalions, it was said, had been left in the interior to overawe the elections; the best generals were in irons; Championnet, the conqueror of Naples, had been dismissed for striving to repress the rapacity of the inferior agents of the Directory; Moreau, the commander in so glorious a retreat, was reduced to the rank of a general of division, and Scherer, unknown to fame, had been invested with the command of the army of Italy. Even measures which had formerly been the object of general praise, were now condemned in no measured terms. The expedition to Egypt, it was discovered, had given an eccentric direction to the best general and bravest army of the Republic, and provoked the hostility at once of the Sublime Porte and the Emperor of Russia; while the attack on Switzerland was an unjustifiable invasion of neutral rights, which necessarily aroused the indignation of all the European powers, and brought on a war which the government had made no preparations to withstand. These complaints were, in a great degree, well founded; but they would never have been heard if the fortune of war had proved favourable, and the Republican armies, instead of being thrown back on their own frontier, had been following the career of victory into the Imperial states. But the Directory now experienced the truth of the saying of Tacitus:—"Hæc est bellorum pessima conditio: prospera omnes sibi vindicant, adversa uni solo imputantur."¹*

¹ Lac. xiv.
352, 353.
Th. x. 260,
261. Dum.
l. 220, 221.

3.
Restoration
of the
liberty of
the press.

In the midst of this general effervescence, the restraints imposed on the liberty of the press after the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, could no longer be maintained. The armed force which had imposed and kept them on was wanting; the soldiers were almost all combating on the frontier. They were, accordingly, no longer enforced against the daily journals, and the universal indignation

* "This is the worst condition of hostilities: all claim credit for prosperous—adverse events are imputed to one alone."

speedily spoke out in the periodical press. In every quarter, in the newspapers, the tribune, the pamphlets, the clubs, nothing was to be heard but declamations against the government. The parties who had alternately felt the weight of their vengeance, the Royalists and the Jacobins, vied with each other in inveighing against their imbecility and want of foresight; while the soldiers, hitherto their firmest support, gave open vent to their indignation at the "Advocates" who had brought back the Republican standards to the Alps and the Rhine.¹

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1799.

¹ Th. x. 268.
Lac. xiv.
354. Goh.
i. 96.

A league was speedily formed against the government, at the head of which were Generals Joubert and Augereau. Barras, though a Director, entered into the plan, and gave it the weight of his reputation, or rather his revolutionary audacity and vigour. It was agreed that no questions should be brought forward, until the obnoxious Directors were removed, as to the form of government which should succeed them; and the three Directors, Lareveillère-Lepaux, Treilhard, and Merlin de Douai, were marked out for destruction. The conspiracy was far advanced, when the misfortunes in Italy and on the Rhine gave tenfold force to the public discontent, and deprived the government of all means of resistance. The departments in the south, now threatened with invasion from the Allied army, were in a state of extreme fermentation, and sent deputations to the Councils, who painted in the most lively colours the destitute state of the troops, the consternation of the provinces, the vexations of the people, the injustice done to the generals, and the indignation of the soldiers. The nomination of Siéyes to the Directory was the most convincing proof of the temper of the Councils, as he had always and openly expressed his dislike at the constitution and the Directorial government. To elect him, was to proclaim, as it were, that they desired a revolution.²

4.
Formation
of a league
against the
government.

² Mign. ii.
412, 443.
Lac. xiv.
353, 355.
Th. x. 268,
274, and 310.

Siéyes soon became the head of the conspirators, who thus numbered among their ranks two Directors, and a great majority of both Councils. It was no longer their first object to remodel the constitution, but to gain immediate possession of the reins of power, in order to extricate the country from the perilous situation in which it was placed. For this purpose they refused all accommodation

5.
Measures of
the Opposi-
tion.

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1799.

or consultation with the three devoted Directors; while the most vehement attacks were made on them in both Councils. The disastrous state of the finances afforded too fair an opportunity for invective. Out of 400,000,000 francs already consumed in the public service for the year 1799, not more than 210,000,000 francs had been received by the treasury, and the arrears were coming in very slowly. Various new taxes were voted by the Councils; but it was apparent to every one that their collection, under the present system, was impossible. A still more engrossing topic was afforded by the discussions on the proposed alteration of the law on the liberty of the press and the popular societies, in order to take away from the Directory the arbitrary power with which they had been invested by the law of the 19th Fructidor. The Democrats exclaimed that it was indispensable to electrify the public mind; that the country was in the same danger as in 1793, and that the same means must be taken to meet it; that every species of patriotism would speedily expire if the clubs were not re-opened, and unlimited freedom allowed to the press. Without joining in this democratic fervour, the Royalists and Constitutionals concurred with them in holding that the Directory had made a bad use of the dictatorial power given to them by the revolution of 18th Fructidor, and that the restoration of the popular clubs had become indispensable. So general a concord among men of such dissimilar opinions on all other subjects, announced the speedy fall of the government.¹

¹ Th. x. 313.
317. Mign.
ii. 417. Lac.
xiv. 355.

6.
Preparations
for a revolution.
May 12.

The first measures of the conspirators were opened by a message from the different commissions of the Councils, presented by Boulay de la Meurthe, in which they insisted upon being informed of the causes of the exterior and interior dangers which threatened the state, and the means of averting them which existed. The Directory, upon receiving this message, endeavoured to gain time, by promising to give an answer in detail, which required several days to prepare. But this was by no means what the revolutionists intended. After waiting a fortnight without receiving any answer, the Councils, on the recommendation of their committees of war, expenditure, and finance, agreed to declare their sittings permanent, till an answer

to the message was obtained, and the three committees were constituted into a single commission of elected members, in other words, a provisional government. The Directory on their part also declared their sittings permanent, and every thing seemed to presage a fierce conflict. The commission dexterously availed themselves of the circumstance that Treilhard, who for thirteen months had been in the Directory, had been appointed four days before the legal period, and instantly proposed that his nomination should be annulled. Lareveillère, who was gifted with great political firmness, in vain strove to induce Treilhard to resist; he saw his danger, and resolved to yield to the storm. He accordingly sent in his resignation, and Gohier, a vehement republican, but a man of little political capacity, though an able writer, was named by the Councils in his stead.¹

The victory was gained, because this change gave the Councils a majority in the Directory, but Lareveillère was still firm in his refusal to resign. After exhausting every engine of flattery, threats, entreaties, and promises, Barras at length broke up the conference by declaring, "Well, then, it is all over; the sabres must be drawn."—"Wretch!" exclaimed Lareveillère, "is it you that speak of sabres? There is nothing here but knives, and they are all directed against those virtuous citizens whom you wish to murder, because you cannot induce them to degrade themselves." But a single individual could not withstand the legislature; he yielded at length to the entreaty of a deputation from the Councils, and sent in his resignation during the night. His example was immediately followed by Merlin; and Generals Moulins and Roger Ducos were appointed as successors to the expelled Directors. Thus, the government of the Directory was overturned in less than four years after its first establishment, and in twenty months after it had, by a violent stretch of illegal force, usurped dictatorial powers. The people of Paris took no part in this subversion of their rulers, which was effected by the force of the national assemblies illegally directed. Revolutionary fervour had exhausted itself;² and an event which, six years before, would have convulsed France from one extremity to the

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1799.

¹ Th. x. 322,
Mign. ii.
443.

7.
Revolution
of the 30th
Prairial.
May 25.

30th Prai-
rial.

² Lac. xiv.
326, 359.
Th. x. 326,
380. Staël,
ii. 223, 224.
Mign. ii. 443.

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8.

Character of
the new
Directory.

other, passed over with hardly more agitation than a change of ministers causes in a constitutional monarchy.

The violent measures, however, which had dispossessed the government, were far from bringing to the helm of affairs any accession either of vigour or ability. The new Directory, composed, like the Councils, of men of opposite principles, was even less qualified than that which had preceded it to make head against the tempest, both without and within, which assailed the state. Siéyes, the only man among them of superior intellect, dreamed of nothing but a new political organisation of society, and had none of the qualities fitted to struggle with the misfortunes of a sinking state. Roger Ducos, an old Girondist, was merely his creature, and unfit to direct any department of the Republic. Moulius, an obscure general, but a vehement republican, had been nominated by the Jacobin party to uphold their interests in the government, and being unknown to the armies, possessed none of the influence with the military so necessary to revive their former spirit. Barras was the only man capable of giving any effectual assistance to the administration; but he was so much under the influence of his passions and his vices, and had taken so many and such contradictory parts in the course of the Revolution, that no reliance could be placed on his assistance. After having been a violent Jacobin after the revolution of 31st May, a leading Thermidorian after the fall of Robespierre, a revolutionary Director on the 18th Fructidor, and a vehement enemy of his ancient colleagues on the 30th Prairial, he now became a royalist Director, elected to withstand the principles of democracy which had so often elevated him to power. Gohier was sincere and honest in his intentions, but he was an infatuated republican, who, amidst the general wreck of the institutions of the country, was dreaming only of the social compact, and the means of averting a counter-revolution. From the moment of their installation, their sentiments on most subjects were found to be so much at variance, that it was evident no cordial

¹ Th. x 331,
332 Lac.
xiv. 358,
360, 361.
Migu. ii 446.
Goh. Mém.
i. 104.

- co-operation could be expected amongst them.¹

The first and most pressing necessity was to stem the torrent of disaster which had overwhelmed the armies of

the Republic. Immediately after the change in the government, news arrived of the forcing of the lines of Zurich : and, before the consternation which this occasioned had subsided, it was followed by intelligence of the battle of the Trebbia, and the evacuation of the ridge of the Apennines. These misfortunes rendered it absolutely necessary to take some steps to restore the public confidence ; and, for this purpose, a great change was made in the military commanders of the Republic. Championet, who had been thrown into prison for evading the orders of the Directory regarding the pillage of the Neapolitan dominions, was liberated from his fetters, and received the command of an army which it was proposed to establish along the line of the higher Alps ; Bernadotte, from whose activity great results were justly expected, was appointed minister at war ; and Joubert, whose exploits in the Tyrol had gained for him a brilliant reputation, nominated to the command of the shattered army of Italy.¹

The overthrow of the government was the signal for the issuing of the Jacobins from their retreats, and the recommencement of revolutionary agitation, with all the perilous schemes of democratic ambition. Every where the clubs were re-opened ; the Jacobins took possession of the Riding-school hall, where the debates of the Constituent Assembly had been held, and began again to pour forth those impassioned declamations in consequence of which such streams of blood had already flowed. Taught by former disasters, however, they abstained from demanding any sanguinary proceedings, and confined themselves to a strenuous support of an agrarian law, and those measures for the division of property to the advocacy of which Babeuf had fallen a victim. The leading members of the Councils attended their meetings, and swelled the ardent multitudes who already crowded their assemblies, flattering themselves, even in the decrepitude of the revolutionary fervour, with the hopeless idea that they would succeed in directing the torrent. But the times were no longer the same, and it was impossible in 1799 to revive the general enthusiasm which ten years before had intoxicated every head in France. The people had not forgotten the Reign of Terror, and the dreadful calamities which had followed the ascendant of the Jacobins ; they received their promises

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9.

New ministerial appointments.

¹ Th. x. 333.
Jom. Vie de
Nap. i. 361.

10.

Efforts of the Jacobins to revive the revolutionary spirit, which totally fail.

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without joy, without illusion, and listened with undisguised anxiety to the menaces which they dealt out to all who opposed their designs. Their apathy threw the Jacobins into despair; as they were well aware that, without the aid of the populace, they would be unable to overturn what yet remained of the fabric of society. "We cannot twice," said the citizens, "go through the same fiery ordeal; the Jacobins have no longer the power of the assignats at their command; the illusion of the people has been dispelled by their sufferings; the army regards their rule with horror." The respectable citizens, worn out with convulsions, and apprehensive beyond every thing of a return to the yoke of the multitude, sighed for the restoration of a stable government, and were prepared to rally round any leader who would subject the passions of the Revolution to the yoke of despotic power.¹

¹ *McC.* xiv.
358, 359.
Th. x. 332,
333. *Magn.*
ii. 445.

11.
Forced loan,
and conscription of
200,000 men
decreed by
the Councils.

To supply the enormous and daily increasing deficit in the public treasury, the revolutionists maintained that it was indispensable to recur to the energy and patriotic measures of 1793; to call into active service all the classes of the state, and levy a forced loan of 120,000,000 of francs, or £4,800,000, upon the opulent classes, increasing in severity with the fortunes of those from whom it was to be exacted. After long debates, this arbitrary measure was adopted; and at the same time, a conscription of two hundred thousand men ordered to recruit the armies. These vigorous measures promised, in the course of time, to procure a great supply for the public necessities: but in the meanwhile the danger was imminent; and it was much to be feared that the frontiers would be invaded before any efficient support could be afforded to the armies intrusted with their defence.²

² *Th. x.* 336,
337. *Jom.*
Vie de Nap.
i. 362.

12.
Anarchy of the provin-
ces. Cruel
law of the
hostages.

What rendered every measure for the supply either of the army or the treasury difficult of execution, was the complete state of anarchy into which the provinces had fallen, and the total absence of all authority from the time that the troops had been removed to the frontier. The Vendéans and Chouans had, in the west, broken into fearful activity; the Companies of the Sun renewed their excesses in the south, and every where the refractory conscripts, forming themselves into bands of robbers, occupied

the forests, and pillaged travellers and merchandise of every description along the highways. To such a height had these disorders, the natural and inevitable consequence of a revolution, arisen, that in most of the departments there was no longer any authority obeyed, or order maintained, but the strong pillaged the weak with impunity, as in the rudest ages. In these circumstances a law, named the law of the *hostages*, was proposed and carried in the Councils, and remains a singular and instructive monument of the desperate tyranny to which those are in the end reduced, who adventure on the perilous course of democratic innovation. Proceeding on the supposition, at once arbitrary and unfounded, that the relations of the emigrants were the sole cause of the disorders, they enacted, that whenever a commune fell into a notorious state of anarchy, the relations of emigrants, and all those known to have been at all connected with the ancient *régime*, should be seized as hostages, and that four of them should be *transported* for every assassination that was committed in that district, and their property be rendered liable for all acts of robbery which there occurred. But this law, inhuman as it was, proved wholly inadequate to restore order in this distracted country; and France was menaced with an anarchy, so much the more terrible than that of 1793, as the Committee of Public Salvation was wanting, whose iron arm, supported by victory, had then crushed it in its grasp.¹

The disturbances in the western provinces, during this paralysis of the authority of government, had again risen to the most formidable height. That unconquerable band, the Vendéans and Chouans, whom the utmost disasters could never completely subdue, had yielded only a temporary submission to the energetic and able measures of General Hoche; and with the arrival of less skilful leaders of the republican forces, and the increasing weakness of government, their activity again led them to insurrection. This fresh outbreak of the insurrection was chiefly owing to the cruel and unnecessary persecutions which the Director Lareveillère-Lepeaux kept up against the priests; and it soon rose to the most formidable height. In March 1799, the spirit of Chouanism, besides its native departments in Brittany, had spread to La Vendée, and the

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1799.

¹ Th. x. 337,
338. Mign.
ii. 446.
Goh. i. 62,
66, and Jom.
Vie de Nap.
i. 364.

13.
Insurrection
in Brittany
and La Ven-
dée.

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1799.

¹ Lac. xiv.
366, 369.
Beauch. iii.
120, 349.
Goh. i. 6.

14.
Great severity in the collection of the forced loan, and success of the military conscription.

² Lac. xiv.
399, 400.
Goh. i. 73,
75, 78.

Republic beheld with dismay the fresh breaking out of that terrible volcano. Chollet, Mortagne, Herbiere, names immortalised in those wonderful wars, were again signalised by the successes of the Royalists; and the flame, spreading further than the early victories of the Vendéans, menaced Touraine. BOURMONT, afterwards conqueror of Algiers, a chief of great ability, revenged in Mans the bloody catastrophe of the Royalist army; and Godet de Chatillon, after a brilliant victory, entered in triumph into Nantes, which had six years before defeated the utmost efforts of the grand army under Cathelineau.¹

Nor did the financial measures of government inspire less dread than the external disasters and internal disorders which overwhelmed the country. The forced loan was levied with the utmost severity; and as all the fortunes of the Royalists had been extinguished in the former convulsions, it now fell on those classes who had been enriched by the Revolution, and thus spread an universal panic through its most opulent supporters. They now felt the severity of the confiscation which they had inflicted on others. The ascending scale, according to which it was levied, rendered it especially obnoxious. No fixed rule was adopted for the increase according to the fortune of the individual, but every thing was left to the tax-gatherers, who proceeded on secret and frequently false information. In these circumstances, the opulent found their whole income disappearing under a single exaction. The tax voted was 120,000,000 francs, or £4,800,000; but in the exhausted state of the country, it was impossible to raise this sum, and specie, under the dread of arbitrary exactions, entirely disappeared from circulation. Its collection took three years, and then only realised three-fourths of its amount.² The three per cents consolidated, that melancholy relic of former bankruptcy, had fallen to six *per cent* on the remnant of a third which the great confiscation of 1797 had left; a little more than a *sixtieth* part of the former value of the stock at the commencement of the Revolution. The executive were more successful in their endeavours to recruit the military forces of the Republic. Soldiers are as easily obtained during public suffering as money is hard to find. Under the able and vigorous management of Bernadotte, the conscription pro-

ceeded with great activity ; and soon a hundred thousand young men were enrolled and disciplined at the dépôts in the interior of the country. These conscripts were no sooner instructed in the rudiments of the military art, than they were marched off to the frontier, where they rendered essential service to the cause of national independence. It was the reinforcements thus obtained which enabled Massena to extricate the Republic from extreme peril at the battle of Zurich ; and it was in their ranks that Napoleon, in the following year, found the greater part of those dauntless followers who scaled the barrier of the Great St Bernard, and descended like a thunderbolt on the plain of Marengo.¹

While the Republic, after ten years of convulsions, was fast relapsing into that state of disorder and weakness which is at once the consequence and punishment of revolutionary violence, the hall of the Jacobins resounded with furious declamations against all the members of the Directory, and the whole system which in every country has been considered as the basis of social union. The separation of property was, in an especial manner, the object of invective, and the agrarian law, which Babeuf had bequeathed to the last democrats of the Revolution, universally extolled as the perfection of society. Felix Lepelletier, Arena, Drouet, and all the furious revolutionists of the age, were there assembled, and the whole atrocities of 1793 were soon held up for applause and imitation. They celebrated the manes of the victims shot on the plain of Grenelle ; demanded in loud terms the instant punishment of all " the leeches who lived on the blood of the people," the general disarming of the Royalists, a levy *en masse*, the establishment of manufactures of arms in the public places, and the restoration of their cannon and pikes to the inhabitants of the faubourgs. These ardent feelings were roused into a perfect fury, when the news arrived of the battle of Novi, and the retreat of the army of Italy over the Alps. Talleyrand became, in an especial manner, the object of attack. He was accused of having projected the expedition to Egypt, the cause of all the public disasters ;² Moreau was overwhelmed with invectives, and Siéyès, the president of the Council of Ancients,

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XXIX.

1799.

¹ Goh. i. 73,
78, 90. Lac.
xiv. 399,
400

15.
Increased
violence of
the Jacobins.

² Th. x. 360,
361. Lac.
xiv. 359,
360. Jom.
Vie de Nap.
i. 364.

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1799.

16.
Fouché is
appointed
Minister of
Police.
His charac-
ter, and con-
servative
designs.

stigmatised as a perfidious priest, who was about to belie in power all the patriotic resolutions of his earlier years.

In these perilous circumstances, the Directory named FOUCHÉ minister of police. This celebrated man, who under Napoleon came to play so important a part in the government of the empire, early gave indication of the great abilities and versatile character which enabled him so long to maintain his influence, not only with many different administrations, but under so many different governments. An old member of the Jacobin club, and thoroughly acquainted with all their designs; steeped in the atrocities of Lyons; a regicide and atheist; bound neither by affection nor principle to their cause, and seeking only in the shipwreck of parties to make his own fortune, he was eminently qualified to act as a spy upon his former friends, and to secure the Directory against their efforts. He perceived at this critical period that the ascendant of the revolutionists was on the wane; and having raised himself to eminence by their passions, he now resolved to attach himself to that conservative party who were striving to reconstruct the elements of society, and establish regular authority by their subversion. The people beheld with dismay the associate of Collot d'Herbois and a regicide member of the Convention, raised to the important station of head of the police: but they soon found that the massacres of Lyons were not to be renewed; and that the Jacobin enthusiast, intrusted with the direction of affairs, was to exhibit, in combating the forces of anarchy, a vigour and resolution unknown in the former stages of the Revolution. His accession to the administration at this juncture was of great importance; for he soon succeeded in confirming the wavering ideas of Barras, and inducing him to exert all his strength in combating those principles of democracy which were again beginning to dissolve the social body.¹

¹ Goh. i. 110.
Th. x. 364.
Lac. xiv.
362.

✱

17.
He closes
the Jacobin
Club.

Under the auspices of so vigorous a leader, the power of the Jacobins was speedily put to the test. He at once closed the Riding-school hall, where their meetings were held; and, supported by the Council of the Ancients, within whose precincts it was placed, prohibited any further assemblies in that situation. The democrats,

expelled from their old den, reassembled in a new place of meeting in the Rue du Bac, where their declamations were renewed with as much vehemence as ever. But public opinion had changed; the people were no longer disposed to rise in insurrection to support their ambitious projects. Fouché resolved to follow up his first blow by closing their meetings altogether. The Directory were legally invested with the power of taking this decisive step, as the organisation of the society was contrary to law; but there was a division of opinion among its members as to the expediency of adopting it—Moulin and Gohier insisting that it was only by favouring the clubs, and reviving the revolutionary spirit of 1793, that the Republic could make head against its enemies. However, the majority, consisting of Siéyes, Barras, and Roger Ducos, persuaded by the arguments of Fouché, resolved upon the decisive step. The execution of the measure was postponed till after the anniversary of the 10th August; but it was then carried into effect without opposition, and the Jacobin club, which had spread such havoc through the world, at last and for ever closed.¹

Deprived of their point of rendezvous, the democrats had recourse to their usual engine—the press: and the journals were immediately filled with the most furious invectives against Siéyes, who was stigmatised as the author of the measure. This able, but speculative man, the author of the celebrated pamphlet, “*What is the Tiers Etat?*” which had so powerful an effect in promoting the Revolution in 1789, was now held up to public execration as a perfidious priest who had sold the Republic to Prussia. In truth, he had long ago seen the pernicious tendency of the democratic dogmas with which he commenced political life, and never hesitated to declare openly that a strong government was indispensable to France, and that liberty was utterly incompatible with the successive tyranny of different parties, which had so long desolated the Republic. These opinions were sufficient to point him out as the victim of republican fury; and, aware of his danger, he was already beginning to look round for some military leader who might execute the *coup d’état*, which he foresaw was the only remaining chance of salvation to the country. In the meanwhile, the state of the press re-

CHAP.

XXIX.

1799.

Aug 12.
¹ Th. x. 366,
 367. Lac.
 xiv. 363.
 Mign. ii. 447
 Goh. i. 125,
 130.

18.
 Violence of
 the daily
 press, and
 attack on
 them by the
 Directory.

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XXIX.

1799.

quired immediate attention ; its license and excesses were utterly inconsistent with any stable or regular government. The only law by which it could be restrained, was one which declared that all attempts to subvert the Republic should be punished with death ; a sanguinary regulation, the offspring of democratic apprehensions, the severity of which prevented it, in the present state of public feeling, from being carried into execution. In this extremity, the three Directors declared that they could no longer carry on the government ; and France was on the point of being delivered over to utter anarchy, when the Directory thought of the expedient of applying to the press the article of the constitution which gave the executive power the right to arrest all persons suspected of carrying on plots against the Republic. Nothing could be more forced than such an interpretation of this clause,¹ which was obviously intended for a totally different purpose ; but the necessity and the well-known principle, *salus populi suprema lex*, seemed to justify, on the ground afterwards taken by Charles X., a stretch indispensable for the existence of regular government, and an *arrêt* was at length resolved on, which authorised the apprehension of the editors of eleven journals, and the immediate suppression of their publications.²

¹ Art. 144.

Sept. 3.

² Th. x. 360,
368, Lac.
xiv. 363.
Mign. ii.
448.

19.
Their con-
tinued vigo-
rous mea-
sures
against the
Jacobins.
Sept. 11.

Sept. 17.

This bold step produced an immediate ebullition among the democrats ; but it was confined to declamations and threats, without any hostile measures. The tribune resounded with "dictators," "the fall of liberty," and all the other overflowings of revolutionary zeal ; but not a sword was drawn. The three resolute Directors, continuing their advantage, succeeded in throwing out, by a majority of 245 to 171, a proposal of Jourdan to declare the country in danger, which was supported by the whole force of the Jacobin party, and soon after successfully ventured on the bold step of dismissing Bernadotte, the minister at war, whose attachment to democratical principles was well known. All thoughts were already turned towards a military chief capable of putting an end to the distractions of the Republic, and extricating it from the perilous situation in which it was placed, from the continued successes of the Allies. "We must have done with declaimers," said Siéyes ; "what we want is a head and a

sword." But where to find that sword was the difficulty. Joubert had recently been killed at Novi; Moreau, notwithstanding his consummate military talents, was known not to possess the energy and moral resolution requisite for the task; Massena was famed only as a skilful soldier; while Augereau and Bernadotte, both violent democrats, had openly thrown themselves into the arms of the opposite party. In this emergency, all eyes were already turned towards that youthful hero who had hitherto chained victory to his standards, and whose early campaigns, splendid as they were, had been almost thrown into the shade by the romantic marvels of his Egyptian expedition. The Directory had already assembled an immense fleet in the Mediterranean to bring back the army from the shores of the Nile, but it had broken up without achieving any thing. But Lucien and Joseph Buonaparte had conveyed to Napoleon full intelligence of the disastrous state of the Republic, and it was by their advice that he resolved to brave the English cruisers and return to France. The public mind was already in that uncertain and agitated state which is the general precursor of some great political event; and the journals, a faithful mirror of its fleeting changes, were filled with conjectures as to the future revolutions he was to achieve in the world.¹

In truth, it was high time that some military leader of commanding talents should seize the helm, to save the sinking fortunes of the Republic. Never since the commencement of the war had its prospects been so gloomy, both from external disaster and internal oppression. A contemporary republican writer, of no common talent, has drawn the following graphic picture of the internal state of France at this period:—"Merit was generally persecuted; all men of honour were chased from public situations; robbers every where assembled in their infernal caverns; the wicked were in power; the apologists of the system of terror thundering in the tribune; spoliation re-established under the name of forced loans; assassinations prepared; thousands of victims already marked out, under the name of hostages; the signal for pillage, murder, and conflagration, anxiously looked for, couched in the words, the 'country is in danger;' the same cries, the same shouts, were heard in the clubs as in 1793; the same executioners, the same

CHAP.
XXIX.

1793.

i Th. x 375,
377. Mign.
ii 448. Lac.
xiv. 362,
363. Goh. i.
140, 155.

20.
Deplorable
state of
France at
this period.

CHAP.
XXIX.

1799.

¹ Prem.
Ann. du
Consulat de
Bonaparte,
7. Dum. ii.
335. Th. x.
429. Bour.
iii. 27.

victims; liberty, property, could no longer be said to exist; the citizens had no security for their lives—the state for its finances. All Europe was in arms against us; America even had declared against our tyranny; our armies were routed, our conquests lost, the territory of the Republic menaced with invasion. Such was the situation of France before the revolution of the 18th Brumaire.”

And such is the picture of the ultimate effect of democratic convulsions, drawn by their own authors; such the miseries which compelled the nation, instead of the feeble sceptre of Louis, to receive the dreaded sword of Napoleon!¹

21.
Arrival of
Napoleon at
Frejus, and
universal
enthusiasm
which it ex-
cited.

The despatches, containing the account of the expedition into Syria, and of the marvellous victories of Mont Thabor and Aboukir, arrived at this time; and spread far and wide the impression that the conqueror of Rivoli was the destined saviour of the state, for whom all classes were so anxiously looking. His name was in every mouth. Where is he? What will he do? What chance is there that he will escape the English cruisers? were the questions universally asked. Such was the anxiety of the public mind on the subject, that rumour had twice outstripped the hopes of his friends, and announced his arrival; and when at length the telegraph gave the official intelligence that he had arrived on the coast of Provence, the public transports knew no bounds. When the people at Frejus heard that the conqueror of Egypt was on the coast, their enthusiasm broke through all the restraints of government. The laws of quarantine were in a moment forgotten. A multitude, intoxicated with joy and hope, seized the first boats, and rushed on board the vessels. Napoleon, amidst universal acclamations, landed, and immediately set out for Paris. The telegraph, with the rapidity of the winds, announced his arrival, and the important intelligence speedily spread over the capital. The entrancement was universal, the joy unanimous. All wishes had been turned towards a hero who could restore peace to desolated France—and here he was, dropt from the clouds: a fortunate soldier presented himself, who had caused the French standards to float on the Capitol and by the Pyramids; in whom all the world recognised both civil and military talents of the very highest order. His

proclamations, his negotiations, his treaties, bore testimony to the first; his astonishing victories afforded irrefragable evidence of the second. So rare a combination might suggest alarm to the friends of liberty, were it not that his well-known principles and disinterestedness precluded the idea that he would employ the dictatorship to any other end than the public good, and the termination of the misfortunes of the country. Discourses of this sort, in every mouth, threw the public into transports, so much the more entrancing as they succeeded a long period of disaster; the joyful intelligence was announced, amidst thunders of applause, at all the theatres; patriotic songs again sent forth their heart-stirring strains from the orchestra; and more than one enthusiast expired of joy at the advent of the hero who was to terminate the difficulties of the Republic.¹

The conqueror was greeted with the most enthusiastic reception the whole way from Frejus to Paris. At Aix, Avignon, Vienne, and Lyons, the people came forth in crowds to meet him; his journey resembled a continual triumph. The few bells which the Revolution had left in the churches were rung on his approach; his course at night was marked by bonfires on all the eminences. On the 16th of October he arrived unexpectedly at Paris; his wife and brothers, mistaking his route, had gone out to meet him by another road. Two hours after his arrival he waited on the Directory; the soldiers at the gate of the palace, who had served under him at Arcola, recognised his figure, and loud cries of "Vive Bonaparte!" announced to the government that the dreaded commander had arrived. He was received by Gohier, and it was arranged that he should be presented in public on the following day. His reception then was, to external appearance, flattering, and splendid encomiums were pronounced on the victories of the Pyramids, of Mont Thabor, and Aboukir; but mutual distrust prevailed on both sides, and a vague disquietude already pervaded the Directory at the appearance of the renowned conqueror, who at so critical a moment had presented himself in the capital.²

Though convinced that the moment he had so long looked for had arrived, and resolved to seize the supreme authority, Napoleon landed in France without any fixed

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1799.

¹ Bour. III.
28, 29. Th.
x. 429, 432.
Nap. i. 56.
Mign. ii.
449.

22.
His journey,
and arrival
at Paris.

Oct. 16.

Oct. 17.

² Bour. III.
38, 39. Th.
x. 433. Nap.
i. 55, 56.
Goh. i. 197,
202.

CHAP.
XXIX.

1799.

23.

Reception
there by the
Directory,
and state of
their gov-
ernment.

project for carrying his design into execution. The enthusiasm, however, with which he had been received in the course of his journey to Paris, and the intelligence which he there obtained of the state of the country, made him at once determine on the attempt. The circumstances of the time were singularly favourable to such a design. None of the Directory were possessed of any personal consideration except Siéyes, and he had long revolved in his mind the project of substituting, for the weak and oppressive government which was now desolating France, the firm hand of a vigorous and able military leader. Even so far back as the revolt of the sections on the 13th Vendémiaire (10th Nov. 1795), he had testified his opinion of the weakness of his colleagues to Napoleon. At the most critical moment of the day, when the Committees of Government had lost their heads, Siéyes approached Napoleon, and, taking him into the embrasure of a window, said, "You see how it is, general; they are haranguing when the moment for action has arrived; large bodies are unfit for the lead of armies, they never know the value of time. You can be of no use here. Go, general, take counsel only of your own genius, and the dangers of the country; the sole hope of the Republic is in you." These words were not lost on Napoleon; they pointed out the speaker as the fit associate in his designs; and to these was soon added M. Talleyrand, who was too clear-sighted not to perceive that the only chance of safety was in the authority of a dictator, and who had also private grievances of his own to induce him to desire the overthrow of the government.¹

Indeed, so general was the impression at that period of the impossibility of continuing the government of France under the Republican form, that, previous to Napoleon's arrival, various projects had been not only set on foot, but were far advanced, for the restoration of monarchical authority. The brothers of Napoleon, Joseph and Lucien, were deeply implicated in these intrigues. The Abbé Siéyes at one time thought of placing the Duke of Brunswick on the throne; Barras was not averse to the restoration of the Bourbons, and was engaged in negotiations with Louis XVIII. for that purpose.² They had even gone so far, that the terms of the Director were fixed for playing the part of General Monk; twelve millions of livres were

¹ Nap. i. 57,
59. Join.
xii. 392, 393.
Bour. iii. 32.

24.
Previous in-
trigues of
the Direc-
tory with
Louis
XVIII.

² Bour. iii.
45 Cape-
figue, Hist.
de la Restau-
ration, i. 129.

to have been his reward, besides two millions to divide among his associates.¹ But in the midst of these intrigues, Joseph and Lucien Buonaparte were in a more effectual way advancing their brother's interests, by inducing the leaders of the army to co-operate in his elevation. They had already engaged Macdonald, Leclerc, Lefebvre, Augereau, and Jourdan, to favour his enterprise; but Moreau hung back, and all their efforts had failed in engaging Bernadotte, whose republican principles were proof against their seductions.²

No sooner had Napoleon arrived at his unassuming dwelling in the Rue Chanteraine, than the whole generals who had been sounded hastened to pay their court to him, and with them all who had been dismissed or conceived themselves ill-used by the Directory. His saloon soon resembled rather the court of a monarch than the rendezvous of the friends of any private individual, how eminent soever. Besides Lannes, Murat, and Berthier, who had shared his fortunes in Egypt, and were warmly attached to him, there were now assembled Jourdan, Augereau, Macdonald, Bournonville, Leclerc, Lefebvre, and Marbot, who, notwithstanding their many differences of opinion on other subjects, had been induced, by the desperate state of the Republic, to concur in offering the military dictatorship to Napoleon; and although Moreau at first appeared undecided, he was at length won by the address of his great rival, who made the first advances, and affected to consult him on his future designs. In addition to this illustrious band of military chiefs, many of the most influential members of the legislature were also disposed to favour the enterprise. Roederer, the old leader in the municipality; Regnault St Angely, long known and respected for his indomitable firmness in the most trying scenes of the Revolution, and a great number of the leading deputies in both Chambers, had paid their court to him on his arrival. Nor were official functionaries, and even members of the administration, wanting. Siéyes and Roger Ducos, the two Directors who chiefly superintended the civil concerns, and Moulins, who was at the head of the military department of the Republic, Cambacérès, the minister of justice, Fouché, the head of the police, and Real, a commissary in the department of the

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XXIX.

1799.

¹ Capefigue, Hist. de la Restauration, i. 129, 135. Nap. i. 66.
² Th. x. 434. Bour. iii. 41, 45.

25.

Junction of the malcontents of all parties to support Napoleon.

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1799.

Seine, an active and intriguing partisan, were assiduous in their attendance. Eight days had hardly elapsed, and already the direction of government seemed to be insensibly gliding into his hands. The ideas of these different persons, however, were far from being unanimous as to the course which should be adopted. The Republican generals offered Napoleon a military dictatorship, and agreed to support him with all their power, provided he would maintain the principles of the Riding-school Club. Siéyes, Talleyrand, Roger Ducos, and Régnier, proposed simply to place him at the head of affairs, and change the constitution, which experience had proved to be so miserably defective; while the Directors Barras and Gohier vainly endeavoured to rid themselves of so dangerous a rival, by offering and anxiously pressing upon him the command of the armies.¹

¹ Th. x. 435, 436, 437.
Nap. i. 64, 65, 74. Goh. i. 211, 212, 218.

26.
Profound
dissimula-
tion of his
conduct.

In the midst of this flattering adulation, the conduct of Napoleon was influenced by that profound knowledge of human nature and thorough dissimulation, which formed such striking features of his character. Affecting to withdraw from the eager gaze of the multitude, he seldom showed himself in public; and then only in the costume of the National Institute, or in a grey surtout, with a Turkish sabre suspended by a silk ribbon; a dress which, under seeming simplicity, revealed the secret pride of the conqueror of the Pyramids. He postponed from day to day the numerous visits of distinguished individuals who sought the honour of being presented to him; and when he went to the theatre, frequented only a concealed box, as if to avoid the thunders of applause which always attended his being recognised.* When obliged to accept an invitation to a sumptuous repast, given in his honour by the minister of justice, he requested that the leading lawyers might be invited: and selecting M. Tronchet, the eloquent defender of Louis XVI., conversed long with him and Treilhard on the want of a simple code of criminal and civil jurisprudence, which might be adapted to the intelligence of the age. To private dinners in his own

* "Nec Agricola, prosperitate rerum in vanitatem usus, expeditionem aut victoriam vocabat, victos continuisse: ne laureatis quidem gesta prosecutus est. Sed ipsa dissimulatione famam auxit, aestimantibus, quanta futuri spe, tam magna tacuisset."—TACITUS, *Agricola*, 18. How identical is human nature in all ages!

house, he invited only the learned men of the Institute, and conversed with them entirely on scientific subjects; if he spoke on politics at all, it was only to express his profound regret at the misfortunes of France. In vain the Directors exaggerated to him the successes of Massena in Switzerland, and Brune in Holland; he appeared inconsolable for the loss of Italy, and seemed to consider every success of no moment till that gem was restored to the coronet of the Republic.¹

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XXIX.

1799.

¹ Nap. i. 60,
61. Lac.
xiv. 401.
Th. x. 437.

Napoleon's first attempt was to engage in his interest Gohier, the president of the Directory, and Moulins, who were both strongly attached to the Republican side; and, with this view, he not only paid them in private the greatest attention, but actually proposed to them that he should be taken into the government instead of Siéyes, though below the age of forty, which the constitution required for that elevated function. "Take care," said he, "of that cunning priest Siéyes; it is his connexion with Prussia, the very thing which should have excluded him from it, which has raised him to the Directory; unless you take care, he will sell you to the coalesced powers. It is absolutely necessary to get quit of him. It is true, I am below the legal age required by the constitution; but in the pursuit of forms we must not forget realities. Those who framed the constitution did not recollect that the maturity of judgment produced by the Revolution is often far more essential than the maturity of age, which in many is much less material. Ambition has no share in these observations; they are dictated alone by the fears which so dangerous an election could not fail to inspire in all the friends of real freedom." Gohier and Moulins, however, agreed in thinking that the Republic had more to fear from the young general than the old metaphysician; and therefore replied, that though, if of the legal age, he would doubtless have secured all suffrages, yet nothing in their estimation could counterbalance a violation of the constitution, and that the true career which lay before him was the command of the armies.²*

^{27.}
His efforts
to gain Go-
hier and
Moulins,
who refuse.

² Goh. i.
205, 210

Meanwhile all Europe was resounding with the return

* At this period, Siéyes's indignation at Napoleon knew no bounds. "Instead," said he, "of lamenting his inactivity, let us rather congratulate ourselves upon it; far from putting arms into the hands of a man whose

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1799.

29.

After much
hesitation,
he at length
resolves to
join Siéyes.

of Napoleon, and speculation with its thousand tongues was every where busied in anticipating the changes which he was to effect in the fate of France and of the world. "What will Buonaparte do? Is he to follow the footsteps of Cromwell, or Monk, or Washington? What change is he likely to make in the fate of the war?" were the questions asked from one end of Europe to the other. But the general himself was for a short time undecided as to the course which he should pursue. To avail himself of the support of the Jacobins and the Riding-school Club seemed the plan most likely to disarm all opposition, because they were the only efficient or energetic body in the state; but he well knew that the Jacobins were jealous of every leader, and were at once exclusive and violent in their passions. To make use of them for his own elevation, and immediately break the alliance and persecute them, would be a dangerous course. Siéyes, on the other hand, was at the head of a numerous body of leading men in the Chambers. His character precluded him from becoming an object of jealousy to the dictator; and although many of his party were firm Republicans, they were not of such an impetuous and energetic kind as to be incapable of employment under a regular government, after the struggle was over; and, besides, their strife with the Riding-school Club was too recent to render any coalition between such opposite bodies the subject of apprehension. Influenced by these considerations, Napoleon resolved to attach himself to Siéyes and his party, and to enter into none of the projects of the Jacobins. Though political considerations, however, led to this alliance, there were no two men in France who hated each other more cordially than Napoleon and Siéyes. They had lately met at dinner at the Director Gohier's: the former, though he had made the first advances to Moreau, thought it unworthy of him to do the same to the veteran of the Revolution, and the day passed over without their addressing each other. They separated mutually exasperated. "Did you see that little insolent fellow?" said Siéyes; "he would not even condescend to notice a member of the govern-

intentions are so suspicious; far from giving him a fresh theatre of glory, let us cease to occupy ourselves more about his concerns, and endeavour, if possible, to cause him to be forgot."—GOHIER, i. 216.

ment, who, if they had done right, would have caused him to be shot."—"What on earth," said Napoleon, "could have made them put that priest in the Directory? He is sold to Prussia, and unless you take care, he will deliver you up to that power." Yet these men, stimulated by ambition, acted cordially together in the revolution which so soon approached. Such is the friendship of politicians!¹

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1799.

¹ Nap. i. 67,
68. Th. x.
438, 439, 443.
Bour. iii. 39,
61, 62. Golt.
i. 202.

On the 30th October, Napoleon dined with Barras. "The Republic is perishing," said the Director; "nothing can be in a more miserable state; the government is destitute of all force. We must have a change, and name Hédouville President of the Republic. Your intention, you know, is to put yourself at the head of the army. As for me, I am ill, my popularity is gone, and I am fit only for private life." Napoleon looked at him steadily, without making any answer. Barras cast down his eyes, and remained silent: they had divined each other. Hédouville was a man of no sort of celebrity; his name had been used merely as a cover to the searching question. The conversation here dropped; but Napoleon saw that the time for action had arrived, and a few minutes after he called on Siéyes, and agreed to make the change between the 15th and 20th Brumaire (6th to 11th November). On returning home, he recounted to Talleyrand, Fouché, and others, what had passed; they communicated it during the night to Barras, and at eight the following morning the Director was at his bedside, protesting his devotion, and that he alone could save the Republic; but Napoleon declined his open assistance, and turned the conversation to the difference between the humid climate of Paris and the burning sands of Arabia.²

29.
Measures
resolved on.

² Nap. i. 69,
70. Th. x.
448, 449.
Lac. xiv.
407, 408.

Notwithstanding his utmost efforts, however, Napoleon was unable to make any impression on Bernadotte. That general, partly from republican principles, partly from jealousy, resisted all his advances. "You have seen," said he to Bourienne, "the enthusiasm with which I was received in France, and how evidently it springs from the general desire to escape out of a disastrous predicament. Well! I have just seen Bernadotte, who boasts, with a ridiculous exaggeration, of the great success of the Republic; he spoke of the Russians beat, and Genoa saved; of

30.
He tries in
vain to gain
Bernadotte.

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the innumerable armies which were about to be raised. He even reproached me with not having brought back my soldiers from Egypt.—‘What!’ I answered, ‘you tell me that you are overflowing with troops—that two hundred thousand infantry, and forty thousand cavalry, will soon be on foot. If that is so, to what purpose should I have brought back the remains of my army?’ He then changed his tone, he confessed that he thought us all lost. He spoke of external enemies, of *internal* enemies, and at that word he looked steadily in my face. I also gave him a glance;—but patience; the pear will soon be ripe.” Soon after, Napoleon expressed himself with his wonted vehemence against the agitation which reigned among the Jacobins, and of which the Riding-school hall had so recently been the centre. “Your own brothers,” replied Bernadotte, “were its principal founders, and yet you accuse me of having favoured that club: it is to the instructions of some one, *I know not who*, that we are to ascribe the agitation that now prevails.” At these words Napoleon could no longer contain himself. “True, general,” he replied with the utmost vehemence, “and I would rather live in the woods than in a society which presents no security against violence.” Their conversation only augmented the breach, and soon after they separated in sullen discontent.¹

¹ Bour. III.
46, 51.

31.
Progress of
the conspi-
racy.

Though a few of the military, however, held out, the great proportion of them were gained. Berthier, Lannes, and Murat, were daily making converts of such as were backward in sending in their adhesion. The officers of the garrison, headed by Moreau, demanded that they should be presented to Napoleon. The forty adjutants of the national guard of Paris made the same request; his brothers, Lucien and Joseph, daily augmented his party in the Councils; the 8th and 9th regiments of dragoons, who had served under him in Italy, with the 21st chasseurs, who had been organised by him, were devoted to his service. Moreau said, “He did not wish to be engaged in any intrigues, but that, when the moment for action arrived, he would be found at his post.”* The people of

* An interesting conversation took place between Napoleon and Moreau when they met, for the first time in their lives, at a dinner party at Gohier’s. When first introduced, they looked at each other a moment without speak-

Paris, who awaited in anxious expectation the unfolding of the plot, could no longer conceal their impatience. "Fifteen days have elapsed," said they, "and nothing has been done. Is he to leave us, as he did on his return from Italy, and let the Republic perish in the agony of the factions who dispute its remains?" Everything announced the approach of the decisive moment.¹

By the able and indefatigable efforts of Lucien Buonaparte, a banquet, at which he himself was president, was given at the Council of the Ancients, in honour of Napoleon. It passed off with sombre tranquillity. Every one spoke in a whisper, anxiety was depicted on every face, a suppressed agitation was visible even in the midst of apparent quiet. Napoleon's own countenance was disturbed; his absent and preoccupied air sufficiently indicated that some great project was at hand. He rose soon from table, and left the party, which, although gloomy, had answered the object in view, which was to bring together six hundred persons of various political principles, and thus engage them to act in unison in any common enterprise. It was on that night that the arrangements for the conspiracy were finally made between Siéyes and Napoleon. It was agreed that the government should be overturned; that, instead of the five directors, three consuls should be appointed, charged with a dictatorial power which was to last for three months; that Napoleon, Siéyes, and Roger Ducos, should fill these exalted stations;² and that the Council of the Ancients should pass a decree on the 18th

1799.

1 Th. x. 451,
452. Nap. i.
71, 72.

32.

Great banquet at the
Hall of the
Ancients.
Nov. 6.

² Bour. iii.
57, 59. Goh.
i. 226. Nap.
i. 73. Mign.
ii. 450. Th.
x. 452, 455.

ing. Napoleon was the first to break silence, and testify to Moreau the desire which he had long felt to make his acquaintance. "You have returned victorious from Egypt," replied Moreau, "and I from Italy after a great defeat. It was the month which his marriage induced Joubert to spend at Paris which caused our disasters, by giving the Allies time to reduce Mantua, and bring up the force which besieged it to take a part in the action. It is always the greater number which defeats the less."—"True," replied Napoleon, "it is always the greater number which beats the less."—"And yet," said Gohier, "with small armies you have frequently defeated large ones."—"Even then," rejoined he, "it was always the inferior force which was defeated by the superior. When with a small body of men I was in presence of a large one, collecting my little band, I fell like lightning on one of the wings of the enemy and defeated it; profiting by the disorder which such an event never failed to occasion in their whole line, I repeated the attack with similar success in another quarter, still with my whole force. I thus beat it in detail; and the general victory, which was the result, was still an example of the truth of the principle, that the greater force defeats the lesser."—See Gohier, i. 203, 204. Two days after, Napoleon made Moreau a present of a dagger set with diamonds, worth 10,000 francs.—*Moniteur*, 1799, p. 178.

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Brumaire (9th Nov.), at seven in the morning, transferring the legislative body to St Cloud, and appointing Napoleon commander of the guard of the legislature, of the garrison of Paris, and the national guard. On the 19th, the decisive event was to take place.

33.
Preparations
of the con-
spirators in
the Council
of the An-
cients.

During the three critical days which followed, the secret, though known to a great number of persons, was faithfully kept. The preparations, both civil and military, went on without interruption. Orders were given to the regiments, both infantry and cavalry, which could be relied on, to parade in the streets of Chantierine and Mont Blanc, at seven o'clock in the morning of the 18th. Moreau, Lefebvre, and all the generals, were summoned to attend at the same hour, with the forty adjutants of the national guard. Meanwhile the secret council of the Ancients laboured, with shut doors and closed windows, to prepare the decree which was to pass at seven in the morning; and as it forbade all discussion, and the Council of Five Hundred were only summoned to meet at eleven, it was hoped the decree would pass at once, not only without any opposition, but before its opponents could be aware of its existence.¹

¹ Th. x. 456,
457. Nap. i.
73, 75.

34.
Efforts of
Napoleon
with all
parties.

Meanwhile Napoleon, in his secret intercourse with the different leaders, was indefatigable in his endeavours to disarm all opposition. Master of the most profound dissimulation, he declared himself, to the chiefs of the different parties, penetrated with the ideas which he was aware would be most acceptable to their minds. To one he protested that he certainly did desire to play the part of Washington, but only in conjunction with Siéyes: the proudest day of his life would be that when he retired from power; to another, that the part of Cromwell appeared to him ignoble, because it was that of an impostor. To the friends of Siéyes, he professed himself impressed with the most profound respect for that mighty intellect before which the genius of Mirabeau had prostrated itself; that, for his own part, he could only head the armies, and leave to others the formation of the constitution. To all the Jacobins who approached him, he spoke of the extinction of liberty, the tyranny of the Directory,² and used terms which sufficiently recalled his famous proclamation which had given the first impulse to the Revolution of the

² Th. x. 457.
Lac. xiv.
408, 409.

18th Fructidor.* In public he announced a review of the troops on the morning of the 18th Brumaire, after which he was to set off to take the command of the army on the frontier.

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All the proposed arrangements were made with the utmost precision. By daybreak on the 18th Brumaire (9th Nov.) the boulevards were filled with a numerous and splendid cavalry, and all the officers in and around Paris repaired, in full dress, to the Rue Chantereine. The Deputies of the Ancients, who were not in the secret, assembled with surprise at the unwonted hour, in their place of meeting, and already the conspirators were there in sufficient strength to give them the majority. The president of the commission charged with watching over the safety of the legislative body, opened the proceedings; he drew, in energetic and gloomy colours, a picture of the dangers of the Republic, and especially of the perils which menaced their own body, from the efforts of the anarchists. "The Republic," said he, "is menaced at once by the anarchists and the enemy; we must instantly take measures for the public safety. We may reckon on the support of Général Buonaparte; it is under the shadow of his protecting arm that the Councils must deliberate on the measures required by the interests of the Republic." The uninitiated members were startled, and considerable agitation prevailed in the Assembly; but the majority were instant and pressing; and at eight o'clock the decree was passed, after a warm opposition, transferring the seat of the legislative body to St Cloud, appointing them to meet there on the following day at noon, charging Napoleon with the execution of the decree, authorising him to take all the measures necessary for its due performance, and appointing him to the command of the garrison of Paris, the national guard, the troops of the line in the military divisions in which it

35.
The 18th
Brumaire,
Nov. 9.

* At a small dinner party, given by Napoleon at this time, where the Director Gohier was present, the conversation turned on the turquois used by the Orientals to clasp their turbans. Rising from his chair, Napoleon took out of a private drawer two brooches, richly set with those jewels, one of which he gave to Gohier, the other to Desaix. "It is a little toy," said he, "which we *Republicans* may give and receive without impropriety."—Soon after, the conversation turned on the prospect of an approaching pacification. "Do you really," said Napoleon, "advocate a general peace? You are wrong, president; a Republic should never make but *partial accommodations*; it should always contrive to have some war on hand to keep alive the military spirit."—GOHIER, i. 214, 215.

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1 Goh. i. 228,
234. Nap. i.
75, 77. Lac.
xiv. 411,
412. Th. x.
459.

36.

Meeting of
the conspi-
rators in the
Rue Chante-
reine.

stood, and the guard of the two Councils. This extraordinary decree was ordered to be instantly placarded on the walls of Paris, dispatched to all the authorities, and obeyed by all the citizens. To lull the suspicions of Gohier, Napoleon invited himself to dine with him on *that very day* (the 18th Brumaire), and sent that director a pressing invitation, carried by Eugene Beauharnais, to breakfast with him in the Rue Chantereine on the preceding morning.¹

Napoleon was in his own house in the Rue Chantereine when the messenger of state arrived: his levee resembled rather the court of a powerful sovereign than the dwelling of a general about to undertake a perilous enterprise. No sooner was the decree received, than he opened the doors, and, advancing to the portico, read it aloud to the brilliant assemblage, and asked if he might rely on their support? They all answered with enthusiasm in the affirmative, putting their hands on their swords. He then addressed himself to Lefebvre, the governor of Paris, who had arrived in ill-humour at seeing the troops put in motion without his orders, and said, "Well, Lefebvre, are you, one of the supporters of the Republic, willing to let it perish in the hands of lawyers? Unite with me to save it; here is the sabre which I bore at the battle of the Pyramids; I give it you as a pledge of my esteem and confidence." The appeal was irresistible to a soldier's feelings. "Yes," replied Lefebvre, strongly moved, "let us throw the advocates into the river." Joseph Buonaparte had brought Bernadotte; but, upon seeing what was in agitation, he quickly retired to warn the Jacobins of their danger. Fouché, at the first intelligence of what was going forward, had ordered the barriers to be closed, and all the usual precautions taken which mark a period of public alarm, and hastened to the Rue Chantereine to receive his orders; but Napoleon ordered them to be opened and the usual course of things to continue, as he marched with the nation and relied on its support. A quarter of an hour afterwards he mounted on horseback, and put himself at the head of his brilliant suite and fifteen hundred horsemen, and rode to the Tuileries. Names since immortalised in the rolls of fame were there assembled: Moreau and Macdonald, Berthier and Murat, Lannes, Marmont, and Lefebvre.² The dragoons, assembled as they imagined for a review,

¹ Lac. xiv.
413. Nap. i.
78. Th. x.
461, 462.
Goh. i.
254.

joyfully followed in the rear of so splendid a *cortège*; while the people, rejoicing at the termination of the disastrous government of the Directory, saw in it the commencement of the vigour of military, instead of the feebleness of legal ascendancy, and rent the air with their acclamations.

The military chief presented himself at the bar of the Ancients, attended by that splendid staff. "Citizen representatives," said he, "the Republic was about to perish when you saved it. Woe to those who shall attempt to oppose your decree! Aided by my brave companions in arms, I will speedily crush them to the earth. You are the collected wisdom of the nation; it is for you to point out the measures which may save it. I come surrounded by all the generals, to offer you the support of their arms. I name Lefebvre my lieutenant: I will faithfully discharge the duty you have intrusted to me. Let none seek in the past examples to regulate the present; nothing in history has any resemblance to the close of the eighteenth century; nothing in the eighteenth century resembles this moment. *We are resolved to have a Republic*; we are resolved to have it founded on true liberty and a representative system. I swear it in my own name, and in that of my companions in arms."—"We swear it," replied the generals. A deputy attempted to speak: the president stopped him, upon the ground that all deliberation was interdicted till the Council met at St Cloud. The assembly immediately broke up; and Napoleon proceeded to the gardens of the Tuileries, where he passed in review the regiments of the garrison, addressing to each a few energetic words, in which he declared that he was about to introduce changes which would bring with them abundance of glory. The weather was beautiful; the confluence of spectators immense; their acclamations rent the skies: every thing announced the transition from anarchy to despotic power.¹

During these events, the anxiety of all classes in Paris on the approaching revolution had risen to the highest pitch. A pamphlet, eagerly circulated at the doors of the Councils, contains a curious picture of the ideas of the moment, and the manner in which the most obvious approaching events are glossed over to those engaged in them.

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37.

Napoleon's
speech at the
bar of the
Ancients.

¹ Th. x. 461,
463. Nap. i.
79. Lac.
xiv. 413,
414.

38.

Curious
pamphlet
published in
support of
Napoleon.

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The dialogue ran as follows:—"One of the Five Hundred. Between ourselves, my friend, I am seriously alarmed at the part assigned to Buonaparte in this affair. His renown, his consideration, the just confidence of the soldiers in his talents, his talents themselves, may give him the most formidable ascendant over the destinies of the Republic. Should he prove a Cæsar, a Cromwell!—*The Ancient*. A Cæsar, a Cromwell! Bad parts; stale parts; unworthy of a man of sense, not to say a man of property. Buonaparte has declared so himself on several occasions. 'It would be a sacrilegious measure,' said he, on one occasion, 'to make any attempt on a representative government in this age of intelligence and liberty.' On another—There is no one except a fool who would attempt to make the Republic lose the gauntlet it has thrown down to the royalty of Europe, after having gone through so many perils to uphold it."¹

¹ Bour. iii.
76, 77.

39.
Proceedings
of the Coun-
cil of Five
Hundred,
and resigna-
tion of
Barras.

While all was thus proceeding favourably at the Tuileries, the Council of Five Hundred, having received a confused account of the revolution which was in progress, tumultuously assembled in their hall. They were hardly met, when the message arrived from the Ancients, containing the decree removing them to St Cloud. No sooner was it read than a host of voices burst forth at once; but the president, Lucien Buonaparte, succeeded in reducing them to silence, by appealing to the decree which interdicted all deliberation till they were assembled at that place. At the same moment an aide-de-camp arrived from Napoleon to the guard of the Directory, communicating the decree, and enjoining them to take no orders but from him. They were in deliberation on the subject, when an order of an opposite description arrived from the Directory. The soldiers, however, declared for their comrades in arms, and ranged themselves round the standard of Napoleon. Soon after, a part of the Directory sent in their resignation. Siéyes and Roger Ducos were already in the plot, and did so in concert with Napoleon. Barras was easily disposed of. Boutot his secretary waited on Napoleon. He bitterly reproached him with the public disasters. "What have you made of that France," exclaimed he, "which I left so brilliant? I left you in peace, I find

you at war: I left you victorious, I find only disasters: I left you the millions of Italy, and in their stead I find only acts of spoliation! What have you made of the hundred thousand men, my companions in glory? They are dead! This state of things cannot continue; in less than three years it would lead to despotism." At length the Director yielded; and, accompanied by a guard of honour, set out for his villa of Gros Bois.¹

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¹ Th. x. 468,
469. Goh. i.
243, 258, 261.
Lac. xiv.
416.

The two Directors who remained, however, were not disposed of without considerable difficulty. These were Gohier and Moulins, brave republicans, but their powers of acting according to the constitution, which required a majority of the Directory for every legal act, were paralysed by the resignation or desertion of the majority of their brethren. Napoleon waited upon them, and said that he believed they were too good citizens to attempt to oppose a revolution which appeared inevitable; and that he therefore expected they would quietly send in their resignations. Gohier replied with vehemence, that, with the aid of his colleague Moulins, he did not despair of saving the Republic. "With what?" said Napoleon. "By means of the constitution which is falling to pieces?" At this instant a messenger arrived with the intelligence that Santerre was striving to raise the faubourgs. "General Moulins," said Napoleon, "you are the friend of Santerre. I understand he is rousing the faubourgs; tell him, that at the first movement I will cause him to be shot." Moulins replied with equal firmness. "The Republic is in danger," said Napoleon, "and we must save it; *it is my will*. Siéyes and Roger Ducos have sent in their resignations; you are two individuals insulated and without power. I recommend you not to resist." The Directors replied, that they would not desert their post. Upon that they were sent back to the Luxembourg, separated from each other, and put under arrest, by orders of Napoleon transmitted to Moreau. Meanwhile Fouché, minister of police, Cambacérès, minister of justice, and all the public authorities, hastened to the Tuileries to make their submission. Fouché, in the name of the Directory, provisionally dissolved the twelve municipalities of Paris, so as to leave no rallying-point to the Jacobins.² Before night the government was annihilated,

40.
Arrest of
Gohier and
Moulins.

² Th. x. 464,
466. Lac.
xiv 414,
415. Nap. i
81, 82. Goh.
i. 254.

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41.

Napoleon,
Siêyes, and
Roger
Ducos, are
named
Consuls.

and there remained, no authority in Paris but what emanated from Napoleon.

A council was held in the evening at the Tuileries, to deliberate on the course to be pursued on the following day. Siêyes strongly urged the necessity of arresting forty leaders of the Jacobins, who were already fomenting opposition in the Council of Five Hundred, and by whom the faubourgs were beginning to be agitated; but Napoleon declared that he would not violate the oath which he had taken to protect the national representation, and that he had no fear of such contemptible enemies. At the same time a provisional government was formed. Napoleon, Siêyes, and Roger Ducos were named First Consuls, and it was agreed that the Councils should be adjourned for three months. Murat was appointed to the command of the armed force of St Cloud, Ponsard to that of the guard of the legislative body, Serrurier, of a strong reserve stationed at Pont de Jour. The gallery of Mars was prepared for the Council of the Ancients, the Orangery for the Five Hundred.¹

¹ Mign. ii.
454. Th. x.
467. Nap. i.
81, 85. Lac.
xiv. 419.

42.

The 19th
Brumaire at
St Cloud.
Nov. 19.

On the morning of the 19th Brumaire (10th November) a formidable military force, five thousand strong, surrounded St Cloud: the legislature were not to deliberate, as on June 2d, under the daggers of the populace, but the bayonets of the soldiery. The Five Hundred, however, mustered strong in the gardens of the palace. Formed into groups, while the last preparations were going on in the hall which they were to occupy, they discussed with warmth the extraordinary position of public affairs, mutually sounded and encouraged each other, and succeeded, even during that brief space, in organising a very formidable opposition. The members of the Five Hundred demanded of the Council of the Ancients what they really proposed to themselves as the result of the proceedings of the day. "The government," said they, "is dissolved."—"Admitted," replied the others; "but what then? Do you propose, instead of weak men, destitute of renown, to place there Buonaparte?" Those of the Ancients who were in the secret, ventured to insinuate something about the necessity of a military leader;² but the suggestion was ill-received, and the opposition in the Five Hundred was every moment becoming stronger, from the rumours

² Th. x. 469,
472. Nap. i.
86, 87. Lac.
xiv. 419,
420. Jom.,
xii. 403.
Goh. i. 272,
273.

which were spread of the approaching dictatorship. The Ancients were violently shaken at the unexpected resistance they had experienced, and numbers in the majority were already anxious to escape from the perilous enterprise on which they had adventured. The opinions of the Five Hundred were already unequivocally declared; every thing seemed to indicate that the legislature would triumph over the conspirators.

It was in the midst of this uncertainty and disquietude that the Councils opened. Lucien Buonaparte was in the chair of the Five Hundred. Gaudin ascended the tribune, and commenced a set speech, in which he dwelt in emphatic terms on the dangers which threatened the country, and concluded by proposing a vote of thanks to the Ancients for having transferred their deliberations to St Cloud, and the formation of a committee of seven persons to prepare a report upon the state of the Republic. Had this been carried, it was to have been immediately followed up by the appointment of the consuls and an adjournment. But no sooner had Gaudin concluded, than the most violent opposition arose. "The winds," says Napoleon, "suddenly escaping from the caverns of Æolus, can give but a faint idea of that tempest." The speaker was violently dragged from the tribune, and a frightful agitation rendered any further proceedings impossible. "Down with the dictators! long live the constitution!" resounded on all sides. "The constitution or death!" exclaimed Delbrel; "bayonets will not deter us: we are still free here." In the midst of the tumult, Lucien in vain endeavoured to exert his authority. After a long scene of confusion, one of the deputies proposed that the assembly should swear fidelity to the constitution; this proposal was instantly adopted, and the roll called for that purpose. This measure answered the double purpose of binding the Council to support its authority, and giving time for the Jacobin leaders to be sent for from the capital. In fact, during the two hours that the calling of the roll lasted, intelligence of the resistance of the Five Hundred circulated in Paris with the rapidity of lightning, and Jourdan, Augereau, and other leaders of the Jacobin party, believing that the enterprise had miscarried, hastened to the scene of action.¹ The Five Hundred, during this delay, hoped

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43.
Excessive
vehemence
in the Five
Hundred.

¹ Nap. i. 87.
Lac. xiv.
420, 422.
Th. x. 473,
474. Goh.
i. 273, 276.

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they would have time to communicate with the Directory; but before it terminated, the intelligence arrived that the government was dissolved, and no executive authority remaining but in the person of Napoleon.

44.
Imminent
danger of
Napoleon,
who enters
the Hall of
the An-
cients.

The danger was now imminent to that audacious general; the Five Hundred were so vehement in their opposition to him, that the whole members, including Lucien, were compelled to take the oath to the constitution; and in the Ancients, although his adherents had the majority, the contest raged with the utmost violence, and the strength of the minority was every instant increasing. The influential Jacobins were rapidly arriving from Paris; they looked on the matter as already decided. Every thing depended on the troops, and although their attachment to Napoleon was well known, it was extremely doubtful whether they would not be overawed by the majesty of the legislature. "Here you are," said Augereau to him the moment he had arrived, "in a happy position."—"Augereau," replied Napoleon, "recollect Arçola; things then appeared much more desperate. Take my word for it; remain tranquil, if you would not become a victim. Half an hour hence you will thank me for my advice." Notwithstanding this seeming confidence, however, Napoleon fully felt the danger of his situation. The influence of the legislature was sensibly felt on the troops; the boldest were beginning to hesitate; the zealous had already become timid; the timid had changed their colours. He saw that there was not a moment to lose; and he resolved to present himself, at the head of his staff, at the bar of the Ancients. "At that moment," said Napoleon, "I would have given two hundred millions to have had Ney by my side."¹

¹ Th. x. 474,
475. Lac.
xiv. 423, 424.
Nap. i. 87,
88. Las
Cas. vii. 235.

45.
Napoleon's
agitation,
and speech
to the An-
cients.

In this crisis, Napoleon was strongly agitated. He never possessed the faculty of powerful extempore elocution—a peculiarity not unfrequently the accompaniment of the most profound and original thought; and on this occasion, from the vital interests at stake, and the vehement opposition with which he was assailed, he could hardly utter any thing intelligible.² So far as his meaning could be gathered amidst the frightful tumult which prevailed, his speech was to the following purpose:—"You are on the edge of a volcano. Allow me to explain myself; you have

² Bour. iii.
83, 84, 112,
114.

called me and my companions in arms to your aid * * * but you must now take a decided part. I know they talk of Cæsar and Cromwell, as if any thing in antiquity resembled the present moment. And you, grenadiers, whose feathers I perceive already waving in the hall, say, have I ever failed in performing the promises I made to you in the camps?" The soldiers replied by waving their hats, and loud acclamations; but this appeal to the military, in the bosom of the legislature, wrought up to a perfect fury the rage of the Opposition. One of their number, Linglet, rose, and said, in a loud voice, "General, we applaud your words; swear, then, obedience and fidelity to the constitution, which can alone save the Republic." Napoleon hesitated; then replied with energy: "The constitution does not exist; you yourselves violated it on the 10th Fructidor, when the government assailed the independence of the legislature; you violated it on the 30th Prairial, when the legislative body overthrew the independence of the executive; you violated it on the 22d Floreal, when, by a sacrilegious decree, the government and legislature sacrificed the sovereignty of the people by annulling the elections which they had made. Having subverted the constitution, new guarantees, a fresh compact, are required. I declare, that as soon as the dangers which have invested me with these extraordinary powers have passed away, I will lay them down. I desire only to be the arm which executes your commands. If you call on me to explain what are the perils which threaten our country, I have no hesitation in answering, that Barras and Moulins have proposed to me to place myself at the head of a faction, the object of which is to effect the overthrow of all the friends of freedom." The energy of this speech, the undoubted truths and audacious falsehoods which it contained, produced a great impression: three-fourths of the assembly rose and loudly testified their applause. His party, recovering their courage, spoke in ~~his~~ ^{his} behalf, and he concluded with these significant words: "Surrounded by my brave companions in arms, I will second you. I call you to witness, brave grenadiers, whose bayonets I perceive, whom I have so often led to victory; I can bear witness to your courage; we will unite our efforts to save our country.¹ And if any orator,"

¹ Th. x. 477.
Bour. iii. 85.
Goh. i. 281,
288.

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46.
He enters
the Hall of
the Five
Hundred.
Frightful
disorders
there.

added he, with a menacing voice, "paid by the enemy, should venture to propose to put me *hors la loi*, I shall instantly appeal to my companions in arms to exterminate him on the spot. Recollect that I march accompanied by the god of fortune and the god of war."

Hardly was this harangue concluded, when intelligence arrived that in the Council of Five Hundred the calling of the roll had ceased; that Lucien could hardly maintain his ground against the vehemence of the Assembly; and that they were about to force him to put to the vote a proposal to declare his brother *hors la loi*. It was a similar proposal which had proved fatal to Robespierre; the cause of Napoleon seemed wellnigh desperate, for if it had been passed, there could be little doubt it would be obeyed by the soldiers. In truth, they had gone so far as to declare, that the oath of 18th Brumaire should receive a place as distinguished in history as that of the *Jeu de Paume*, "the first of which created liberty, while the second consolidated it," and had decreed a message to the Directory to make them acquainted with their resolution. This decree was hardly passed, when a messenger arrived with a letter from Barras, containing his resignation of the office of Director, upon the ground, "that now the dangers of liberty were *all surmounted*, and the interests of the armies secured." This unlooked-for communication renewed their perplexity; for now it was evident that the executive itself was dissolved. Napoleon, who clearly saw his danger, instantly took his resolution. Boldly advancing to the Hall of the Five Hundred, whose shouts and cries already resounded to a distance, he entered alone, uncovered, and ordered the soldiers and officers of his suite to halt at the entrance. In his passage to the bar he had to pass one half of the benches. No sooner did he make his appearance, than half of the assembly rose up, exclaiming, "Death to the tyrant! down with the dictator!" The scene which ensued baffles all description. Hundreds of deputies rushed down from the benches, and surrounded the general, exclaiming, "Your laurels are all withered; your glory is turned into infamy; is it for this you have conquered? respect the sanctuary of the laws; retire, retire."¹ Two grenadiers left at the door, alarmed by the danger of their general, rushed forward, sword in hand,

¹ Nap. i. 9.
Th. x. 477,
478. Lac.
xiv. 428.
Goh. i. 291,
295, 298.

seized him by the middle, and bore him, almost stupified, out of the hall: in the tumult one of them had his clothes torn. Nothing was to be heard but the cries, "No Cromwell! down with the dictator! death to the dictator!"

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His removal increased rather than diminished the tumult of the assembly. Lucien, alone, and unsupported in the president's chair, was left to make head against the tempest. All his efforts to justify his brother were in vain. "You would not hear him," he exclaimed. "Down with the tyrant! *hors la loi* with the tyrant!" resounded on all sides. With rare firmness he for long resisted the proposal. At length, finding further opposition fruitless, he exclaimed, "You dare to condemn a hero without hearing him in his defence. His brother has but one duty left, and that is to defend him. I renounce the chair, and hasten to the bar to defend the illustrious accused;" and with these words, laying down his insignia of president, he mounted the tribune. At that instant an officer, dispatched by Napoleon, with ten grenadiers, presented himself at the door. It was at first supposed that the troops had declared for the Council, and loud applause greeted their entrance. Taking advantage of the mistake, the leader approached the tribune and laid hold of Lucien, whispering at the same time in his ear, "By your brother's orders;" while the grenadiers exclaimed, "Down with the Assassins!" At these words a mournful silence succeeded to the cries of acclamation, and he was conducted without opposition out of the hall.¹

47.
Intrepid
conduct of
Lucien.

1 Goh. i.
298, 308.

Meanwhile Napoleon had descended to the court, mounted on horseback, ordered the drums to beat the order to form circle, and thus addressed the soldiers:—"I was about to point out the means of saving the country, and they answered me with strokes of the poniard. They desire to fulfil the wishes of the Allied Sovereigns—what more could England do? Soldiers, can I rely on you?" Unanimous applause answered the appeal; and ~~then~~ after the officer arrived, bringing out Lucien from the Council. He instantly mounted on horseback, and with Napoleon rode along the ranks, then halting in the centre, said, with a voice of thunder which was heard along the whole line, "Citizen-soldiers! the President of the Council of Five Hundred declares to you, that the

48.
Dissolution
of the Five
Hundred by
an armed
force.

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immense majority of that body is enthralled by a factious band, armed with stilettoes, who besiege the tribune, and interdict all freedom of deliberation. General, and you soldiers, and you citizens, you can no longer recognise any as legislators but those who are around me. Let force expel those who remain in the Orangery; they are not the representatives of the people, but the representatives of the poniard. Let that name for ever attach to them, and if they dare to show themselves to the people, let all fingers point to them as the representatives of the poniard."—"Soldiers," added Napoleon, "can I rely on you?" The soldiers, however, appeared still to hesitate, when Lucien, as a last resource, turned to his brother, and raising his sword in his hand, swore to plunge it in his breast if ever he belied the hopes of the Republicans, or made an attempt on the liberty of France. This last appeal was decisive. "Vive Buonaparte!" was the answer. He then ordered Murat and Leclerc to march a battalion into the Council, and dissolve the assembly. "Charge bayonets," was the word given. They entered slowly in, and the officer in command notified to the Council the order to dissolve. Jourdan and several other deputies resisted, and began to address the soldiers on the enormity of their conduct. Hesitation was already visible in their ranks, when Leclerc entering with a fresh body, in close column, instantly ordered the drums to beat and the charge to sound. He exclaimed, "Grenadiers, forward!" and the soldiers slowly advancing, with fixed bayonets, speedily cleared the hall, the dismayed deputies throwing themselves from the windows, and rushing out at every aperture, to avoid the shock.¹

¹ Nap. i. 93.
Migu. ii.
458, 459.
Th. x. 479,
480. Lac.
xiv. 431.
Jom. xii.
406, 408.
Bour. iii. 95.
97. Goh. i.
309, 311.

49.
Nocturnal
meeting of
the conspi-
rators in the
Orangery
Their de-
crees.

Intelligence of the violent dissolution of the Five Hundred was conveyed by the fugitives to the Ancients, who were thrown by this event into the utmost consternation. They had expected that that body would have yielded without violence, and were thunderstruck by the open use of bayonets on the occasion. Lucien immediately appeared at their bar, and made the same apology he had done to the troops for the *coup-d'état* which had been employed, viz. that a factious minority had put an end to all freedom of deliberation by the use of poniards, which rendered the application of force indispensable; that

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nothing had been done contrary to forms; that he had himself authorised the employment of the military. The Council were satisfied, or feigned to be so, with this explanation; and at nine at night the remnant of the Five Hundred who were in the interests of Napoleon, five-and-thirty only in number, under the direction of Lucien, assembled in the Orangery, and voted a resolution, declaring that Buonaparte and the troops under his orders had deserved well of their country. "Representatives of the people," said that audacious partisan, in his opening speech, "this ancient palace of the Kings of France, where we are now assembled, attests that *power is nothing*, and that glory is every thing." At eleven at night, a few members of the two Councils, not amounting in all to sixty persons, assembled, and unanimously passed a decree abolishing the Directory, expelling sixty-one members from the Councils as demagogues, adjourning the legislature for three months, and vesting the executive power in the mean time in Napoleon, Siéyes, and Roger Ducos, under the title of Provisional Consuls. Two commissions* of twenty-five members each were appointed from each Council, to combine with the Consuls in the formation of a new constitution.¹

¹ Nap. i. 94,
95. Jom.
xii. 409.
Th. x. 481.
Goh. i. 314,
334.

During these two eventful days, the people of Paris, though deeply interested in the issue of the struggle, and trembling with anxiety lest the horrors of the Revolution should be renewed, remained perfectly tranquil. In the evening of the 19th, reports of the failure of the enterprise were generally spread, and diffused the most mortal disquietude; for all ranks, worn out with the agitation and sufferings of past convulsions, passionately longed for repose, and it was generally felt that it could be obtained only under the shadow of military authority. But at length the result was communicated by the fugitive members of the Five Hundred, who arrived from St Cloud, loudly exclaiming against the military violence of which they had been the victims; and at nine at night the intelligence was officially announced by a proclamation of Napoleon, which was read by torch-light to the agitated groups.²*

50.
Joy in Paris
at these
events.

² Nap. i. 98.
Th. x. 482.
Jom. xii.
410.

* This proclamation is chiefly remarkable for the unblushing effrontery with which it set forth a statement of facts, utterly at variance with what above a thousand witnesses, only five miles from the capital, had them-

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51.
General
satisfaction
which the
revolution
diffused
through the
country.

With the exception of the legislature, however, all parties declared for the revolution of 18th Brumaire. Violation of the laws and *coups d'état* had been so common during the Revolution, that the people had ceased to regard them as illegal; and they were judged of entirely by their consequences, and above all by their success. To such a height had the anarchy and distresses of the country arisen in the latter years of the Revolution, that repose and a regular government had become the object of universal desire at any price, even that of the extinction of the very liberty to attain which all these misfortunes had been undergone. The feeling, accordingly, not only of Paris, but of France, was universal in favour of the new government. All parties hoped to see their peculiar tenets forwarded by the change. The Constitutionals trusted that rational freedom would at length be established; the Royalists rejoiced that the first step towards a regular government had been made, and secretly indulged the hope that Buonaparte would play the part of General Monk, and restore the throne; the great body of the people, weary of strife, and exhausted by suffering, passionately rejoiced at the commencement of repose; the numerous exiles and proscribed families exulted in the prospect of revisiting their country, and drawing their last breath in that France which was so dear to them. Ten years had wrought a century of experience. The nation was as unanimous in 1799 to terminate the era of Revolution, as in 1789 it had been to commence it.¹

Napoleon rivalled Cæsar in the clemency with which he used his victory. No proscriptions or massacres, few arrests or imprisonments, followed the triumph of Order

selves beheld, and which Napoleon himself has subsequently recorded in his own Memoirs, from which the preceding narrative has in part been taken. He there said, "At my return to Paris I found division among all the authorities, and none agreed except on this single point, that the constitution was half destroyed and could no longer save the public liberty. All parties came to me, and unfolded their designs; but I refused to belong to any of them. The Council of the Ancients then summoned me; I answered their appeal. A plan for a general restoration had been concerted among the men in whom the nation had been accustomed to see the defenders of its liberty, its equality, and property; but that plan demanded a calm and deliberate investigation, exempt from all agitation or control, and therefore the legislative body was transferred by the Council of the Ancients to St Cloud." After narrating the events of the morning of the 18th, it proceeded thus:—"I presented myself to the Council of the Five Hundred, alone and unarmed, in the same manner as I had been received with transport by the Ancients. I was desirous of rousing the majority

¹ Mign. ii.
462. Lac.
xiv 433,
434

over Revolution. On the contrary, numerous acts of mercy, as wise as they were magnanimous, illustrated the rise of the Consular throne. The law of hostages and the forced loans were abolished; the priests and persons proscribed by the revolution of 18th Fructidor were permitted to return: the emigrants who had been shipwrecked on the coast of France, and thrown into prison, where they had been confined for four years, were set at liberty. Measures of severity were at first put in force against the violent Republicans; but they were gradually relaxed, and finally given up. Thirty-seven of this obnoxious party were ordered to be transported to Guiana, and twenty-one to be put under the observation of the police; but the sentence of transportation was soon changed into one of *surveillance*, and even that was shortly abandoned. Nine thousand state prisoners, who languished at the fall of the Directory in the prisons of France, received their liberty. Their numbers, two years before, had been sixty thousand. The elevation of Napoleon was not only unstained by blood, but not even a single captive long lamented the progress of the victor. A signal triumph of the principles of humanity over those of cruelty, glorious alike to the actors and the age in which it occurred; and a memorable proof how much more durable the victories gained by moderation and wisdom are, than those achieved by violence and stained by blood.¹

The revolution of the 18th Brumaire had established a provisional government, and overturned the Directory; but it still remained to form a permanent constitution. In the formation of it a rupture took place between Siéyes and Napoleon. The views of the former, long based on speculative opinions, and strongly tinged with

to an exertion of its authority, when twenty assassins precipitated themselves on me, and I was only saved from their hands by the brave grenadiers, who rushed to me from the door. The savage cry of 'Hors la loi' arose; the howl of violence against the force destined to repress it. The assassins instantly surrounded the president; I heard of it, and sent ten grenadiers, who extricated him from their hands. The factious, intimidated, left the hall and dispersed. The majority, relieved from their strokes, re-entered peaceably into its hall, deliberated on the propositions submitted to it in the name of the public weal, and passed a salutary resolution, which will become the basis of the provisional constitution of the Republic." Under such colours did Napoleon veil one of the most violent usurpations against a legislature recorded in history. When such falsehood was employed in matters occurring at St Cloud, it renders probable all that Bourrienne has said of the falsehood of the bulletins in regard to more distant transactions.—See NAPOLEON, i. 98, 101.

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52.

Clemency of
Napoleon
after his
victory.

¹ Nap. in
Month. i.
178. Mign.
ii. 463. Lac.
xiv. 434,
440.

53.

Formation
of a consti-
tution.

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republican ideas, were little likely to accord with those of the young conqueror, accustomed to rule every thing by his single determination; and whose sagacity had already discovered the impossibility of forming a stable government out of the institutions of the Revolution. He allowed Siéyes to mould, according to his pleasure, the legislature, which was to consist of a Senate or Upper Chamber; a Legislative body, without the power of debate; and a Tribune, which was to discuss the legislative measures with the Council of State; but opposed the most vigorous resistance to the plan which he brought forward for the executive, which was so absurd, that it is hardly possible to imagine how it could have been seriously proposed by a man of ability. The plan of this veteran constitution-maker, who had boasted to Talleyrand ten years before, that "politics was a science which he flattered himself he had brought to perfection," was to have vested the executive in a single *Grand Elector*, who was to inhabit Versailles, with a salary of 600,000 francs a-year, and a guard of six thousand men, and represent the state to foreign powers. This singular magistrate was to be vested with no immediate authority; but his functions were to consist in the power of naming two consuls, who were to exercise all the powers of government, the one being charged with the interior, the finances, police, and public justice; the other with the exterior, including war, marine, and foreign affairs. He was to have a council of state, to discuss with the legislature all public measures. He was to be irresponsible, but liable to removal at the pleasure of the senate.—It was easy to perceive that, though he imagined he was acting on general principles, Siéyes in this project was governed by his own interests; that the situation of grand elector he destined for himself, and the military consulship for the conqueror of Arcola and Rivoli.¹

¹ Jom. xii.
113, 415.
Mign. ii.
164, 465.
Dum. 64.

54.
Napoleon's
objection to
Siéyes's
plan.

Napoleon, who saw at once that this senseless project, besides presenting insurmountable difficulties in practice, would reduce him to a secondary part, exerted all his talents to combat the plan of Siéyes. "Can you suppose," said he, "that any man of talent or consideration will submit to the degrading situation assigned to the grand elector? What man, disposing of the national force,

would be base enough to submit to the discretion of a Senate, which, by a simple vote, could send him from Versailles to a second flat in Paris? Were I grand elector, I would name as my Consul of the exterior Berthier, and for the interior some other person of the same stamp. I would prescribe to them their nominations of ministers; and the instant that they ceased to be my staff-officers I would overturn them." Siéyes replied, "that in that case the grand elector would be absorbed by the Senate." This phrase got wind, and threw such ridicule over the plan in the minds of the Parisians, that even its author was compelled to abandon it. He soon found that his enterprising colleague would listen to no project which interfered with the supreme power, which he had already resolved to obtain for himself, and which, in truth, was the only form of government capable at that period of arresting the disorders, or terminating the miseries, of France.¹

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¹Jom. xli.
417, 418.
Nap. ii. 141,
143. Mign.
ii. 468.

The ideas of Napoleon were unalterably fixed; but he was too clear-sighted not to perceive that time, and a concession, in form at least, to public opinion, were necessary ere he could bring them into practice. "I was convinced," says he, "that France could not exist but under a monarchical form of government; but the circumstances of the times were such, that it was thought, and perhaps was, necessary to disguise the supreme power of the president. All opinions were reconciled by the nomination of a FIRST CONSUL, who alone should possess the authority of government, since he singly disposed of all situations, and possessed a deliberative voice, while the two others were merely his advisers. That supreme officer gave the government the advantage of unity of direction: the two others, whose names appeared to every public act, would soothe the republican jealousy. The circumstances of the times would not permit a better form of government." After long discussion, this project was adopted. The government was in fact exclusively placed in the hands of the First Consul; the two other Consuls had a right to enlighten him by their counsels, but not to restrain him by their vote. The Senate, itself nominated by the Consuls, selected out of the list of candidates who had been chosen by the nation those who were to be the members of the

55.
Napoleon's
appointment
as First
Consul.

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1 Mign. ii.
464, 465.
Const. Tit.
iii. Nap. i.
363, 364.
Bignon, i.
27, 28.

56.

Total abro-
gation of the
power of
the people.

Tribunate and Legislature. Government alone was invested with the right of proposing laws. The Legislative body was interdicted the right of speaking; it was merely to deliberate and decide upon the questions discussed before it by the Tribunate, and the Council of State nominated by the Consuls; the first being understood to represent the interests of the people, the second that of the government. The Legislative body was thus transformed from its essential character in a free state, that of a deliberative assembly, into a supreme court, which heard the state pleadings, and by its decision formed the law.¹

The people no longer were permitted to choose deputies for themselves, either in their primary assemblies or electoral colleges. They were allowed only to choose the *persons eligible* to these offices, and from the lists thus furnished, government made its election. The whole citizens first chose a tenth of their number in each arrondissement, who formed the electors of the *commune*. This body, composed of the electors, again chose out of the list of eligible persons for the *department* a tenth, who were to form the departmental electors, and they again a tenth of their body, who formed the list out of which the legislature was to be chosen. The Senate, in the close of all, selected such as it chose out of the last list, thus trebly purified, to form the Legislative Body. The senators being nominated by the First Consul, and holding their situations for life, the whole legislature was subjected to the control of the executive. Its duty was strictly conservative, to watch over the maintenance of the fundamental laws, and the purification of the other branches of the legislature. All public functionaries, civil and military, including the whole judges, instead of being chosen, as heretofore, by the people, were appointed by the First Consul, who thus became the sole depository of influence. The lowest species of judges, called *juges de paix*, were alone left in the gift of the people. By means of the Senate, chosen from his creatures, he regulated the legislature and possessed the sole initiative of laws; by the appointment to every office, he wielded the whole civil force of the state; by the command of the military, he overawed the discontented, and governed its external relations.²

The departmental lists were the most singular part of

1 Jom. xii.
420, 421.
Mign. ii.
464, 468, 469.
Const. Tit.
iv. sec. 41.
Bign. i. 27,
28.

the new constitution. Every person born and residing in France, above twenty-one, was a citizen; but the rights of citizenship were lost by bankruptcy, domestic service, crime, or foreign naturalisation. But the *electors* were a much more limited body. "The citizens of each *arrondissement* chose by their suffrages those whom they deemed fit to conduct public affairs, amounting to not more than a *tenth* of the electors. The persons contained in this first list were alone eligible to official situations in the *arrondissement* from which they were chosen. The citizens embraced in this list chose a tenth of their number for each *département*, which formed the body alone eligible for departmental situations. The citizens chosen by the departmental electors again selected a tenth of their number, which formed the body alone capable of being elected for national situations."¹ The persons on the first list were only eligible to the inferior situations, such as *juges de paix*, a species of arbiters to reconcile differences and prevent lawsuits; those on the second were the class from whom might be selected the prefects, the departmental judges, tax-gatherers, and collectors; those on the third, who amounted only to *six thousand* persons, were alone eligible to public offices, as the Legislature, any of the Ministries of State, the Senate, the Council of State, the Tribunal of Cassation, the ambassadors at foreign courts. Thus, the whole offices of state were centred in six thousand persons, chosen by a triple election from the citizens. The lists were to be revised, and all the vacancies filled up every three years. These lists of notability, as Napoleon justly observed, formed a limited and exclusive nobility, differing from the old noblesse only in this, that it was elective, not hereditary; and it was, from the very first, subject to the objection, that it excluded from the field of competition many of the most appropriate persons to hold public situations. The influence of the people in the legislature was, by these successive elections, completely destroyed, and the whole power of the state, it was early foreseen, would centre in the First Consul. The changes introduced, diffused, however, general satisfaction. All the members of the legislature received pensions from government: that of the senators was 25,000 francs, or £1000 a-year;² that of the Tribunate, 15,000 francs, or

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57.

Outlines of
the new con-
stitution,
and forma-
tion of the
eligible
classes.

¹ Const. Tit.
i. sec. 78, 79.

² Const. Tit.
ii. and iii.
Nap. i. 139,
141, 361, 362

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58.
Appoint-
ments in ad-
ministration
made by Na-
poleon.

5000 yearly; that of the Legislative Body, 20,000 francs, or 5000 a year. The Senate was composed of persons above forty years of age; the Legislative Body, above thirty. A senator remained in that high station for life, and was ineligible to any other situation.

On the 24th December 1798, the new constitution was proclaimed; and the whole appointments were forthwith filled up, without waiting for the lists of the eligible, who were, according to its theory, to be chosen by the people. Two consuls, eighty senators, a hundred tribunes, three hundred legislators, were forthwith nominated, and proceeded to the exercise of all the functions of government. In the choice of persons to fill such a multitude of offices, ample means existed to reward the moderate, and seduce the Republican party; and the consuls made a judicious and circumspect use of the immense influence put into their hands. Siéyes, discontented with the overthrow of his favourite ideas, retired from the government; received as a reward for his services 600,000 francs and the estate of Crosne, afterwards changed for the more valuable domain of Faisanderie in the park of Versailles; and the democratic fervour of the author of the pamphlet—"What is the Tiers-Etat?" sunk into the interested apathy of the proprietor of fifty thousand pounds. Roger Ducos also withdrew, perceiving the despotic turn which things were taking; and Napoleon appointed in their stead Cambacérès and Lebrun, men of moderation and probity, who worthily discharged the subordinate functions assigned to them in the administration. "In the end," said Napoleon, "you must come to the government of boots and spurs; and neither Siéyes nor Roger Ducos was fit for that."¹ Talleyrand was made minister of foreign affairs, and Fouché retained in the ministry of the police; the illustrious La Place received the portfolio of the interior. By the latter appointments Napoleon hoped to calm the fears and satisfy the ambition of the Republican party. Siéyes was very adverse to the continuance of Fouché in office, but Napoleon was resolute. "We have arrived," said he, "at a new era; we must recollect in the past only the good, and forget the bad. Age, the habits of business, and experience, have formed or modified many characters."² High salaries were given to all the public functionaries,

¹ Las Cas.
ii. 353.

² Mign. ii.
468, 469.
Jom. xii.
422, 423.
Nap. i. 113.
Goh. ii. 6, 8.

on condition only that they should live in a style of splendour suitable to their station : a wise measure, which both secured the attachment of that powerful body of men, and precluded them from acquiring such an independence as might enable them to dispense with employment under government.

A curious incident occurred on occasion of the dismissal of Siéyes, highly characteristic of the disposition of that veteran of the Revolution, as well as of the preceding governments. At the first meeting which Napoleon had with him in the apartments of the Directory, Siéyes, after cautiously shutting the doors, and looking round to see that he was not overheard, said, in a low voice to Napoleon, pointing to a bureau, "Do you see that piece of furniture? You will not easily guess what it is worth. It contains 800,000 francs. During our magisterial duties, we came to perceive that it would be unseemly for a Director to leave office without being worth a farthing; and we therefore fell upon the expedient of getting this depot, from whence every one who retired might take a suitable sum. But now the Directory is dissolved, what shall we do with it?"—"If I had been officially informed of it," said Napoleon, "it must have been restored to the public treasury; but as that is not the case, I am not supposed to know any thing of the matter. Take it, and divide it with Ducos; but make haste, for to-morrow it may be too late." Siéyes did not require a second bidding; that very day he took out the treasure, "but appropriated," says Napoleon, "600,000 francs to himself, and gave only 200,000 to poor Ducos." In truth, Ducos got only 100,000; the Grand Elector absorbed all the rest.¹ This treasure, however, was far from satisfying Siéyes. One day, soon after, he said to Napoleon, "How fortunate you are; all the glory of the 18th Brumaire has fallen to your lot; while I shall probably incur only blame for my share in the attempt."—"What!" exclaimed Napoleon, "have not the consular commissaries passed a resolution that you have deserved well of your country? Tell me honestly, what do you want?" Siéyes, with a ridiculous grimace, replied, "Do you not think, citizen-consul, that some *national domain*, a monument of the national gratitude, would be a fit recompense to one who has coöperated with you in your great designs?"—

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59.

Gross cupidity of Siéyes.

¹ Gen. ii. 5.

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¹ Nap. i. 146.
Las Cas. ii.
350. Goh.
ii. 5, 8.

"Oh! I understand you now," said Napoleon; "I will speak with Ducos on the subject." Two days afterwards appeared a decree of the commission of the Councils, awarding to Siéyes the national domain of Crosne, in "name of national recompense." But Siéyes soon found out that the nation had not the right to dispose of the estate of Crosne; and it was exchanged for the superb Hotel del Infantado in Paris, and the rich lands of Faisanderie in the park of Versailles.¹

60.
Immense
majority of
the people
who approv-
ed of the
new consti-
tution.

² Mign. ii.
469.

Such was the exhaustion of the French people, occasioned by revolutionary convulsions, that this constitution, destroying, as it did, all the objects for which the people had combated for ten years, was gladly adopted by an immense majority of the electors. It was approved of by 3,011,007 citizens; while that of 1793 had only obtained 1,801,918 suffrages, and that in 1795, which established the Directory, 1,057,390.² These numbers are highly instructive. They demonstrate, what so many other considerations conspire to indicate, that even the most vehement changes are brought about by a factious and energetic minority, and that it is often more the supineness than the numerical inferiority of the better class of citizens which subjects them to the tyranny of the lowest. In 1789, indeed, the great majority of all classes were carried away by the fever of innovation; but these transports were of short duration; and from the time that the sombre days of the Revolution began, their numerical superiority was at an end. It was the terrors and disunion of the class of proprietors, which, by leaving no power in the state, but the populace and their demagogues, delivered the nation over to the horrors of Jacobin slavery.

61.
Reflections
on the acces-
sion of Na-
poleon to
the Consti-
tutional
Throne.

Such was the termination of the changes of the French Revolution; and such the government which the people brought upon themselves by their sins and their extravagance. On the 23d June 1789, before one drop of blood had been shed or one estate confiscated, Louis offered the States-General a constitution containing all the elements of real freedom, with all the guarantees which experience has proved to be necessary for its continuance; the security of property, the liberty of the press, personal freedom, equality of taxation, provincial assemblies, the voting of

taxes by the States-General, and the vesting of the legislative power in the representatives of the three estates in their separate chambers.¹ The popular representatives, seduced by the phantom of democratic ambition, refused the offer, usurped for themselves the whole powers of sovereignty, and with relentless rigour pursued their victory, till they had destroyed the clergy, the nobles, and the throne. France waded through an ocean of blood: calamities unheard of assailed every class, from the throne to the cottage; for ten long years the struggle continued, and at length it terminated in the establishment, by universal consent, of a government which swept away every remnant of freedom, and consigned the state to the tranquillity of military despotism. So evidently was this result the punishment of the crimes of the Revolution, that it appeared in that light even to some of the principal actors in that convulsion. In a letter written by Siéyes to Riouffe at that period, he said, "It is then for such a result that the French nation has gone through its Revolution! The ambitious villain! He marches successfully through all the ways of fortune and crime—all is vanity, distrust, and terror. There is here neither elevation nor liberality. *Providence wishes to punish us by the Revolution itself.* Our chains are too humiliating; on all sides nothing is to be seen but powers prostrated, leaden oppression; military despotism is alone triumphant. If any thing could make us retain some esteem for the nation, it is the luxury of perfidy of which it has been the victim. But the right of the sabre is the weakest of all; for it is the one which is soonest worn out."²

Had this been merely a temporary result, the friends of freedom might have found some consolation in the reflection, that the elements at least of ultimate liberty were laid, and that the passing storm had renovated, not destroyed, the face of society. But the evil went a great deal deeper. In their democratic fervour, the people had pulled down the bulwarks not only of order, but of liberty: and when France emerged from the tempest, the classes were extinct whose combined and counteracting influence are necessary for its existence. "The principle of the French Revolution," says Napoleon, "being the absolute equality of all classes, there resulted from it a

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¹ See chap.
iv. § 68.² Siéyes to
Riouffe, Jan.
17, 1800;
Hard. vii.
371.62.
Durable
freedom had
been ren-
dered im-
possible by
the destruc-
tion of the
aristocracy
and clergy.

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1789.

¹ Nap. i. 145,
146.² Bacon, ii.
282.

total want of aristocracy. If a republic is difficult to construct on any durable basis without an order of nobles, much more so is a monarchy. To form a constitution in a country destitute of any species of aristocracy, is like *attempting to navigate in a single element*. The French Revolution has attempted a problem as insoluble as the direction of balloons."¹ "A monarchy," says Lord Bacon, "where there is no nobility at all, is ever a pure and absolute tyranny, as that of the Turks; for nobility attempts sovereignty, and draws the eyes of the people somewhat aside from the line royal."² In these profound observations is to be found the secret of the subsequent experienced impossibility of constructing a durable free government in France, or preserving any thing like a balance between the different classes of society. The Revolution had left only the government, the army, and the people; no intermediate rank existed to counteract the influence of the former, or give durability to the exertions of the latter. Left to themselves, the people were no match in the long run for an executive wielding the whole military force of the kingdom, and disposing in offices and appointments, ere long even in pacific periods, of above £40,000,000 a-year.

63.
All revolutions after this were revolutions of the palace only.

In moments of excitement, the democratic spirit may become powerful; and by infecting the military, give a momentary triumph to the populace; but, with the cessation of the effervescence, the influence of government must return with redoubled force, and the people be again subjected to the yoke of servitude, either under the old government or the new one which they have installed in its stead. In such a state of society all convulsions, though effected by the physical force of the people, must be revolutions of the palace only. Casual bursts of democratic passion cannot maintain a long contest in a corrupted age with the steady efforts of a regular government; and if they could, they would lead only to the transference of despotic power from one set of rulers to another. It is hard to say whether liberty has most to dread, in such circumstances, from its friends or its enemies. Durable freedom is to be secured only by the steady, persevering efforts of an aristocracy, supported, when necessary, by the enthusiasm of the people, and hindered from running

into excess by the vigour of the executive. In all ages of the world, and under all forms of government, it is in the equipoise of these powers that freedom has been formed, and from the destruction of one of them that the commencement of servitude is to be dated. The French Revolution, by totally destroying the whole class of the aristocracy, and preventing, by the abolition of primogeniture, its reconstruction, has rendered this balance impossible, and, instead of the elements of European freedom, left in society only the instruments and the victims of Asiatic despotism. It is as impossible to construct a durable free government with such materials, as it would be to form glass or gunpowder with two only of the three elements of which they are composed; and the result has completely established the truth of these principles. The despotism of Napoleon was, till his fall, the most rigorous of any in Europe: and although France enjoyed fifteen years of liberty under the Restoration, when the swords of Alexander and Wellington had righted the balance, and the recollection of subjugation had tamed for a time the aspirations of democracy; yet, with the rise of a new generation and the oblivion of former disaster, the scales were anew subverted, the constitutional monarchy was overturned, and from amidst the smoke of the Barricades, the awful figure of military power again emerged.

Grievous as has been the injury, however, to the cause of freedom, which the ruin of the French aristocracy has occasioned, it is not so great or so irreparable as has resulted from the destruction of the Church, and consequent irreligion of the most energetic part of the population. This evil has spread to an unparalleled extent, and produced mischiefs of incalculable magnitude. If it be true, as the greatest of their philosophers has declared, that it was neither their numbers, nor their talent, nor their military spirit, which gave the Romans the empire of the world, but the religious feeling which animated their people,* it may be conceived what consequences must have resulted from the extinction of public worship over a whole coun-

64.

Disastrous
effects of the
irreligion of
France.

* "Nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis et terræ domestico nativeque sensu, Italos ipsos et Latinos; sed pietate ac religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod Deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique persperimus, omnes gentes, nationesque superavimus."—CICERO.

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try, and the rising up of a generation ignorant of the very elements of religious belief. It is the painful duty of the moralist to trace the consequences of so shocking an act of national impiety, in the progressive dissolution of manners, the growth of selfishness, and the unrestrained career of passion, by which so large a portion of the French people have since been distinguished; but its effects upon public freedom are, in a political point of view, equally important.

65.
Its lasting
alliance with
the selfish
passions.

Liberty is essentially based on the generous feelings of our nature; it requires often the sacrifice of private gratification for the public good; it can never subsist for any length of time without that heroic self-denial, which can only be founded on the promises and the belief of religion. We must not confound with this generous and elevated spirit the desire for licentiousness, which chafes against every control whether human or divine; the one is the burst of vegetation in its infancy, and gives promise of the glories of summer and the riches of harvest; the other the fermentation which precedes corruption. By destroying the Church, and educating a whole generation without any religious principles, France has given a blow to her freedom and her prosperity, from which she can never recover. The fervour of democracy, the extension of knowledge, will give but a transient support to liberty, when deprived of that perennial supply which is derived from the sense of duty that devotion inspires. "As Atheism," says Lord Bacon, "is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means of exalting itself above human frailty; and as it is in particular persons, so it is in nations." Passion will find as many objects of gratification under a despotism as under a republic; seduction is as easy from private as from public desires; pleasure is as alluring in the palace of opulence as in the forum of democracy. The transition is in general slow from patriotic principle or public spirit to private gratification, because they spring from the ~~opposite~~ motives to human conduct; but it is rapid from rebellion against the restraints of virtue, to thralldom under the chains of vice, for the former is but the commencement of the latter.

"The character of democracy and despotism," says

Aristotle, "is the same. Both exercise a despotic authority over the better class of citizens; decrees are in the one what ordinances and arbitrary violence are in the other. In different ages, the democrat and court favourite are not unfrequently *the same men*, and always bear a close analogy to each other; they have the principal power in their respective forms of government; favourites with the absolute monarch; demagogues with the sovereign multitude."¹ "Charles II." says Chateaubriand, "threw Republican England into the arms of women;" but, in truth, it was not the amorous monarch who effected the change; it was the easy transition from democratic license to general corruption, which debased the nation at the Restoration. Mr Hume has observed, that religious fanaticism during the Civil Wars disgraced the spirit of liberty in England; but, in truth, it was the only safeguard of public virtue during those critical times; and but for the unbending austerity of the Puritans, public freedom would have irrecoverably perished in the flood of licentiousness which overwhelmed the country on the accession of Charles II. "Knowledge," says Lord Bacon, "is power;" he has not said it is either wisdom or virtue. It augments the influence of opinion upon mankind; but whether it augments it to good or evil purpose, depends upon the character of the information which is communicated, and the precautions against corruption which are simultaneously taken. As much as it enlarges the foundations of prosperity in a virtuous, does it extend the sources of corruption in a degenerate age. Unless the moral and religious improvement of the people extends in proportion to their intellectual cultivation, the increase of knowledge is but an addition to the lever by which vice dissolves the fabric of society.

The revolutionary party have frequently said, that it was Napoleon who constructed with so much ability the fabric of despotism in France; but, in truth, it was not he that did it, nor ~~was~~ his power, great as it was, ever equal to the task. It was the Constituent Assembly who broke up the fabric of society in France, and left only a disjointed, misshapen mass, an easy prey to the first despotism which should succeed it. By destroying the parliaments, provincial assemblies, and courts of law; by annihilating the old

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66.

Identity of
courtiers and
democrats.

1 Arist. de
Pol. iv. § 4.

67.

Prodigious
effects of the
centralisation
of
power introduced by the
Revolution.

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1799.

divisions and rights of the provinces ; by extinguishing all corporations and provincial establishments, at the same time that they confiscated the property of the Church, drove the nobles into exile, and soon after seized upon their estates, they took away for the future all elements of resistance to the power of the metropolis. Every thing was immediately centralised in its public offices ; the lead in all public matters taken by its citizens ; and the direction of every detail, however minute, assumed by its ministers. France, ever since, has fallen into a state of subjection to Paris, to which there is nothing comparable even in the annals of Oriental servitude. The ruling power in the East is frequently shaken, sometimes overturned, by tumults originating in the provinces ; but there has been no example, since the new *régime* was fully established by the suppression of the La Vendée rebellion, of the central authority in France being shaken except by movements originating in the capital. The authority of Robespierre, Napoleon, Louis, and Louis Philippe, were successively acknowledged by thirty millions over the country, as soon as a faction in Paris had obtained the ascendancy ; and the obedient departments waited for the announcement of the telegraph, or the arrival of the mail, to know whether they should salute an emperor, a king, a consul, or a decemvir. This total prostration of the strength of a great nation before the ruling power in the metropolis, could never have taken place under the old government ; and, accordingly, nothing of the kind was experienced under the monarchy. It was the great deeds of democratic despotism perpetrated by the Constituent Assembly which destroyed all the elements of resistance in the provinces, and left France a helpless multitude, necessarily subject to the power which had gained possession of the machinery of government. Despotic as the old government of France was, it could never have attempted such an arbitrary system ; even the power of the Czar Peter, or the Sultaun Mahmoud, would have been shattered, on attempting such an invasion of established rights and settled interests. A memorable instance of the extreme danger to which the interests of freedom are exposed from the blind passions of democracy ; and of the fatal effect of the spring-flood which drowns the institutions of a state, when the opposing powers of the people and the

government are brought for a time to draw in the same direction.

To all human appearance, therefore, the establishment of permanent freedom is hopeless in France; the bulwarks of European liberty have disappeared in the land, and over the whole expanse is seen only the level surface of Asiatic despotism. This grievous result is the consequence and the punishment of the great and crying sins of the Revolution; of the irreligious spirit in which it was conceived; the atheistical measures which it introduced; the noble blood which it shed; the private right which it overturned; the boundless property which it confiscated. But for these offences, a constitutional monarchy, like that which for a century and a half has given glory and happiness to England, might have been established in its great rival; because, but for these offences, the march of the Revolution would have been unstained by crime. In nations, as in individuals, a harvest of prosperity never yet was reaped from seed sown in injustice. But nations have no immortality; and that final retribution which in private life is often postponed, to outward appearance at least, to another world, is brought with swift and unerring wings upon the third and fourth generation in the political delinquencies of mankind.

Does, then, the march of freedom necessarily terminate in disaster? Is improvement, inevitably allied to innovation, innovation to revolution? And must the philosopher, who beholds the infant struggles of liberty, ever foresee in their termination the blood of Robespierre, or the carnage of Napoleon? No! The distinction between the two is as wide as between day and night—between virtue and vice. The simplest and rudest of mankind may distinguish, with as much certainty as belongs to erring mortals, whether the ultimate tendency of innovations is beneficial or ruinous—whether they are destined to bring blessings or curses on their wings. This test is to be found in the character of those who support them; and the moral justice or injustice of their measures. If those who forward the work of reform are the most pure and upright in their private conduct; if they are the foremost in every moral and religious duty; most unblemished in their intercourse with men, and most undeviating in their duty

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68.

Hopeless
state of the
cause of
freedom in
France

69.

Distinction
between the
safe and
dangerous
spirit of
freedom.

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to God ; if they are the best fathers, the best husbands, the best landlords, the most charitable and humane of society, who take the lead ; if their proceedings are characterised by moderation, and they are scrupulously attentive to justice and humanity in all their actions : then the people may safely follow in their steps, and anticipate blessings to themselves and their children from the measures they promote. But if the reverse of all this is the case ; if the leaders who seek to rouse their passions are worthless or suspicious in private life ; if they are tyrannical landlords, faithless husbands, negligent fathers ; if they are sceptical or indifferent in religion, reckless or improvident in conduct, ruined or tottering in fortune ; if they are selfish in their enjoyments, and callous and indifferent to the poor ; if their liberty is a cloak for licentiousness, and their patriotism an excuse for ambition ; if their actions are hasty and inconsiderate, and their measures calculated to do injustice or create suffering to individuals, on the plea of state necessity : then the people may rest assured that they are leading them to perdition ; that the fabric of liberty never yet was reared by such hands, or on such a basis ; and that, whatever temporary triumph may attend their steps, the day of reckoning will come, and that an awful retribution awaits them or their children.

70.
Immense
impulse
given by the
changes of
the Revolution,
to the
spread of
Christianity
over the
world.

The final result of the irreligious efforts of the French people is singularly illustrative of the moral government to which human affairs are subject, and of the vanity of all attempts to check that spread of religion which has been decreed by Almighty power. When the Parisian philosophers beheld the universal diffusion of the spirit of scepticism which they had produced ; when a nation was seen abjuring every species of devotion, and a generation rising in the heart of Europe ignorant of the very elements of religious belief, the triumph of infidelity appeared complete, and the faithful trembled and mourned in silence at the melancholy prospects which were opening upon the world. Yet in this very spirit were preparing, by an unseen hand, the means of the ultimate triumph of civilised over barbaric belief, and of a greater spread of the Christian faith than had taken place since it was embraced by the tribes who overthrew the Roman empire. In the deadly strife of European ambition, the arms of civilisa-

tion acquired an irresistible preponderance; with its last convulsions, the strength of Russia was immeasurably augmented, and that mighty power, which had been organised by the genius of Peter and matured by the ambition of Catherine, received its final development from the invasion of Napoleon. The Crescent, long triumphant over the Cross, has now yielded to its ascendant; the barrier of the Caucasus and the Balkan have been burst by its champions; the ancient war-cry of Constantinople, "Victory to the Cross!" has, after an interval of four centuries, been heard on the *Ægean* Sea; and that lasting triumph; which all the enthusiasm of the Crusaders could not effect, has arisen from the energy infused into what was then an unknown tribe, by the infidel arms of their descendants. In such marvellous and unforeseen consequences, the historian finds ample grounds for consolation at the temporary triumph of wickedness; from the corruption of decaying, he turns to the energy of infant civilisation: while he laments the decline of the principles of prosperity in their present seats, he anticipates their resurrection in those where they were first cradled; and traces, through all the vicissitudes of nations, the incessant operation of those general laws which provide, even amidst the decline of present greatness, for the final improvement and elevation of the species.

CHAPTER. XXX.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF NAPOLEON TO THE OPENING
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.CHAP.
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1.

Napoleon's
letter, pro-
posing peace
to the
British Go-
vernment.
Dec. 25.

THE first step of Napoleon upon arriving at the Consular Throne was to make proposals of peace to the British Government. The debate on that subject in Parliament is the most important that occurred during the war, and forms the true introduction to the political history of Europe during the nineteenth century. The letter of Napoleon, which, contrary to all diplomatic usage, was addressed directly to the King of England, couched in his usual characteristic language, was in these terms: "Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first station in the Republic, I think it proper on entering into office to make a direct communication to your Majesty. The war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the globe, is it destined to be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their independence and safety require, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the benefits of commerce, prosperity, and domestic happiness? How has it happened that they do not feel that peace is of the first necessity as well as the truest glory? These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who reign over a free nation with the sole desire of rendering it happy. You will see in this overture only the effect of a sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a step speedy, implying confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, however necessary to disguise the dependence of

feeble states, prove only in those which are strong the mutual desire of deceiving each other. France and England may, by the abuse of their strength, still for a time, to the misfortune of nations, retard the period of their annihilation; but I will venture to say, the fate of all civilised nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world."

To this letter the following answer was returned by Lord Grenville, the English minister of foreign affairs:—

"The King has given frequent proofs of his sincere desire for the re-establishment of secure and permanent tranquillity in Europe. He neither is, nor has been, engaged in any contest for a vain and false glory. He has had no other view than that of maintaining against all aggression the rights and happiness of his subjects. For these he has contended against an unprovoked attack; and for the same objects he is still obliged to contend. Nor can he hope that this necessity would be removed by entering at the present moment into a negotiation with those whom a fresh revolution has so recently placed in the exercise of power in France; since no real advantage can arise from such negotiation to the great and desirable object of a general peace, until it shall distinctly appear that those causes have ceased to operate which originally produced the war, and by which it has been since protracted, and in more than one instance renewed. The same system, to the prevalence of which France justly ascribes all her present miseries, is that which has also involved the rest of Europe in a long and destructive warfare, of a nature long since unknown to the practice of civilised nations. For the extension of this system, and for the extermination of all established governments, the resources of France have, from year to year, and in the midst of the most unparalleled distress, been lavished and exhausted. To this indiscriminate spirit of destruction, the Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Swiss Cantons, his Majesty's ancient allies, have been successively sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged; and Italy, though now rescued from its invaders, has been made the scene of unbounded rapine and anarchy. His Majesty himself has been compelled to maintain an arduous and burdensome contest for the independence and existence of his kingdom.

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2.
Lord Grenville's answer.

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3.

His statement of the grounds on which peace is impossible.

" While such a system continues to prevail; and while the blood and treasure of a numerous and powerful nation can be lavished in its support, experience has shown that no defence but that of open and steady hostility can be availing. The most solemn treaties have only prepared the way for fresh aggression; and it is to a determined resistance alone that is now due whatever remains in Europe of security for property, personal liberty, social order, or religious freedom. For the security, therefore, of these essential objects, his Majesty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general professions of pacific dispositions. Such dispositions have been repeatedly held out by all those who have successively directed the resources of France to the destruction of Europe, and whom the present rulers have declared to have been, from the beginning and uniformly, incapable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity. Greatly, indeed, will his Majesty rejoice if it shall appear that the dangers to which his own dominions and those of his allies have so long been exposed have really ceased: whenever he shall be satisfied that the necessity for resistance is at an end; that, after the experience of so many years of crimes and miseries, better principles have ultimately prevailed in France; and that all the gigantic projects of ambition, and all the restless schemes of destruction which have endangered the very existence of civil society, have at length been finally relinquished. But the conviction of such a change, however agreeable to his Majesty's wishes, can result only from experience and the evidence of facts.

4.

Terms on which the government could alone treat.

" The best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence would be the restoration of that line of princes, which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home and consideration and respect abroad. Such an event would at once have removed, and will at any time remove, all obstacles in the way of negotiation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient territory; and it would give to all the other nations in Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that security which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But, desirable as such an event must be, both to France and the world, it is not to this mode exclusively that his Majesty limits the possi-

bility of secure and solid pacification. His Majesty makes no claim to prescribe to France what shall be the form of her government, or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. He looks only to the security of his own dominions and those of his Allies, and to the general safety of Europe. Whenever he shall judge that such security can in any manner be attained, as resulting either from the internal situation of the country from whose internal situation the danger has arisen, or from such other circumstances, of whatever nature, as may produce the same end, his Majesty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his Allies the means of a general pacification. Unhappily, no such security hitherto exists; no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability."¹

To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand, the French minister for foreign affairs:—"Very far from France having provoked the war, she had, it must be recollected, from the very commencement of the Revolution, solemnly proclaimed her love of peace, her disinclination for conquests, her respect for the independence of all governments; and it is not to be doubted that, occupied at that time entirely with her own internal affairs, she would have avoided taking any part in those of Europe, and would have remained faithful to her declarations. But from an opposite disposition, as soon as the French Revolution had broken out, almost all Europe entered into a league for its destruction. The aggression was real, long before it was public; internal resistance was excited, its opponents were favourably received, then extravagant declamations were supported, the French nation was insulted in the person of its agents, and England particularly set this example, by the dismissal of the minister accredited by France; finally, France was in fact attacked in her independence, in her honour, and in her safety, long before war was declared. Thus it is to the projects of dismemberment, subjection, and dissolution, which were prepared against her, and the execution of which was several times attempted and pursued, that France has a right to impute the evils which she has suffered, and those which have afflicted Europe. Such projects

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¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiv.

5.
Talleyrand's
reply. His
statement of
the conduct
of France.

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6.
M. Talley-
rand's reply
continued.
And of her
inclination
to peace.

for a long time, without example with respect to so powerful a nation, could not fail to bring on the most fatal consequences. Assailed on all sides, the Republic could not but extend universally the efforts of her defence, and it is only for the maintenance of her own independence that she has made use of those means which she possessed in her own strength and the courage of her citizens.

"As long as she saw that her enemies obstinately refused to recognise her rights, she counted only upon the energy of her resistance, but as soon as they were obliged to abandon the hope of invasion, she sought for means of conciliation, and manifested pacific intentions; and if these have not always been efficacious—if, in the midst of the critical circumstances of her internal situation, which the Revolution and the war have successively brought on, the former depositaries of the executive power in France have not always shown as much moderation as the nation itself has shown courage—it must, above all, be imputed to the fatal and persevering animosity with which the resources of England have been lavished to accomplish the ruin of France. But if the wishes of his Britannic Majesty, in conformity with his assurances, are in unison with those of the French Republic for the re-establishment of peace, why, instead of attempting the apology of the war, should not attention be paid to the means of terminating it? The First Consul of the French Republic cannot doubt that his Britannic Majesty must recognise the right of nations to choose the form of their government, since it is from the exercise of this right that he holds his crown; but he cannot comprehend how, after admitting this fundamental principle, upon which rests the existence of political societies, he could annex insinuations which tend to an interference in the internal affairs of the Republic, and which are not less injurious to the French nation and its government, than it would be to England and his Majesty, if a sort of invitation were held out in favour of that Republican form of government of which England adopted the forms about the middle of the last century, or an exhortation to recall to the throne that family whom their birth had placed there, and whom a Revolution had compelled to descend from it."¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiv. 1199,
1202.

These able state papers are not only valuable as exhibit-

ing the arguments advanced by the opposite parties in this memorable contest, but as containing an explicit and important declaration of the object uniformly pursued by Great Britain throughout its continuance. The English ministry never claimed a right to interfere in the internal affairs of France, or dictate to her inhabitants the form of government or race of sovereigns they were to choose ; the object of the war is there expressly declared to have been, what it always was, defensive. It was undertaken, not to impose a government upon France, but to prevent its imposing one upon other nations ; not to partition, or circumscribe its territory, but to oppose a barrier to the inundation of infidel and democratical principles, by which the Republic first shook the opinions of the multitude in all the adjoining states, and then, having divided their inhabitants, overthrew their independence. The restoration of the Bourbons was held forth as the mode most likely to remove these dangers ; but by no means as an indispensable preliminary to a general pacification, if adequate security against them could in any other way be obtained. Of the reality of the peril, the existence of the Batavian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, Helvetian, Roman, and Parthenopeian republics, most of whom had been revolutionised in a state of profound peace, afforded ample evidence ; and it was one which increased rapidly during any interval of hostilities, because it was then that the point of the wedge was most readily inserted by the revolutionary propagandists into an unsuspecting people.

The debates, however, which followed in both Houses of Parliament on this momentous subject, were still more important, as unfolding the real views of the contending parties, and forming the true key to the grounds on which it was thereafter rested on both sides. On the part of the Opposition, it was urged by Mr Fox and Mr Erskine, " Now is the first time when the House are assembled in a new epoch of the war ; without annexing any epithet to it, or advertng to its unparalleled calamities, it cannot be denied that a new era in any possible war, or one which leads to a nearer prospect of peace, is a most critical and auspicious period. The real question is, whether the House of Commons can say, in the face of a suffering nation and a desolated world, that a lofty, imperious, declamatory, insulting answer to a proposition professing peace and con-

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7.
Reflections
on this nego-
tiation.8.
Arguments
of the Oppo-
sition for an
immediate
peace.
Speech of
Mr Fox.

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1799.

ciliation, is the answer which should have been sent to France, or to any human government. Though they might not be able to determine what answer, in the circumstances of the country, should have been sent, they could, without the possibility of being mistaken, pronounce that the answer given was odiously and absurdly wrong. As a vindication of the war, it was loose, and in some parts unfounded; but as an answer to a specific proposition, it was dangerous as a precedent to the best interests of mankind. It rejected the very idea of peace, as if it were a curse; and held fast to war, as an inseparable adjunct to the prosperity of nations.

9.
His general
argument
against the
war.

"The French Revolution was undoubtedly, in its beginning, a great and awful event, which could not but extend its influence more or less to other nations. So mighty a fabric of despotism and superstition, after having endured for ages, could not fall to the ground without a concussion which the whole earth should feel; but the evil of such a Revolution was only to be averted by cautious internal policy, and not by external war, unless it became impossible, from actual and not speculative aggression, to maintain the relations of peace. The question was not, whether the tendency of the Revolution was beneficial or injurious, but what was our own policy and duty as connected with its existence? In Mr Burke's words, applied to the American Revolution, the question is not, whether this condition of human affairs deserves praise or blame, but what, in God's name, are you to do with it?

10.
And against
the principles
on which it was
first grounded.

"When war was first proclaimed by this country, after the death of Louis, it was rested on the 'late atrocious act perpetrated at Paris.' Then, as now, it was provoked, and peace rejected upon general and unjustifiable objections—speculative dangers to religion and government, which, supposing them to have existed, with all their possible consequences, were more likely to be increased than diminished by the bitterness of war. At that time, ministers were implored not to invite war upon principles which made peace dependent upon systems and forms of government, instead of the conduct of nations; upon theories which could not be changed, instead of aggressions which might be adjusted. France had then, and for a long time after, a strong interest in peace; she had not then extended her conquests; but Europe combined to

extinguish France, and place her without the pale of the social community; and France, in her turn, acted towards Europe on the same principles. She desolated and ravaged whatever countries she occupied, and spread her conquests with unexampled rapidity. Could it be expected that so powerful a nation, so assailed, should act merely on the defensive, or that, in the midst of a revolution which the confederacy of surrounding nations had rendered terrible, the rights of nations would be respected? Ambitious projects, not perhaps originally contemplated, followed their steps; and the world was changed with portentous violence, because the government of Great Britain had resolved, that, if changed at all, it should revert to establishments which had reached their period and expired.

"In 1795, without any pacific proposition from France, when the government of France was not a month old, at a time when the alarm was at its height in England, and the probable contagion of French principles, by the intercourse of peace, was not only the favourite theme of ministers, but made the foundation of a system by which some of our most essential liberties were abridged—even these ministers invited the infant, democratic, Jacobin, regicide republic of France to propose a peace. On what principle, then, can peace now be refused when the danger was so much diminished, because the resistless fury of that popular spirit which had been the uniform topic of declamation had not only subsided, from time and expansion, but was curbed, or rather extinguished, by the forms of the new government which invited us to peace? If Buonaparte found that his interests were served by an arrangement with England, the same interests would lead him to continue it. Surrounded with perils, at the head of an untried government, menaced by a great confederacy, of which England was the head, compelled to press heavily upon the resources of an exhausted people, it was not less his interest to propose than it was ours to accept peace.

"It is impossible to look without the most bitter regret on the enormities which France has committed. In some of the worst of them, however, the Allies have joined her. Did not Austria receive Venice from Buonaparte? and is not the receiver as bad as the thief? Has not Russia

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11.

Argument
from the former
peace of 1795.

12.

Errors of the
Allies.

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attacked France? Did not the Emperor and the King of Prussia subscribe a declaration at Pilnitz which amounted to a hostile aggression? Did they not make a public declaration, that they were to employ their forces, in conjunction with the other kings of Europe, 'to put the King of France in a situation to establish, in perfect liberty, the foundations of a monarchical government equally agreeable to the rights of sovereigns and the welfare of the French?' and, whenever the other princes should co-operate with them, did they not 'then, and in that case, declare their determination to act promptly, and by mutual consent, to obtain the end proposed by all of them?' Can gentlemen lay their hands on their hearts, and not admit that the fair construction of this is, that whenever the other powers should concur, they would attack France, then at peace with them, and occupied only in domestic and internal regulations?

13.
Remarks on
the Revolutionary
decree of Nov.
19, 1792.

"The decree of 19th November 1792, is alleged as a clear act of aggression, not only against England, but against all the sovereigns of Europe. Much weight should not be attached to that silly document, and it has been sufficiently explained by M. Chauvelin, when he declared that it never was meant to proclaim the favour of France for insurrection, but that it applied to those people only who, after having acquired their liberty by conquest, should demand the assistance of the Republic. Should not a magnanimous nation have been satisfied with this explanation; and where will be the end of wars, if idle and intemperate expressions are to be made the groundwork of bitter and never-ending hostilities? Where is the war, pregnant with so many horrors, next to be carried? Where is it to stop? Not till you establish the House of Bourbon!—and this you cherish the hope of doing, because you have had a successful campaign. But is the situation of the Allies, with all they have gained, to be compared with what it was after Valenciennes was taken? One campaign is successful to you; another may be so to them; and in this way, animated by the vindictive passions of revenge, hatred, rancour, which are infinitely more flagitious than those of ambition and the thirst of power, you may go on for ever, as, with such black incentives, no end can be foreseen to human misery.¹ And all

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiv. 1291,
1398.

this without an intelligible motive, merely that you may gain a better peace a year or two hence. Is then peace so dangerous a state, war so enviable, that the latter is to be chosen as a state of probation, the former shunned as a positive evil?"

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On the other hand, it was contended by Mr Pitt and Lord Grenville, "The same necessity which originally existed for the commencement and prosecution, still called for perseverance in the war. The same proneness to aggression, the same disregard to justice, still actuated the conduct of the men who rule in France. Peace with a nation by whom war was made against all order, religion, and morality, would rather be a cessation of resistance to wrong than a suspension of arms in the nature of an ordinary warfare. To negotiate with established governments was formerly not merely easy, but in most circumstances safe; but to negotiate with the government of France now would be to incur all the risks of an uncertain truce, without attaining the benefits even of a temporary peace. France still retains the sentiments, and is constant to the views which characterised the dawn of her Revolution. She was innovating, she is so still; she was Jacobin, she is Jacobin still; she declared war against all kings, and she continues to this hour to seek their destruction. Even the distant commonwealth of America could not escape that ravaging power, and bordering on a state of active and inveterate war were the relations of those two states for a long time. The Republic, indeed, has frequently published her disinclination to conquest; but has she followed up that declaration by any acts indicating a corresponding disposition? Have we not seen her armies march to the Rhine, seize the Netherlands, and annex them to her dominions? Have we not witnessed her progress in Italy? Are not the wrongs of Switzerland recent and marked? Even into Asia she has carried her lust for dominion; severed from the Porte, during a period of profound peace, a vast portion of its empire; and stimulated 'Citizen Tippoo' to engage in that contest which ultimately proved his ruin?"

14.
And of Mr
Pitt and the
government
for refusing
to treat.

"The Republic has proclaimed her respect for the independence of all governments. How have her actions corresponded with this profession? Did not Jacobin

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15.

The aggres-
sions of
France on
Switzerland,
&c.

France attempt the overthrow of every government ? Did she not, whenever it suited her purpose, arm the governors against the governed, or the governed against the governors ? How completely has she succeeded, during a period of profound peace which had been unbroken for centuries, in convulsing the population, and so subduing the independence of Switzerland ! In Italy, the whole fabric of civil society has been changed, and the independence of every government violated. The Netherlands, too, exhibit to mankind monuments of the awful veneration with which the Republic has regarded the independence of other states. The memorable decree of November 1792, has not slept a dead letter in their statute-book. No : it has ever since been the active energetic principle of their whole conduct, and every nation is interested in the extinction of that principle for ever.

16.

Her general
faithlessness
to treaties.

“ Every power with whom the Republic has treated, whether for the purpose of armistice or peace, could furnish melancholy instances of the perfidy of France, and of the ambition, injustice, and cruelty of her rulers. Switzerland concluded a truce with the Republic ; her rulers immediately excited insurrections among her cantons, overthrew her institutions, seized her fortresses, robbed her treasures, the accumulation of ages, and, to give permanence to her usurpations, imposed on her a government new alike in form and substance. The Grand Duke of Tuscany was among the earliest sufferers by a treaty of peace with the Republic. In every thing he strove to conform to the views of France ; her rulers repeated to him her assurances of attachment and disinclination to conquest ; but at the very time that the honour of the Republic was pledged for the security of his states, he saw the troops of his ally enter his capital, and he himself was deposed and a democracy given to the Florentines. The King of Sardinia opened the gates of his capital to the Republican arms, and, confiding in the integrity of the French government, expected to be secured in his dominions by the treaty which guaranteed his title and his rights, and communicated to France equal advantages. He was, however, in a state of peace, invaded in his dominions, forced to fly to his insular possessions, and Turin treacherously taken possession of by the Republican troops.

The change in the Papal government was another part of the same system. It was planned by Joseph Buonaparte in his palace. He excited the populace to an insurrection; and effected a revolution in the capital at the head of the Roman mob. To Venice their conduct was still more atrocious. After concluding an armistice with the Archduke Charles, Buonaparte declared that he took the Venetians under his protection, and overturned the old government by the movements excited among the people; but no sooner was the national independence in this way destroyed, than he sold them to the very Imperial government against whose alleged oppression he had prompted them to take up arms. Genoa received the French as friends; and the debt of gratitude was repaid by the government being revolutionised; and, under the authority of a mock constitution, the people plundered, and the public independence subverted.

"It is in vain to allege that these atrocities are the work of former governments, and that Buonaparte had no hand in them. The worst of these acts of perfidy have been perpetrated by himself. If a treaty was concluded and broken with Sardinia, it was concluded and broken by Buonaparte. If peace was entered into and violated with Tuscany, it was entered into and violated by Buonaparte. If Venice was first seduced into revolutionary revolt, and then betrayed and sold to Austria, it was by Buonaparte that the treachery was consummated. If the Papal government was first terrified into submission, and then overturned by rebellion, it was Buonaparte who accomplished the work. If Genoa was convulsed in a state of profound peace, and then sacrificed, it was by Buonaparte that the perfidious invasion was committed. If Switzerland was first seduced into revolution, and then invaded and plundered, it was by the deceitful promises and arts of Buonaparte that the train was laid. Even the affiliated republics and his own country have not escaped the same perfidious ability. The constitution which he forced on his countrymen, at the cannon's mouth, on the 13th Vendémiaire, he delivered up to the bayonets of Augereau on the 18th Fructidor, and overturned with his grenadiers on the 18th Brumaire. The constitution of the Cisalpine republic, which he himself had established, was overthrown by his lieutenant,

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17.
Napoleon's
share in
these atrocities.

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Berthier. He gained possession of Malta by deceitful promises, and immediately handed it over to the Republic. He declared to the Porte that he had no intention to take possession of Egypt, and yet he avowed to his army that he conquered it for France, and instantly roused the Copts into rebellion against the Mamelukes. He declared to the Mußulmans* that he was a believer in Mahomet,* thus demonstrating that, even on the most sacred subjects, truth was set at nought when any object was to be gained by its violation. Nay, he has, in his official instructions, openly avowed this system; for in his instructions to Kleber, he declares, 'You may sign a treaty to evacuate Egypt, but do not execute the articles, and you may find a plausible excuse for the delay in the observation, that they must be sent home to be submitted to the Directory.' What reliance can be placed on a power which thus uniformly makes peace or truce a stepping-stone to further aggressions; and systematically uses perfidy as an allowable weapon for circumventing its enemies? And what is especially worthy of observation, this system is not that of any one man; it has been the principle of all the statesmen, without exception, who have governed France during the Revolution—a clear proof that it arises from the force of the circumstances in which they are placed, and the ruinous ascendancy of irreligious principles in the people; and that the intentions of the present ruler of the country, even if they were widely different from what they are, could afford no sort of security against its continuance.

18.
Advantages
of peace to
France.

"France would now derive great advantages from a general peace. Her commerce would revive; her seamen be renewed, her sailors acquire experience; and the power which hitherto has been so victorious at land, would speedily become formidable on another element. What benefit could it bring to Great Britain? Are our harbours blockaded, our commerce interrupted, our dockyards empty? Have we not, on the contrary, acquired an irresistible preponderance on the seas during the war, and is not the trade of the world rapidly passing into the hands

* This was strictly true. "They will say I am a Papist," said Napoleon. "I am no such thing. I was a Mahometan in Egypt. I would become a Catholic here for the good of the people. I am no believer in any particular religion; but as to the idea of a God, look up to the heavens, and say who made that."—See TRIMBAUDAU, *Sur le Consulat*, 153.

of our merchants ? Buonaparte would acquire immense popularity by being the means of bringing about an accommodation with this country ; if we wish to establish his power, and permanently enlist the energy of the Revolution under the banners of a military chieftain, we have only to fall into the snare which he has so artfully prepared. In turbulent republics, it has ever been an axiom to maintain internal tranquillity by external action ; it was on that principle that the war was commenced by Brissot and continued by Robespierre, and it is not likely to be forgotten by the military chief who has now succeeded to the helm of affairs.

“ It is in vain to pretend that either the Allied powers or Great Britain were the aggressors in the terrible contest which has so long desolated Europe. In investigating this subject, the most scrupulous attention to dates is requisite. The attack upon the Papal states by the seizure of Avignon in August 1791, was attended by a series of the most sanguinary excesses which disgraced the Revolution ; and this was followed, in the same year, by an aggression against the whole empire, by the seizure of Porentrui, part of the dominions of the Bishop of Bâle. In April 1792, the French government declared war against Austria ; and in September of the same year, without any declaration of their intention, or any cause of hostility, and in direct violation of their promises to abstain from conquest, they seized Savoy and Nice, upon the pretence that nature had destined them to form a part of France. The assertion that this war was rendered necessary by the threatening alliance formed at Pilnitz, is equally devoid of foundation. That celebrated declaration referred only to the state of imprisonment in which Louis XVI. was kept, and its immediate object was to effect his deliverance, if a concert among the European powers could be brought about for that purpose, leaving the internal state of France to be decided by the king when restored to his liberty, with the free consent of the states of the kingdom, without one word relative to its dismemberment. This was fully admitted in the official correspondence which took place between this country and Austria ; and as long as M. Delessart was minister of foreign affairs in France, there was a great probability that the differences would be ter-

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19.

France the
aggressor in
the war.

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minated amicably ; but the war party excited a tumult in order to dispossess him, as they considered, in Brissot's words, that ' war was necessary to consolidate the Revolution.' Upon the King of France's acceptance of the constitution, the emperor notified to all the courts of Europe that he considered it as his proper act, and thereby the convention of Pilnitz fell to the ground ; and the event soon proved the sincerity of that declaration, for when war was declared by the French in 1792, the Austrian Netherlands were almost destitute of troops, and soon fell a prey to the Republicans.

20
Pacific conduct of
Great Britain.

" Great Britain at this time, and for long after, entertained no hostile designs towards France. So far from it, on 29th December, 1792, only a month before the commencement of hostilities, a note was sent by Lord Grenville to the British ambassador at St Petersburg, imparting to Russia the principles on which we acted, and the terms on which we were willing to mediate for peace, which were, ' the withdrawing the French arms within the limits of their territory, the abandoning their conquests, the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of other nations, and the giving, in some unequivocal manner, a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles or excite disturbances against other governments. In return for these stipulations, the different powers of Europe might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against France, or interference in its internal affairs.' Such were the principles on which we acted ; and what, then, brought on the war with this country ? The insane decrees of 19th November and 15th December 1792, which amounted to a declaration of war against all governments, and the attack on our allies the Dutch, and the opening of the Scheldt, in open prosecution of the new code of public law then promulgated by the Republic.

21.
Principle of
the Republicans
which renders war
inevitable.

" The fundamental principle of the revolutionary party in France always has been an insatiable love of aggrandisement, an implacable spirit of destruction against all the civil and religious institutions of every other country. Its uniform mode of proceeding has been to bribe the poor against the rich, by proposing to transfer into new hands, on the delusive notion of equality, and in breach of every principle of justice, the whole property of the country ;

the practical application of this principle has been to devote the whole of that property to indiscriminate plunder, and make it the foundation of a revolutionary system of finance, productive in proportion to the misery and desolation which it created. It has been accompanied by an unwearied spirit of proselytism, diffusing itself over all the nations of the earth ; a spirit which can apply itself to all circumstances and all situations ; hold out a promise of redress equally to all nations ; which enables the teachers of French liberty to recommend themselves to those who live under the feudal code of the German empire, the various states of Italy, the old Republicans of Holland, the new republicans of America, the Protestants of Switzerland, the Catholics of Ireland, the Mussulmans of Turkey, and the Hindoos of India ; the natives of England, enjoying the perfection of practical freedom, and the Copts of Egypt, groaning under the last severity of Asiatic bondage. The last and distinguishing feature is a perfidy which nothing can bind ; which no ties of treaty, no sense of the principles generally received among nations, no obligation, human or divine, can restrain. Thus qualified, thus armed for destruction, the genius of the French Revolution marched forth the terror and dismay of the world. Every nation has in its turn been the witness, many have been the victims, of its principles ; and it is left now for us to decide whether we will enter into compromise with such a danger, while we have yet resources to supply the sinews of war, while the heart and spirit of the country is yet unbroken, and while we have the means of calling forth and supporting a powerful co-operation in Europe. ‘*Cur igitur pacem nolo ?—quia infida est, quia periculosa, quia esse non potest.*’”¹*

The House, upon a division, supported the measures of Administration by a majority of two hundred and sixty-five to sixty-four. Feb. 3, 1800.

In judging of this decision of the British government, which formed the true commencement of the second period of the war, that in which it was waged with Napoleon, it is of importance to recollect the circumstances in which he was placed, and the nature of the government which he

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¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiv. 1206,
1349.

22.
Napoleon's
views on the
necessity of
conquest to
his exis-
tence.

* It is impossible, in this abstract, to give any idea of the splendid and luminous speeches made on this memorable occasion in the British Parliament. They are reported at large in Hansard, and throw more light on the motives and objects of the war than any other documents in existence.

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had assumed. France had *not ceased to be revolutionary* ; but its energies were now, under a skilful and enterprising chief, turned to military objects. He was still, however, borne forward upon the movement, and the moment he attempted to stop he would have been crushed by its wheels. No one was more aware of this than the First Consul himself. "The French government," said Napoleon in 1800, "has no resemblance to those which surround it. Hated by all its neighbours, obliged to restrain many different classes of malcontents within its bosom, it stands in need of action, of *éclat*, and, by consequence, of war, to maintain an imposing attitude against so many enemies."—"Your government," replied Thibaudeau, "has no resemblance to one newly established. It assumed the *toga virilis* at Marengo ; and, sustained by a powerful head and the arms of thirty millions of inhabitants, its place is already sufficiently prominent among the European powers."—"Do you really think that sufficient !" replied Napoleon ; "*it must be first of all, or it will perish.*"—"And to obtain such a result, you see no other method than war ?"—None other, citizen."¹—"His fixed opinion from the commencement," says Bourrienne, "was, that if stationary he would fall ; that he was sustained only by continually advancing, and that it was not sufficient to advance, but he must advance rapidly and irresistibly."—"My power," said he, "depends on my glory, and my glory on the victories which I gain. My power would instantly fall, if it were not constantly based on fresh glory and victories. Conquest made me what I am : conquest alone can maintain me in that position. A government newly established has need to dazzle and astonish ; when its *éclat* ceases it perishes. It is in vain to expect repose from a man who is the concentration of movement."²

¹ Thibaudeau, Consul, 393.

² Bour. iii. 214.

23.
Reflections
on this sub-
ject.

Such were Napoleon's views ; and that they were perfectly just, with reference to his own situation, is evident from the consideration that a revolutionary power, whether in civil or military affairs, has never yet maintained its ascendancy in any other way. But, these being his principles, and the independence of England forming the great stumbling-block in his way, it is evident that no permanent peace with him was practicable ; that every accommodation could have been only a truce ; and that it never

would be proposed, unless in circumstances when it was for his interest to gain a short breathing-time for fresh projects of ambition.* The event completely proved the justice of these views, and forms the best commentary on the prophetic wisdom of Mr Pitt. Every successive peace on the Continent only paved the way for fresh aggressions; and at length he was precipitated upon the snows of Russia, by the same invincible necessity of dazzling his subjects by the lustre of additional victories which was felt in the commencement of his career. "His power, without and within," says Marshal St Cyr, "was founded solely on the *éclat* of his victories. By intrusting himself without reserve to fortune, he imposed upon himself the necessity of following it to the utmost verge whither it would lead him. Unheard-of success had attended enterprises, the temerity of which was continually increasing; but thence arose a necessity to keep for ever awake the terror and admiration of Europe, by new enterprises and more dazzling triumphs."

"The more colossal his power became, the more immeasurable his projects required to be, in order that their unexpected success should keep up the same stupor in the minds of the vulgar. Admiration, enthusiasm, ambition, the emotions on which his dominion was founded, are not durable in their nature; they must be incessantly fed with fresh stimulants; and to effect that, extraordinary efforts are requisite. These principles were well known to Napoleon; and thence it is that he so often did evil, albeit knowing better than any one that it was evil, overruled by a superior power, from which he felt it was impossible to escape. The rapid movement which he impressed on the affairs of Europe was of a kind which could not be arrested; a single retrograde step, a policy which

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24.
St Cyr's
views on it.

* This accordingly was openly avowed by Napoleon himself. "England," said he in January 1800, "*must be overturned*. As long as my voice has any influence, it will never enjoy any respite. Yes! yes! war to the death with England for ever—aye, till its destruction."¹ He admits, in his own Memoirs, that when he made these proposals to Mr Pitt, he had no serious intention of concluding peace. "I had then," said he, "need of war; a treaty of peace which would have derogated from that of Campo Formio and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every imagination. Mr Pitt's answer accordingly was impatiently expected. When it arrived, it added me with a secret satisfaction." His answer could not have been more favorable. From that moment I foresaw that, with such impassioned antagonists, I would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies."—*Nap. in Month.* i. 33, 34.

1 D'Abr. ii.
179, 180.

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indicated a stationary condition, would have been the signal of his fall. Far, therefore, from making it subject of reproach to Napoleon, that he conceived an enterprise so gigantic as the Russian expedition, he is rather to be pitied for being placed in a situation where he was overruled by necessity; and this furnishes the true answer to those who would ascribe to chance, the rigour of the elements, or an excess of temerity, what was in truth but the inevitable consequence of the false position in which for fifteen years France had been placed."¹ It is this law of the moral world which rendered durable peace with that country, when headed by a revolutionary power, impossible; and which was ultimately destined to inflict an awful retribution on its guilt and its ambition. Experience, therefore, has now proved that Mr Pitt's view of the character of the revolutionary war was well founded; and that the seizure of the consular throne by Napoleon, only gave a new and more dangerous direction to that restless and insatiable spirit which had arisen from the convulsions which the Revolution had produced.

1 St Cyr,
Hist. Mil.
iii. 3, 4.

25.
Great error
of the Eng-
lish Opposi-
tion at this
period.

Justice requires that it should be declared, that, in espousing the cause of the enemy on this occasion, and uniformly palliating the crimes of the popular party in that country, the English Opposition were led, by the spirit of party, to forget equally the duties of patriotism and the dictates of reason. No hesitation need be felt by a British writer in expressing this opinion, because the ablest of the liberal party in France themselves admit that their partisans in this country fell into this enormous error. "Nothing," says Madame de Staël, "was more contrary to Buonaparte's nature, or his interest, than to have made peace in 1800. He could only live in agitation; and if any thing could plead his apology with those who reflect on the influence of external circumstances on the human mind, it is, that he could only breathe freely in a volcanic atmosphere. It was absolutely necessary for him to present, every three months, a new object of ambition to the French, in order to supply, by the grandeur and variety of external events, the vacuum occasioned by the removal of all objects of domestic interest. At that epoch, unhappily for the spirit of freedom in England, the English Opposition, with Mr Fox at their head, took an entirely

false view of Napoleon ; and hence it was that that party, previously so estimable, lost its ascendant in the nation. It was already too much to have defended France under the Reign of Terror : but it was, if possible, a still greater fault to have considered Buonaparte as identified with the principles of freedom, when in truth he was their deadliest enemy."—"The eloquent declarations of Mr Fox," says General Mathieu Dumas, "cannot invalidate the facts brought forward by Mr Pitt and Lord Grenville as to the origin of the war. The Girondists alone were the cause of its commencement. The names of those impostors who, to overturn the monarchical throne of France, prevailed on the King to declare that fatal war, should be consigned to an execrable celebrity ; they alone brought down on Europe and their country a deluge of calamities."²

War being thus resolved on, the most vigorous measures were taken, both by Parliament and the executive, to meet the dangers with which it might be attended. Parliament voted the sum of £500,000 to the crown, for the purpose of immediately aiding Austria in the armaments which she had in contemplation, and Mr Pitt stated that a loan of £2,500,000 to the Emperor would be advanced. The budget brought forward by the chancellor of the exchequer exhibited a most flattering picture of the public credit, and proved that, notwithstanding the immense expenditure of the eight preceding campaigns, the national resources were still unimpaired.* The extraordinary fact which he mentioned, that, in the eighth year of the war, a loan of eighteen millions and a half had been obtained at the rate of four and three-fourths per cent, proved the enduring credit of the government, and the almost boundless extent of the wealth of England ; but both that great financier and the British public, misled by the fallacious brilliancy of present appearances, overlooked the grievous burden which the contraction of debt in the three *per cents*,—in other words, the imposition of a burden of £100 for every £60 advanced,—was ultimately to produce upon the national resources.³

The land forces of Great Britain in this year amounted to 168,000 men, exclusive of 80,000 militia ; and for the service of the fleet, 120,000 seamen and marines were

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¹ *Mad. de Staël, Rév. Franç. ii.*
268, 270.

² *Dum. iv.*
308, 312.

26.
The parliament resolve on war.
Supplies voted by the British Parliament.

³ *Parl. Hist.*
xxxiv. 1439,
1442, and
1515, and
Ann. Reg.
151, 152.
App. to Chron.

* See *App. A*, chap. xxx.

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27.

Land and sea
forces voted.

¹ James, ii.
App. No. 8.
Ann. Reg.
160, and 144.
App. to
Chron.

28

Mr Dundas's
India
budget.

² Parl. Hist.
xxxiv. 1471;
xxxv. 14,
15. Ann.
Reg. 1801,
112, 116.

voted. The ships in commission were no less than 510, including 124 of the line. From a table laid before Parliament in this year, it appeared that the whole troops, exclusive of militia, which had been raised for the service of the state during the eight years from 1792 to 1800, had been only 208,000; a force not greater than might have been easily levied in a single year, out of a population then amounting to nearly sixteen millions, in the three kingdoms; and which, if ably conducted, and thrown into the scale, when nearly balanced between France and Austria, would unquestionably have terminated the war at the latest in two campaigns.¹*

Several domestic measures of great importance took place in this session of Parliament. The bank charter was renewed for twenty-one years, there being twelve of the old charter still to run; in consideration of the advantages of which, the directors agreed to give the public a loan of £3,000,000 for six years without interest; the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act was continued by a great majority in both houses of Parliament; and Mr Dundas brought forward a full and satisfactory account of the affairs of India.† The union of Ireland with Great Britain was, after a stormy debate in both houses of Parliament in Dublin, carried by a large majority, chiefly through the powerful abilities, cool courage, and vigorous efforts of LORD CASTLEREAGH, who then gave the first specimen of that indomitable firmness and steady perseverance which were afterwards destined, on a greater stage, to lead the coalition against France to a glorious issue in the campaign of 1814.² This great measure, however, was not carried without the most violent opposition, both in the

* The number of troops raised yearly from the commencement of the war for the regular army, was as follows—a woful picture of the ignorance which then prevailed as to the means of combating a revolutionary power:

1793,	.	.	17,038	1797,	.	.	16,096
1794,	.	.	38,561	1798,	.	.	21,457
1795,	.	.	40,460	1799,	.	.	41,316
1796,	.	.	16,336	1800,	.	.	17,124

Total in eight years, 208,388

Whereas the French, with a population of 25,000,000, raised in 1792, 700,000, and in 1793, 1,500,000 soldiers. Prussia, with a population of 4,000,000, raised in 1813 nearly 200,000 men.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 144, *App. to Chronicle*. The population of Great Britain, according to the census of 1800, was 10,942,000, that of Ireland probably 5,000,000.

† See *App. B*, Chap. xxx.

Irish 'Peers and Commons; and it left the seeds of an animosity between the two islands, which, fostered by religious rancour and democratic passion, produced melancholy effects in after times upon the tranquillity and strength of the empire.

By the treaty of Union, the Peers for the united Imperial Parliament were limited, from Ireland, to twenty-eight temporal and four spiritual peers, the former elected for life by the Irish peerage, the latter by rotation; the commoners fixed at one hundred. The Churches of England and Ireland were united, and provision was made for their union, preservation, and the continuance of their discipline, doctrine, and worship for ever. Commercial privileges were fairly communicated; the national debt of each was imposed as a burden on its own finances, and the general expenditure ordered to be defrayed, for twenty years after the Union, in the proportion of fifteen for Great Britain and two for Ireland. The laws and courts of both kingdoms were maintained on their existing footing, subject to such alterations as the united Parliament might deem expedient. This important step was carried in the British House of Commons by a majority of 208 to 26, and in the Lords by 75 to 7.¹

The debates on this subject in the British Parliament, which, although highly important in English, are not of sufficient moment for quotation in European history, are chiefly remarkable for the complete blindness of all parties to the real and ultimate consequences of the measure which was adopted. Mr Pitt was most desirous to show that the influence of the *crown* would not be unduly augmented by the Irish members in the House of Commons; while Mr Grey contended that "ultimately at least, the Irish members will afford a certain accession of force to the party of every administration, and therefore forty of the most decayed boroughs should be struck off before the Union takes place. He accordingly moved, that it should be an instruction to the House to guard against the increase of the influence of the crown in the approaching Union." To us, who know that by the aid of the Irish members, and their aid alone, even after the franchise had been raised from forty shillings to ten pounds by the

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29.
Union with
Ireland
passes the
Parliament
of Great
Britain and
Ireland.
Its leading
provisions.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 31,
150, 195.

30.
Views of the
leaders on
both sides of
Parliament
on this great
change.

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1800.

4

Duke of Wellington, the great democratic change of 1832 on the British constitution was carried,* these speculations as to the ultimate consequences of the Union are singular monuments of the difficulty which even the greatest intellects experience in prognosticating the consequences of any considerable alteration in the frame of government. In truth, the decisive addition which the Irish members furnished to the democratic party of the empire on the first great crisis which occurred, adds another to the numerous examples which history affords of the extreme peril of applying to one country the institutions or government of another, or of supposing that the system of representation which the habits of centuries have moulded to a conformity with the interests of one state, can be adopted without the utmost hazard by another in an inferior stage of civilisation, inheriting from its forefathers a more ardent temperament, or under the influence of more vehement passions.¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxvi. 47,
101.

31.
Great prosperity of the British empire at this period, and prodigious rise of prices.

Ever since the great financial crisis of 1797, and the limitation of cash payments by the act of that year, followed by the issue of two and one-pound notes by the Bank of England, which immediately ensued, the prosperity of the British empire had been steadily and rapidly increasing. The expenditure of above sixty millions a-year by government, either in the current expenses or the payment of interest on debt, and the increase of the issues by the bank from eleven millions to above fifteen during that period,† had produced a most extraordinary effect on the national industry. Prices of every species of produce had rapidly and steadily risen; that of grain in 1800, exclusive of the effects of the scarcity of that year,

* English and Scotch members for the Reform Bill on its first division,							251
Against it,	-	-	-	-	-	-	266—15
Ireland, against it,	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
For it,	-	-	-	-	-	-	53—16

Thus it was the admission of the Irish members which effected that great alteration in the English constitution.

† Bank of England notes in circulation last quarter, of—

	Five pounds.	Two and one pounds.	Totals.
1797,	L.10,411,700	- L.1,230,700	L.11,642,400
1798,	10,711,690	- 1,730,380	12,442,070
1799,	12,335,920	- 1,671,040	13,006,960
1800,	13,338,670	- 2,062,300	15,400,970

‡ See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, p. 148, *App. to Chronicle*.

was double what it had been in 1792, and every other article had advanced in a similar proportion.* The consequence was, that the industrious classes were, generally speaking, in affluent circumstances; immense fortunes rewarded the efforts of commercial enterprise; the demand for labour, encouraged by the employment of nearly four hundred thousand soldiers and sailors in the public service, was unbounded; the numerous indirect taxes, heavy as they were, scarcely appeared a burden amidst the constant rise in the money price of the produce of industry; and even the increasing weight of taxation, and the alarming magnitude of the debt, were but little felt amidst the general rise of prices and incomes which resulted from the profuse expenditure and lavish issue of paper by government.†

One class only, that of annuitants, and all others depending on a fixed income, underwent, during those years, a progressive decline of comfort, which was increased in many cases to the most poignant distress by the high prices and severe scarcity which followed the disastrous harvest of 1799. The attention of Parliament was early directed to the means of alleviating the famine of that

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1800.

32.

Bad harvest
of 1799, and
consequent
scarcity in
1800.

* Highest and lowest price of grain in five years, ending respectively—

1790, from 51s. 11d. to 39s. 2d.

1795, ... 74s. 2d. ... 42s. 11d.

1800, ... 113s. 7d. ... 50s. 3d.

—See MONDEL'S *Industrial Situation of Great Britain*, 53.

† According to Mr Pitt's statement in 1800, the British exports, imports, shipping, tonnage, and revenue in the under-mentioned years, stood as follows:

<i>Imports.</i>	
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1793,	- L.18,685,000
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1801,	- 25,259,000

<i>Exports.</i>	
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1793:	
Manufactures,	- L.14,771,000
Foreign goods,	- 5,468,000
	<hr/> L.20,239,000

On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1801:	
Manufactures,	- L.20,085,000
Foreign goods,	- 12,867,000
	<hr/> L.32,952,000

<i>Shipping, &c.</i>			
	<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>	<i>Seamen.</i>
Shipping in 1788,	- 13,827	- 1,363,000	107,925
1792,	- 16,079	- 1,540,145	118,286
1800,	- 18,877	-	143,661

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1800.

33.

Great efforts of government to relieve it, and noble patience of the people.

year. Six reports were made by the Commons and two by the Lords on the dearth of provisions ; but the government, although severely pressed by the public suffering, steadily resisted all those harsh or violent measures which procure a present relief at the expense of future confidence in the cultivators. An act was passed to lower the quality of all the bread bakēd in the kingdom ; the importation of rice and maize encouraged by liberal bounties ; distillation from grain stopped, and by these and other means an additional supply, to the enormous amount of 2,600,000 quarters, nearly a tenth part of the annual consumption at that period, was procured for the use of the inhabitants.* By these generous and patriotic efforts, joined to the admirable patience and forbearance of the people, this trying crisis was surmounted without any of those convulsions which might have been anticipated from so severe a calamity during a period of almost universal war ; and in the latter part of the year, England, so far from being overwhelmed by its reverses, was enabled to present an undaunted front to the hostility of combined Europe.

Deprived by the secession of Russia of the power from whom they had derived such efficacious assistance in the

Permanent taxes, exclusive of war taxes:					
Year ending 5th Jan.	1793,	-	-	-	I. 14,284,000
Do.	do.	1794,	-	-	13,941,000
Do.	do.	1795,	-	-	13,858,000
Do.	do.	1796,	-	-	13,557,000
Do.	do.	1797,	-	-	14,292,000
Do.	do.	1798,	-	-	13,332,000
Do.	do.	1799,	-	-	14,275,000
Do.	do.	1800,	-	-	15,743,000

<i>Gross receipts from taxes:</i>				
1797,	-	-	-	L.23,076,000
1798,	-	-	-	30,175,000
1799,	-	-	-	34,750,000
1800,	-	-	-	33,535,000

—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 1563.

* The resources obtained in this way are thus detailed in the sixth report of the Commons :

Importation of wheat from Jan. 1 to Oct. 1,	Quarters.
Do. of flour from America, -	170,000
Do. of flour from Canada, -	580,000
Do. of rice, equal to -	30,000
Stoppage of starch, equal to -	630,000
Do. of distilleries, -	40 000
Use of coarse meal, -	360,000
Retrenchment, -	400,000
	300,000

2,510,000

preceding campaign, Austria and England made the utmost efforts to prosecute the war with vigour. By their united influence, the German empire was prevailed upon to sign a treaty, binding the states who composed it to furnish a contingent of three hundred thousand men for the common cause ; but very few of the electors obeyed the requisition, and the troops of the empire were of hardly any service in the succeeding campaign. To stimulate their languid dispositions, a vigorous circular was, in the beginning of December, sent by the Archduke Charles to the anterior circles of the empire, in which he strenuously urged the formation of new levies, and pointed out, in energetic terms, the futility of the idea that any durable peace was practicable with a country in such a state of revolutionary excitement as France, and the vanity of supposing that, by concentrating all the powers of government in the hands of a victorious chieftain, it was likely to be either less formidable or more pacific. But although that great general was indefatigable in his endeavours to put the Imperialists on a respectable footing, and rouse them to make the most active preparations for war, he was far from feeling any confidence in the issue of the approaching contest, now that Russia was withdrawn on the one side and Napoleon was added on the other ; and he earnestly counselled the Austrian cabinet to take advantage of the successes of the late campaign, and the recent changes of government in France, by concluding peace with the Republic. The cabinet of Vienna, however, deemed it inadvisable to stop short in the career of success ; and not only refused to treat with Napoleon, who had proposed peace on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio, but deprived the Archduke, who had so candidly stated his opinion, of the command of the army in Germany, and conferred it on General Kray. Notwithstanding the great abilities of the latter general, this change proved extremely prejudicial to the Imperial fortunes : the Archduke was adored by the soldiers, and his retirement not only shook their confidence in themselves, but cooled the ardour of the circles in the south of Germany, to whom his great achievements in the campaign of 1796 were still the subject of grateful recollection.¹ He retired to his government of Bohemia, from whence he had the melancholy prospect of a series of

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1800.

34.

Measures of
England and
Austria for
the prosecu-
tion of the
war.

Dec. 4, 1799.

¹ Dum. iii
14, 16. Join.
xiii. 12, 16.
Arch. Ch.
ii. 334.
Ann. Reg.
1800, 168,
and Martens,
vii. 62

CHAP. reverses, which possibly his talents might have prevented,
XXX. and certainly his wisdom had foreseen.

1800.

35.

Treaties entered into
for this purpose with
Austria and
Bavaria.
April 30.

By a treaty, signed on the 16th March, the Elector of Bavaria agreed to put twelve thousand men in the pay of Great Britain, to be employed in the common cause ; and by another treaty with the Elector of Mentz and the Duke of Wirtemberg, each of these petty states agreed to furnish six thousand men, paid by the same power, for the same purpose. These troops, however, could not be organised in sufficient time to take a part in the early operations of the campaign, and they formed at best but a poor substitute for the sturdy Russian veterans, who were retiring towards the northern extremity of Germany, equally exasperated at their allies and their enemies. By another and more important treaty, signed at Vienna on the 20th June, the Emperor agreed to raise his forces, both in Germany and Italy, to the greatest possible amount, and the two powers bound themselves each not to make a separate peace without the consent of the other ; in consideration of which England engaged not only to advance a subsidy of £2,000,000 sterling to the Imperial treasury, but to augment as much as practicable the German and Swiss troops in the British pay in the German campaign.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
240, 243.
State
Papers.
Martens, vii.
61, and 707.

36.

Military pre-
parations of
the Imperi-
alists.

Justly proud of the glorious successes of the preceding campaign, which, in so far as its troops were concerned, had been almost unchecked, and relying with confidence on its superb armies, two hundred thousand strong, in Germany and Italy, the cabinet of Vienna resolved on continuing the contest. But the military preparations which they made were not commensurate to the magnitude of the danger which was to be apprehended, since the First Consul was placed at the head of the French government. Their armies in Germany were raised to ninety-two thousand men, exclusive of the Bavarian and Wirtemberg contingents ; but this vast body was scattered over an immense line, from the source of the Rhine to the banks of the Main, while the centre, in the valley of the Danube, where the decisive blows were to be struck, was so weakened that no respectable force could be collected to make head against the French invasion. The army under Melas in Italy, was, by great exertions, augmented to ninety-six thousand men ; the Aulic Council, seduced

by the recent conquest of that country, having fallen into the great mistake of supposing that the vital point of the war was to be found in the Maritime Alps or on the banks of the Var, whereas it lay nearer home, on the shores of the Danube and the plains of Bavaria. No levies in the interior were made; few points were fortified, the government sharing in the common delusion that the strength of France was exhausted, that a war of invasion alone awaited their armies, and that it would without difficulty be brought to reasonable terms of accommodation in the ensuing campaign. The foresight of the Archduke Charles alone had surrounded Ulm with a formidable intrenched camp, which proved of the most essential service after the first disasters of the campaign, and retarded for six weeks the tide of Republican conquest in the heart of Germany.¹

The Republics with which France had encircled her frontier had either been conquered by the Allies, or were in such a state of exhaustion and suffering, as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid to the parent state. The Dutch groaned in silence under a yoke which was every day becoming more oppressive. The democratic party looked back with unavailing regret to the infatuation with which they had thrown themselves into the arms of a power which used them only as the instruments of its ambition; while the commercial aristocracy, finding the trade of the United Provinces destroyed, abandoned every species of enterprise, lived in the most economical way on the interest of their realised capital, and quietly awaited in retirement the return of more prosperous days. By a treaty, concluded on the 5th January 1800, Holland agreed to pay six millions of francs to France, and obtained in return only the restitution of the effects of the clergy and emigrants who had possessions in the United States. So violent was the hatred at France among its inhabitants, that a loan of a million sterling, which Napoleon endeavoured to negotiate among the capitalists of Amsterdam, totally failed. Switzerland was in a still more discontented state. Without any regard to the rights of the allied republic, Massena had imposed a forced loan on Berne, Bâle, and Zurich; and as the Swiss magistrates courageously resisted this act of oppression, an intrigue was got up by the democratic party, and the councils were at-

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1800.

¹ Arch. Ch.
II. 334.
Dum. iii. 14,
16. Jom.
xiii. 11, 12.
Nap. i. 185.

37.
Discon-
tented state
of the
French
affiliated
Republics.

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1800.

1 *Jom. xiii.*
19, 28.

tempted to be dissolved by military force. The conspiracy failed, and Colonel Clavel, who had been appointed to execute it, was compelled to take refuge in France; but the violent party spirit which these proceedings left in Switzerland, deprived it of any weight in the approaching contest, and prepared the way for its total subjugation by Napoleon.¹

38.
Measures of
Napoleon to
restore pub-
lic credit in
France.

To make head with such feeble auxiliaries against the united force of Austria and England, with a defeated army, an exhausted treasury, and a disunited people, was the difficult task which awaited the First Consul; but he soon showed that he was equal to the attempt. The first step which he took to accomplish the gigantic undertaking, was to introduce some degree of order into the finances, which the cupidity and profligacy of the Republican government had reduced to the most deplorable state. A deficit of 600,000,000 francs, or £24,000,000 sterling, existed in the revenue of the preceding year; and recovery of arrears had become impossible from the universal penury and misery which prevailed. The remnant of the public funds, though deprived of two-thirds of their amount, was still at eight per cent, not more than a thirty-eighth part of their value in 1789, at the commencement of the Revolution. The public treasury was empty; sufficient funds were not to be found in it to fit out a courier. Payments of every description were made in bills or paper securities of some sort, which had already largely anticipated all the legal receipts of government. The armies were supported only by cruel requisitions of horses, food, and clothing, which had become as oppressive as during the Reign of Terror. To avoid the forced loans and arbitrary taxation of the wealthier classes, expenditure of every sort had altogether ceased among the better description of citizens; and in France, after ten years of revolution, the concealment of treasure had become as common as in the Pachalics of Turkey. Amidst the universal dismay, extortion, pillage, and corruption were general among the servants of government. Places, clothing, provisions, stores; every thing, in short, was sold to satisfy their cupidity; and while every office was openly put up to sale, enormous fortunes were amassed both by the elevated and inferior agents of corruption.²

2 *Jom. xiii.*
27, 29.
Bour. iii.
241. *Nap.*
I. 106.

The injustice committed by these forced loans, is one of the most striking instances of the monstrous effects of the democratic ascendancy which, by the Revolution of 18th Fructidor, had obtained in France. They were laid indiscriminately on all property, movable and immovable, and were founded—1. On the amount of the direct contribution; and 2. On an arbitrary base. Every one who paid 500 francs was taxed at four-tenths of his income; all who paid 4000 francs and upwards, at its *whole* amount. The arbitrary base was founded on the opinion of a jury, selected from the lowest classes, who were entitled to tax the relations of emigrants or any persons of noble birth at any sum they chose. The effects of so iniquitous a system may be conceived. Property disappeared, or was concealed as studiously as in the dynasties of the East. Every branch of the public revenue was drying up from the extinction of credit.¹

The establishment of a firm and powerful government in a great degree arrested these disorders, and re-established the finances as if by enchantment. The capitalists of Paris, long inaccessible to the demands for loans by the revolutionary government, came forward with 12,000,000 of francs; the sale of the estates of the house of Orange produced 24,000,000 more; national domains to a great extent found purchasers from the increasing confidence in government; and, instead of the forced loans from the opulent classes, which had utterly annihilated credit, and by the flagrant injustice with which they were levied recalled the worst days of the Reign of Terror, a new tax of twenty-five per cent on real property, though a burden that would be deemed intolerable in any state which had tasted of the sweets of real freedom, gave general satisfaction, and soon produced a large increase to the revenue. At the same time the foundations of a sinking fund and a national bank were laid, the public forests put under a new and rigorous direction, monthly remittances from the collectors of taxes established, and the measures commenced which were calculated to revive public credit after a prostration of ten years.²

The pacification of La Vendée was the next object of the First Consul. The law of hostages and the forced requisitions had revived the civil war in that country, and sixty

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1800.

39.

Dreadful
injustice of
the forced
loans.¹ Nap. i. 107.

40.

Salutary
effect of
Napoleon's
government.² Nap. i. 107,
110. Jom.
xiii. 28.

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1800.

41.
Pacification
of La Ven-
dée.

thousand men were in the field ; but it was a different contest from the terrible burst which, seven years before, had proved so disastrous to the Republican arms. The devastation of the country and destruction of the population by that bloody strife, had annihilated the elements of resistance on any considerable scale ; and mere guerilla bands, seldom amounting to two thousand men, traversed the fields in different directions, levying contributions, and held together as much by the love of pillage as by indignation at oppression. Through the intervention of Hyde Neuville, an able young man of an ardent disposition, who nevertheless was not misled by the dictates of passion, a negotiation was opened with the leaders of the insurgents ; and although they paid but little attention to the first proclamations of Napoleon, yet, being soon convinced by the tenor of his administration, that a more equitable system than that of the Revolution was about to commence, they gradually listened to his proposals. At the same time, the approach of formidable forces from all quarters, convinced them that they had now a more difficult antagonist to deal with than the weak though tyrannical Directory. Chatillon and d'Autichamps were the first to give the example of submission ; and soon after Suzanet and the Abbé Bernier concluded, at Mount Luçon, a treaty highly honourable to themselves for the termination of hostilities.¹

¹ Beauch.
iv. 493, 502.
Bour. iv. 8,
9.
Jan. 17, 1801.

42.
Iniquitous
execution of
Count Louis
Frotte.

The able and heroic Count Louis de Frotte was not equally fortunate. He had written a letter to the Republican chief, proposing a general pacification of the Chouans, and was at the place of conference, when the negotiation was protracted beyond the time assigned for the acceptance of terms of peace by the Royalists. He was then perfidiously seized, along with all his followers, on the ground of a letter he had written to an aide-de-camp during the negotiation, and brought before a military tribunal, by which they were immediately ordered to be executed. They underwent the sentence next day, and met death with the most heroic courage, standing erect, with their eyes unbandaged. One of the aides-de-camp was only wounded by the first fire ; he calmly ordered the men to fire again, and fell pierced to the earth. The unhappy aide-de-camp whose unfortunate discovery of the letter had occasioned this catastrophe, was seized with such despair

that he blew out his brains. This murder is a lasting stain on Napoleon's administration. Frotte was not taken in arms, but perfidiously seized by a company of Republicans, when under an escort of the national troops, and engaged in a negotiation for a final pacification. But he was deemed too able to be permitted to survive, even in that age of returning clemency; and the intercepted letter, though imprudent, contained nothing which could warrant the captive's execution. It must be added, however, in justice to Napoleon, that it contained expressions extremely hostile to the First Consul, and that, at the earnest solicitation of his secretary Bourrienne, he had actually made out an order for his pardon, which, from some delay in the transmission, unfortunately arrived too late to save the hero's life. About the same time he generously pardoned M. Defeu, a brave emigrant officer taken in arms against the state, and doomed by the cruel laws of the Republic to instant death.¹

Georges, Bourmont, and some others, maintained for a few weeks longer in Brittany a gallant resistance; but, finding that the inhabitants were weary of civil war, and gladly embraced the opportunity of resuming their pacific occupations, they at length came into the measures of government, and were treated with equal clemency and good faith by the First Consul, to whom most of them ever after yielded a willing and useful obedience. In the end of January, General Brune announced by proclamation that the pacification of La Vendée was complete, and on the 23d of the following month a general and unqualified amnesty was published. The Vendéan chiefs were received with great distinction by Napoleon at Malmaison, and generally promoted to important situations. The curé Bernier was made Bishop of Orleans, and intrusted afterwards with the delicate task of conducting the negotiation concerning the concordat with the Papal government. The rapid and complete pacification of this distracted province by Napoleon, proves how much the long duration of its bloody and disastrous war had been owing to the cruelty and oppression of the Republican authorities.²

The next important step of Napoleon was to detach Russia completely from the alliance of Great Britain; an attempt which was much facilitated by the angry feelings

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XXX.
1800.

¹ Bour. iv. 8,
10. Beauch.
iv. 498, 504.

43.
Submission
of Bour-
mont and
Georges. "

Feb. 23,
1801.

² Nap. i.
129, 133.
Jom. xiii.
29, 31
Dum. iii.
19, 21.
Ann. Reg.
166.

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44.

Napoleon
effects a
reconcilia-
tion with
the Empe-
ror Paul.

excited in the mind of the Emperor Paul and his generals by the disastrous issue of the preceding campaign, and the rising jealousy of the maritime power of Great Britain, which had sprung up from fortuitous events, in the minds of the Northern powers, and in the following year led to the most important results. Aware of the favourable turn which affairs in the Baltic had recently taken, the First Consul lost no opportunity of cultivating a good understanding with the Russian Emperor; and, by a series of adroit acts of courtesy, succeeded at length, not only in obliterating all feelings of hostility, but in establishing the most perfect understanding between the two cabinets. Napoleon sent back all the Russian prisoners in France, seven thousand in number, who had been taken at Zurich and in Holland, not only without exchange, but equipped anew in the Russian uniform. This politic proceeding was not lost on the Czar, who had been already dazzled by the lustre of Napoleon's victories in Italy and Egypt; a contest of civilities and courtesies ensued, which soon terminated in the dismissal of Lord Whitworth from St Petersburg, and the arrival of Baron Springborton, the Russian ambassador, at Paris. The British vessels were soon after laid under embargo in the Russian harbours, and that angry correspondence began, which was shortly terminated by the array of all the powers of the North in open hostility against Great Britain.¹

¹ *Jorn.* xiii.
13, 14.
Four. iii.
269, 270.
Ann. Reg.
234.

45.

His ener-
getic mili-
tary mea-
sures, and
revival of
the military
spirit in
France.

The military measures of Napoleon were equally energetic. Upon the refusal of Great Britain to treat, he issued one of his heart-stirring proclamations, which were so well calculated to rouse the ardent spirit of the French people. He told them that the English minister had rejected his proposals of peace; that to command it he had need of money, of iron, and soldiers, and that he swore not to combat except for the happiness of France and the peace of the world. This animated address, coupled with the magic that encircled the name of Napoleon, produced an amazing effect. Victory seemed again about to attend the Republican standards, under the auspices of a leader to whom she had never yet proved faithless; the patriotic ardour of 1793 was in part revived, with all the addition which the national strength had since received from the experience of later times. The first class of the conscription

for the year 1800 was put in requisition, without any exemption either in favour of rank or fortune; this supply put at the disposal of government one hundred and twenty thousand men. Besides this, a still more efficient force for immediate service, was formed by a summons to all the veterans who had obtained furlough or leave of absence for the eight preceding years, and who, unless furnished with a valid excuse, were required again to serve. They joyfully rejoined their colours to serve under the conqueror of Rivoli, and this measure procured a supply of thirty thousand experienced soldiers. At the same time, the *gendarmérie* were put on a better footing; and various improvements effected, particularly in the artillery department, which greatly augmented the efficiency of that important arm of the public service. Twenty-five thousand horses, bought in the interior, were distributed among the artillery and cavalry on the frontier, and all the stores and equipments of the armies repaired with a celerity so extraordinary, that it would have appeared incredible, if long experience had not proved, that confidence in the vigour and stability of government operates as rapidly in increasing, as the vacillation and insecurity of democracy does in withering the national resources. Far from experiencing the difficulty which had been so severely felt by the Directory in retaining the soldiers to their colours, the consular government was powerfully seconded by the patriotic efforts of all classes. Several brilliant corps of volunteers were formed; and the ranks rapidly filled up by veterans hastening to renew their toils under a leader to whom fortune had hitherto proved so propitious. In consequence, the government soon found itself at the head of two hundred and fifty thousand men to commence hostilities in Italy and Germany; while above one hundred thousand conscripts were rapidly learning the rudiments of war at the depôts in the interior, and before six months might be expected to join the armies on the frontier.¹

But it was not merely in such praiseworthy efforts for the security and pacification of France, that the energies of the First Consul were employed. He already meditated the re-establishment of the monarchy, and early commenced that system of misleading the people by false

CHAP.

XXX.

1800.

¹ *Jom. xiii.*
33, 35.
Dum. iii. 23,
25.

CHAP.
XXX.

1800.

46.

His mea-
sures to ex-
tinguish the
revolution-
ary fervour
of the
people.

epithets, and dazzling them by splendid pageants, which was intended to prepare them for the lustre of the throne, and induce them to concur in the reconstruction of all the parts of the social edifice, which it had been the object of the Revolution to destroy. To accomplish this object, he applied himself to what he was well aware is at all times, but especially during the decline of revolutionary fervour, the ruling principle of human nature, viz. self-interest. All the officers of state, all the members of the legislature, were endowed with ample salaries; even the tribunate, which professed to be the barrier of the people against the encroachments of government, received above £50,000 a-year among its eighty members, being at the rate of nearly £700 a-year to each individual who composed it; a very large allowance in a country where the highest civil functionaries, the heads of the law and church, received only from £300 to £600 annually; and the great body of the parochial clergy only £40 or £50.* From the very first he commenced the demolition of all those ensigns and expressions which recalled the idea of the liberty and equality, from the strife of which his redoubtable power had arisen. The image of the Republic, seated and holding a spear in her hand, which was at the top of all the official letters at the commencement of the consulship, was suppressed. Some doubt existed in the first instance as to which of the consuls should take the chair, and Siéyes openly asserted his pretensions to it, in virtue as well of his seniority as of his great services in the cause of freedom; but Napoleon cut the matter short by stepping into the chair himself. The jealousy of the elder consul was soon removed by the grant of the large property out of the park of Versailles which has been already mentioned. At the same time, the habiliments and ensigns

* The civil list under the First Consul was fixed at the following sums:

Legislative Body,	-	-	2,400,000	francs, or L. 96,000
Tribunate,	-	-	1,312,000	... 58,000
Archives,	-	-	75,000	... 3,000
Three Consuls,	-	-	1,800,000	... 72,000
Council of State,	-	-	675,000	... 27,000
Their Secretaries,	-	-	112,500	... 45,000
Six Ministers,	-	-	360,000	... 14,000
Minister of Foreign Affairs,	-	-	90,000	... 3,500

6,824,500 francs, or L. 275,000

—See BOURRIENNE, iii. 242.

of authority were changed; the Greek and Roman costumes, which recalled the ideas of equality lately so much in vogue, were abolished and replaced by the military dress. The First Consul appeared on all occasions in uniform, with boots and spurs; and all the inferior military functionaries followed his example. The levees, which he held almost daily, were crowded with officers in full dress; and the court of the first magistrate of the Republic was noways distinguishable from the headquarters of its greatest general. At the same time, the institution of sabres and fusils of merit, as a testimony of reward to military distinction, already shadowed out to the discerning eye the Legion of Honour, and the re-establishment of titles of rank and a hereditary nobility; while the daily reviews, with all the pomp and splendour of war, in the Place Carrousel, accustomed the people to those magnificent pageants which were destined to conceal from their gaze the chains of the empire.¹

These measures were all steps, and not unimportant ones, to the re-establishment of monarchical authority. But they were the prelude only to more important changes. In December 1799, an important *arrêt* was published, which, on the preamble—"That a part of the journals printed at Paris are instruments in the hands of the enemies of the Republic; and that it is the first duty of the government to watch over its security," decreed, "That the minister of police should not *suffer to be printed*, during the continuance of the war, any journals but the following." Then followed a list of thirteen newspapers, thus invested with the monopoly of Paris; and from those thus suppressed were only excepted "those *exclusively* devoted to science, the arts, literature, commerce, or advertisements." It was decreed, by a separate article, that "any journal among those retained which inserted any thing contrary to the sovereignty of the people, should be immediately suppressed." This clause, inserted to blind the people to the real tendency of the measure, received in the sequel, as was foreseen at the time, the most liberal interpretation, and was applied, contrary to its obvious meaning, to sanction the extinction of all newspapers opposed to the consular government. Thus early commenced the system of Napoleon for the coercion of the press; a system which

CHAP.

XXX.

1800.

Dec. 1799.

¹ Thib. 2, 3.

Bour. iii.

243, 255, 256.

Nap. i. 243.

47.

He totally
suppresses
the liberty
of the press.
Dec. 24,
1799.

CHAP.
XXX.

1800.

¹ De Staël, li.
284. Bour.
iii. 254.

48.

He fixes his
residence at
the Tuille-
ries.

received, during the remainder of his reign, such ample development; and which, as Madame de Staël justly remarks, converted that great engine, generally considered as the palladium of liberty, into the most powerful instrument of bondage, by perpetually exhibiting a series of false and delusive pictures to the human mind, and excluding all others from the view.¹

The next step of Napoleon was to fix his residence in the Tuileries, and sleep in the ancient apartments of the kings of France. This great change, however, required considerable caution in its accomplishment; it was so palpable an approach towards royalty, that it might shock the feeling of the people, and endanger the newly established authority. Slowly, and with profound dissimulation, therefore, he proceeded in his advances. A fine statue of Brutus was first placed in one of the galleries of the palace; it was thought the most ardent Republicans could apprehend nothing from a change which commenced with honour done to the hero who had slain a tyrant. Orders were next given to repair and put in order the royal apartments in the Tuileries, and under the veil of these words great changes were effected. The *bonnets rouges* and Republican emblems were all effaced; the statues which were to adorn the great gallery chosen by Napoleon himself; he selected among the ancients, Demosthenes and Alexander, Brutus and Cæsar; among the moderns, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Condé, Prince Eugene, Marlborough, Marshal Saxe, Frederick, Washington, Dugommier, Dampierre, and Joubert. At length, the translation of the Consuls from the Luxembourg to the Tuileries took place; the royal apartments were destined for Napoleon, those in the pavilion of Flora for the other Consuls. The *cortège* set out from the Luxembourg, surrounded by a splendid train of officers and three thousand chosen troops, among whom the famous regiment of Guides was peculiarly conspicuous. Napoleon, with the two other Consuls, was drawn in a magnificent chariot by six white horses, the same which the Emperor of Austria had given him after the treaty of Campo Formio; he bore in his hand the splendid sabre presented to him by the same sovereign on that occasion. The cabinet ministers followed in their carriages, the only ones which were to be seen on the occa-

sion ; for such was the miserable destitution in which the Revolution had left the highest civil functionaries of France, that to transport the council of state they were obliged to have recourse to hackney coaches ! The real luxury of that period consisted in the splendour of the troops, whose brilliant uniforms and prancing chargers formed a painful contrast to the meanness and simplicity of the civil authorities. Last and sad effect of revolutionary convulsions, to cast to the earth every thing but the ensigns of military prowess !¹

CHAP.

XXX.

1800.

¹ Bour. iii.
320, 321.
Goh. ii. 15,
19. Thib.
Consulat, 2.

From the opening into the Carrousel, from the quay of the Tuileries to the gate of the palace, the procession passed through a double line of guards : a royal usage, which offered a singular contrast to the inscription on the guard-house by which it passed—"10th August 1792—Royalty is abolished in France, and shall *never be re-established*." On entering the gates, he observed some clusters of pikes surmounted by *bonnets-rouges*, and tricolor flags. "Remove all that trash," said he, with characteristic impatience.* No sooner had he arrived at the foot of the great stair, than Napoleon, allowing the other Consuls to ascend to the presence chamber, mounted on horseback, and, amidst incessant cries of "Vive le Premier Consul !" passed in review above twenty thousand men. Murat was on his right, Lannes on his left ; the brilliant staff who surrounded him bore on their visages the marks of the sun of Italy or the sands of Egypt. When the banners of the ninetieth, the forty-third, and thirtieth demi-brigades, which exhibited only bare poles riddled with shot and surmounted by tatters black with powder, were carried past, he bowed with respect to the monuments of military valour. Enthusiastic acclamations rent the skies ; and such was the universal transport, that when the review was concluded, and the First Consul ascended to the audience chamber and took his station in the centre of the room, his colleagues were reduced to the rank of pages following his train. On that day royalty was in truth re-established in France, somewhat less than eight years after it had been abolished by the revolt of the 10th August. On the night of his entry into the Tuileries,

49.
Splendid
military
pageant on
this occasion.

* "Otez-moi bien vite toutes ces cochonneries-là."—CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de Louis Philippe*, v. 233.

CHAP.
XXX.

1800.

¹ Bour. iii.
286, 267, 318,
323. Thib.
2, 3.

50.
Commence-
ment of the
etiquette
and splen-
dour of a
court.

Napoleon said to his secretary, "Bourrienne, it is not enough to be in the Tuileries, we must take measures to remain there. Who has not inhabited this palace? It has been the abode of robbers, of members of the Convention. Ah! there is your brother's house, from which, eight years ago, we saw the good Louis XVI. besieged in the Tuileries, and carried off into captivity. But you need not fear a repetition of the scene. Let them attempt it with me if they dare."¹*

No sooner was the First Consul established at the Tuileries, than the usages, dress, and ceremonial of a court were at once resumed. The antechambers were filled with chamberlains, pages, and esquires; footmen in brilliant liveries filled the lobbies and staircases; the levees were conducted with as much splendour as the dilapidated state of most fortunes would permit; and a drawing-room, composed chiefly of the wives of the young generals who had been the companions of Napoleon, presided over by the grace and elegance, and embellished by the extravagance, of Josephine, already revived to a certain degree the lustre of a court. Napoleon was indefatigable in his attention to these matters. He deemed the colour of a livery, the cut of a court-dress, not beneath his notice, endeavouring in every way to dazzle the eyes of the vulgar, and efface all recollection of the Republic before it was formally abolished by the authority of government.† For the same reason, he revived the use of silk stockings in dress, and re-established the balls of the opera, an event which was so great an innovation on the manners of the Republic, that it created quite a sensation at that period. But Napoleon, in pursuing these measures, knew well the character of the French. "While they are discussing these changes," said he, "they will cease to talk nonsense about my politics, and that is what I want. Let them

* See *ante*, cap. vii. § 73.

† The King of Prussia was among the first to recognise the consular government, and Napoleon was highly gratified when an aide-de-camp whom he dispatched to Berlin, was admitted to the honour of dining at the royal table. M. Lucchesini, in October 1800, was charged with a special mission to the court of the Tuileries from the Prussian government. The First Consul received him at St Cloud, and was at the balcony when he arrived. He was much struck with the decorations which he bore, and the rich livery of the servants who attended him: and he was heard to exclaim, "That is imposing: we must have things of that sort to dazzle the people."—See THIBAUDEAU, 14-15.

amuse themselves, let them dance; but let them not thrust their heads into the councils of government. Commerce will revive under the increasing expenditure of the capital. I am not afraid of the Jacobins; I never was so much applauded as at the last parade. It is ridiculous to say that nothing is right but what is new; we have had enough of such novelties. I would rather have the balls of the Opera than the saturnalia of the Goddess of Reason."¹

CHAP.
XXX.

1800.

¹ Bour. iii.
263, 264, 319,
326, 327.
Thib. 15.
D'Abr. ii.
265, 280.

About the same time an *arrêt* was published, which took off the sentence of banishment against a great number of those who had been exiled by the result of the 18th Fructidor. It was only provided that they should be under the surveillance of the police, and reside at the places appointed for each respectively in the decree. Among the persons thus restored against an unjust sentence, were many of the most eminent citizens of the Republic; Carnot, Barthélemy, Boissy d'Anglas, Portalis, Villoul, Joyeuse, and above forty others. The First Consul immediately made use of the most eminent of them in the service of the state: Carnot was appointed minister at war in the absence of Berthier, and contributed in a powerful manner to the glorious issue of the succeeding campaign. Barère also was recalled, and was so desirous to receive employment, that he wrote a long letter justifying his conduct to Napoleon; but the latter never could be persuaded to take into his direct service that hardened Republican. Those proscribed by the Directory were thus early admitted into favour; at a subsequent period he received with equally open arms the Royalists and the victims of the Revolution; the only faction against which to the last he was inveterate, was the remnant of the Jacobin party, who retained throughout all his reign the resolution of their character and the perversity of their opinions.²

51.
Recall of
many emi-
grants exiled
since 18th
Fructidor.

² Bour. iii.
264, 267.

At the time when Napoleon was placed on the consular throne, he organised his *secret police*, intended to act as a check on the public one of Fouché. Duroc was at first at the head of this establishment, to which Junot, as governor of Paris, soon after succeeded. So early did this great leader avail himself of this miserable engine, unknown in constitutional monarchies, the resource of despots, inconsistent with any thing like freedom, but the sad legacy bequeathed to

52.
Establish-
ment of the
secret
police.

CHAP.
XXX.

1800.

¹ Bour. iii.
295, 303.

succeeding ages by the despotism of the monarchy, and the convulsions and devastation of the Revolution. The spies and agents of this police and counter-police soon filled every coffee-house and theatre in Paris; they overheard conversations, mingled in groups, encouraged seditious expressions, were to be found in saloons and palaces, and rendered every man insecure, from the monarch on the throne to the captive in the dungeon. Lately appointed governor of Paris, Junot had a multitude of inferior agents in his pay to watch the motions of Fouché; and he, in his turn, carried corruption into the bosom of the consular family, and, by liberally supplying funds for her extravagance, obtained secret information from Josephine herself.¹ This miserable system has survived all the changes to which it gave birth. The formidable engine, organised in the heart of Paris with its arms extending over all France, is instantly seized upon by each successive faction which rises to the head of affairs; the herd of informers and spies is perpetuated from generation to generation, and exercises its prostituted talents for behoof of any government which the armed force of the capital has elevated to supreme power; the people, habituated to this unseen authority, regard it as an indispensable part of regular government; and a system, which was the disgrace of Roman servitude in the corrupted days of the empire, is engrafted on a government which boasts of concentrating within itself all the lights of modern civilisation.

53.
Comparison
of his sys-
tem of go-
vernment
with that
established
by Constan-
tine in the
Byzantine
empire.

The circumstances of the Roman empire, as remodelled by Constantine, afford a striking analogy to those of France when Napoleon ascended the throne; and it is curious to observe how exactly the previous destruction of the nobility and higher classes in the two countries paved the way, by necessary consequence, for the same despotic institutions. "The Patrician families," says Gibbon, "whose original numbers were never recruited till the end of the commonwealth, either failed in the ordinary course of nature, or were extinguished in so many foreign or domestic wars. Few remained who could derive their genuine origin from the foundation of the city, when Cæsar and Augustus, Claudius and Vespasian, created a competent number of new Patrician families. But these

artificial supplies, in which the reigning house was always included, were rapidly swept away by the rage of tyrants, by frequent revolutions, the change of manners, and the intermixture of nations. Little more was left, when Constantine ascended the throne, than a vague and imperfect tradition that the patricians had once been the first among the Romans. To form a body of nobles whose influence may restrain, while it secures, the authority of the monarch, would have been very inconsistent with the character and policy of Constantine; but had he seriously entertained such a design, it might have exceeded the measure of his power to ratify, by an arbitrary edict, an institution which must expect the sanction of time and opinion. He revived, indeed, the title of patricians; but he revived it *as a personal, not a hereditary distinction*. They yielded only to the transient authority of the annual consuls; but they enjoyed the preëminence over all the great officers of state. This honourable rank was bestowed on them for life, and as they were usually favourites and ministers at the imperial court, the true etymology of the word was perverted by ignorance and flattery, and the patricians of Constantine were revered as the adopted fathers of the emperor and the republic."

"The *police* insensibly assumed the license of reporting whatever they could observe of the conduct, either of magistrates or private citizens, and were soon considered as the *eyes* of the monarch and the scourge of the people. Under the warm influence of a feeble reign, they multiplied to the incredible number of ten thousand, disdained the mild though frequent admonitions of the laws, and exercised in the profitable management of the posts a rapacious and insolent oppression. These official spies, who corresponded with the palace, were encouraged with reward and favour anxiously to watch the progress of every treasonable design, from the faint and latent symptoms of disaffection, to the actual preparation of open revolt. Their careless or criminal violation of truth and justice was covered by the consecrated mask of zeal; and they might securely aim their poisoned arrows at the breast either of the innocent or the guilty, who had provoked their resentment or refused to purchase their silence.¹ A faithful subject of Syria, perhaps, or Britain, was exposed to the

CHAP.
XXX.
1800.

54.
Identity of
the French
and Byzantine
police.

¹ Gibbon, c.
xvii. vol. ii.
278, 279.

CHAP.
XXX.

1800.

danger, or at least to the dread, of being dragged in chains to the court of Milan or Constantinople, to defend his life and fortune against the malicious charges of these privileged informers." This might pass for a description of the Conservative Senate and police of Napoleon.

"Augustus knew well," says the same historian, "that mankind are governed by names; and that they will in general submit to real slavery, if they are told that they are in the enjoyment of freedom." No man understood this principle better than Napoleon. While he was preparing, by fixing his residence in the royal palace, the appointments of the legislature by the executive, the suppression of the liberty of the press, and the establishment of a vigilant police, for the overthrow of all the principles of the Revolution, he was careful to publish to the world proclamations which still breathed the spirit of democratic freedom. Shortly before his installation in the Tuileries, intelligence arrived of the death of Washington, the illustrious founder of American independence. He immediately issued the following order of the day to the army: "Washington is dead! That great man has struggled with tyranny; he consolidated the liberty of his country. His memory will be ever dear to the French people, as to all freemen in both hemispheres, who, like him and the American soldiers, have fought for liberty and equality. As a mark of respect, the First Consul orders, that for ten days black crape shall be suspended from all the standards and banners of the Republic." Thus, by the skilful use of high-sounding names and heart-stirring recollections, did this great master of the art of dissimulation veil his advances towards absolute power, and engraft an enthusiastic admiration for his despotic government on the turbulent passions which had been nourished by the Revolution.¹

The mind of Napoleon was equally elevated in every thing which it undertook. He had early conceived an admiration for architectural decoration, which his residence among the stately monuments of Egypt had converted into a chastened and elevated passion. His present situation, as chief of the French government, gave him ample room for the indulgence of this truly regal disposition, and he already began to conceive those great designs for the embellishment of Paris and the improvement of France,

55.
Napoleon's hypocritical eulogy on Washington, who died Dec. 14, 1799.

¹ Thib. 2, 3.
Bour. iii.
278.

56.
Commencement of his great designs for architectural embellishment at Paris.

which have thrown such durable lustre over his reign. The inconceivable activity of his mind seemed to take a pleasure in discovering new objects for exertion ; and at a time when he was conducting the diplomacy of Europe, and regulating all the armies of France, he was maturing plans for the construction of roads, bridges, and canals, through all its wide extent, and setting on foot those great works, which have given such splendour to its capital. He early selected M. Fontaine and M. Perier as the instruments of his designs, and aided by the suggestions of these able architects, the embellishment of the metropolis proceeded at an accelerated pace. The formation of a quay on the banks of the Seine, opposite to the Tuileries, near the Quai Voltaire, first removed a deformity which had long been felt in looking from the windows of the palace, and the clearing out of the Place Carrousel next suggested the idea of uniting the Louvre and Tuileries, and forming a vast square between these two sumptuous edifices. At first it was proposed to construct a building across the vacant area, in order to conceal the oblique position in which they stood to each other ; but this idea was soon abandoned, as Napoleon justly observed, that " no building, how majestic soever, could compensate for a vast open space between the Louvre and Tuileries." The construction of a fourth side for the great square, opposite to the picture gallery, was therefore commenced, and the demolition of the edifices in the interior soon after began ; a great undertaking, which the subsequent disasters of his reign prevented him from completing, and which all the efforts of succeeding sovereigns have not been able as yet to bring to a conclusion. The Pont des Arts, between the Louvre and the Palace of the Institute, was commenced about the same time, and the demolition of the convents of the Feuillans and Capucines made way for the Rue de Rivoli, which now forms so noble a border to the gardens of the Tuileries. Malmaison at this time was the favourite country residence of the First Consul ; but he already meditated the establishment of his court at St Cloud, and the apartments of that palace began to be fitted up in that sumptuous style which has rendered them unequalled in all the palaces of France.¹

The First Consul did not as yet venture openly to break
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CHAP.

XXX.

1800.

¹ Thib. 2, 3.
Bour. iv. 46,
56.

CHAP.
XXX.

1800.

57.

Suppression
of the *fête*
on 21st
January, and
elevation of
Tronchet.

with the Republican party, but he lost no opportunity of showing in what estimation he held their principles. On occasion of the establishment of the Court of Cassation, the supreme tribunal of France, he said to Bourrienne,—“I do not venture as yet to take any decided step against the regicides; but I will show what I think of them. To-morrow I shall be engaged with Abrial in the formation of the Tribunal of Cassation. Target, who is its president, declined to defend Louis XVI.: Whom do you suppose I am about to name in his place? Tronchet, who so nobly discharged that perilous duty. They may say what they choose; my mind is made up.” Tronchet accordingly received the appointment so richly deserved by his heroic conduct. The commemoration of the murder of Louis XVI. was at the same time suppressed, and concerts of sacred music were permitted on Sundays at the Opera. Thus, though the Republican calendar was still observed, an approach was made to the ancient mode of measuring time in the public amusements.¹

¹ Bour. iv.
68, 70.

Louis XVIII. at this time wrote several letters to Napoleon, in which he expressed the high esteem in which he held his character, and offered him any situation which he chose to fix on under the government, if he would aid in re-establishing the throne of the Bourbons. Napoleon replied in firm but courteous terms, declining to have any connexion with the exiled family.* He clearly foresaw,

58.
Corres-
pondence
between
Napoleon
and Louis
XVIII.

* The letter of Louis XVIII. was in these terms:—

Feb. 4.

“For long, general, you must have known the esteem in which I hold you. If you doubt my gratitude, fix upon the place you desire for yourself; point out the situations which you wish for your friends. As to my principles, they are those of the French character. Clemency on principle accords with the dictates of reason.

“No—the victor of Lodi, Castiglione, and Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, can never prefer a vain celebrity to true glory. But you are losing the most precious moments. We could secure the happiness of France. I say we, for I require Buonaparte for such an attempt, and he could not achieve it without me. General, Europe observes you—glory awaits you, and I am impatient to restore peace to my people.”

Sept. 24.

Napoleon replied:

“I have received, sir, your letter. I thank you for the obliging expressions which it contains regarding myself.

“You should renounce all hope of returning to France. You could not do so, but over the bodies of one hundred thousand Frenchmen. Sacrifice your interest to the repose and happiness of France. History will duly appreciate your conduct in so doing.

“I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family, and shall learn with pleasure that you are surrounded with every thing which can secure the tranquillity of your retreat.”

This answer was not dispatched for seven months after the receipt of

with admirable sagacity, all the difficulties which would attend the restoration of that unfortunate family, and felt no inclination to make way for such an event. "The partisans of the Bourbons," said he, "are much mistaken if they imagine that I am the man to play the part of Monk. I am not insensible to the hazard to which France may be one day exposed from my decease without issue, as my brothers are evidently unfit for such a throne; but consider the absurdity of the propositions which they have made to me. How could we secure so many new interests and vested rights against the efforts of a family returning with eighty thousand emigrants, and all the prejudices of fanaticism? What would become of the holders of national domains, and all those who had taken an active part in the Revolution? The Bourbons would conceive they had conquered by force; all their professions and promises would give way before the possession of power. My part is taken; no one but a fool would place any reliance upon them."¹*

CHAP.
XXX.
1800.

¹ BOURN iv.
72, 83.
Capefigue,
Hist. de la
Restauration, i. 137,
141.

Thus, on all sides, the prospects of France rapidly brightened under the auspices of Napoleon. To the insecurity, distrust, and terror which had paralysed all the efforts of patriotism under the Directory, succeeded confidence, energy, and hope; genius emerged from obscurity to take an active part in public affairs; corruption and profligacy ceased to poison every branch of administration. There is nothing more striking in European history than the sudden resurrection of France under the government of

59.
General improvement
in the prospects of
France.

the letter from Louis, and when the Congress of Luneville was about to open.—See BOURRIENNE, iv. 77-79.

Not disconcerted with this repulse, the Bourbon family endeavoured to open a negotiation with Napoleon, through the Duchess of Guiche, a lady of great beauty and abilities, who found no difficulty in penetrating to Josephine, and conveying to her the propositions of the exiled family, which were, that he should, on restoring them, be made Constable of France, and receive the principality of Corsica. Napoleon no sooner heard of it than he ordered the fascinating duchess to leave Paris in twenty-four hours: an order which gave great satisfaction to Josephine, who already had become somewhat uneasy at the proximity of so charming a personage. It had been proposed that a splendid pillar should be erected on the Place Carrousel, surmounted by a statue of Napoleon crowning the Bourbons. "Nothing was wanting," said Napoleon, "to such a design, except that the pillar should be founded on the dead body of the First Consul."—LAS CAs, i. 289, 290, and CAPEFIGUE, i. 140.

- "Son nom serait suspect à mon autorité,
On sait son droit au trône, et ce droit est un crime.
Du destin qui fait tout, tel est l'arrêt cruel:
Si j'eusse été vaincu je serais criminel."

VOLTAIRE'S *Zaïre*, Act i. scene 5.

CHAP.

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1800.

this great man, or more descriptive of the natural tendency of human affairs to right themselves after a period of disorder. It evinces the general disposition of all classes, when taught wisdom by suffering, to resume that place in society for which they were destined by nature, and in which alone their exertions can add to the sum of general felicity.

CHAPTER XXXI.

CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

IMMENSE was the addition which the vigour and popularity of Napoleon, and the termination of the imbecile government of the Directory, made to the effective forces of France at this period. They were disposed, previous to the commencement of hostilities, in the following manner:—The army of Italy, which occupied the crest of the Alps from the neighbourhood of Genoa to Mont Cenis, was thirty-six thousand strong, of which twenty-eight thousand were assembled in Liguria, from the Trebbia to the Col di Tende, to guard the passes of the Apennines and protect Genoa from the Imperial forces, which were grouped in the plain round the walls of Alexandria. These troops, however, were for the most part in the most miserable condition. Their spirits were depressed by a campaign of unprecedented disaster, their clothing was worn out, their feet bare, their artillery broken down, their cavalry dismounted, and it required all the efforts of St Cyr and their other officers during the winter to retain them at their colours. The army of Germany, which was afterwards called the army of the Danube, was a hundred and twenty thousand strong, including sixteen thousand cavalry, of which immense force a hundred thousand men, including fourteen thousand horse, could be relied on for active operations. An army of reserve of fifty thousand men was at the same time formed, the headquarters of which were nominally at Dijon, but the bulk of the force was in reality disposed at Geneva, Lausanne, and the other towns which lay between the Jura and the Alps. This reserve was destined either to support the army of

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1.

Disposition
of the
French
armies at the
opening of
the cam-
paign, and
formation of
the army of
reserve.

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Italy or that of Germany, as circumstances required, and it was formed of twenty thousand veteran soldiers, brought from Holland, under Brune, to La Vendée, which the pacification of that district rendered disposable for offensive operations, and thirty thousand conscripts, directed to that quarter from the central depôts. These troops traversed France, with drums beating and colours flying, in the finest order, and their splendid appearance contributed much to revive the martial ardour of the people, which the disasters of the preceding campaigns had seriously impaired. Berthier received the command of this army, and gave up the portfolio of minister of war to Carnot, whom Napoleon sought out in exile to fill that important situation.¹

¹ Jom. xiii.
111. Dum.
iii. 25, 27.
St Cyr, i.
102.

2.
Forces of
the Imperialists.

On the other hand, the Imperialists had collected ninety-six thousand men in Piedmont and at the foot of the Maritime Alps, besides twenty thousand who were dispersed in garrisons in the states of Venice, Lombardy, and Tuscany. Their forces in Germany were nearly as considerable, amounting to ninety-two thousand men, including eighteen thousand superb cavalry, and they were followed by above four hundred pieces of artillery. This was independent of the troops of Bavaria and the minor states in the English pay, which amounted to twenty thousand more, making in all a hundred and twelve thousand men. This great force, however, was scattered over an immense line, two hundred miles long, from the Alps to the Maine, insomuch that, in the valley of the Danube, which was the decisive point of the whole, as it at once led to the Hereditary States, Kray could only assemble forty-five thousand men to resist the seventy-five thousand whom Moreau could direct against that point. The great error of the Austrians in this campaign consisted in supposing that Italy was the quarter where the decisive attack was to be made, and collecting in consequence the greater part of their reserves in that country; whereas the valley of the Danube was the place where danger was really to be apprehended, and where the principal forces of the Republicans were collected. But they were deceived by the great successes of the preceding campaign;² they were ignorant or incredulous of the rapid change produced on the French armies by the seizure of supreme power by

² Arch. Ch.
ii. 334. Nap.
i. 185, 161.
Jom. xiii. 48,
52, 113. St
Cyr, ii. 84,
108, 137.

Napoleon; and were dreaming of conquests on the Var and in Provence, when their redoubtable adversary was already meditating strokes in the heart of Bavaria.

The plan of the Austrians was to resume the offensive vigorously in Italy, where the great numerical superiority of Melas, as well as the warlike and experienced quality of the troops he commanded, promised the most important results; to throw Massena back into Genoa, and capture that important city; drive the French over the Maritime Alps, and carry the war into the heart of Provence. To co-operate with this design, an English expedition, having twelve thousand troops on board, was to proceed to the Mediterranean, and aid the Imperialists either in the south of France or the Maritime Alps. This being the quarter where active operations were to be undertaken, the war in Germany was intended to be merely defensive, and rather to occupy a considerable army of the enemy on the Rhine, than to make any serious impression on his territories in that quarter.¹

On his side, Napoleon determined to prosecute the contest vigorously where the Austrians proposed only to pursue defensive measures, and to liberate Italy by the blows struck at the Hereditary States in the heart of Germany. The possession of Switzerland, like a central fortress, gave the French the advantage of being able to take the line of the enemy's operations in rear, either in Italy or Swabia. Napoleon had intrusted the command of the army of Germany to Moreau, a generous proceeding towards so formidable a rival, but one which his great military talents, and the unbounded confidence of the army of the Rhine in his capacity, as well as the important services which he had rendered to the First Consul on the 18th Brumaire, rendered indispensable. The plan which he proposed to his great lieutenant was to assemble all his forces in the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen, cross the Rhine by four bridges near that town, move directly in an imposing mass on Ulm, and thus turn the left of the Imperialists, and take in rear all the Austrians placed between the Rhine and the defile of the Black Forest. By this means he hoped that the army, in a week after the opening of the campaign, would be at Ulm, and such of the Imperialists as escaped would have no alterna-

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3.

Plan of the
Austrians.

¹ Nap. i. 162.
Jom. xiii. 41,
42.

4.

And of the
First Con-
sul.

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¹ Nap. i 163,
164. St Cyr,
ii. 103, 104.
Jom. xlii. 36,
37. Dum.
iii. 84, 85.
Eul. Feld-
zug, Maren-
go, 17.

tive but to throw themselves into Bohemia, leaving Vienna and the Hereditary States to their fate. That these brilliant anticipations were not chimerical, is proved by the result of the campaigns of 1805 and 1809; and so strongly was Napoleon impressed with their importance, that he at one time entertained the project of putting himself at the head of the army of the Danube, and directing the army of reserve to its support, which would have brought a force of a hundred and eighty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian line in Germany.¹

5.
Jealousy of
the army of
the Rhine of
Napoleon.

But Moreau would not submit to the indignity of acting as second in command to his former rival;* and the disposition of his troops was too republican, and their attachment to their general too strong, to render it prudent to run the risk of revolt in so powerful an army, even for the sake of the greatest external advantages. An angry discussion took place between the two generals, which terminated in the retention of the supreme command by Moreau, and the adoption of a modified plan for the campaign in Germany, in lieu of the brilliant but hazardous one projected by the First Consul; and in consequence Napoleon resolved to direct the army of reserve to Italy, and in person renew the struggle on the scene of his former triumphs on the plains of Piedmont. In truth the First Consul had no alternative in this determination; the relinquishment of the command of the army of the Rhine to Moreau had become a matter of necessity. At that period the soldiers of that army were far from cordially supporting the government of the First Consul. Independent of the republican principles with which, in common with all the other French troops, they were more or less imbued, they were in a peculiar manner jealous of the audacious general who had placed himself at the head of affairs, and seized the sceptre which they thought would have been more worthily held by his less interested rival. Any attempt to displace Moreau from the command of this great army would probably have led to a collision, which might have proved fatal to the infant authority of Napoleon.²

² St Cyr, ii.
102. Dum.
iii. 84, 85, 86.

Field-marshal Kray had his headquarters at Donaues-

* He said, "I have no notion of seeing a little Louis XIV. at the head of my army. If the First Consul takes the command, I will send in my resignation."—St Cyr, ii. 103, *Hist. Mil.*

chingen ; but his chief magazines were in the rear of his army, at Stockach, Engen, Moeskirch, and Biberach. The right wing, twenty-six thousand strong, under the command of Starray, rested on the Maine ; its headquarters were at Heidelberg, and it guarded the line of the Rhine from the Renchen to the Maine. The left, under the orders of the Prince of Reuss, was in the Tyrol ; it consisted of twenty-six thousand men, besides seven thousand militia, and occupied the Rheinthal and the shores of the lake of Constance. The centre, forty-three thousand strong, under the command of Kray in person, was stationed behind the Black Forest in the environs of Villingen and Donaueschingen ; its advanced posts occupied all the passes of that woody range, and observed the course of the Rhine from the lake of Constance to the neighbourhood of Kehl ; while fifteen thousand men, under Keinmayer, guarded the passes from the Renchen to the Valley of Hell, and formed the link which connected the centre and right wing. Thus, though the Imperialists were nearly one hundred and ten thousand strong, their detachments were stationed at such a distance from each other as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid in case of need ; and were rather to be regarded as three separate armies, the largest of which could not bring above forty thousand men into the field at any one point.¹

The French army, at the opening of the campaign, was also divided into three corps. The right, thirty-two thousand strong, under Lecourbe, occupied the cantons of Switzerland from the St Gothard to Bâle, won at the expense of so much blood in the preceding campaign, from the Imperialists ; the centre, under Gouvion St Cyr, who was transferred to that command from the army of Genoa, consisted of twenty-nine thousand men, and occupied the left bank of the Rhine, from New Brisach to Plobsheim ; the left, under Sainte Suzanne, twenty-one thousand strong, extended from Kehl to Haguenau. Independent of these, Moreau himself was at the head of a reserve, consisting of twenty-eight thousand men, which was assembled in the neighbourhood of Bâle, and which, if added to either of the divisions of the army, would give it a decided preponderance over that of the enemy to which it was opposed. Thus Moreau could, by uniting the reserve and centre,

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6.
Positions of
Kray's
forces in
Germany.

¹ St Cyr, ii.
107, 108.
Jom. xiii.
112, 113.
Nap. i. 161,
162.

7.
Positions of
Moreau's
troops.

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1 Jom. xiii.
110, 111.
St Cyr, ii.
109, 110.

bring nearly sixty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian force of forty thousand in the same quarter; an immense advantage, which was speedily turned to the best account by that able commander. Besides these great forces, the French general had at his disposal the garrisons of the fortresses of Switzerland, Landau, and Spire; the division of Mayence, commanded by Laval, and the troops of the fifth and twenty-sixth military divisions, forming an aggregate of thirty-two thousand men additional, which might be termed the reserves of the army; while the possession of the bridges of Kehl, New Brisach, and Bâle, gave him the means of crossing the Rhine whenever he deemed it most advisable.¹

8.
First move-
ments of the
French
general.

It was part of the plan of Napoleon to detach sixteen thousand men under Moncey, from Lecourbe's wing stationed in Switzerland, in order to take a share in the great operations which he meditated in the Italian plains; and therefore it was of importance that Moreau should early resume the offensive, both in order to take advantage of his numerical superiority before that detachment took place, and operate as a diversion to the army of Italy, which it was foreseen would soon be hard pressed by Melas in the mountains of Genoa. Orders, therefore, were transmitted to him to open the campaign without delay, and every thing was ready for a forward movement by the 24th April. The plan finally arranged between Moreau and the First Consul was to make a feint on the left against the corps of Keimayer and the enemy's right; and having thus drawn their attention to that quarter, to accumulate all his disposable forces against the Imperial centre, and overwhelm it by a concentration of the French left wing, centre, and reserve. By this means he hoped to break through the Austrian line of defence with a preponderating force, and, after a single battle, cut off their communication with the Tyrol and Italy, and force them back, after losing their magazines at Moeskirch and Engen, to a disadvantageous defensive on the banks of the Danube.²

2 Nap. i. 165,
Jom. xiii.
116, 117.
Dum. iii. 93,
94.

The better to conceal this able design, Moreau, for some days before the army was put in motion, made the greatest demonstrations against the enemy's right. Every thing was prepared for the headquarters at Colmar, and it was

publicly announced that the reserve was to be directed against Keimayer and the Valley of Hell. Meanwhile, the columns moved to the different points assigned to them, and on the 25th, at daybreak, Sainte Suzanne crossed the bridge of Kehl, at the head of sixteen thousand men, and drove in the advanced posts of Keimayer towards the entrance of the Black Forest. On the same day, the centre crossed at New Brisach, under the orders of St Cyr, and advanced towards Freyburg. Kray upon this moved a considerable part of his centre and reserves to the support of Keimayer; but Sainte Suzanne having thus executed his feint, suddenly remeasured his steps, recrossed the Rhine at Kehl, and advanced by forced marches to New Brisach, where he crossed again and formed a second line in the rear of St Cyr. On the 25th, Moreau also crossed at Bale with the reserve, and moved in the direction of Lauffenburg.¹

These different and apparently contradictory movements, threw the Austrian generals into the greatest perplexity. Uncertain where the storm was likely to burst, they adopted the ruinous resolution of guarding equally every point; and still inclining to the belief that the right and the Valley of Hell were really threatened, they retained thirty thousand men, under Starray and Keimayer, on the right, and twenty-five thousand on the left in the rocks of the Vorarlberg, while their centre and reserve, now reduced to forty thousand men, were menaced by an attack from Sainte Suzanne, Moreau, and St Cyr, at the head of seventy thousand combatants. The two following days were employed by Moreau in concentrating his forces between Kehl and Freyburg; and the better to distract the enemy, Lecourbe soon after crossed the Rhine, with the right wing, at Paradis and Richlingen, and, after throwing a bridge over at Stein, advanced towards Engen and Stockach. On the same day, the inaccessible fort of Hohenstohel capitulated without firing a shot, and the left of Lecourbe entered into communication with Moreau and St Cyr. Thus the whole French army, with the exception of two divisions of the left wing, which observed Keimayer and Starray, were converging towards the Imperial magazines at Engen and Moeskirch,² which it was evident could not

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9.

Steps taken
by Moreau
to conceal
his designs.
April 25.

April 27.

1 St Cyr, ii.
120, 129.
Dum. iii. 94,
99, Jom.
xiii. 120, 125.

10.

Irresolution
of the Aus-
trian gene-
rals in con-
sequence.

April 28 and
29.

May 1.

² Nap. i 166.
Jom. xiii.
125, 129.
Dum. iii. 98,
101. St Cyr,
ii. 131, 137.

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11.
Moreau ad-
vances
against their
centre.
May 2.

be saved but by a battle fought against most unequal odds.

Ably profiting by the great advantages already gained, Moreau directed Lecourbe to move towards Stockach, in order to turn the centre of the enemy and cut off their communication with the left wing under the Prince of Reuss; while he himself, with the centre, reserve, and part of Sainte Suzanne's corps, moved directly upon the town of Engen, which it was anticipated would not be abandoned without a struggle, on account of the valuable magazines which it contained. Kray, on his part, assembled all the disposable force he could command in front of Engen, where he resolved to give battle, to gain time for the evacuation of his magazines upon Moeskirch. But while he was concentrating his forces in that central position, the Prince of Lorraine, who formed the communication between the Austrian centre and left wing, and was retiring with inferior forces before Lecourbe, was suddenly assailed by the French advanced-guard, under Molitor, and the cavalry of Nansouty, and entirely routed. Three thousand prisoners and eight pieces of cannon were the immediate results of this brilliant affair; but it became still more important by the capture of Stockach, with all its magazines, directly in rear of the position of Kray in front of Engen.¹

¹ Nap. i. 167.
Jom. xiii.
132, 133.
Dum. iii.
107, 109.
St Cyr, ii.
157, 158.

12.
Battle of
Engen.

On the same day on which this important success was gained on the right, the French centre, under Moreau in person, encountered the Austrian main body in the vast plain which lies before that town. Kray, with forty thousand men, was there in position, and the cavalry, above nine thousand strong, presented the most imposing spectacle, drawn up in *echelon* in front of its walls. Moreau's design was to attack in front himself, at the head of the reserve and part of the centre, while St Cyr, with his division, was directed to turn the left of the enemy. But that general being five leagues in the rear, could not come up till a late hour of the day; and Moreau, apprehensive lest, if the attack were delayed, the enemy would retreat, commenced the action himself at the head of thirty-two thousand men. The chief efforts of the French general were directed to gain possession of a plateau on the right

of the Imperialists, which would both have commanded their line of retreat and facilitated his own junction with St Cyr; but he encountered the most stubborn resistance. Kray had skilfully availed himself of all the advantages which the ground afforded him in that quarter; and for long all the efforts of the Republicans were unable to drive back their opponents from the vineyards and wooded heights, which they had occupied in force, and surmounted with a numerous artillery. At length, the French carried the peak of Hohenhowen, the most elevated point on the field of battle, and the Imperialists retired to the village of Ehingen. To restore the combat, the Austrian general strongly reinforced that important post, while Moreau brought up his reserve to expel the enemy from it. At first the Republicans were successful, and the village was carried; but Kray having charged in person at the head of the Hungarian grenadiers, they were driven out with great slaughter, and fled to the plain in extreme confusion. Moreau, instantly advancing to the spot, succeeded in restoring a certain degree of order, and in part regained the ground which had been lost; but the Hungarians continued to hold the village, and at nightfall all the avenues to it were still in their possession.¹

Meanwhile the division of Richepanse, which had established itself on the peak of Hohenhowen, was exposed to a furious attack from the Austrian right; the summit of the mountain resembled a volcano, which vomited forth fire in every direction; and it was easy to see, from the intensity of the light, which, as the twilight approached, illuminated the heavens in that direction, that it was only by the greatest efforts that he could maintain his ground. At seven o'clock, however, the vanguard of the corps of St Cyr, which had met with the greatest difficulties in the course of its march, and had been compelled to fight its way against Nauendorf's division through strong defiles, arrived in the field, and soon after began to take a part in the action. The combat now became more equal, and though the fire of artillery on both sides continued extremely violent, it was evident that the enemy fought only to gain time to withdraw his stores and ammunition.² In fact, at this hour the Austrian general received intelligence of the defeat of the Prince of Lorraine and the

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¹ Dum. iii.
110, 114.
Jom. xiii.
134, 139.
St Cyr, ii.
156, 161.

13.
Victory of
the French.

² Dum. iii.
114, 116.
Jom. xiii.
139, 141.
St Cyr, ii.
159, 179

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14.
Its great
results, and
retreat of
Kray.

capture of Stockach, which threatened his line of communications. He therefore drew off his forces in the direction of Liptingen and Moeskirch, where he formed a junction with that prince, who had retreated with the remains of his division in the same direction.

The loss of the Austrians in this battle was above seven thousand men, and that of the French was as great; but the moral consequences of the success with which it terminated to the Republicans were incalculable. It at once raised the spirit of the army, and produced that confidence in themselves which is the surest prelude to still greater success. Kray, finding that the intentions of the enemy were now fully proclaimed, and that he had on his hands the whole strength of the French army, made the utmost efforts when too late to concentrate his forces. Keilmayer was advancing with the greatest expedition by the Valley of Hell, while Starray had received orders to hasten to the decisive point, leaving only six thousand in the neighbourhood of Mannheim to observe the enemy's forces in that quarter. Moreau having received intelligence of this intended concentration of force, resolved to make the most of his present advantages, and attack the Austrians before they received any further reinforcements. On the 4th, the Imperialists retired to a strong position in front of Moeskirch; the whole front of their line was covered by a great ravine, which descends from Hendorf to Moeskirch, and its left by the Ablach, a rocky stream which flows in a rapid course into the Danube; the cavalry, and a reserve of eight battalions of grenadiers, were stationed on the heights of Rohrdorf. Powerful batteries commanded the chaussée which approached the village, and by their concentric fire seemed to render all access impossible. In this formidable position were collected forty thousand foot soldiers, and twelve thousand splendid cavalry, besides above two hundred pieces of cannon.¹

¹ Jom. xiii.
144, 145.
Dum iii.
124, 125.

15.
Battle of
Moeskirch.

Though Moreau had ordered Lecourbe to join him with all his disposable force, in order to take a part in the general action which was approaching, yet he had not contrived matters so as to bring all his forces into the field at the same time. The consequence was, that Lecourbe, with that portion of his corps which had not taken a part in the action of the preceding day, first commenced the

attack. He advanced with the greatest intrepidity to the assault of his old antagonist the Prince of Lorraine ; but he was received with so tremendous a fire from the cross batteries which Kray had established on the heights, that his artillery was instantly dismounted, and he himself compelled to take refuge in the neighbouring woods to avoid the merciless storm. Moreau, upon this, brought forward the division Lorges, and attacked the position by its left and the village of Hendorf ; but the attacking columns having been assailed by the enemy's masses, who suddenly debouched from behind their batteries, were thrown into confusion and entirely routed. Encouraged by this success, Kray made a sally with his right wing, and advanced into the plain ; but it was received in so resolute a manner by the French left, that he was not only compelled to retire, but the victorious Republicans recovered all the ground they had lost, and the village was carried by their pursuing columns, who entered pell-mell with the fugitives. At the same time, Vandamme, with the Republican right, advanced against the Imperial left, and attacked the village of Moeskirch ; the Austrians defended it with the utmost resolution, and it was taken and retaken several times : at length Lecourbe formed his division into four columns, which advanced simultaneously to the attack. Nothing could resist their impetuosity ; they rushed down the sides of the ravines and up the opposite banks, and chased the Imperialists from the plateau, while Molitor drove them out of Moeskirch, and the victorious columns met in the centre of the town.¹

¹ Jom. xiii.
146, 150.
Dum. iii.
126, 130.
St Cyr, ii.
190, 194.

Kray, seeing his left forced, skilfully executed a change of position in the very middle of the battle. He drew back his left from the plateau which had been so obstinately disputed, and took up a position parallel to the Danube, with his centre still resting on the plateau of Rohrdorf. This new position brought him on the flank of the division of Lorges, who was unsupported on that side. Kray instantly saw his advantage, and charged the exposed division, which was overthrown, and driven back in such confusion that nothing but the opportune arrival of Delmas with six fresh battalions prevented the French line being entirely broken through at that point. Both parties now made the utmost efforts ; the Austrians to improve the advantage they had gained, the French to re-establish their

16.
It at length
terminates
in the defeat
of the Impe-
rialists.

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¹ St Cyr, ii.
195, 197.
Dum. iii.
129, 131.
Jom. xiii.
150, 155.

17.
Results of
the battle.

² Memorial
du Dépôt de
la Guerre, v.
92. St Cyr,
ii. 199, 201.
Dum. iii.
129, 131.
Jom. xiii.
154, 156.

18.
Perilous
situation of
St Cyr, on
the follow-
ing day.

line. Moreau executed a change of front, arranging his army parallel to, that of the enemy, and during the progress of this new formation, the French division Delmas was furiously assailed; but all the efforts of the Imperialists were unable to break his admirable infantry.¹ Still, however, Kray redoubled his efforts, and charged himself at the head of his reserve against the division of Bastoul; Moreau also brought up reinforcements, and the combat continued for two hours with various success, till at length the arrival of Richepanse with a fresh division induced the Austrian general to retire, which was done before nightfall in the best order to the heights of Bucherni and Rohrdorf.¹

In this action, so obstinately contested on both sides, the loss to the contending parties was nearly equal, amounting to each to about six thousand men. The Austrians retained at the close of the day the plateau of Rohrdorf; the French slept on great part of the field of battle. But all the moral advantages of a victory were on their side; and as, on the following day, the Imperialists retired across the Danube, they in reality achieved the object for which they contended. The success was balanced chiefly in consequence of the non-arrival of St Cyr with his division, who lingered at Liptingen; had he come up and taken a part in the action, it would probably have terminated in a total defeat, the more disastrous to the Imperialists that they fought with their backs to the Danube. The cause of this inactivity in so able an officer, is to be found in the nature of the first instructions he had received from Moreau, and the intercepting of the couriers which conveyed the second orders to hasten to the decisive point.²

Following out the directions he had received, St Cyr, on the succeeding day, was leisurely moving parallel to the Danube, between that river and the Austrian army, when he came unawares upon their whole force drawn up in a small but strong position in front of the bridge of Sigmaringen. The ground they occupied would barely have sufficed for the deploying of a single division, being formed by a bend of the Danube, the base of which fronting the enemy, was covered by a formidable array of artillery, behind which the army was posted in seven lines almost forming a close column, and protecting in this manner the passage of their stores over the river.

Upon the approach of the French the surprise was equal on both sides; Kray, much alarmed, and apprehending an immediate attack, drew up his rearguard in battle array, and disposed the artillery which had crossed as well as that which remained in their front, in such a manner as to enfilade all the roads by which the position might be approached. St Cyr also paused: with the half of his division, which alone had come up, he did not venture to attack the whole Austrian army, but he insulted them by a battery of twelve pieces, which was pushed forward within cannon shot; and so weakened was the spirit of the Imperialists, that they replied to this fire only by a discharge from their numerous batteries, instead of issuing from their lines and sweeping the guns off by a charge of their powerful cavalry. There can be little doubt that if Moreau, instead of lingering at Moeskirch on the field of battle, had followed the traces of the enemy, joined St Cyr, and attacked them when backed by the Danube in this extraordinary position, he would have succeeded in destroying a large part of their army. But that general, with all his great qualities, had not the vigour in following up a success, which formed a leading characteristic of his more enterprising rival.¹

At Sigmaringen the Austrian general was joined by Keimayer with his whole division; and with this augmented force he recrossed the Danube and moved towards Biberach. He had resolved to retire to the shelter of the intrenched camp at Ulm; but his object in this movement was to cover the evacuation of the great magazines at Biberach upon that fortress. Thither he was followed by the French army, and on the morning of the 9th May their advanced posts found eighteen thousand Austrians posted at the entrance of the remarkable defile which leads to that town. This rearguard was posted for the most part on a series of formidable heights behind Biberach, which could be approached only by passing through that town, and afterwards traversing a road which ran through a morass. An advanced guard, consisting of ten battalions and as many squadrons, with eight pieces of cannon, was placed in front of Biberach, at the entrance of the defile. This position, apparently so hazardous, was necessary to cover the evacuation of the great magazines which that

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May 6.

¹ Nap. i. 169,
170. Dum.
iii. 131. St
Cyr, ii. 203,
205.

19.
Affair of
Biberach,
and retreat
of the Aus-
trians to
Ulm.

May 9.

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town contained, preparatory to the concentration of the whole army in the intrenched camp of Ulm. The advanced guard was attacked by St Cyr with such superior forces, that they were speedily routed, and driven in the utmost disorder across the morass. Biberach was so rapidly carried that the Austrians had not time to destroy their magazines, which fell in great part entire into the hands of the victors. Transported with ardour, the French dragoons and light troops traversed the town, and crossed the defile on the other side, notwithstanding a heavy and concentrated fire from the Austrian batteries; such was the intimidation produced by their audacity, that the Imperialists fired by platoons upon the light troops, as they would have done by a regular line, instead of combating them with the same species of force. In this affair Kray lost fifteen hundred prisoners, besides a thousand killed and wounded, and five pieces of cannon; but he gained time by it for the evacuation of his magazines at Memmingen, which were transported in safety to the intrenched camp at Ulm. There his army was all collected in two days afterwards, numbering eighty thousand infantry and twelve thousand horse; and after a campaign of unexampled activity, though of only fifteen days' duration, the Republicans found their victorious columns on the banks of the Danube.¹

¹ St Cyr, ii.
222, 224.
Jom. xiii.
164, 169
Dum. i..
138, 142
Nap. i. 171.

20.
Great advantage of that position.

In retiring to Ulm, Kray separated himself from his left wing, twenty-five thousand strong, in the Tyrol, and the detached corps on the Maine; but the advantages of that central position were such as amply to counterbalance these circumstances. The intrenched camp, occupying both banks of the Danube, and the heights of St Michel, traced out by the prophetic wisdom of the Archduke Charles, and connected with the fortress, was of the most formidable description. The town and *tête-du-pont* on the river were armed with a hundred and forty pieces of heavy cannon; the redoubts of the camp were complete, and lined with a proportional quantity of artillery: and not only were the magazines in the place most ample, but the extent of the works rendered all idea of a regular blockade out of the question. By remaining in this defensive position, the Austrian general not only preserved entire his own communications and line of retreat by

Donawert and Ratisbon, but threatened those of his adversary; who, if he attempted to pass either on the north or south, exposed himself to the attack of a powerful army in flank. Securely posted in this central point, the Imperialists daily received accessions of strength from Bohemia and the Hereditary States; while the French, weakened by the detachments necessary to preserve their communications, and observe the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol, soon began to lose that superiority which, by the skilful concentration of their force, they had hitherto enjoyed in the campaign.¹

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

1 Nap. i. 171,
172 Jom.
xiii. 310, 313.
Dum. iii.
145, 146.
St. Cyr. ii.
234, 235.

The difficulty of dislodging the Imperialists from this formidable position, was much augmented by the necessity to which Moreau at this period was subjected, of sending off nearly twenty thousand men under Moncey to cross the Alps by the St Gothard, and take a share in the projected operations of the First Consul in Italy. This great detachment restored the balance between the contending parties, and the spirit of the Austrians at the same time was so much revived by the sight of their vast forces within the intrenched camp, and the great resources which they found in the place, that Kray no longer hesitated to keep the field; and even detached the corps of Starray and Keinmayer, which had suffered least in the preceding operations, to the left bank of the Danube and the confluence of the Iller. Moreau accordingly found himself extremely embarrassed, and six weeks were employed in the vain attempt to dislodge a defeated army from this stronghold—a striking proof of the prophetic wisdom of the Archduke Charles in its formation, and the importance of central fortifications in arresting the progress of an invading army.²

21.
Kray keeps
the field
with part of
his force.

2 Jom. xiii.
312 St Cyr,
ii 235, 236.
Nap. i. 172

As the efforts of Austria and Russia during the Seven Years' War were shattered against the intrenched camp of Frederick at Burtzelwitz, so this important position seemed to be the *ne plus ultra* of the Republican operations in this campaign. It was hopeless to attempt to conquer so strong a position by main force; and it was no easy matter to see by what movement the Austrian general could be compelled to abandon it. For Moreau to move on, leaving eighty thousand men, supported by impregnable fortifications, in his rear, was impossible, as it would immediately

22.
Great
strength of
the in-
trenched
camp.

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

1 Jom. xiii.
314. Dum.
iv. 12, 13.
St Cyr, ii.
241.

23.
Measures of
Moreau to
dislodge him
from it, and
vigorous
stroke of the
Austrian
general on
the French
left.

May 16.

2 St Cyr, ii.
245, 251.
Jom. xiii.
315, 317.
Nap. i. 173,
174. Dum.
iv. 16, 18.

have led to the intercepting his communications with France; while to attempt the passage of the Danube in presence of such a force, would have been in the highest degree perilous. The Austrians soon reaped the benefits of this admirably chosen stronghold. The soldiers, lodged in excellent quarters, rapidly recovered their strength while the *morale* of the army, which had been extremely weakened by the continued disasters of the campaign, as quickly rose, when they perceived that a stop was at length put to the progress of the enemy.¹

With a view to dislodge Kray, Moreau advanced with the right in front; headquarters passed the Gunz on the right bank of the Danube, St Cyr followed with his division in *echelon*, while Sainte Suzanne received orders to approach Ulm on the left bank. The Republicans were masters of no bridge over the river, so that Sainte Suzanne with his single corps, was exposed to the attack of the whole Austrian army. Finding that the distance of Moreau with the centre and right wing precluded him from giving any effectual support to his left, Kray resolved to direct all his disposable forces against that general. On the 16th, the Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of the splendid Imperial cavalry, followed by several columns of infantry, suddenly assailed this detached corps near Erbach. The attack was so impetuous, and the surprise so complete, that the Republicans were speedily routed, and the Austrians, pressing forward with great vigour, not only drove them back in disorder above two leagues, but interposed their victorious columns between their flying divisions. Nothing but the intrepidity and presence of mind of the French generals preserved their left wing from total destruction. But while Sainte Suzanne did his utmost to retard the advance of the enemy, St Cyr, alarmed by the violence and receding sound of the cannonade, which distinctly showed how much the left wing was losing ground, halted his corps, and moved it towards the scene of danger; at the same time, rapidly bringing up his artillery, he placed it in batteries on the right bank of the Danube in such a manner as to enfilade the road by which the Archduke Ferdinand had issued from Ulm.² Alarmed at this apparition on his left, which he feared was preparatory to a passage of the river by the French centre, the Arch-

duke drew back his victorious columns to the intrenched camp, and an action was terminated, in which, if properly supported, the Imperialists might have achieved the destruction of the whole Republican left wing, and possibly changed the issue of the campaign.

Confounded by this vigorous stroke on his left, and made sensible, by his firm countenance, that the enemy was resolved to risk a battle rather than hazard the important position of Ulm, Moreau was thrown into a cruel perplexity. For several days he remained in a state of indecision, merely directing Sainte Suzanne to cross the Danube, to the support of St Cyr; so that, of the eleven divisions of which his army was composed, six were on the right bank, and five on the left. At length he resolved to resume his operations on the right bank, and after moving St Cyr again across the river, advanced with his centre and right, followed by Sainte Suzanne with the left, along the right bank towards Bavaria. Kray, upon this, made a sortie with ten thousand men on the moving mass; he attacked Souham's division with great vigour,

CHAP.
XXXI.
1800.

24.
Increasing
perplexity
of Moreau.
He in vain
moves round
to Augs-
burg.

but after an obstinate conflict, the Imperialists retired to Ulm, after inflicting a severe loss on the enemy. Meanwhile, Moreau continued his advance towards Bavaria, and on the 28th occupied Augsburg, directly in the rear of the Austrian army, on the high-road between them and Munich. The intelligence of this event, however,

May 24.

May 28.

had no effect in inducing the Imperial general to quit his stronghold; on the contrary, wisely judging that the advance of Moreau was only to excite alarm, or levy contributions, he wrote to the Aulic Council, that Moreau would never advance into the Hereditary States leaving his great army behind him, and that he would merely push forward his parties in all directions to disquiet the enemy in his advance, and intercept his communications. His firmness was completely successful; the French general did not venture to advance further into Germany, as long as the enemy remained in such force in his rear; while the lengthened stay of so immense a mass in one quarter speedily rendered provisions scarce in the French army, and induced such disorders as rendered several severe examples, and a new organisation of great part of their army, necessary.¹

¹ Dum. iv.
31, 36. Jom.
xiii. 319,
320. St Cyr,
ii. 258, 290.
Nap. i. 174,
175.

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

25.

He next ad-
vances on
the left bank
of the
Danube.
Imminent
risk of the
French left.

June 4.

Finding that Kray had penetrated his design, and remained firm at Ulm, in such a position as to endanger his communications if he continued his present advance, Moreau conceived a new and more decisive project, which was to pass the Danube below Ulm, and cut the Austrian army off from its great magazines in Bohemia. With this view, the advanced guard, which had occupied Augsburg, and levied a contribution of 600,000 florins (£60,000) on that flourishing city, was withdrawn, and the army was preparing to follow in this direction, when their movement was interrupted by a sudden irruption of the Austrians on the right bank. In effect, Kray, perceiving his adversary's design, collected thirty thousand men in the intrenched camp, with which, during the night, he crossed the bridge of Ulm, and assailed, at break of day, the flank* of the French army. The tempest fell on the left wing, under the orders of Richepanse; it was speedily enveloped by superior forces, broken, and placed in a state of the greatest danger. From this almost desperate condition the Republicans were rescued by a seasonable and able attack by Ney, who, having received orders to support the menaced corps, flew to the scene of danger, and advanced with such vigour against their vanguard, posted on the plateau of Kerchberg, that it was defeated with the loss of a thousand prisoners. Emboldened by this success, Richepanse halted his retiring columns, faced about, and renewed the combat with Kray, who, finding superior forces of the enemy now accumulating, withdrew to his intrenchments. Never did the French army incur greater danger; the Austrians in half an hour would have gained the bridge over the Iller, cut through the middle of the Republicans, and possibly, by opening a communication with the Prince of Reuss in the mountains of Tyrol, have retrieved all the disasters of the campaign.¹

¹ *Jom.* xiii.
326, 328.
Dum. iv. 36,
37. *Nap.* i.
174, 175.

Heavy rains, which fell at this time, precluded the possibility of active operations for nearly a week; but Moreau, encouraged by this last success, was still intent on prosecuting his movement upon the Lower Danube. With this view, he spread his troops along the whole line of the Upper Lech; Lecourbe made himself master of Landenberg, and continuing his march down the course of that river, entered a second time into Augsburg,

26.
At length
Moreau cuts
off his com-
munica-
tions.
June 12.

directly in the rear of the Imperialists. At the same time, the centre and left descended the Kamlach and Gunz, towards Krumbach ; thus accumulating almost all the Republican army between the Austrians and Bavaria. Threatened by such superior forces, Starray, who commanded the detached corps of the Austrians in that quarter, was obliged to cross to the left bank of the Danube. This able movement re-established the Republican affairs in that quarter ; Kray, in his turn, now saw his connexions with the interior threatened, and himself reduced to the necessity of either abandoning his intrenchments, or making an effort with his whole disposable force to re-establish his communications.¹

CHAP.
XXXI.
1800.

1 *Jom.* xiii.
334, 335.
Dum. iv. 40,
44. *Nap.* i.
176.

Finding his adversary still immovably fixed at Ulm, Moreau, after having concentrated his forces on the southern bank of the Danube, between Gunzburg and Donawerth, resolved to attempt the passage by main force. Far from penetrating his design, Starray, who commanded the Imperial forces on the opposite bank, sent all his troops, except eight battalions and a few squadrons, towards Ulm ; where Kray lay inactive, neither attempting any thing against the French under Richepanse, between him and the Tyrol, nor taking any steps to secure his last and most important communications with the rich and fertile plains of Bohemia. Moreau ably profited by the supineness of his antagonist. After several unsuccessful attempts, which distracted the enemy's attention, the passage was effected on the 19th at Blindheim, with that romantic gallantry which so often in similar situations has characterised the French arms. The Austrians immediately hastened from all quarters to crush the enemy, before he was firmly established on the left bank ; but Lecourbe, pushing on to Schwinningen, which lay between their detachments, prevented their junction ; and, after a murderous conflict, not only succeeded in maintaining his position, but made prisoners three battalions of the enemy.²

27.
The passage
of the
Danube is
effected by
the French.
June 19.

2 *Jom.* xiii.
334, 338.
Dum. iv. 44,
51. *Nap.* i.
178.

Both parties now hastened with all their disposable forces to the scene of action. Lecourbe speedily crossed over the remainder of his corps to the left bank, and advanced with fifteen thousand men to Hochstedt, while Kray detached the greater part of his cavalry and light artillery to the support of Starray. The Austrian general,

28.
Severe ac-
tion at
Hochstedt.

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

* 1 Dum. iv.
51, 55. Jom.
xiii. 338,
341. Nap. i.
178.

29.

Kray is at
length com-
pelled to
abandon
Ulm, and
reaches
Nordlingen.
June 19.

not finding himself in sufficient strength to resist the increasing masses of the enemy, retired to Dillingen, severely harassed by the French cavalry, which made above a thousand men prisoners. Kray advanced two thousand cuirassiers to extricate his infantry, and a desperate *mêlée* took place between the Republican and Imperial cavalry, in which the Austrian horse maintained their high character, but could not bear up against the great superiority of the enemy. After a bloody conflict, in the course of which Moreau and Lecourbe repeatedly charged in person, the Imperialists retired behind the Brentz, leaving the enemy securely established on the left bank of the Danube. Thus the Republican cavalry gained a glorious success on the very plains where a century before the incapacity of Marshal Tallard had endangered the crown of Louis XIV., and brought an unheard-of disaster on the French arms.¹

The consequences of this victory were decisive. Twenty pieces of cannon, and four thousand prisoners, had been captured in these continued combats; but what was of far more importance, Kray was cut off from his resources in Bohemia, and obliged to evacuate the intrenched camp of Ulm. Compelled to abandon that important position, he left a garrison of ten thousand men within its walls, and having stationed his cavalry on the Brentz, so as to cover his movement, and dispatched his grand park, consisting of one hundred and sixty pieces and eight hundred caissons, on the road to Neresheim and Nordlingen, he himself followed with the remainder of his army in three divisions, and after undergoing unparalleled fatigues and privations, during a continued forced march of four days, arrived on the 23d, late in the evening, at Nordlingen. This march of the Austrians, in a semicircle, of which the Republicans occupied the base, was performed with the greatest expedition, chiefly during the night, and was conducted with a degree of military talent, which rescued them from their embarrassments, and reflects the highest honour on the capacity and determination of their commander. The opposing generals seemed to have changed places, during the eventful period from the 14th to the 23d June: the supineness of the Imperial commander during the first four days, when the able Republican

movement was in preparation, exposed him to the greatest dangers, from which he was afterwards extricated not less by his own ability, when roused to a sense of the perils which surrounded him, than by the tardiness and irresolution which deprived the French general of the fruits of his movement, at the very moment when they were within his grasp. Had Moreau, with his victorious and concentrated army, fallen perpendicularly on the flank of the Imperialists, when performing their perilous march to regain their communications, the vanguard would probably have been separated from the rear, great part of the park taken, and the triumph of Hohenlinden been contemporary with that of Marengo.¹

During the last day's march, before arriving at Nordlingen, the Imperial cavalry were severely pressed by the French, and the exhaustion of the troops was such, that the Austrian general deemed it indispensable to give them a day's rest to recover from their fatigues. Moreau, finding that the enemy had gained several marches upon him, and that he could not hope to force him to a general engagement, resolved to change his direction, and by occupying Munich, and laying Bavaria under contribution, both separate Kray irretrievably from his left wing, under the Prince of Reuss, in the Tyrol, and secure for himself all the consequences of the most brilliant victory. For this purpose he detached General Decaen with ten thousand men, who set out on the 25th from Dillingen, marched in the three following days forty leagues, and, after defeating the troops of Meerfelt stationed to protect the electoral capital, entered Munich on the 28th. The elector, taken by surprise, had hardly time to take refuge with his family behind the Isar, under the escort of the Austrian troops. At the same time, Richepanse with his corps invested Ulm on both sides of the Danube, and Kray leisurely continued his retreat towards the upper palatinate, abandoning the whole of Swabia and Franconia to the enemy.²

Montrichard, with the Republican vanguard, came up with the Imperial rearguard, posted in front of Neuberg. Carried away by an impetuous courage, he immediately commenced an attack; but Kray, who was at hand with twenty-five thousand men, made him repent his temerity

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

¹ Nap. i. 178,
179. Jom.
xiii. 342,
345. Dum.
iv. 59, 61.

30.
Moreau
occupies
Munich

June 25.

June 28.

² Dum. iv.
61, 63. Jom
xiii. 350, 355.
Nap. i. 178.

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

31.

Kray crosses
the Danube,
and descends
the right
bank to
Landshut.
June 29.

and suddenly assailing the French with greatly superior forces, threw them into disorder, and drove them back above two leagues in the utmost confusion. The approach of night, and the arrival of Lecourbe with great reinforcements, induced him to draw off his victorious troops after this success; and, finding that he could not establish himself on the Lech before the enemy, he continued his march during the night, reached Ingolstadt, repassed the Danube, and descending the right bank of that river, advanced towards Landshut. In this engagement the Republicans had to lament the loss of the brave Latour d'Auvergne, deemed the first grenadier of France. A model of every warlike virtue, this soldier, though a captain by rank, had taken a musket on his shoulder as a private grenadier. He perished from the stroke of a lance, while repulsing in the front rank a charge of Imperial cavalry. Such was the esteem in which he was held, that the whole army wore mourning for him for three days, and a monument was erected on the spot where he fell, which, according to the noble expression of General Dessolles in his order of the day on the occasion, "consecrated to virtue and courage, was put under the protection of the brave of every age and country." It was not in vain that this touching appeal was made to German honour. The Archduke Charles, at a subsequent period, when the fortune of war had restored the country where it stood to the power of the Imperialists, took it under his especial protection. It survived all the disasters which overwhelmed the throne of Napoleon, and still remains, in the midst of a foreign land, a monument honourable alike to the French who erected, and the Imperialists who protected it.¹

¹ Fain, MS
de 1813, ii.
431. Dum.
iv. 63, 66.
Jom. xiii.
354, 355.

32.

And falls
back behind
the Inn.
July 7.

Notwithstanding all his diligence, Kray could not reach Munich before the French; and he had the mortification, on reaching the neighbourhood of that city, of finding that it was already in the hands of the enemy, and that his communication with his left wing in the Tyrol was irrecoverably cut off. Continuing his retreat, therefore, he left the banks of the Iser for those of the Inn, and arrived in five marches by Wartenberg, Hohenlinden, and Haag, at the camp of Amfing.² He was there joined by the corps of Meerfelt, which had retired from Munich; the corps of the Prince of Condé received orders to advance to

² Jom. xiii.
355, 357.
Dum. iv. 66,
71. Nap. i.
179.

his support from Salzburg, and as he approached the Hereditary States, the Imperial general began to receive those reinforcements, which the patriotism of their inhabitants never fails to afford to the Austrian monarchy when seriously menaced with danger.

Both parties at this period received intelligence of the battle of Marengo and armistice of Alexandria, which shall immediately be noticed; and not doubting that it would speedily be followed by a suspension of arms in Germany as well as Italy, Moreau resolved to take advantage of the short period which remained to clear his extreme right of the Prince of Reuss, who from the mountains of Tyrol was now in a situation, from the advance of the French army into the heart of Germany, to threaten its communications. For this purpose Lecourbe was detached, with the right wing of the army, towards Feldkirch, the formidable position which covered the north-west of that rugged district, and against which all the efforts of Massena and Oudinot had failed in the preceding campaign.* The troops who garrisoned its intrenchments, had been in great part drawn away to keep up the communication with the Prince of Condé and the main body of the Imperialists on the eastern frontier of Tyrol; and those which remained were so scattered over many different points, as to be incapable of rendering effectual resistance at any. After some trifling successes at Fusen and Immenstadt, Coire and Luciensteg were abandoned to the enemy, whose superiority of force rendered opposition impossible; and although the Austrians, in the first instance, gained some advantage before Feldkirch, they found themselves in the end unable to man sufficiently its extensive works, and on the following day that celebrated stronghold, which had lost much of its importance from the new theatre on which the war was carried on, was abandoned to the enemy. While Lecourbe was thus clearing the right of the Republican position, Sainte Suzanne, who had been dispatched to the Lower Rhine to organise the French forces in that direction, was performing the same service on the banks of the Maine. He invested Philipsburg, and advanced to Aschaffenburg, where the Imperialists were repulsed; and the Lower Maine was speedily cleared of their troops.¹

CHAP.
XXXI.
1800.

33.
Operations
against the
Prince of
Reuss in the
Tyrol.
Feldkirch is
carried by
the Republi-
cans.

July 13.

July 14.

¹ Jom. xiii.
357, 367.
Dum. iv. 71,
82. Nap. i.
180.

CHAR.
XXXI.

1800.

34.

Armistice
of Parsdorf
in Germany.
July 15.

Matters were in this situation, when the truce which had been concluded at Alexandria between France and Austria a month before, was extended to Germany, under the appellation of the armistice of Parsdorf. By this subsidiary treaty, hostilities were terminated at all points in the empire, and were not to be resumed without a notice of twelve days. The French occupied all the country from Balzers in the Grisons, on the right bank of the Rhine, to the sources of the Inn; the whole valley of that river, from the latter point, by the reverse of the mountains to the sources of the Lech, and the intermediate country occupied by their troops along the Iser to its junction with the Danube; and from thence by Weissenburg and the Rednitz to the Maine. The fortresses included within this line, still in the hands of the Imperialists, particularly Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, were to remain in their possession, on the condition, on the one hand, that their garrisons were not to be augmented, and on the other, that they were to be provisioned every ten days, under the superintendence of commissioners named by the belligerent powers. In the circumstances in which the Austrians then were, threatened with invasion in the Hereditary States in their most vulnerable quarter, the valley of the Danube, this armistice was a most fortunate event, and gave them a breathing-time, of which they stood much in need, to repair their shattered forces, and prepare for the further struggles which awaited the monarchy.¹

¹ Dum. iv.
84, 90.

Important as these events were, they were eclipsed by those which, during the same period, occurred to the south of the Alps.

35.
Designs of
Napoleon
for the re-
conquest of
Italy.

An ordinary general, terrified at the dangers with which the southern departments were threatened, would have hastened with the army of reserve to the Var, in order to protect the menaced frontier of Piedmont. But Napoleon, who was well aware of the difficulties attending a front attack upon the Imperialists in that mountainous region, and appreciated with all the force of his genius the importance of the central position which he occupied in Switzerland, determined upon a more important and decisive operation. This was to cross the Alps by one of the central passes after the Austrians were far advanced

in Piedmont, and thus interpose between them and their resources, cut them off from their communication with the Hereditary States, and compel them to fight under the most disadvantageous circumstances, with their front towards Lombardy, and their rear shut in by the Mediterranean sea and the inhospitable ridges of the Apennines. Defeat in such circumstances could not be other than ruin, while a disaster to the French would be of comparatively little importance, as their retreat, at least for the infantry and cavalry, was secure over the passes of the St Gothard or the Simplon into Switzerland, which was still in their hands, and where experience had proved they could resist the utmost efforts of the Imperialists.¹

¹ Jom. xiii.
39. 40. Nap.
i. 252.

But before this great blow could be struck, the French had a desperate and hopeless struggle to maintain on the ridges of the Apennines. During the winter months, while the Austrians were reposing from their fatigues, and repairing their losses in men, horses, and equipments, in the fertile plains of Lombardy, the French army, perched on the rugged summits of the mountains, had to contend at once with the hardships incident to those sterile regions, and the contagious maladies which they brought with them from their disastrous campaign in the plains. No words can describe the sufferings they underwent during that afflicting period. A few regiments lost two thousand men in the hospitals of Genoa in four months: the wants of the troops, without shoes, blankets, or winter clothing, produced universal insubordination, and the authority of the officers being generally lost under the influence of the common calamities, vast numbers openly abandoned their colours and returned into France. The French army was rapidly melting away under such accumulated disasters, and every thing announced an easy conquest of Genoa to the Imperialists, when the torrent was arrested by the energetic measures adopted by the First Consul, immediately after he assumed the reins of public affairs.²

36.
Extreme suffering of the troops on the summits of the Maritime Alps.

² Jom. xiii.
45, 46.

His first care was to appoint Massena, whose abilities in mountain warfare had been so fully tried, and who was so well acquainted, from the campaigns of 1795 and 1796, with that country, to the direction of the army; and upon assuming the command, that able general issued an energetic proclamation in Napoleon's name to the troops:—

CHAP.

XXXI.

1800.

37.

Massena is appointed to the command. Napoleon's proclamation to these troops.

"The first quality of a soldier," said he, "is to bear with constancy the privations of war; valour is but a secondary consideration. Many corps have abandoned their colours; they have remained deaf to the voice of their officers. Are, then, the brave men of Castiglione, Rivoli, and Neu-markt no more? Rather than desert their colours, they would have perished at their feet. Your rations, you complain, have not been regularly distributed. What would you have done, if, like the 18th and 32d regiments, you had found yourselves in the midst of the desert, without either bread or water, having nothing but horse and camel flesh to subsist on?—'Victory will give us bread,' said they. And you desert your standards! Soldiers of Italy! a new general is to take the command of you; he was ever with the advanced guard in the days of your glory; place your confidence in him, he will again chain victory to your standards." These energetic words, and still more the magic of Napoleon's name, had a prodigious effect on the French soldiers, ever liable to pass with rapidity from one extreme to another. The desertion speedily diminished, and some severe examples which Massena made immediately after his arrival, stopped it altogether.¹

¹ Nap. i. 200,
201. Jom.
xiii. 45, 48.
Bot. iii. 455.

38.

Energetic measures taken to restore order. Positions of the opposite armies.

At the same time, the vigour of the First Consul provided more substantial additions to the comforts of the men. Their rations were augmented, and distributed with regularity; a portion of their arrears was discharged; and by incredible exertions, not only were ample supplies conveyed to their frigid bivouacs, but fresh clothing provided for their shivering limbs. By these means the spirit of the soldiers was in a short time so restored, that an army, which a few weeks before seemed menaced with approaching dissolution, became capable of the most persevering exertions. A new organisation was completed by Massena, and four regiments, which he brought with him, in the highest state of equipment, from the north of Switzerland, became the model on which the army was formed. The army, which amounted to twenty-eight thousand men, in Liguria, exclusive of eight thousand on the summits of the Alps, from Argentièrre to Mont Cenis, was divided into three corps. The right, under the command of Soult, sixteen thousand strong, occupied Gavi, the Cam-po-Freddo, the Bochetta, and the summit of the valleys

leading from Piedmont to Genoa; the centre, consisting of twelve thousand, guarded the ridges extending westward, and from thence, through Cadebone, Vado, Savona, and the Col di Tende, towards France; while the left wing, under Thureau, perched on the summit of the Alps which form the western boundary of the plain of Piedmont, watched the important passes of Mont Cenis, the Little St Bernard, and the Col di Genève. The Austrians, cantoned in the plain below, and at the entrance of the numerous valleys which were occupied by the enemy, were so much scattered, that out of ninety-six thousand men who composed their active troops, not more than sixty thousand could be assembled for operations on the Bormida and in the Apennines. This force, however, was amply sufficient for the object in view, which was the expulsion of the French from Italy; and at length the order from Vienna arrived, and active operations commenced on the 6th April.¹

CHAP.

XXXI.

1800.

¹ Bot. iii.
455, 456.
Nap. i. 201.
Jom. xiii. 45,
48, 51, 53, 54.

The town of Genoa, against which all the efforts of the Imperialists were now directed, is situated in the centre of the gulf which bears its name; and from a very early period has occupied a distinguished place in the history of modern Europe. Placed, on the southern slope of the Apennines, where they dip into the Mediterranean sea, it exhibits a succession of lofty buildings, terraces, gardens, and palaces, rising one above another in imposing masses from the water's edge to a very great eminence. The streets of palaces, rising tier above tier from the sea, girdle with the long lines of their bright white houses the vast sweep of the harbour, the mouth of which is marked by a huge natural mole of rock, surmounted by a magnificent lighthouse tower. The gay and glittering aspect of the buildings, ascending in succession from the bay to the summit of the hills which screen it from the north; the splendour of the palaces which adorn its higher quarters; the picturesque air of the towers and fortifications by which it is surmounted; the contrast between the dazzling whiteness of the edifices, and the dark green of the firs and olives by which they are shrouded; the blue sea which washes the southern ramparts of the city, and reflects its innumerable domes and spires;² form a spectacle at once so varied and gorgeous, as to have early captivated the

39.
Description
of Genoa.

² Personal
observation,
and Arnold's
History, 215

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40.

Its walls and
fortifica-
tions.

imagination of the Italians, and secured for it the appellation of *Genova la Superba*.

A double circle of fortifications, rising above one another on the successive ridges which, on the land side, surmount the walls, surrounds this splendid city. These exterior fortifications are the famous lines closely resembling those which, in ancient days, surrounded the *Epipolæ* of Syracuse, which, converging inland, and running up the hills from the eastern and western extremities of the city, meet on the apex on their summit; the outer or exterior walls consist of a triangle of nine thousand toises in circumference. On the south, bounded by the sea, this line extends from the point of the Lantern lighthouse at the mouth of the rivulet called the *Polcevera* to the mouth of the *Bisagno*: the eastern side runs along the banks of the *Bisagno* to the fort of *Eperon*, which forms the apex of the triangle, and the western descends from that elevated point to the *Lanterne* along the margin of the *Polcevera*. The batteries on the western side command the whole valley of the *Polcevera*, with the long and straggling faubourg of *St Pierre d'Arena*, which runs through its centre; those on the east, on the other hand, are themselves commanded by the heights of *Monte Ratti* and *Monte Faccio*, a circumstance which rendered it necessary to occupy them by detached outworks, which are called the forts of *Quizzi*, of *Richelieu*, and of *San Tecla*, on the *Madonne del Monte*. Higher up the *Apennines* than the *Fort Eperon*, is the plateau of the *Two Brothers*, which is commanded in rear by the *Diamond Fort*, perched on a summit twelve hundred toises from *Fort Eperon*. The peculiar situation of *Genoa*, lying on the rapid declivity where the *Apennines* descend into the sea, rendered it necessary to include these mountains in its rear in the exterior line of its fortifications, and to occupy so many points beyond their wide circuit by detached outworks, which give the ridges by which it is encircled the appearance of an immense castle. The interior line which surrounds the city properly so called, is susceptible of some defence; but the possession of the outer works would render any protracted resistance impossible, as the batteries on the *Lantern* and the fort of *Eperon* would expose the city to the horrors of a bombardment.¹

¹ Nap. i. 203,
204. Jom.
xiii. 88, 92.
Dum. iii.
227, 231.
Personal ob-
servation.

Early in March, Admiral Keith, who commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean, established a close blockade of the harbour of Genoa and its dependencies, which promised to augment extremely the difficulties of the besieged; and in the beginning of April, General Melas having completed his preparations, moved forward in three columns to the attack of the French defensive positions. Ott, with the left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was intrusted with the attack of the right, and the forts on Monte Faccio; Melas with the centre, consisting of twenty-four thousand, was to ascend the valley of the Bormida, and separate the centre of the enemy from their left wing; while Elnitz with the right, amounting to eighteen thousand soldiers, was to assail their left, and to facilitate the important and decisive movements of Melas in the centre. These attacks all proved successful. The Imperialists experienced every where the most vigorous resistance, and the courage and enterprise on both sides seemed exalted to the highest pitch by the great object for which they contended, and the lofty eminences, midway between the plain and the clouds, on which the struggle took place. But the resolution of the Austrians, aided by their great superiority of numbers, and the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountain warfare, at length overcame all the aid which the French derived from the possession of the heights and the fortifications by which they were strengthened.¹

Soult, on the French right, driven from Montenotte, the first scene of Napoleon's triumphs, was thrown back upon Genoa, while Savona, Cadebone, and Vade, were occupied by the Imperialists, and their extreme left, under Suchet, altogether detached from the centre, driven off towards France. Hohenzollern, who was intrusted with the attack of the Bochetta, drove the French from the neighbourhood of Gavi far up that important pass, and with some difficulty succeeded in attaining the crest of the mountains; while on the extreme left, Klenau obtained the most important advantages. Commencing his march from the valley of the Trebbia, he advanced, in three columns, up the narrow ravines which lead to the eastern fortifications of Genoa, carried the summit of the mountains, drove the Republicans from the Monte Faccio and

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41.

Measures taken for its blockade by land and sea. Successful attack of the Imperialists on the French position.

¹ Dum. iii. 47, 49. Nap. i. 206. Journ. xiii. 53, 55. Thib. 70, 72.

42.

Suchet is separated from the main body, and driven back towards France. April 6.

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1 Dum. iii.
47, 51. Nap.
i. 207.
Jom. xii. 53.
57. Bot. iii.
460, 462.
Thib. 79, 85.
Sicge de
Genes.

the Monte Ratti, and invested the forts of Quizzi, Rihoe-
lieu, and San Techo, within cannon-shot of the walls of the
city. Its inhabitants were variously agitated with hopes
and fears, as the firing of the musketry and cannon came
nearer and nearer. At length the smoke was distinctly
visible, even from the interior ramparts, and while the
broken regiments of Soult were entering the city from
the westward, by the gates of the Lanterne, the whole
heavens to the north and west were illuminated by the
fires of the bivouacs, from the crowded summits of Monte
Faccio.¹

43.
Desperate
and success-
ful sortie of
Massena.

The situation of Massena was now highly critical; the
more especially as a large and influential part of the inha-
bitants were strongly attached to the cause of the Impe-
rialists, and ardently desired a deliverance from the demo-
cratic tyranny to which for years they had been subjected.
The effervescence in the city was extreme, especially
among the working classes, who had been grievously
straitened from the cessation of commerce, since the
French government had been established, and the English
blockade had closed their harbour. Their ardour, strongly
excited by the sight of the Austrian watchfires, and the
sound of the tocsin which incessantly rang to rouse the
peasants on the neighbouring mountains, was with diffi-
culty restrained even by the presence of a garrison, now
increased, by the refuge from all quarters, to twenty
thousand men. But Massena was not a man to be easily
daunted; and on this accumulation of force in the central
position of Genoa, he founded his hopes of expelling the
enemy from the posts most threatening to the city. By
daybreak on the 7th, he threw open the gates of the town,
and attacked the Austrian division on the Monte Faccio
with such vigour, that in a short time that important post
was regained; the Imperialists were driven from the
Monte Cornua, the Torriglio, and all the passes of the
Apennines in that direction, and fifteen hundred men
made prisoners, who were before nightfall marched through
the astonished crowds into the interior of the city.²

April 7.

² Bot. iii.
463. Jom.
xiii. 56, 57.
Nap. i. 207.
Dum. iii. 51,
52. Thib.
90, 110.

On the same day a series of obstinate engagements took
place on the Austrian right between Elnitz and Suchet, which,
though attended with varied success, upon the whole, had
the effect of establishing the Imperialists in great strength

on the heights of St Giacomo and Vado, and completing the separation of the French left wing from the centre of their army and the city of Genoa. No sooner was the French general informed of this disaster, than he perceived that it was not by any transient success on the Monte Faccio, but by a vigorous effort towards Savona, and the re-establishment of his communications with Suchet, that the torrent of disaster was to be arrested. With this view he divided his army into three divisions; the first, under Miollis, being intrusted with the defence of the city and environs of Genoa; the second, under Gazan, was to advance from Voltri towards Sassello; while the third, under Massena in person, was to move along the sea-coast. Suchet at the same time received orders to suspend his retreat, and co-operate in the general attack, which, it was hoped, would lead to the capture of the Austrian division at Montenotte and Savona, and re-establish the important communication with Suchet and France. The execution of the combined attack was fixed for the 9th of April.¹

Meanwhile Melas, having so far strengthened Elmitz on the heights of Vado, as to enable him to make head against Suchet, resolved to move with the bulk of his forces against Massena at Genoa, wisely judging that the principal efforts of his opponent would be directed to the opening a communication with France and the left wing of his army. With this view he moved forward Hohenzollern, on the evening of the 8th, who, after a sharp resistance, carried the Bochetta by moonlight, which had been abandoned after the reverse on the Monte Faccio, and drove the French down the southern side to Campo Marone. This success so entirely disconcerted Soult, who directed Gazan's division, that though he had gained considerable advantages, he deemed it prudent to suspend the march of his troops. On the following night, however, having been strongly reinforced by the general-in-chief, he assailed with superior forces the division of St Julien at La Vereira, and after a desperate conflict routed it with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners and seven standards. But this success was more than compensated by the disaster which, on the same day, befell the left of the French at Cogoletto, who were overwhelmed by Melas, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Massena in person, and driven back, sword in

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44.

His dispositions for re-opening the communication with Suchet.

1 Jom. xlii.
60. Bot. ii.
463, 464.
Nap. i 208,
209. Thib.
110, 135.

45.

Austrian measures to prevent it, which prove successful.

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April 2.

¹ Bot. iii.

463, 465.

Jom. xiii. 61,

71. Dum.

iii. 53, 65.

Nap. i. 210,

211. Thib.

167, 180.

46.
Continued
successes of
the Imperial-
ists.

hand, to the neighbourhood of Voltri. At the same time, Elnitz and Suchet combated with divided success on the Monte Giacomo. At first the Republicans were victorious, and an Austrian brigade commanded by General Ulm, separated from the main body, was surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms. But this success having led Suchet to attempt on the following day the attack of the Monte Giacomo itself, a lofty ridge of prodigious strength, he was repulsed with great slaughter, and, after leaving the slopes of the mountain and its snowy crest covered with the dead and the dying, driven back in confusion to Melogno and Sette Pani on the sea-coast.¹

Thus, though the Republicans combated every where with rare intrepidity, and inflicted fully as great a loss on their adversaries as they received themselves, yet, on the whole, the object of their efforts was frustrated. Gigantic efforts had been made, blood had flowed in torrents, and the rival armies, amidst the rocks and clouds of the Apennines, had struggled with unheard-of obstinacy, but still the Austrians retained their advantage; their columns remained interposed in strength between the French centre and left, and the multitude of killed and wounded was weakening, in an alarming degree, an army now cut off from all external assistance. Both parties now made the utmost efforts to concentrate their forces, and bring this murderous warfare to a termination. On the 15th, Melas renewed the attack with the utmost vigour at Ponte Ivrea, and at the same time reinforced Hohenzollern on his left, and directed him to press down from the Bochetta, and threaten the communication of the French with Genoa. The soldiers of both armies, though exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of provisions, fought with the utmost obstinacy on the following day; but at length Soult, finding that his rear was threatened by a detachment of Hohenzollern, fell back to Voltri, overthrowing in his course the Austrian brigade who endeavoured to dispute the passage. On the same day, Massena in person was repulsed by the Imperialists under Latterman, and finding his retreat also menaced by Hohenzollern, he too retreated to Voltri in the night, where the two French divisions were united on the following morning.²

But the Imperialists, who now approached from all

² Bot. iii.

464, 465.

Nap. i. 211.

Jom. xiii. 71,

75. Dum.

iii. 69, 73.

Thib. 180,

200.

quarters, gave the wearied Republicans no rest in this position. From the heights of Monte Fayole, Melas beheld the confusion which prevailed in the army of his opponents; while the corps of Ott, whose right wing now began to take a part in the hostilities, already threatened Sestri, and the only line of retreat to Genoa which still remained to them. A general attack was immediately commenced. Melas descended the Monte Fayole, while Ott, whose troops were comparatively fresh, assailed it from the eastern side, and by a detachment menaced the important post of Sestri in their rear. Ott forced his way to Voltri, while Soult was still resolutely combating Melas on the heights of Madonna del Acqua, at the foot of Monte Fayole, and a scene of matchless horror and confusion immediately ensued. Soult, informed that his communications were threatened, instantly began his retreat; the victorious troops of Ott were assailed at once by the flying columns of that general, who fought with the courage of despair, and the troops they had displaced from Voltri, who rallied and returned to the rescue of their comrades. After a desperate conflict, continued till nightfall, in which the French and Imperialists sustained equal losses, the passage was at length cleared, and the retreating columns, by torchlight, and in the utmost confusion, reached the Polcevera, and found shelter within the walls of Genoa.¹

Thus, after a continued combat of fifteen days, maintained with matchless constancy on both sides, and in which the advantages of a fortified central position on the side of the Republicans long compensated their inferiority of force to the Imperialists, Massena with his heroic troops was shut up in Genoa, and all hope of co-operating with Suchet, or receiving reinforcements from France, finally abandoned. In these desperate conflicts, the loss of the French was seven thousand men, fully a third of the force which remained to their general after he was shut up in Genoa; but that of the Austrians was nearly as great, and they were bereaved, in addition, of above four thousand prisoners, a success dearly purchased by the French in a city where the dearth of provisions already began to be severely felt. Meanwhile Suchet, having been informed by Oudinot, who had made a perilous passage by sea in the midst of the English cruisers, of the desire of Massena that he

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47.

Massena
finally driven
into Genoa.

April 21.

¹ Thib. 200,
217. Dum.
iii. 74, 76.
Jom. xiii 76,
78. Bot. in.
467.

48.
Results of
these combats,
and defeat of
Suchet by
Elnitz.

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should co-operate in the general attack, instantly made preparations for a fresh assault on the blood-stained ridge of the Monte Giacomo ; but in the interval, Melas, now relieved on his left by the retreat of Massena into Genoa, had reinforced Elnitz by three brigades, and the position of the Imperialists, naturally strong, was thereby rendered impregnable. The consequence was, that the moment the Republicans made their appearance at the foot of the mountain, they were attacked and overthrown so completely, that it was only owing to an excess of caution on the part of the Imperialists that they were not wholly cut off and made prisoners. By this disastrous defeat Suchet lost all hope of regaining his communication with Genoa, and was compelled to fall back, for his own security, towards the Var and the frontier of Piedmont.¹

¹ Dum. iii.
76, 79. Jom.
xiii. 76, 79,
80.

49.
Who is
driven over
the Var into
France.
April. 27.

May 2.

May 6.

On the other hand, Melas, having completed the investment of Genoa, and left Ott with twenty-five thousand men to blockade that fortress, moved himself, with the bulk of his forces, to reinforce Elnitz on the Monte Giacomo, and pursue his successes against Suchet. To aid in the accomplishment of this object, he moved up part of the twenty-five thousand men, who, during this desperate struggle in the Apennines, had lain inactive in Piedmont under Kaim. Threatened by so many forces, Suchet retired with about ten thousand men to Albuega, in the rear of Loano, and took a position at Borghetto, where Kellerman, in 1795, had so successfully arrested the advance of General Divini. There, however, he was attacked a few days after by Melas with superior forces, and driven from the field with great loss : He endeavoured in vain to make a stand on the Monte di Torria and the Col di Tende ; the columns of the Austrians turned his flanks and pushed him across the frontier and over the Var, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners, and an equal number killed and wounded. Thus the French, after a desperate struggle, were at length driven back into their own territories ; and nothing remained to them of their vast conquests in Italy but the ground which was commanded by the cannon of Genoa.²

² Jom xiii.
83, 86. Bot.
iii. 467, 469.
Dum. iii.
198, 200.

While Melas was thus chasing the Republican eagles from the Maritime Alps, Ott was preparing a general attack, by which he hoped to drive the French from the exterior

line of defence, and render their position untenable in that important fortress. With this view, while the English fleet kept up a severe cannonade upon the town from the entrance of the harbour, a general assault was planned against the defences of Massena on the Bisagno, the Polcevera, and the fortified summits of Madonna del Monte and Monte Ratti. These attacks were all in the first instance successful. Bussy, supported by the fire of the English gun-boats, made himself master of St Pierro d'Arena and the valley of the Polcevera; while Palfi, by a vigorous attack, carried the Monte Ratti, surrounded the fort Richelieu, surprised the fort Quizzi, and gained possession of all the southern slopes of the Monte Faccio and the Madonna del Monte. At the same time Hohenzollern stormed the important plateau of the Two Brothers, and summoned the commander of Fort Diamond, now completely insulated, to surrender. The Imperialists even went so far as to make preparations for establishing mortar batteries on the commanding heights of Albaro, and bombarding the city over its whole extent, so as to render the French position untenable within its walls.¹

Had the Austrians possessed a sufficient force to make good the advantages thus gained, they would have speedily brought the siege of Genoa to a conclusion, and by a concentration of all their forces on the Bormida, might have defeated the invasion by Napoleon over the Alps, and changed the fate of the campaign. But General Ott had only twenty-five thousand men at his disposal, while an equal number, under Kaim, lay inactive in the plains of Piedmont, and this imprudent distribution of force proved in the highest degree prejudicial to the Imperial interests through the whole campaign. Availing himself with skill of the immense advantage which the possession of a central position in an intrenched camp afforded, Massena withdrew four battalions from the eastern side, where he judged the danger less pressing, and dispatched them, under Soult, to regain the heights of the Two Brothers, while he himself hastened, with four battalions more, to reinforce Miollis on the Monte Albaro. The Imperialists, who had gained time to strengthen their acquisitions, received the attack with great resolution; the fury of the combatants was such that soon fire-arms became useless,

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50.
General
attack on
the French
positions
round
Genoa.
April 30.

1 Nap. i. 212.
Bot. iii. 472,
473. Dum.
iii. 234.
Jom. xiii 95,
96. Thib.
200, 209.

51.
Which, at
first suc-
cessful, is
finally re-
pulsed by
Massena.

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1800.

and they fought hand to hand with the bayonet. For long the result was doubtful, and even some success was gained by the Imperialists; but at length the Republicans were victorious, and the Monte Ratti, with its forts and four hundred prisoners, fell into their hands. At the same time, Soult glided round by the ravines into the rear of the Two Brothers; and the Austrians, under Hohenzollern, assailed in front by the garrison of Fort Diamond, and in the rear by these fresh troops, were broken, and escaped in small parties only by throwing themselves with desperate resolution on the battalions by which they were surrounded. By the result of this day the Imperialists lost three thousand men, of whom eighteen hundred were made prisoners, and they were forced to abandon all the ground which they had gained from their opponents, excepting the Monte Faccio; while the spirits of the French were proportionally elevated by the unlooked for and glorious success which they had achieved. Taking advantage of the consternation of the besiegers, Massena, on the following day, attempted a sally, and attacked the fortified heights of Coronata; but after a trifling advantage he was repulsed with great slaughter, and compelled finally to shut himself up in the walls of Genoa.¹*

¹ Dum. iii.
236, 241.
Jom. xiii.
97, 98. Nap.
i. 212. Bot.
iii 472, 473.
Thib. 210,
230.

52.
Successful
sally of the
French.

Nothing of moment occurred for the next ten days; but, during that time Massena, finding that famine was likely to prove even a more formidable enemy than the Austrian bayonets, and that it was necessary at all hazards to endeavour to procure a supply of provisions, resolved upon a sally. The Austrians had been celebrating, by a *feu-de-joie* along their whole lines, the success of Melas on the Var, when Massena determined, by a vigorous effort, both to prove that the spirits of his own garrison were not sinking, and to facilitate the meditated descent of the First Consul into Piedmont. Miollis was charged with

* A singular circumstance occurred at this assault of the Monte Faccio. The soldiers of two French regiments, the 25th light infantry and the 24th of the line, had been on the worst possible terms since the opening of the campaign, because, during the winter, when insubordination was at its height, the former, which maintained its discipline, had been employed to disarm the latter. They had, in consequence, been carefully kept asunder from each other; but during the confusion of this bloody conflict, their ranks became intermingled. The same dangers, the same thirst for glory, animated both corps, and these generous sentiments so far obliterated their former jealousies, that the soldiers embraced in the midst of the fire, and fought side by side like brothers during the remainder of the day.—See Dumas, iii. 245, 246.

the attack of the Monte Faccio on the front of the Sturla, while Soult, ascending the bed of the torrent Bisagno, was to take it in flank. The attack of Miollis, commenced before Soult was at hand to second it, failed completely. He gained possession, in the first instance, of the front positions of the enemy on the slopes of the mountain, and was advancing over the ground drenched with the blood of so many brave men of both nations, when his troops were charged by the Imperialists in close column with such vigour, that they were instantly thrown into confusion, and driven back in the utmost disorder to the glacis of the Roman gate of Genoa, where, by the opportune arrival of the general-in-chief with a reserve, some degree of order was at length restored. The expedition of Soult was more fortunate. The Imperialists, assailed in front by the Republicans whom Massena had rallied on the Sturla, and in flank by the troops of Soult, were driven from the Monte Faccio, and were only able to force their way through their pursuers by leaving thirteen hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy.¹

This brilliant success led to a still more audacious enterprise, which proved the ruin of the able and enterprising French general. This was the attack of the Monte Creto, the most important position occupied by the Austrians on the mountains in the rear of the city, and which, if successful, would have rendered it necessary for them to raise the siege. The Republicans, six thousand strong, issued by the Roman gate, and ascending the olive-clad steeps of the Bisagno, attacked the Austrians in this important post, while Gazan, at the head of eighteen hundred men, assailed them on the other side. The intrenched camp on the Monte Creto was fortified with care, and its defence intrusted to Hoherwollern, supported by a powerful reserve. The French advanced with intrepidity to the attack, but as they approached the intrenchments, a violent thunder-storm enveloped the mountain, the air became dark, the rain descended in torrents, and the hostile forces could only discern each other by the flashes of lightning which at intervals illuminated the gloom. In the midst of the tempest the lines met; the shock was terrible, but the Republicans insensibly gained ground; already the first line of intrenchments was carried, and the Austrian bar-

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May 11.

1 Jom. xlii.
101, 102.
Dum. iii.
243, 247.
Bot. iii. 473.
Nap. i. 220.
Thib. 220,
249.

53.

Which leads
to another,
in which
they are de-
feated, and
Soult made
prisoner.
May 12.

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¹ *Jom.* xiii.
102, 105.
Dum. iii.
247, 252.
Nap. i. 220.
Bot. iii. 473.
Thib. 249,
260.

54.

The siege is
converted
into a
blockade.
Extreme
sufferings
of the in-
habitants.

May 27.

² *Dum.* iii.
255. *Jom.*
xiii. 105.
Bot. iii. 474.
Thib. 250,
270.

racks, were on fire, when Hohenzollern, charging at the head of the reserve in close column, overthrew the assailants. Soult, wounded in the thigh, was made prisoner, and his troops, dispersing in the utmost confusion, fled to Genoa with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. At the same time intelligence was received of the surrender of Savona; and Massena, now severely weakened, had no alternative but to remain shut up within the walls, exposed to all the horrors of approaching famine.¹

This disaster terminated the military operations of the siege of Genoa. Thenceforward it was a mere blockade; the Austrians, posted on the heights which surround the city, cut off all communication with the land side, while Admiral Keith, with the English fleet, rendered all intercourse impossible with the neighbouring harbour. The horrors of famine were daily more strongly felt, and in that inglorious warfare the army was called upon to make more heroic sacrifices than ever they had made in the tented field. The miserable soldiers, worn down by fatigue, and extenuated by famine, after having consumed all the horses in the city, were driven to the necessity of feeding on dogs, cats, and vermin, which were eagerly hunted out in the cellars and common sewers. Soon even these wretched resources failed, and they were reduced to the pittance of four or five ounces of black bread, made of cocoa, rye, and other substances ransacked from the shops of the city. Affairs were in these desperate circumstances, when Captain Fianeschi, who had left Napoleon at the foot of the St Bernard, arrived in the roads of Genoa with despatches from the First Consul. In an open boat, with three rowers, he had succeeded, during the night, in steering through the midst of the English fleet; when day dawned, he was discovered, about a mile from the shore, under the guns of their cruisers. They instantly fired, and some of the seamen were wounded. The brave officer stripped off his clothes, took his sabre in his teeth, and swam towards the harbour. After incredible efforts he reached the shore, and landed, almost exhausted, on the mole, whence he was immediately conducted to the general-in-chief.²

The cheering intelligence of the passage of the Alps by Napoleon, and the first successes of Moreau in Germany, revived the dying hopes of the French garrison. The

spectres who wandered along the ramparts were animated with a passing ebullition of joy, and Massena, taking advantage of this momentary enthusiasm, commenced a general attack on the Monte Ratti and the Monte Paccio. But this effort was beyond the strength of his men. The soldiers marched out with all their wonted enthusiasm, and with a fierce countenance began the ascent of the heights; but the unusual exertion wore out their exhausted strength, and when they arrived at the foot of the redoubts, they were torn to pieces by a tremendous and well-sustained fire of grape and musketry, without the possibility of making any effort to avert their fate. Broken and dispirited, the enfeebled mass was driven back into the city, after having acquired, from sad experience, the mournful conviction that the Imperialists, whatever their reverses might have been in other situations, had abated nothing of their firm countenance in the neighbourhood of Genoa. Two days afterwards, the rolling of distant thunder in the Apennines was mistaken by General Gazan for the welcome note of their approaching deliverers. Massena himself hastened, with a palpitating heart, to the heights of Tinale; but he was there witness to the imperturbable aspect of the Austrians in their impregnable intrenchments, and the agitated crowd returned, sad and downcast, to their quarters.¹

While the French garrison was alternately agitated by these hopes and fears, the wretched inhabitants were a prey to the most unparalleled sufferings. From the commencement of the siege the price of provisions had been extravagantly high, and in its latter days grain of any sort could not be had at any cost. The horrors of this prolonged famine, in a city containing above a hundred thousand souls, cannot be adequately described. All day the cries of the unhappy victims were heard in the streets, while the neighbouring rocks, within the walls, were covered with a famished crowd, seeking, in the vilest animals and the smallest traces of vegetation, the means of assuaging their intolerable pangs. At night, the lamentations of the people were still more dreadful; too agitated to sleep, unable to endure the agony by which they were surrounded, they prayed aloud for death to relieve them from their sufferings. In this extremity, the usual effect of long-

CHAP.
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55.
A fresh
sortie is
defeated.
May 23.

¹ Dum. iii.
256, 257.
Bot. iii. 474.
Jom. xiii.
224. Thib.
251, 260.

56.
Agonies
endured by
the inhabi-
tants.

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1800.

endured calamity became conspicuous, in closing the fountains of mercy in the human heart, and rendering men insensible to every thing but their own disasters. Infants deserted in the streets by their parents, women who had sunk down from exhaustion on the public thoroughfares, were abandoned to their fate, and sought, with dying hands, in the sewers and other receptacles of filth, for the means of prolonging for a few hours a miserable existence. Parents and children lay down to die together, and perished locked in each other's arms. In the desperation produced by such prolonged torments, the more ardent and impetuous sought the means of destruction. They rushed out of the gates, and threw themselves on the Austrian bayonets, or precipitated themselves into the harbour, where they perished without either commiseration or assistance. In the general agony, not only leather and skins of every kind were consumed, but the horror at human flesh itself was so much abated, that numbers were supported on the dead bodies of their fellow-citizens. Pestilence, as usual, came in the rear of famine; contagious fevers swept off multitudes, whom the strength of the survivors was unable to inter. Death in every form awaited the crowds whom common suffering had blended together in the hospitals; and the multitude of unburied corpses which encumbered the streets threatened the city with depopulation, almost as certainly as the grim hand of famine under which they were melting away. In the course of this dreadful siege nearly twenty thousand of the inhabitants perished of famine, or the contagious disorders to which it gave rise; an awful instance of the ravages of war, and loudly calling for some change in its laws.¹

¹ Arnold's
Lectures on
History, 218.
Bot. iii. 476,
477. Dum.
iii. 257.
Jom. xiii.
224.

57.
Massena at
length sur-
renders.
May 31.

Such accumulated horrors at length shook the firm spirit of Massena. The fermentation in the city had risen to an alarming height, and there was every probability that the famished French garrison would be overpowered by the multitudes whom despair had armed with unwonted courage. Matters were in this desperate state, when the French general received a letter from Melas, couched in the most flattering terms, in which he invited him, since resistance had now become hopeless, to conclude an arrangement for the evacuation of the city. Massena at first suspected that this was merely a *ruse* to cover the approaching

raising of the siege, and refused to accede to any terms; but a severe bombardment both by land and sea, on the night of the 31st, having convinced him that there was no intention on the part of the Allies of abandoning their enterprise, and provisions, even after the most rigid economy, existing only for two days more, the negotiation was resumed, and at length, on the 4th June, when they were totally exhausted, a capitulation was agreed to, in virtue of which the gates were surrendered to the Allies on the following day at noon. It was stipulated that the garrison should evacuate Genoa, with their arms, artillery, baggage, and ammunition; they were conducted by the Allies, to the number of nine thousand, by land and sea, to Voltri and Antibes. The conditions of the treaty were faithfully observed towards the vanquished, and all the stipulations in favour of the democratic party at Genoa implemented by the Austrians with true German faith; a trait as honourable to them, as the opposite conduct of the English admiral at Naples a year before, was derogatory to the well-earned character of British integrity. When the evacuation took place, the extent of suffering which the besieged had undergone appeared painfully conspicuous. "Upon entering the town," says the faithful annalist of this memorable siege, "all the figures we met bore the appearance of profound grief or sombre despair; the streets resounded with the most heart-rending cries; on all sides death was reaping its victims, and the rival furies of famine and pestilence were multiplying their devastation; in a word, the army and the inhabitants seemed approaching their dissolution."¹ The Allies acted generously to the heroic garrison, with their illustrious chief; while, upon the signal of a gun fired from the ramparts, innumerable barks, laden with provisions, entered the harbour, amidst the transports of the inhabitants. "Your defence," said Lord Keith to Massena, "has been so heroic, that we can refuse you nothing; yet you alone are worth an army; how can we allow you to depart?"²

It was not without reason that the Imperialists urged forward the evacuation, and granted the most favourable terms to the besieged, in order to accelerate their departure. At the very time when the negotiations were going on, a messenger arrived from Melas, with intelligence of the

¹ Thib. 282.² Jom. xiii.
228, 231.Dum. iii.
260, 263.
Bot. iii. 478.

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58.

Melas sets
out to meet
Napoleon.
Advance of
the Allies to
Nice.

entry of Napoleon into Milan, and an immediate order to raise the siege. The embarrassment of the Austrian general, between his reluctance to relinquish so important a conquest, and his apprehensions at disobeying the orders of his superior officer, was extreme; and he deemed himself happy at being able to escape from so serious a dilemma, by granting the most favourable terms of capitulation to his enemy. No sooner was the place surrendered, than he detached a division to Tortona, and a brigade to Placentia; and set out on the following day with his remaining forces in the same direction, leaving Hohenzollern to occupy Genoa with sixteen battalions. Meanwhile Suchet continued his retrograde movement towards the Var; and on the 11th May effected the passage of that river. He was closely followed by the Austrians under Melas, who, on the same day, entered into Nice, and took up their quarters in the territory of the Republic. The enthusiasm of the troops rose to the highest pitch; at length they found themselves on the soil of France, and that ambitious power, which had so long sent forth its armies to devastate and oppress the adjoining states, began now to experience the evils it had inflicted on others.¹

¹ Nap. i. 217.
Jom. xiii.
87, 227, 232.

59.

Description
of Suchet's
position on
the Var, and
attack on it
by the Aus-
trians.

The Var is a mountain river, in general fordable, but which, like all mountain streams in those latitudes, is readily swelled by rains in a few hours into an impetuous torrent. It has always been considered as a weak part of the French frontier, because, to give solidity to its left extremity, it would be necessary to carry the line of defence far into the French Alps, at the distance of ten or twelve leagues from the sea. The portion of this line, however, which was occupied by Suchet, was much more inconsiderable, and did not extend above half a mile in breadth between the sea and the first rugged eminences. It had been fortified with care during the years 1794 and 1795, and the long bridge which traverses the broad gravelly bed of the river was covered by a formidable *tête-du-pont*, mounted with a plentiful array of heavy artillery. In this position Suchet hoped to arrest the enemy until the army of reserve, under Napoleon, had descended into Italy and appeared in their rear. In effect, the alarming reports which he received of the appearance of a powerful French force in the valley of Aosta, induced Melas; soon

after his arrival at Nice, to detach a large part of his troops in that direction: and at length, when there could no longer be any doubt of the fact, he set out in person for Piedmont, leaving Elnitz, with eighteen thousand men, to make himself master of the bridge of the Var. Suchet had but thirteen thousand; but they were covered by formidable works, and were daily receiving additions of strength from the conscripts and national guard in the interior. The Imperialists, having at length got up their heavy artillery from Nice, unmasked their batteries on the 22d, and advanced with great intrepidity to the attack. But when Suchet evacuated the territory of Nice, he left a garrison in Fort Montauban, perched on a rock in the rear, from whence every thing which passed in the Austrian lines was visible, and from which he received, by telegraph, hourly intelligence of what was preparing on the enemy's side. Thus warned, the Republicans were on their guard; the Austrian columns, when they arrived within pistol-shot of the works, were received with a tremendous fire of grape and musketry; and after remaining long and bravely at the foot of the intrenchments, a prey to a murderous fire which swept off numbers by every discharge, they were compelled to retire, after sustaining a considerable loss.¹

Elnitz, however, was not discouraged. The accounts which he received from his rear rendered it more than ever necessary to carry this important post, in order to secure a barrier against the French, in the event of its being necessary to retire, and make head against the invasion of the First Consul. Already accounts had arrived of the descent of Thureau upon Suza, and the capture of Ivrea by Lannes with the vanguard of Napoleon. Collecting, therefore, all his forces, he made a last effort. Twenty pieces of heavy cannon, placed in position within musket-shot, battered the Republican defences, while the English cruisers thundered on the right of the position. Under the cover of this imposing fire, the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the assault, and the sappers succeeded in breaking through the first palisades. But the brave men who headed the columns almost all perished at the foot of the intrenchment, and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon their enterprise.² After this

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May 18.

May 22.

¹ Personal
observation.
Jom. xiii.
200, 201.
Dum. iii.
204, 211.
Nap. i. 218.

60.

Fresh attack
and final re-
pulse of
them.

May 27.

² Dum. iii.
215, 216.
Jom. xiii.
201.

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check, all thoughts of carrying the *têtes-du-pont* on the Var were laid aside, and the Austrians broke up during the night, and retreated, with seventeen thousand men, in the direction of Piedmont.

61.
Formation
of the army
of reserve by
Napoleon.

It is now time to resume the operations of Napoleon and the army of reserve, which rendered these retrograde movements of the Imperialists necessary, cut short their brilliant career of victories, and ultimately precipitated them into the most unheard-of reverses. This army, which had been in preparation ever since its formation had been decreed by the Consuls, on 7th January 1800, had been intrusted, since the commencement of April, to Berthier, whose indefatigable activity was well calculated to create, out of the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, a formidable and efficient force. Thirty thousand conscripts and twenty thousand veteran troops, rendered disposable by the conclusion of the war in La Vendée, were directed to different points between Dijon and the Alps, to form the basis of the armament. Napoleon, whose gigantic mind was equal alike to the most elevated conceptions and the superintendence of the minutest details, was indefatigable in his endeavours to complete the preparations, and from the interior of his cabinet directed the march, provisioning, and equipment of every regiment in the army. He was at first undecided whether to direct the great reserve upon Germany or Italy; but the angry correspondence which had passed between him and Moreau, joined to the reverses experienced by Massena in the environs of Genoa, at length determined him to cross the Alps and move upon Piedmont. Reports were obtained from skilful engineers, on the state of all the principal passes, from Mont Cenis to the St Gothard. After full consideration, he determined to cross the Great St Bernard. The advantages of this passage were obvious. It was at once the shortest road across the mountains, being directly in front of Lausanne, Vevay, and Besançon, where the greater part of the army was cantoned; and it led him in a few days into the rear of the army of Melas, so as to leave him no alternative but to abandon his magazines and reserves, or fight his way to them, with his face towards Milan and his back to the Maritime Alps.¹ In

¹ Nap. i. 252,
253. Jom.
xiii. 172.
173. Dum.
iii. 219.

such a situation, the loss of a considerable battle could hardly fail to be fatal to the Imperial army, and might reasonably be expected to lead to the conquest of all Italy; whereas a reverse to the Republicans, who could fall back upon the St Gothard and the Simplon, was not likely to be attended with any similar disaster.

Towards the success of this great design, however, it was indispensable that the real strength and destination of the army of reserve should be carefully concealed, as the forces of the Austrians lay in the valley of Aosta, on the southern side of the St Bernard, and by occupying in strength the summit of the mountain, they might render the passage difficult, if not impossible. The device fallen upon by the First Consul for this purpose was to proclaim openly the place where the army was collected, and the service to which it was destined, but to assemble such inconsiderable forces there as might render it an object rather of ridicule than alarm to the enemy. With this view it was pompously announced, in various ways, that the army of reserve, destined to raise the siege of Genoa, was assembling at Dijon; and when the Austrian spies repaired thither, they found only a few battalions of conscripts and some companies of troops of the line, not amounting in all to eight thousand men, which entirely dissipated the fears which had been formed by its announcement. The army of reserve at Dijon in consequence became the object of general ridicule throughout Europe; and Melas, relieved of all fears for his rear, continued to press forward with perseverance his attacks on the Var, and considered the account of this army as a mere feint, to serve as a diversion to the siege of Genoa.¹

The St. Bernard, which had been used for above two thousand years as the principal passage between Italy and France, lies between Martigny in the Valais, and Aosta in the beautiful valley of the same name on the southern side of the Alps. Though the direct communication between these countries, however, and perfectly passable for horsemen and foot-soldiers, it presented great difficulties for the transit of artillery and caissons. As far as St Pierre, indeed, on the side of the Valais, the passage is practicable for cannon, and from Aosta to the Italian plains the road is excellent; but in the interval between these places the

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62.

Skilful measures taken to conceal its strength

1 Jom. xlii.
175. Nap. i.
253, 254.
Dum. iii.

63.

Description of the passage of the St Bernard.

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track consists often merely of a horse or bridle-path, following the sinuosities of the ravines through which it is conducted, or winding round the innumerable precipices which overhang the ascent. The summit of the ridge itself, which is above 8000 feet above the level of the sea,* consists of a small plain or valley, shut in by snowy mountains of still greater elevation, about a mile in length, with features of such extraordinary gloom as to be indelibly imprinted on the recollection of every traveller who has witnessed it. At the northern extremity, where the path, emerging from the steep and rugged ascent of the Valley of Desolation, as it is emphatically called, first enters upon the level surface, is situated the convent of St Bernard, the highest inhabited ground in Europe, founded a thousand years ago by the humanity of the illustrious saint whose name it bears, and tenanted ever since that time by pious and intrepid monks, the worthy followers of such a leader, who there, amidst ice and granite, have fixed their abode, to rescue from destruction the travellers overwhelmed by snow, amidst the storms to which those elevated regions are at almost every season of the year exposed.¹

¹ Ebel. i.
178. Personal
observation.

^{64.}
The Italian
side.

At the southern end are still to be seen a few remains of the Temple of Jupiter Penninus, which formerly stood at the summit of the Italian side of the pass, and at its foot the cut in the solid rock through which the Roman legions defiled for centuries to the tributary provinces of the empire on the north of the Alps. Innumerable votive offerings are found among the ruins of the solitary edifice, in which the travellers of ancient days expressed in simple but touching language their gratitude to Heaven for having surmounted the dangers of the passage. In the centre of the valley, midway between the remains of heathen devotion and the monument of Christian charity, spreads out a lake, whose waters, cold and dark even at the height of summer, reflect the bare slopes and snowy crags which shut it in on every side. The descent towards Aosta is much more precipitous than on the north; and in the season when avalanches are common, travellers are often exposed to great danger from the masses of snow, which, detached from the overhanging heights, sweep with resist-

* 7542 French feet, or 8367 English feet; twelve French inches being equal to thirteen English.—Ebel. i. 178.

less violence across the path, which there descends for miles down the bare and exposed side of the mountain. The climate in these elevated regions is too severe to permit of vegetation; the care of the monks has reared a few cresses and hardy vegetables in the sheltered corners of the slopes, on the northern side of the lake; but in general the mountains consist only of sterile piles of rock and snow, and not a human being is ever to be seen, except a few travellers, shivering and exhausted, who hasten up the toilsome ascent to partake in the never-failing hospitality of the convent at the summit.

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1800.

1 Personal
observation.

This scene, so interesting from historical recollections, as well as natural sublimity, was destined to receive additional celebrity from the memorable passage of the French army. None of the difficulties with which it was attended were unknown to their resolute chief; but, aware of the immense results which would attend an irruption into Italy, he resolved to incur their hazard. To all the observations of the engineers on the obstacles which opposed the passage, he replied, "We must surmount several leagues of rocks covered with snow. Be it so; We will dismount our guns, and place them on sledges adapted to the rugged nature of the ascent. Nothing is to be found in these sterile mountains but a few chestnuts and herds of cattle; we will transport rice and biscuit by the lake of Geneva to Villeneuve; every soldier will carry as much as will suffice him for six days, and the sumpter mules will transport subsistence for six days more. When we arrive in the valley of Aosta, we shall hasten to the fertile banks of the Tessino, where abundance and glory will reward our audacious enterprise." In pursuance of this bold design, the most active preparations were made by Marmont to facilitate the passage. Two millions of rations of biscuit were baked at Lyons, and transported by the lake of Geneva to Villeneuve, to await the arrival of the army; trees were felled in the forests of the Jura to form sledges for the cannon, and mules and peasants summoned from all quarters to aid in the transport of the stores and ammunition. Napoleon set out from Paris on the 6th May, and arrived at Geneva on the 8th. He instantly sent for Marescot, the chief of engineers.² After listening with patience to his enumeration of the difficulties of the attempt, he said, "Is

65.
Napoleon
resolves to
hazard the
passage.

² Jom. xiii.
174, 176.
Nap. i. 255,
256.

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66.
Measures
taken for
effecting the
passage.1 Nap. i. 257.
Bour. vii.
109.

May 9.

it possible to pass ?"—"Yes !" he replied, "but with difficulty."—"Let us then set out," answered the First Consul, words eminently descriptive of the clear conception and immovable resolution which formed the leading features of that great man's character.

At Geneva, Napoleon had an interview with M. Necker, who had remained in retirement at his villa of Coppet, near that town, since the period of his banishment by the Constituent Assembly. He professed himself little struck with his conversation, and alleged that he did not disguise his desire to be restored to the direction of the Republican finances ; but it is probable the First Consul regarded the Swiss statesman with prejudiced eyes, from his strong sense of the incalculable evils which his concessions to democratic ambition had brought upon the French people.¹ On the 13th, he passed in review at Lausanne the vanguard of the real army of reserve, consisting of six regiments of veteran troops, newly equipped, and in the finest possible order. Shortly after, he received a visit from Carnot, the minister of war, who brought accounts of the victory of Moeskirch, and the advance of Moréau in Germany ; while the stores and artillery arrived from all quarters. The preparations were rapidly completed. A hundred large firs were hollowed out so as to receive each a piece of artillery ; the carriages were taken to pieces and put on the backs of mules ; the ammunition dispersed among the peasants, who arrived from all quarters with their beasts of burden to share in the ample rewards which the French engineers held forth to stimulate their activity. Two companies of artillery workmen were stationed, the one at St Pierre, on the north, the other at St Remi, on the south of the mountains, to take to pieces the artillery and remount them on their carriages ; the ammunition of the army was conveyed in little boxes, so constructed as to go on the backs of mules. With such admirable precision were these arrangements made, that the dismounting and replacing of the guns hardly retarded for an hour the march of the columns ; and the soldiers, animated by the novelty and splendour of the enterprise, vied with each other in their efforts to second the activity of their officers. Bernier, when they reached the foot of the mountains, addressed them in the following proclamation : "The sol-

diers of the Rhine have signalised themselves by glorious triumphs; those of the army of Italy struggle with invincible perseverance against a superior enemy. Emulating their virtues, do you ascend and reconquer beyond the Alps the plains which were the first theatre of French glory. Conscripts! you behold the ensigns of victory; march, and emulate the veterans who have won so many triumphs; learn from them how to bear and overcome the fatigues inseparable from war. Buonaparte is with you; he has come to witness your first triumph. Prove to him that you are the same men whom he formerly led in these regions to immortal renown." These words inflamed to the highest pitch the ardour of the soldiers, and there was but one feeling throughout the army, that of seconding to the uttermost the glorious enterprise in which they were engaged.¹

On the 16th May, the First Consul slept at the convent of St Maurice, at the foot of the northern side of the St Bernard, and on the following morning the army commenced the passage of the mountain. During the four following days the march continued, and from eight to ten thousand men passed daily. The first night they slept at St Pierre, the second at St Remi or Etroubles, the third at Aosta. Napoleon himself remained at St Maurice till the 20th, when the whole had crossed. The passage, though toilsome, presented no extraordinary difficulties till the leading column arrived at St Pierre. But from that village to the summit, the ascent was painful and laborious in the highest degree. To each gun a hundred men were harnessed, and relieved by their comrades every half mile; the soldiers vied with each other in the fatiguing undertaking of dragging it up the toilsome and rugged track, and it soon became a point of honour for each column to prevent their cannon from falling behind the array. To support their efforts, the music of each regiment played at its head, and where the paths were peculiarly steep, the charge sounded to give additional vigour to their exertions. Toiling painfully up the ascent, hardly venturing to halt to draw breath lest the march of the column should be retarded, ready to sink under the weight of their arms and baggage, the soldiers animated each other by warlike songs, and the solitudes of the St

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¹ Bot. iv. 10.
11. Nap. i.
257. Jom.
xiii. 176.
177. Dum.
iii. 169, 170.

67.
Passage of
the mountain.

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¹ Nap. i. 259.
Dum. ii. 174.
Bot. iv. 13.

Bernard resounded with the strains of military music. From amidst the snows and the clouds, the glittering bands of armed men appeared; and the distant chamois on the mountains above, startled by the unwonted spectacle, bounded away to the regions of desolation, and paused on the summit of their inaccessible cliffs to gaze on the columns which wound around their feet.¹

68.
The summit
is at length
reached.

After six hours of toilsome ascent, the head of the army reached the hospice at the summit; and the troops, forgetting their fatigues, traversed with joyful steps the snowy vale, or reposing beside the cool waters of the lake, rent the air with acclamations at the approaching termination of their labours. By the provident care of the monks, every soldier received a large ration of bread and cheese, and a draught of wine at the gate; a seasonable supply, which exhausted the ample stores of their establishment, but was fully repaid by the First Consul before the termination of the campaign. After an hour's rest, the columns wound along the margin of the lake, and began the steep and perilous descent to St Remi. The difficulties here were still greater than on the northern side. The snow, hard beneath, was beginning to melt on the surface, and great numbers, both of men and horses, lost their footing, and were precipitated down the rapid declivity.* At length, however, they reached a more hospitable region; the sterile rocks and snow gave place to herbage, enamelled with the flowers of spring; a few firs next gave token of the descent into the woody region, gradually a thick forest overshadowed their march, and before they reached Etroubles, the soldiers, who had so recently shivered in the blasts of winter, were melting under the rays of an Italian sun.† Napoleon himself

* It is a curious coincidence; that a difficulty precisely similar befell Hannibal when his army began the descent on the Italian side of the Alps. "The snows," says Polybius, "of the former year having remained unmelted upon the mountains, were now covered over by those which had fallen in the present year. The latter being soft and of no great depth, gave an easy admission to the foot; but when these were trodden through, and the soldiers began to touch the snows that lay beneath, which were now so firm that they would yield to no impression, their feet both fell at once from under them, as if they had been walking on the edge of some high and slippery precipice. And when struggling with their hands and knees to recover from their fall, they slid down with great violence."—POLYBIUS, iii. 55.

† "Oh joy! the signs of life appear,
The first and single fir

crossed on the 28th. He was mounted on a sure-footed mule, which he obtained from the Priory of St Maurice, and attended by a young and active guide, who confided to him, without knowing his quality, all his wishes, and was astonished to find them, some time after, all realised by the generous recollection of the First Consul. He rested an hour at the convent, and descended to St Remi, over the hard and slippery surface of the snow, chiefly on foot, often sliding down, and with considerable difficulty.¹

¹ Nap. i. 261.
Dum. iii.
171, 172.
Bot. iv. 13,
14.

The passage of the St Bernard has been the subject of great exaggeration from those who are unacquainted with the ground. To speak of the French troops traversing paths known only to the smuggler or the chamois hunter, is ridiculous, when the road has been a beaten passage for two thousand years, and is traversed daily in summer by great numbers of travellers. One would suppose from these descriptions, it was over the Col du Geant between Chamouni and Aosta, or over the summit of the Col du Bonhomme, that the French army had passed. It will bear no comparison with the passage of Hannibal over the Mont Cenis,* opposed as it was by the mountain tribes, through paths comparatively unformed, and in the course of which the Carthaginian general lost nearly half his army. Having traversed on foot both the ground over which Napoleon's army passed at the Great St Bernard, that traversed by Suwarroff on the St Gothard, the Schächenthal, and the Engiberg, and that surmounted by Macdonald in the passage of the Splügen, the Monte Aprigal, and the Monte Tonal, the author is enabled to speak with perfect confidence as to the comparative merit of these different undertakings. From being commenced in the depth of winter, and over ridges comparatively unfrequented, the march of Macdonald was by far the most hazardous, so far as mere natural difficulties were

69.
Comparison
of the pas-
sages of the
Alps, by
Hannibal,
Napoleon,
Suwarroff,
and Macdon-
ald.

That on the limits of the living world
Strikes in the ice its roots;
Another, and another now,
And now the larch, that flings its arms
Down curving like the falling wave,
And now the aspen's glittering leaves
Grey glitter on the moveless twig,
The poplar's varying verdure now,
And now the birch so beautiful,
Light as a lady's plume."

* The author has no doubt Hannibal passed the Alps by the Mont Cenis. His reasons are given elsewhere.

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concerned; that of Suwarroff was upon the whole the most worthy of admiration, from the vigorous resistance he experienced at every step, the total inexperience of his troops in mountain warfare, and the unparalleled hardships, both physical and moral, in which its later stages were involved. That of Napoleon over the St Bernard, during a fine season, without any opposition from the enemy, with every aid from the peasantry of the district, and the experience of his own officers, and by a road impracticable only for carriages and cannon, must, with every impartial observer acquainted with the ground, rank as the easiest of these memorable enterprises.

70.
The army is
stopped in
the valley of
Aosta by the
Fort of
Bard.

Lannes, who commanded the advanced guard, descended rapidly the beautiful valley of Aosta, occupied the town of the same name, and overthrew at Chatillon a body of fifteen hundred Croats who endeavoured to dispute his passage. The soldiers, finding themselves in a level and fertile valley, abounding with trees, vines, and pasture, deemed their difficulties past, and joyfully followed the hourly increasing waters of the Dora Baltea, under spreading chestnuts, and amidst smiling vineyards, until their advance was suddenly checked by the fort and the cannon of Bard. This inconsiderable fortification had wellnigh proved a more serious obstacle to the army than the whole perils of the St Bernard. Situated on a pyramidal rock midway between the opposite cliffs of the valley, which there approach very near to each other, and at the distance of not more than fifty yards from either side, it at once commands the narrow road which is conducted close under its ramparts, and is beyond the reach of any but regular approaches. The cannon of the ramparts, two-and-twenty in number, are so disposed upon its well-constructed bastions, as to command not only the great road which traverses the village at its feet, but every path on either side of the adjacent mountains by which it appears practicable for a single person to pass.¹ No sooner was the advanced guard arrested by this formidable obstacle, than Lannes advanced to the front, and ordered an assault on the town, defended only by a single wall. It was quickly carried by the impetuosity of the French grenadiers; but the Austrians retired in good order into the fort on the rock above, and from its

¹ Personal observation.

secure casemates the garrison kept up an incessant fire upon every column that attempted the passage. Marescot, the chief of the engineers, reported, after a reconnaissance, that the fort could not be carried by a *coup-de-main*, while the rocky cliffs of the mountains on either side opposed the greatest difficulties to a regular siege. The advance of the army was instantly checked; cannon, caissons, infantry, and cavalry accumulated in the narrow defile in the upper part of the valley, and the alarm rapidly running from front to rear, the advance of the columns behind was already suspended, from the apprehension that the enterprise was impracticable, and that they must recross the mountains.¹

Napoleon, deeming all his difficulties surmounted, was advancing with joyful steps down the southern declivity of the St Bernard, when he received this alarming intelligence. Instantly advancing to the vanguard, he ascended the Monte Albaredo, which commanded the fort on the left bank of the Dora Baltea, and with his telescope long and minutely surveyed its walls. He soon perceived that it was possible for the infantry to pass by a path along the face of the cliffs of that rugged mountain, above the range of the guns of the fort; but by no exertions was it possible to render it practicable for artillery. In vain the Austrian commandant was summoned, and threatened with instant assault and death in case of refusal to surrender; he replied as became a man of courage and honour, well aware of the importance of his position, and the means of defending it which were in his power. A few pieces of artillery were, by great efforts, hoisted up to an eminence on the Monte Albaredo which commanded the fort; but their fire produced little impression on the bomb-proof batteries and vaulted casemates which sheltered the garrison; a single piece only, placed on the steeple of the town, answered with effect to the fire of one of the bastions. Time pressed, however, and it was indispensable that the army should without delay continue its advance. Contrary to the advice of Marescot, Napoleon ordered an escalade, and Berthier formed three columns, each of three hundred grenadiers, who advanced with the utmost resolution at midnight to the assault. They climbed in silence up the rock, and reached the works without being discovered.

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¹ Nap. i. 261
252. Jom.
xiii. 182,
183. Dum.
iii. 176, 177.
Bot. iv. 14.

71.

Firm resistance of the Austrian commandant.
May 23.

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

1 Nap. i. 263.
Jom. xiii.
185. Bour.
iv. 102.
Dum. iii.
176.

72.
Device by
which the
passage was
at length
effected.

July 25.

The outer palisades were carried, and the Austrian videttes retired precipitately to the ramparts above, but at its first all the efforts of the Republicans were frustrated. The garrison was instantly on the alert. A shower of balls spread death through their ranks, while vast numbers of shells and hand grenades thrown down amongst them, augmented the confusion and alarm inseparable from a nocturnal attack. After sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon the attempt; the passage seemed hermetically closed; the army could not advance a step further in its progress.¹

In this extremity, the genius and intrepidity of the French engineers surmounted the difficulty. The infantry and cavalry of Lannes' division traversed one by one the path on the Monte Albaredo, and re-formed lower down the valley, while the artillerymen succeeded in drawing their cannon, in the dark, through the town, close under the guns of the fort, by spreading straw and dung upon the streets, and wrapping the wheels up, so as to prevent the slightest sound being heard. In this manner forty pieces and a hundred caissons were drawn through during the night, while the Austrians, in unconscious security, slumbered above, beside their loaded cannon, directed straight into the street where the passage was going forward. A few grenades and combustibles were merely thrown at random over the ramparts during the gloom, which killed a considerable number of the French engineers, and blew up several of their ammunition waggons, but without arresting for a moment the passage. Before daylight a sufficient number were passed to enable the advanced guard to continue its march; and an obstacle, which might have proved the ruin of the whole enterprise, was effectually overcome. During the succeeding night, the same hazardous operation was repeated, with equal success; and while the Austrian commander was writing to Melas that he had seen thirty-five thousand men and four thou-

² Nap. i. 263,
265. Jom.
xiii. 185,
188. Dum.
xiii. 176,
180. Bour.
iv. 102, 103.

sand horse cross the path of the Albaredo, but that not one piece of artillery or caisson should pass beneath the guns of his fortress, the whole cannon and ammunition of the army were safely proceeding on the road to Ivrea.² The fort of Bard itself held out till the 5th June; and we have the authority of Napoleon for the assertion, that if

the passage of the artillery had been delayed till its fall, all hope of success in the campaign was at an end. The presence of an Austrian division seven thousand strong would have fully sufficed to destroy the French troops as they emerged without cannon from the perilous defile of the Albaredo. On such trivial incidents do the fate and the revolutions of nations in the last result often depend.

Meanwhile Lannes, proceeding onward with the advanced guard, emerged from the mountains, and appeared before the walls of Ivrea. This place, once of considerable strength, and which in 1704 had withstood for ten days all the efforts of the Duke of Vendôme with a formidable train of artillery, had of late years fallen into decay, and its ruined walls, but partially armed, hardly offered an obstacle to an enterprising enemy. Lannes ordered an assault at once on the three gates of the city. He advanced himself with the column on the right, and with his own hand directed the first strokes of the hatchet at the palisades. The defences were soon broken down, the chains of the draw-bridges cut, the gates blown open, and the Republicans rushed, with loud shouts, on all sides into the town. A battalion which defended the walls was forced to fly, leaving three hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy, and the Austrian troops drawn up behind the town retired precipitately towards Turin. They took post behind the Chinsella, spreading themselves out, according to custom, over a long line, to cover every approach to the capital of Piedmont. They were there attacked on the following day by the French general, and a warm contest ensued. The Imperialists, confident in the numbers and prowess of their cavalry, vigorously charged the Republicans; but, though they urged their horses to the very bayonets of the infantry, they were in the end repulsed, and the bridge over the river was carried by the assailants. After this check the Austrians retired towards Turin; and Lannes, pursuing his successes, pushed on to the banks of the Po, where he made himself master of a flotilla of boats, of the greatest value to the invading army, as they did not possess the smallest bridge equipage. The whole army, thirty-six thousand strong, was assembled at Ivrea, with all its artillery, on the 28th, while the advanced guard pushed its patrols to the gates of Turin.¹

CHAP.
XXI.
1800.

73.
After a
short skir-
mish at
Ivrea, the
French ad-
vance to
Turin.

May 26.

May 28.
¹ Nap. i. 266.
267. Dum.
iii. 185, 187.
Jom. xiii.
193, 195.

CHAP.

XXXI.

1800.

74.

Passage of
the St Go-
thard and
Mont Cenis
by the wings
of the army.
Melas in
haste con-
centrates
his troops.

While the centre of the army of reserve was thus surmounting the difficulties of the St Bernard, the right and left wings performed with equal success the movements assigned to them. Thureau, with five thousand men, crossed the Mont Cenis, and descended to Susa and Novalèse, while Moncey, detached with sixteen thousand choice troops from the army of the Rhine, crossed the St Gothard, and began to appear in the neighbourhood of the Lago Maggiore. At the same time General Bethencourt, with a brigade of Swiss troops, ascended the Simplon; and, forcing the terrific defile of Gondo, appeared at Duomo d'Ossola, and opened up the communication with the left of the army. Thus, above sixty thousand men, converging from so many different quarters, were assembled in the plains of Piedmont, and threatened the rear of the Imperial army engaged in the defiles of the Apennines from Genoa to the mouth of the Var. No sooner did Melas receive information of the appearance of this formidable enemy in the Italian plains, than he dispatched couriers in all directions to concentrate his troops. He himself, as already mentioned, broke up from the Var with the greater part of his forces, and orders were dispatched to Ott to raise the siege of Genoa, and hasten with all the strength he could collect to the Bormida. The orders arrived at Genoa just at the time when the capitulation was going forward, so that the advance of the army of reserve was too late to raise the siege of that fortress; but still an important and decisive operation awaited the First Consul. To oppose him in the first instance, the Austrians had only the corps of Wukasowich, Laudon, and Haddick, who could hardly muster eighteen thousand men in all, and not above six thousand in any one point; so widely were their immense forces scattered over the countries they had conquered; while the concentration of their troops from the Var and the neighbourhood of Genoa would require a considerable time.¹

In these circumstances the French commander had the choice of three different plans, each of which promised to be attended with important results. The first was to incline to the right, form a junction with Thureau, and, in concert with Suchet, attack the Austrian army under Melas; the second, to cross the Po by means of the barks so opportunely thrown into his power, and advance to the relief of

¹ Jom. Vie
de Nap. i.
134, and
xiii. 190,
192. Dum.
iii. 187, 192.

75.

Different
plans which
lay open to
Napoleon.
He resolves
to occupy
Milan.

Massena, who yet held out ; the third, to move to the left, pass the Tessino, form a junction with Moncey, and capture Milan with the stores and reserve parks of the Imperialists. Of these different plans the first appeared unadvisable, as the forces of Melas were superior to those of the First Consul without the addition of Moncey, and it was extremely hazardous to run the risk of a defeat, while the fort of Bard still held out and interrupted the retreat of the army. The second was equally perilous, as it plunged the invading army, without any line of communication, into the centre of the Imperial forces, and it was doubtful whether Genoa could hold out till the Republican eagles approached the Bocchetta. The third had the disadvantage of abandoning Massena to his fate ; but to counterbalance that, it offered the most brilliant results. The possession of Milan could not fail to produce a great moral impression, both on the Imperialists and the Italians, and to renew, in general estimation, the halo of glory which was wont to encircle the brows of the First Consul. The junction with Moncey would raise the army to fifty thousand effective men, and secure for it a safe retreat in case of disaster by the St Gotthard and the Simplon ; the magazines and parks of reserve collected by the Austrians, lay exposed to immediate capture in the unprotected towns of Lombardy ; while, by intercepting their communications with Germany, and compelling them to fight with their rear towards France and the Maritime Alps, the inestimable advantage was gained of rendering any considerable disaster the forerunner of irreparable ruin.¹

Moved by these considerations, Napoleon directed his troops rapidly towards the Tessino, and arrived on the banks of that river on the 31st May. The arrival of so great a force, in a quarter where they were totally unexpected, threw the Austrians into the utmost embarrassment. All their disposable infantry was occupied at Bellinzona in opposing the advance of Moncey, or had retired behind the Lago Maggiore, before Bethencourt. The only troops which they could collect to oppose the passage were the cavalry of Festenberg, with a few regiments of Laudon, a force under five thousand men, and totally inadequate to maintain the line of the Tessino from Sesto-Calende, where it flows out of the Lago Maggiore, to Pavia, where it joins

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

¹ Nap. i. 263,
270. Journ.
xiii. 190,
196.

76.
Advanced
into Lombardy, and
capture of
that city.
May 31.

June 2.
Nap. i. 271.
Dum.
iii. 265, 268.
Jom. xiii.
208, 210.

the Po, against an enemy thirty thousand strong. Unable to guard the line of the river, the cavalry of Festenberg was drawn up in front of Turbigo, when Gerard, with the advanced guard, crossed the river under cover of the French artillery, advantageously posted on the heights behind, and instantly made himself master of the bridge of Naviglio, by which the infantry of the division began to defile to his assistance. He was immediately and warmly attacked by the Imperial cavalry; but though they at first had some success, yet the French having retired into a woody position deeply intersected by canals, they succeeded in maintaining their ground, until the Republicans had crossed over in such numbers as to enable them to carry Turbigo with the bayonet, and effectually establish themselves on the left bank of the river. At the same time Murat effected a passage at Buffalora, on the great road from Turin to Milan, with hardly any opposition; the Austrians retired on all sides, and Napoleon, with the advanced guard, made his triumphant entry into Milan on the 2d June, where he was received with transports of joy by the democratic party, and the same applause by the inconstant populace which they had lavished the year before on Suwarroff.¹

77.
He spreads
his forces
over Lom-
bardy, and
addresses a
proclama-
tion to his
troops.

Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the Milanese at this sudden apparition of the Republican hero. Some believed he had died near the Red Sea, and that it was one of his brothers who commanded the army; none were aware that he had so recently crossed the Alps, and revisited the scenes of his former glory. He instantly dismissed the Austrian authorities, re-established, with more show than sincerity, the republican magistrates; but foreseeing that the chances of war might expose his partisans to severe reprisals, wisely forbade any harsh measures against the dethroned party. Taking advantage of the public enthusiasm which his unexpected arrival occasioned, he procured, by contributions and levies, large supplies for his troops, and augmented their numbers by the regiments of Moncey, which slowly made their appearance from the St Gothard. On the 6th and 7th June these troops were reviewed, and the French outposts extended in all directions. They were pushed to Placentia and the Po, the principal towns in Lombardy being abandoned, without

resistance, by the Austrians. Paris fell into their hands, with 200 pieces of cannon, 8000 muskets, and stores in proportion. At the same time the following animated proclamation was addressed to the troops, and electrified all Europe, long accustomed only to the reverses of the Republicans!—"Soldiers! when we began our march, one of our departments was in the possession of the enemy: consternation reigned through all the south of France. The greatest part of the Ligurian Republic, the most faithfully of our country, was invaded. The Cisalpine Republic, annihilated in the last campaign, groaned under the feudal yoke. You advanced, and already the French territory is delivered: joy and hope have succeeded in our country to consternation and fear. You will restore liberty and independence to the people of Genoa: you already are in the capital of the Cisalpine Republic. The enemy, terror-struck, seeks only to regain his frontiers: you have taken from him his hospitals, his magazines, his reserve parks. The first act of the campaign is finished; millions of men address you in strains of praise. But shall we allow our audacious enemies to violate with impunity the territory of the republic? Will you permit the army to escape which has carried terror among your families? You will not. March, then, to meet him; tear from his brows the laurels he has won; teach the world that a malediction attends those who violate the territory of the great people. The result of our efforts will be unclouded glory and a durable peace."¹

While these important operations were going forward in Lombardy, Melas conceived the project of threatening his adversary's communications by a movement on Vercelli. But when on the point of executing this design, he received intelligence of the simultaneous disasters which in so many different quarters were accumulating on the Austrian monarchy; the repeated defeats of Kray in Germany, and his concentration in the intrenched camp at Ulm; the arrival of Moncey at Bellinzona, and the retreat of Wukasowich towards the Adda. In these circumstances more cautious measures seemed necessary, and he resolved to concentrate his army under the cannon of Alexandria. But while the French soldiers were abandoning themselves to the flattering illusions which this extraordinary and

¹ Nap. i. 272, 275. Jom. xiii. 209, 210, 214, 216. Dum. iii. 269, 271, 273. Bul. 110, 117.

78. Napoleon advances to meet Melas, who concentrates his forces at Alexandria.

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

¹ Napoleon,
i. 275, 277.
Dum. iii.
276, 279.
Jom. xiii.
212, 220.
Bul. 124,
127.

79.
The French
vanguard
comes up
with the
Austrians
at Montebello.

rapid success suggested, they received the disastrous intelligence of the surrender of Genoa; and Napoleon had the mortification of finding, from the point to which the troops who capitulated were to be conveyed, that they could be of no service to him in the decisive operations that were fast approaching. It was evident, therefore, that he would have the whole Austrian army on his hands at once, and therefore no time was to be lost in striking a decisive blow. The fort of Bard capitulated on the 5th June, which both disengaged the troops of Chabran employed in its reduction, and opened the St Bernard as a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. The rapid marches and counter-marches of the Republicans through the plain of Lombardy, had made the enemy fall back to Mantua and the line of the Mincio, and the French troops already occupied Lodi and blockaded Pizzighitone, and other fortresses on the Po; but from this dispersion of force, and eccentric direction given to a large portion of the army, arose a most serious inconvenience; it reduced to one-half the mass that could be collected to make head against Melas in Piedmont. In effect, out of the sixty thousand men which he commanded in Lombardy, Napoleon could only collect thirty thousand in one body to meet the main army of the enemy; but, confident in his own abilities and the spirit of his troops, he resolved with this inconsiderable force to cut Melas off from his line of retreat, and for this purpose moved upon Stradella, on the right bank of the Po, which brought him on the great road from Alexandria to Mantua.¹

The French army began its march towards the Po on the 6th June, and Lannes, commanding the advanced guard, crossed that river at St Cipriano. At the same time Murat, who had broken up from Lodi, attacked the *têtes-du-pont* at Piacenza, and drove the Austrians out of that town on the road towards Tortona; while Duhesme, not less fortunate, assailed Cremona, and expelled the garrison, with the loss of eight hundred men. The line of the Po being thus broken through at three points, the Imperialists every where fell back; and, abandoning all hope of maintaining their communication with Mantua and their reserves in the east of Italy, concentrated their forces towards Casteggio and Montebello. Ott there joined them with the forces rendered disposable by the sur-

render of Genoa, and stationed his troops on a chain of gentle eminences, in two lines, so disposed as to be able to support one another in case of need. Fifteen thousand chosen troops were there drawn up in the most advantageous position; their right resting on the heights which formed the roots of the Apennines, and commanding the great road to Tortona which wound round their feet; their left extending into the plain, where their splendid cavalry could act with effect. At the sight of such an array, Lannes was a moment startled, but instantly perceiving the disastrous effect which the smallest retrograde movement might have on a corps with its rear resting on the Po, he resolved forthwith to attack the enemy. His forces did not exceed nine thousand men, while those of the enemy were fifteen thousand strong; but the division of Victor, of nearly equal strength, was only two leagues in the rear, and might be expected to take a part in the combat before its termination.¹

The French infantry, with great gallantry, advanced in *echelon*, under a shower of grape-shot and musketry, to storm the hills on the right of the Austrian position, where strong batteries were placed, which commanded the whole field of battle; and succeeded in carrying the heights of Revetta: but they were there assailed, while disordered by success, by six fresh regiments, and driven with great slaughter down into the plain. In the centre, on the great road, Watrin with difficulty maintained himself against the vehement attacks of the Imperialists; and notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Lannes, defeat appeared inevitable, when the battle was restored by the arrival of a division of Victor's corps, which enabled the Republicans to rally their troops and prepare a fresh attack. New columns were immediately formed to assail the heights on the left, while Watrin commenced a furious onset in the centre; the Austrians were every where driven back, and the triumph of the French appeared certain, when Ott brought up his reserves from the second line, and victory again inclined to the other side. The Republicans, attacked in their turn by fresh troops, gave way, and the loud shouts of the Imperialists announced a total overthrow, when the arrival of the remainder of Victor's corps not only restored the balance, but turned it

1800.

June 9.

¹ Bot. iv. 23.

Nap. i. 279.

Dum. iii.

288, 290.

Jom. xiii.

257, 258.

80.

Desperate
and bloody
action there,
in which the
Austrians
are worsted.

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

¹ Nap. i. 278.
269. Bot.
iv. 23, 24.
Jom. xiii.
256, 260.
Dum. iii.
293, 297.
Bul. 137.
145. Bour.
iv. 110, 112.

81.
Position of
the French
in the Pass
of Stradella,
between the
Apennines
and the Po.

against the Austrians. Their troops, however were too experienced, and their confidence in themselves too great, to yield without a desperate struggle. Both sides were animated by the most heart-stirring recollections. The French fought to regain the laurels they had won in the first Italian campaign, the Imperialists to preserve those they had reaped in so many later triumphs; and both parties felt, that the fate of the war, in a great degree, depended on their exertions; for the Austrians struggled to gain time for the concentration of their forces to meet this new enemy, the Republicans to avoid being driven back with ruinous loss into the Po. The last reserves on both sides were soon engaged, and the contending parties fought long hand to hand with the most heroic resolution. At length the arrival of Napoleon with the division Gardanne, decided the victory. Ott, who now saw his right turned, while the centre and left were on the point of giving way, reluctantly gave the signal of retreat; and the Imperialists, in good order, and with measured steps, retired towards St Juliano, after throwing a garrison of a thousand men into the fortress of Tortona.¹

This was one of the most desperate actions which had yet occurred in the war. "The bones," said Lannes, "cracked in my division like glass in a hailstorm." The Austrians lost in it three thousand killed and wounded, and fifteen hundred prisoners. The French had to lament nearly an equal number slain or disabled; but the moral effect of the victory was immense, and more than counter-balanced all their losses. It restored at once the spirit of their troops, which the continued disasters of the preceding campaign had severely weakened; and when Napoleon traversed the field of battle, late in the evening, he found the soldiers lying on the ground, and exhausted with fatigue, but animated with all their ancient enthusiasm. He halted his army at Stradella, a strong position, formed by the advance of a lower ridge of the Apennines towards the Po, where the intersected and broken nature of the ground promised to render unserviceable the numerous squadrons of the enemy.² In this position he remained the three following days, concentrating and organising his troops for the combat which was approaching, and covering by *têtes-du-pont* the two bridges over the Po in his

² Nap. i. 280.
Dum. iii.
297, 299.
Jom. xiii.
260, 261.

rear—his sole line of retreat in case of disaster, or means of rejoining the large portion of his army which remained behind.

While Napoleon, with the army of reserve, was thus threatening Melas in front, and occupied, at Stradella, the sole line by which the Austrian general could re-establish his communications with the plain of Lombardy, disasters of the most formidable kind were accumulating in the rear of the Imperialists. No sooner did Elnitz commence his retreat, in the night of the 27th May, than Suchet, reinforced by some thousands of the national guard in the vicinity, which raised his corps to fourteen thousand men, instantly resumed the offensive. At noon, on the following day, General Menard attacked the intrenchments which covered the retreat of the Austrians, forced them, and made three hundred prisoners. Following up his successes, he advanced rapidly on the three succeeding days, and on the 31st, attacked Bellegarde, and drove him from a strong position on the Col di Braus. On the next day, all the French columns were put in motion by sunrise. Garnier moved upon the Col di Tende by the Col di Rauss; Menard, by the heights of Metra Cava, directed his steps to the fort of Saorgio, now dismantled, and the camp of Mille Fourches; while Brunet attacked the Col di Brais in front, supported by a lateral column on each flank. These movements, though complicated from the nature of the ground, were attended with complete success. The important positions of the Col di Rauss, and the camp of Mille Fourches, were successively carried; the troops who defended them flying towards the Col di Tende and Fontan, leaving a thousand prisoners in the hands of the Republicans; Menard descended from the heights in its rear to the romantic fort of Saorgio, which fell without any resistance; at the same time, Garnier and Lesuire established themselves on the Col di Tende, the troops intrusted with the defence of which sought refuge within the walls of Coni.¹

The great road by the Col di Tende being thus forced, and the Austrian line broken through the middle, the usual series of disasters fell upon their scattered detachments, Elnitz, instead of uniting his forces to fall on Menard, and regain the decisive pass of Saorgio and the

CHAP.

XXII.

1800.

82.

Disastrous
retreat of
Elnitz from
the Var.

May 28.

¹ Jom. xiii.
234, 238.
Dum. iii.
219, 224.
Bot. iv. 21,
22.

83.

His immense
losses.

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

June 3.

June 4.

June 7.

Jorn. xlii.
214, 243.
Dum. lii.
219, 227.
Bot iv. 22,
24. Bul.
187, 195.

81.
Gallant re-
solution of
Melas to cut
his way
through Na-
poleon's
army.

great road, moved to the left to Acqua-Dolce to cover the communication with Genoa. The consequence of this was, that the Austrian generals, Ulm and Bellegarde, with two Austrian brigades, were surrounded at Bregio, and being cut off by the fall of Saorgio, from the great road, had no alternative but to sacrifice their artillery, consisting of twelve light pieces, and throw themselves upon the heights of Foscoire, a branch of the Mont Jove. They were there attacked on the following day by Rochambeau, and driven back to Pigna, while Suchet pursued Elnitz towards Acqua-Dolce, and Menard descended from the sources of the Tanaro towards Pieve. He had hardly arrived at that place when Ulm and Bellegarde, who, after unheard-of fatigues, had surmounted the rugged mountains which overhang Triola, arrived at the same place, exhausted with fatigue and totally unable to make any resistance. They occupied the houses without opposition, but they soon found that the overhanging woods were filled with enemies, and to complete their consternation, intelligence shortly after arrived that Delaunay, with an entire brigade, had cut off their only line of retreat. A panic instantly seized the troops; whole battalions threw down their arms and dispersed, and after wandering for days in the woods, were compelled by the pangs of hunger to surrender to the enemy. Of their whole force, only three hundred men, with the two generals, made their retreat by the Monte Ariolo to Latterman's camp. Elnitz at length, with eight thousand men, reached Ceva, having lost nearly nine thousand men in this disastrous retreat; while Suchet united at Voltri with the garrison of Genoa, landed at that place by the Austrians, and advanced with these combined forces to the heights of Montenotte.¹

These disasters accumulating, one after another, on all sides, rendered the position of Melas highly critical. In his front was Napoleon, with the army of reserve, amounting in all to sixty thousand men; while in his rear, Suchet occupied all the mountain passes, and was driving before him the scattered Imperialists like chaff before the wind. On his left, the awful barrier of the Alps, leading only into a hostile country, precluded all hopes of retreat; while on his right, the ridges of the Apennines, backed by the sea, rendered it impossible to regain by a circuitous

route the Hereditary States. Nothing could be more perilous than his situation ; but the Austrian veteran was not discouraged, and concentrating all his disposable forces, he resolved to give battle, and open a communication, sword in hand, with the eastern provinces of the empire. Nor was it without reason that he ventured on this step, albeit hazardous at all times, and doubly so when retreat was impossible and communication with the base of operations cut off. He could collect above thirty thousand veteran troops in one field, animated with the best spirit, and proud of two campaigns of unbroken glory ; his artillery was greatly superior to that of the enemy, while the plains of the Bormida, where the decisive battle apparently was to be fought, seemed admirably adapted for his numerous and magnificent cavalry. Having taken his resolution, he dispatched messengers in all directions to concentrate his forces ; Elnitz, with the broken remains of his corps, was recalled from Ceva ; Hohenzollern from Genoa, the defence of which was entrusted to the attenuated prisoners, liberated from captivity by its fall ; while a courier was dispatched, in haste, to Admiral Keith, to accelerate the arrival of a corps of twelve thousand English, who at this decisive crisis lay inactive at Minorca.¹

The post of Stradella, where Napoleon awaited the arrival of the enemy, and barred the great road to the eastward, was singularly well adapted to compensate the inferiority in cavalry and artillery of the First Consul. The right rested on impracticable morasses, extending to the Po ; the centre was strengthened by several large villages ; the left, commanding the great road, extended over heights, the commencement of the Apennines, crowned with a numerous artillery. Napoleon remained there, awaiting the attack, for three days ; but the Austrian general had scarcely completed his operations, and he judged it not advisable to abandon the open plain, so favourable for his cavalry, for the broken ground selected by the enemy. On the 11th, Desaix, who had returned from Egypt, and performed quarantine at Toulon, arrived at headquarters with his aides-de-camp, Savary and Rapp. They sat up all night conversing on the changes of France, and the state of Egypt since they had parted on the banks of the Nile ; and the First Consul, who really loved his

CHAP.
XXXI.
1800.

¹ Dum. iii.
298, 299.
Jom. xiii.
244, 248.
Bul. 200,
209.

85.
Arrival of
Desaix from
Egypt at
Napoleon's
headquarters.

CHAP.

XXXI.

1800.

June 12.

¹ Nap. i. 281,
283. Bot.
iv. 24. Dum.
iii. 299.
Jom. xiii.
260, 263.

lieutenant, and appreciated his military talents, immediately gave him the command of the division of Boudet. Finding that the Austrians were resolved not to attack him where he was, and remained grouped under the cannon of Alexandria, and fearful that they might recoil upon Suchet, or incline to the right towards Genoa, or the left to the Tessino, and threaten in turn his own communications, he resolved to give them battle in their own ground, and advanced to Voghera and the plain of MARENGO. Ott, at his approach, retired across the Bormida, the two bridges over which were fortified, and armed with cannon.¹

86.
Preparatory
movements
of both par-
ties.

Melas learned on the 10th, at Alexandria, the disastrous issue of the combat at Montebello, and the immense extent of the losses sustained by Elnitz. Far from being stunned by so many reverses, he only rose in firmness as the danger increased; and after dispatching a courier to Lord Keith, with accounts of his critical situation, and his resolution, in case of disaster, to fall back upon Genoa, he addressed a noble proclamation to his troops, in which, without concealing their danger, he exhorted them to emulate their past glory, or fall with honour on the field which lay before them. Napoleon, on his side, fearful that the enemy meditated a retreat, and might retire unbroken to the fastnesses of the Apennines, pushed forward with vigour. Lapoype, with his division, who had been left in observation on the north of the Po, received orders instantly to cross that river, and hasten to the scene of action; while Victor was directed to advance straight towards Marengo, and make himself master of the bridges over the Bormida. He successfully performed the task; Marengo, after a slight resistance, was carried, and the victorious French troops were arrested only by the fire of cannon from the *îles-du-pont* on the Bormida. The facility with which Marengo was abandoned, confirmed Napoleon in his opinion that the Austrian general meditated a retreat; and impressed with this idea, he resolved to return during the night to Ponte Curone, and move in the direction of the Po; a resolution which would have proved fatal to his army, as it would have been attacked and routed on the following day, while executing its movement, by the Austrian general.² The rapid swelling

June 13.

² Nap. i. 287,
298. Jom.
xiii. 263,
266. Dum.
iii. 305, 307.
Bul. 210,
220.

of the torrent of the Scrivia rendered this impossible, and induced the First Consul to fix his headquarters at Torre de Garofalo, between Tortona and Alexandria; and during the night intelligence of such a kind was received as rendered it necessary to suspend the lateral movements, and concentrate all his forces to resist the enemy.

In effect, Melas, having collected thirty-one thousand men on the Bormida, of which seven thousand were cavalry, with two hundred pieces of cannon, was advancing with rapid strides towards Marengo; having finally determined, in a general council on the preceding day, to risk every thing on the issue of a battle. Napoleon's troops of all arms present on the field, did not exceed twenty-nine thousand, of which only three thousand six hundred were horse; no less than thirty thousand being in observation or garrison in the Milanese States, or on the banks of the Po. The Austrian force had undergone a similar diminution from the same supposed necessity of protecting the rear; four thousand were left in Coni, and so many in Liguria, that instead of the thirty thousand who were disposable at the end of May in that quarter, only sixteen thousand joined the Imperial headquarters. Their spirits, however, which had been somewhat weakened by the recent reverses, were elevated to the highest degree, when the determination to fight was taken; every one returned in joyful spirits to his quarters; the camp resounded with warlike cries and the note of military preparation, and that mutual confidence between officers and men was observable, which is the surest forerunner of glorious achievements.¹

By daybreak on the 14th June, the whole army of Melas was in motion; they rapidly defiled over the three bridges of the Bormida; and when the first rays of the sun appeared above the horizon, they glittered on twenty-one thousand foot-soldiers, seven thousand cavalry, and two hundred pieces of cannon, pressing forward in proud array over the vast and level field of Marengo, perhaps the only plain in Italy where charges of horse can be made in full career.² The First Consul was surprised; he never anticipated an attack from the enemy; his troops were disposed in oblique order by *echelon*, the left in front, and the right at half a day's march in the rear, in marching order; not

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

87.
Forces as-
sembled on
both sides.

¹ Bot. iv. 25.
Jom. xiii.
270. Bul.
230, 233.

88.
Battle of
Marengo.
June 14.

² Personal
observation.

CHAP.

XXII.

1800.

more than twenty-two thousand men, under Lannes and Victor, could be brought till noon into the field to withstand the shock of the whole Austrian army. The violence of the cannonade soon convinced him that a general battle was at hand, and he instantly dispatched orders to Desaix to remeasure his steps, and hasten to the scene of action. But before he could do this, events of the utmost importance had taken place. At eight o'clock, the Austrian infantry, under Haddick and Kaim, preceded by a numerous and splendid array of artillery, which covered the deploying of their columns, commenced the attack. They speedily overthrew Gardanne, who, with six battalions, was stationed in front of Marengo, and drove him back in disorder towards that village. They were there received by the bulk of Victor's corps, which was by this time drawn up, with its centre in the village, and its wings along the hollow of Fontanone, which separated the two armies; that of Lannes was still in the rear. For two hours, Victor withstood all the efforts of Haddick and Kaim with heroic resolution, and at length the corps of Lannes came up, and the forces on both sides became more equal. The battle now raged with the utmost fury; the opposing columns stood, with invincible firmness, within pistol-shot of each other, and all the chasms, produced by the dreadful discharges of artillery, were rapidly filled up by a regular movement to the centre of the brave men who formed the ranks.¹

¹ Nap. i. 289.
Dum. ii. 310,
314. Jom.
xiii. 272,
275.

89.
Great success of the
Austrians.

While this desperate conflict was going on, intelligence was received that the advanced guard of Suchet had reached Acqui in the rear. Melas, uneasy for his communications, detached two thousand five hundred horse to arrest his progress; an unnecessary precaution, as he was too far off to effect any thing on the field of battle; and which, perhaps, decided the fate of the day. At length the perseverance of the Austrians prevailed over the heroic devotion of the French: Marengo was carried, the stream of the Fontanone forced, and the Republicans were driven back to the second line they had formed in the rear. Here they made a desperate stand, and Haddick's division, disordered by success, was repulsed across the stream by Watrin with the right of Lannes' division; but the Republicans could not follow up their advantage, as Victor's corps, exhausted

with fatigue, and severely weakened in numerical strength, was in no condition to support any offensive movement. The Austrians, perceiving his weakness, redoubled their efforts; a fresh attack was made on the centre and left, by which Victor's corps, weakened by four hours' incessant fighting, was at length broken. The Imperialists pressed forward with redoubled vigour, when their adversaries gave way; their regiments were rapidly pursued, and frequently surrounded, and no resource remained but to traverse for two leagues the open plain as far as St Julian, where the reserve under Lannes might be expected to arrive for their support. The Imperialists rapidly followed, preceded by fifty pieces of artillery, which spread death through the flying columns. Melas, with the centre, established himself at Marengo, and Lannes, now entirely uncovered on his left, was obliged to commence a retrograde movement, which at first was performed by echelon in squares with admirable discipline. Gradually, however, the retreat became more disorderly; in vain Kellerman and Champeaux, by repeated charges, arrested the Imperial cavalry, which swept round the retreating columns. He could not check the Hungarian infantry, which advanced steadily in pursuit, halting at every fifty yards, and pouring in destructive volleys, while the intervals between the regiments were filled up by a powerful artillery, which incessantly sent a storm of grape-shot through the retreating masses. No firmness could long endure such a trial. Gradually the squares broke; the immense plain of Marengo was covered with fugitives; the alarm spread even to the rear of the army, and the fatal cry, "*Tout est perdu, sauve qui peut!*" was already heard in the ranks.¹

Matters were in this disastrous state when Napoleon, at eleven o'clock, arrived on the field of battle with his guard. The sight of his staff, surrounded by two hundred mounted grenadiers, revived the spirits of the fugitives; the well-known plumes recalled to the veterans the hopes of success. The fugitives rallied at St Julian, in the rear of those squares of Lannes which still kept their ranks, and Napoleon detached eight hundred grenadiers of his guard to the right of the army, to make head against Ott, who there threatened to turn its flank. At the same time, he himself advanced with a demi-brigade to the support of

CHAP.
XXII.
1800.

¹ Nap. i. 289,
290. Bot.
iv. 27, 28.
Dum. iii.
310, 317
Jom. xlii.
272, 279.
Sav i. 174,
175. Bul.
232, 245.

90.
Arrival of
Napoleon on
the field of
battle, and
his first
steps.

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Lannes, in the centre, and detached five battalions, under Monnier, the vanguard of Desaix's division, to Castel Ceriolo, on the extreme right, to hold in check the light infantry of the enemy, which was there making serious progress. The grenadiers first advanced in square into the midst of the plain, clearing their way equally through the fugitives and the enemy; from their sides, as from a flaming castle, issued incessant volleys of musketry, and all the efforts of the Imperialists were long unable to force back this intrepid band. At length, however, they were shaken by the steady fire of the Imperial artillery, and being charged in front by the Hungarian infantry, and in flank by the Austrian hussars, were broken and driven back in disorder. Their destruction appeared certain, when the leading battalions of Desaix's division, under Monnier, arrived, disengaged this band of heroes from the numerous enemies by whom they were surrounded, and advancing rapidly forward, made themselves masters of the village of Castel Ceriolo. Here, however, they were charged with fury by Vogelsang, with part of Ott's division, who regained Castel Ceriolo, and separated Monnier from the grenadiers of the guard; it was soon, however, retaken by the French, and Cara St Cyr, barricading himself in the houses, succeeded in maintaining that important post during the remainder of the day.¹

91.
The French reserves are brought into action under Desaix.

While the reserves of Napoleon were thus directed to the French right, with a view to arrest the advance of the Austrians in that quarter, the left was a scene of the most frightful disorder. Then was felt the irreparable loss to the Austrians which the detachment of so large a portion of their cavalry to the rear had occasioned. Had the squadrons detached to observe Suchet poured in upon the broken fugitives in that quarter, the defeat of the left and centre would have been complete; and Desaix, assailed both in front and flank, would have come up only in time to share in the general ruin. But nothing of the kind was attempted; Melas, deeming the victory gained, after having had two horses shot under him, and being exhausted with the excessive heat and fatigue, retired at two o'clock to Alexandria, leaving to his chief of the staff, Zach, the duty of following up his success;² and the broken centre and left of the Republicans retired to St Julian, and

¹ Nap. i. 290, 291. Dum. iii. 318, 321. Bot. iv. 29, 30. Jom. xiii. 279, 282. Sav. i. 176. Bul. 249, 260.

² Nap. i. 291, 292. Jom. xiii. 282, 283. Bot. iv. 29, 30. Dum. iii. 320. Sav. i. 177. Bul. 260, 264.

leisurely followed by the Austrian army. Zach put himself at the head of the advanced guard, and at the distance of half a mile behind him came up Kaim with three brigades, and at an equal distance in his rear the reserve, composed of Hungarian grenadiers. Napoleon on his part had resolved to abandon the great road to Tortona, and effect his retreat by the shorter line of Sale or Castel Nuova.

Matters were in this desperate state, when, at four o'clock, the main body of Desaix at length made its appearance at St Julian. "What think you of the day?" said Napoleon to his lieutenant, when he arrived with his division. "The battle," said Desaix, "is completely lost. But it is only four o'clock; there is time to gain another one." Napoleon and he alone were of this opinion; all the others counselled a retreat. In pursuance of this resolution, the remains of Victor and Lannes' corps were reformed, under cover of the cavalry, which was massed in front of St Julian, a masked battery prepared under the direction of Marmont, and Desaix advanced at the head of his corps, consisting of little more than four thousand men, to arrest the progress of the enemy. Napoleon, advancing to the front, rode along the line, exclaiming, "Soldiers! we have retired far enough. You know it is always my custom to sleep on the field of battle." The troops replied by enthusiastic shouts, and immediately advanced to the charge. Zach, little anticipating such an onset, was advancing at the head of his column, five thousand strong, when he was received by a discharge of twelve pieces, suddenly unmasked by Marmont, while at the same time Desaix debouched from the village at the head of his division. The Imperialists, astonished at the appearance of so considerable a body, where they expected to find only fugitives in disorder, and apprehensive of falling into a snare, paused and fell back; but Zach soon succeeded in restoring order in the front, and checked the advance of the enemy. At this moment Desaix was struck by a ball in the breast, and soon after expired. This catastrophe, however, was far from weakening the ardour of his soldiers.¹ The second in command, Boudet, succeeded in inspiring them with the desire of vengeance, and the fire rolled rapidly and sharply along

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XXXI.

1800.

92.
After a gallant charge,
he too is
defeated.

¹ *Jom.* xlii.
286, 287, 289.
Nap. i.
292, 293.
Dum. iii.
324, 325.
Sav. i. 179.
Bul. 260,
271. *Bour.*
iv. 122.

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XXXI.

1800.

93.

Decisive
charge of
Kellerman
converts a
defeat into
a victory.

the whole line. But the Imperialists had now recovered from their surprise; the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the charge; the French in their turn hesitated and broke, and victory was more doubtful than ever.

At this critical moment, a happy inspiration seized Kellerman, which decided the fate of the day. The advance of Zach's column had, without their being aware of it, brought their flank right before his mass of cavalry, eight hundred strong, which was concealed from their view by a vineyard, where the festoons, conducted from tree to tree, rose above the horses's heads, and effectually intercepted the sight. Kellerman instantly charged, with his whole force, upon the flank of the Austrians, as they advanced in open column, and the result must be given in his own words. "The combat was engaged," says Kellerman; "Desaix soon drove back the enemy's tirailleurs on their main body; but the sight of that formidable column of six thousand Hungarian grenadiers made our troops halt. I was advancing in line on their flank, concealed by the festoons; a frightful discharge took place; our line wavered, broke, and fled; the Austrians rapidly advanced to follow up their success, in all the disorder and security of victory. I see it; I am in the midst of them; they lay down their arms. The whole did not occupy so much time as it has taken me to write these six lines." The Duchess of Abrantes states also that she repeatedly heard the battle of Marengo discussed by Lannes, Victor, and the other generals engaged, at her own table, and that they all ascribed the victory to Kellerman's charge. Zach's grenadiers, cut through the middle by this unexpected attack, and exposed to a murderous fire in front from Desaix's division, which had rallied upon receiving this unexpected aid, broke and fled. Zach himself, with two thousand men, were made prisoners; the remainder, routed and dispersed, fled in the utmost disorder to the rear, overthrowing in their course the other divisions which were advancing to their support.¹

¹ Sav. i. 178,
179. Bul.
271, 275.
Nap. i. 292,
293. Dum.
iii. 324, 325;
v. 361. Journ.
xiii. 298.
289. Bot.
iv. 30, 31.
Mém du
Dépôt de la
Guerre, iv.
272.
D' Abrantes,
iii. 44, 45.

94.

Final defeat
of the Aus-
trians.

This great achievement was decisive of the fate of the battle. The remains of Victor and Lannes' corps no sooner beheld this success, than they regained their former spirit, and turned fiercely upon their pursuers. The infantry of Kaim, overwhelmed by the tide of fugitives, gave way; the

Austrian cavalry, which already inundated the field, were seized with a sudden panic; and, instead of striving to restore the day, galloped off to the rear, trampling down in their progress the unfortunate fugitives who were flying before them. A general cry arose, "To the bridges—to the bridges!" and the whole army, disbanding, rushed in confusion towards the Bormida. In the general consternation, Marengo was carried, after a gallant defence, by the Republicans; the cannoniers, finding the bridge choked up by the fugitives, plunged with their horses and guns into the stream, where twenty pieces stuck fast, and fell into the hands of the enemy. At length Melas, who hastened to the spot, rallied the rearguard in front of the bridges, and by its heroic resistance, gained time for the army to pass the river; the troops, regaining their ranks, re-formed upon the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the day; and after twelve hours' incessant fighting, the sun set upon this field of carnage.^{1*}

Such was the memorable battle of Marengo; one of the most obstinately contested which had yet occurred during the war, in which both parties performed prodigies of valour, and which was attended with greater results perhaps than any conflict that had yet occurred in modern Europe. The Imperialists had to lament seven thousand men killed and wounded, besides three thousand prisoners, eight standards, and twenty pieces of cannon, taken by their enemies. The French sustained an equal loss in killed and wounded, besides one thousand prisoners taken in the early part of the day. But although the disproportion was not so great in the trophies of victory, the difference was prodigious in the effect it produced on the respective armies, and the ultimate issue of the campaign. The

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¹ Bul. 275,
280. Sav. i.
179. Nap. i.
293, 294.
Jom. xiii.
290, 294.
Dum. iii.
325, 326.
Bot. iv. 31.
Saalfeld, iv.
230, 231.
Gaz. Mil.
d'Autriche,
Ann. 1823.

95.
Loss sustained on
both sides.

* There is a considerable similarity between the crisis of Marengo and that of Waterloo, with this difference, that the rout of the French was complete before the arrival of Desaix, while not an English square was broken before the final charge of the old guard. But the defeat of the last attacks in both battles was accomplished in the same way. The rout of Zach's columns, by the fire of Desaix's division in front, aided by the charge of Kellerman in flank, was precisely similar to the defeat of the old guard at Mount St John by the English guards, aided by the happy flank attack of Colonel Colborne, now Lord Seaton, with the 52d and 71st regiments, and the gallant subsequent charge of Sir Hussey Vivian with the 10th, 21st, and 18th hussars. In both cases the overthrow of the last columns of attack drew after it the total defeat of the army.—See "*Crisis of Waterloo*," by MAJOR GAWLER and SIR H. VIVIAN. *United Service Journal*, July 1833.

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Austrians had fought for life or death, with their faces towards Vienna, to cut their way sword in hand through the French army. Defeat in these circumstances was irreparable ruin. By retiring either to Genoa or the Maritime Alps, they ran the risk of being cooped up in a corner of a hostile territory, without any chance of regaining their own country, and the certainty of depriving the empire of the only army capable of defending its Italian possessions. The French, on the other hand, had now firmly established themselves in the plains of Piedmont; and could, by merely retaining their present position, effectually cut off the Imperialists, and hinder their rendering any assistance to the Hereditary States. In these circumstances, the victory gave the Republicans, as that under the walls of Turin had given the Imperialists a century before, the entire command of Italy. Such a result was in itself of vast importance; but, coming as it did in the outset of Napoleon's career as First Consul, its consequences were incalculable. It fixed him on the throne, revived the military spirit of the French people, and precipitated the nation into that career of conquest which led them to Cadiz and the Kremlin.¹*

United with the great qualities of Napoleon's character was a selfish thirst for glory, and consequent jealousy of any one who had either effectually thwarted his designs, or rendered him such services as might diminish the lustre of his own exploits. His undying jealousy of Wellington was an indication of the first weakness; his oblivion of Kellerman's inappreciable service, an instance of the second. When this young officer was brought into the presence of the First Consul after the battle, he coldly said, "You made a good charge this evening;" and immediately turning to Bessières, added, "The guard has covered itself with glory."—"I am glad you are pleased," replied Kellerman, "for it has placed the crown on your head." He repeated the same expression in a letter, which was opened

¹ Nap. i. 294.
Jom. xiii.
295, 296.
Dum. iii.
323, 329.
Bot. iv. 32.
34. Austrian Official Account,²
Gaz. Mil.
d'Autriche,
1823, Mé-
morial du
Dépôt de la
Guerre, iv.
333. Bul.
290, 281.

96.
Base con-
duct of Na-
poleon to
Kellerman.

* In the preceding account of the battle of Marengo, the author has corrected the various French and German accounts of the engagement hitherto published, by some Manuscript Notes by General Kellerman, who had so great a share in achieving the success, written on the margin of the collection of the various accounts of the battle, contained in the "Mémoire du Dépôt de la Guerre," iv. 269, 343. For these valuable manuscript notes, the author is indebted to the kindness of his esteemed friend, Captain Basil Hall.

at the post-office and brought to Napoleon. The obligation was too great to be forgiven. Kellerman was not promoted like the other generals, and never afterwards enjoyed the favour of the chief on whose brow he had placed the diadem.* The First Consul, at the same time, was perfectly aware of the immense service rendered by the charge of his lieutenant; for he said in the evening to Bourrienne, "That little Kellerman made a happy charge. He struck in at the critical moment; we owe him much. On what trivial events do affairs depend!" Tacitus has unfolded the secret reason of such ingratitude:—"Tanto proclivius est injuriæ, quàm beneficio vicem exsolvere: quia gratia oneri, ultio in quæstu habetur."¹†

While nothing but congratulation and triumph were heard in the French lines, the Austrian camp exhibited the utmost consternation. The night was spent in re-forming the regiments, repairing the losses of the artillery, and replenishing the exhausted stores of ammunition. A council of war was summoned; the majority, thunder-struck by the magnitude of the disaster and the hopeless nature of their situation, inclined for a treaty to evacuate the Piedmontese territory. "If we cut our way through," said they, "supposing us to be successful, we must sacrifice ten thousand men left in Genoa, and as many in the fortresses of Piedmont, and shall not be the less compelled to take refuge under the cannon of Mantua. It is better to save these twenty thousand men than to preserve towns for the King of Sardinia." In conformity with these views, June 15. a flag of truce was dispatched on the following morning to the French headquarters to propose terms of capitulation. He arrived at their outposts just at the time when an attack on the *têtes-du-pont* on the Bormida was pre-

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¹ Bour. iv.
124, 125.
Bot. iv. 34.

97.
Mélès pro-
poses a sus-
pension of
arms, and
armistice of
Alexandria.

* The poets had figured this feeling; so true are the words of Corneille:—

— "il m'a trop bien servi;
Et qui me fait regner en effet est mon maître.
Pour paraître à mes yeux son mérite est trop grande,
On n'aime point avoir ceux à qui l'on doit tant.
Tout ce qu'il a fait parle au moment qu'il approche;
Et sa seule présence est un secret reproche;
Elle me dit toujours qu'il m'a fait roi,
Que je tiens plus de lui qu'il ne tiendra de moi."

Nicomède, Act i., Scene 3.

"So much more prone are men to avenge an injury than requite a benefit; for gratitude is a burden, revenge a gratification."—TACITUS, *Hist.* iv. 3.

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paring; and, after some difficulty, the terms of the treaty were agreed upon between the two generals. By this convention it was provided that "there should be an armistice between the two armies till an answer was obtained from the Court of Vienna. That, in the mean time, the Imperial army should occupy the country between the Mincio and the Po; that is, Péschiera, Mantua, Borgoforte, and from it to the left bank of the Po, and on its right bank, Fèrrara, Ancona, and Tuscany; that the French should possess the district between the Chiesa, the Oglio, and the Po, and the space between the Chiesa and the Mincio should not be occupied by either army. That the fortresses of Tortona, Milan, Turin, Pizzighitone, Arona, Placentia, Ceva, Savona, Urbia, Coni, Alexandria, and Genoa, should be surrendered to the French, with all their artillery and stores, the Austrians taking with them only their own cannon." The evacuation of all these places, and the final retreat of the Austrian army, were to be completed by the 24th June.¹

¹ Nap. i 294,
296, 296.
Jom. xlii.*
296, 300.
Bul. 281,
287.

98.
Its immense
results, and
faithful ob-
servance by
the Aus-
trians.

Thus the complete reconquest of Piedmont and the Milanese, the cession of twelve fortresses, armed with fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, and the advance of the Republican eagles to the Mincio, were the immediate effect of the stubborn resistance of Desaix and the happy charge of Kellerman. A few battalions and eight hundred horse changed the face of the world. But Napoleon must not be deprived of his share in these glorious results. These incidents were but the last steps in a chain of causes which his genius had prepared, and his skill brought to bear upon the final issue of the campaign. He had thrown himself upon his adversary's communications without compromising his own, and thence its astonishing consequences. Defeated at Marengo, Napoleon could still have fallen back upon an equal force detached in his rear, and, in the worst event, have retired over the St Gothard and the Simplon, with no other sacrifice but his artillery. To have achieved such results, at so inconsiderable a risk, is the greatest triumph of genius in the science of war. The convention of Alexandria was religiously observed by the Austrian commanders. The English expedition under Abercromby, with twelve thousand men, arrived in the bay of Genoa just in time to see that important city

surrendered to the Republican commanders; but, notwithstanding that important succour, German integrity swerved nothing from its good faith. Had this important reinforcement, instead of lying inactive at Minorca, arrived a fortnight sooner with the troops which so soon afterwards conquered in Egypt, what important effects might it have had upon the fortune of the war! But the English at that period were ignorant of the importance of time in military operations, and but novices in the art of war. The time was yet to come when they were to appear in it as masters.¹

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¹ Jom. xiii.
301, 302, 305

Napoleon, after this great victory, appointed Jourdan regent in the continental dominions of the King of Sardinia, until their destiny was determined by a general peace, and returned to Milan to enjoy his triumph. He was received with extraordinary demonstrations of joy by the inconsistent populace, and Italian adulation lavished on him those splendid epithets which, during three centuries of servitude, they have learned to bestow upon their rulers. He discoursed there much on peace, religion, literature, and the sciences. The Ligurian republic was immediately re-organised, and regained its nominal independence. He shortly after returned by Mont Cenis and Lyons to Paris. When passing through that town, he laid, with extraordinary pomp, amidst an immense concourse of spectators, the first stone of the new Place Bellecour, erected on the site of that which had been destroyed by the barbarity of the Convention. Napoleon was in high spirits during the remainder of the journey; but his triumphs, great as they were, appeared to him but as nothing in comparison of those which he yet desired to achieve. "Well," said he, "a few more great events like those of this campaign, and I may really descend to posterity; but till it is little enough; I have conquered, it is true, in less than two years, Cairo, Paris, Milan; but were I to die to-morrow, half a page of general history would, after ten centuries, be all that would be devoted to my exploits." He reached Paris during the night; and nothing could exceed the universal transports on the following day when his arrival was known. The people had been kept in a cruel state of suspense during his absence; the first news they received of the battle of

99.
Napoleon
returns to
Milan, and
thence to
Paris.

July 2.

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¹ Nap. i. 301,
303. Bour.
iv. 164, 171,
181. Bot. v.
36.

100.
Reflections
on this cam-
paign.
Great
changes are
never owing
to trivial
causes.

Marengo was from a mercantile traveller who left the field at one o'clock, and reported that all was lost. Rich and poor now vied with each other in their demonstrations of joy; all business was suspended; nothing but songs of triumph were heard in the streets; and at night a general illumination proclaimed the universal transports.¹

Such was the memorable campaign of Marengo. Inferences of the most important kind, both in a moral and political view, may be drawn from the events which occurred during its progress.

I. Great changes in human affairs never take place from trivial causes. The most important effects, indeed, are often apparently owing to inconsiderable springs; but the train has been laid in all such cases by a long course of previous events, and the last only puts the torch to its extremity. A fit of passion in Mrs Masham arrested the course of Marlborough's victories, and preserved the tottering kingdom of France; a charge of a few squadrons of horse, under Kellerman, at Marengo, fixed Napoleon on the consular throne; and another, with no greater force, against the flank of the old guard at Waterloo, chained him to the rock of St Helena. Superficial observers lament the subjection of human affairs to the caprice of fortune or the casualties of chance; but a more enlarged observation teaches us to recognise in these apparently trivial events the operation of general laws; and the last link in a chain of causes which have all conspired to produce the general result. Mrs Masham's passion was the ultimate cause of Marlborough's overthrow, but that event had been prepared by the accumulating jealousy of the nation during the whole tide of his victories, and her indignation was but the drop which made the cup overflow; Kellerman's charge, indeed, fixed Napoleon on the throne, but it was the sufferings of the Revolution, the glories of the Italian campaigns, the triumph of the Pyramids, which induced the nation to hail his usurpation with joy; the charge of the 10th and 18th hussars broke the last column of the Imperial array, but the foundation of the triumph of Wellington had been laid by the long series of his Peninsular victories and the bloody catastrophe of the Moscow campaign.

II. The sudden resurrection of France, when Napoleon

assumed the helm, is one of the most extraordinary passages of European history, and singularly descriptive of the irresistible reaction in the favour of a firm government which inevitably arises from a long course of revolutionary convulsions. Let not future ages be deluded by the idea that a period of democratic anarchy is one of national strength; it is, on the contrary, in the end, the certain forerunner of public calamity. The glories of the Revolutionary wars were achieved under the despotic rule of the Convention, wielding ten times the power which had ever been enjoyed by Louis XIV.; the effects of democratic anarchy appeared upon its dissolution in the disasters of the Directory. After the fall of the Committee of Public Salvation, the triumphs of France centred in Napoleon alone; wherever he did not command in person, the greatest reverses were experienced. In 1795 the Republicans were defeated by Clairfait on the Rhine; in 1796 by the Archduke Charles in Germany. In 1799 their reverses were unexampled both in Italy and Germany; from the 9th Thermidor to the 18th Brumaire, a period of above five years, the fortunes of the Republic were singly sustained by the sword of Napoleon and the lustre of his Italian campaigns. When he seized the helm in November 1799, he found the armies defeated and ruined; the frontier invaded, both on the sides of Italy and Germany, the arsenals empty, the soldiers in despair deserting their colours, the royalists revolting against the government, general anarchy in the interior, the treasury empty, the energies of the Republic apparently exhausted.

Instantly, as if by enchantment, every thing was changed; order re-appeared out of chaos, talent emerged out of obscurity, vigour arose out of weakness. The arsenals were filled, the veterans crowded to their eagles, the conscripts joyfully repaired to the frontier, La Vendée was pacified, the exchequer began to overflow. In little more than six months after Napoleon's accession, the Austrians were forced to seek refuge under the cannon of Ulm, Italy was regained, unanimity and enthusiasm prevailed among the people, and the revived energy of the nation was finally launched into the career of conquest. Changes so extraordinary cannot be explained by the influence of any one man. Great as the abilities of Napoleon undoubtedly

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101.
Disasters
of France
under the
Directory.

102.
The sudden
reformation
under Na-
poleon.

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1800.

were, they could not be equal to the Herculean task of reanimating a whole nation. It was the transition from anarchy to order, from the tyranny of demagogues to the ascendant of talent, from the weakness of popular to the vigour of military government, which was the real cause of the change. The virtuous, the able, the brave, felt that they no longer required to remain in obscurity; that democratic jealousy would not now be permitted to extinguish rising ability; financial imbecility to crush patriotic exertion; private cupidity to exhaust public resources; civil weakness to paralyse military valour. The universal conviction that the reign of the multitude was at an end, produced the astonishing burst of talent which led to the glories of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

103.
Causes of
the disasters
of the cam-
paign to the
Imperialists.

III. The disastrous issue of the German campaign to the Imperialists, is not to be entirely ascribed either to the genius of Moreau, or the magnitude of the force which the First Consul placed at his command. It was chiefly owing to the ruinous dispersion of the Austrian army and their obstinate adherence to the system of a cordon, when, by the concentration of their enemy's troops, it had become indispensably necessary to accumulate adequate forces on the menaced points. Kray, at the opening of the campaign, had nearly one hundred and ten thousand men at his command; but this immense force, irresistible when kept together, was so dispersed over a line above two hundred miles in length, from the Alps to the Maine, that he could not collect forty-five thousand men to resist the shock of the French centre of nearly double that strength, at Engen or Biberach. The loss of these battles, by piercing the Allied line, compelled the whole body to fall back; and thus seventy thousand men abandoned Swabia and Franconia without firing a shot, while half their number, added to the Austrian centre, would have prevented the Republicans even crossing the Black Forest. The brief campaign of 1815 afforded another example of the same truth; the Allied forces quartered over all Flanders, though greatly superior, upon the whole, to the army of Napoleon, were inferior to their assailants, both at Ligny and Waterloo; and the intrepid daring of Wellington, joined to the devoted heroism of his troops, alone prevented in that struggle the continued disasters of Bibe-

rach and Moeskirch. The successful stand, on the other hand, made by the Austrian army when concentrated under the cannon of Ulm, and the effectual covering which, in that confined spot, they gave to the whole Hereditary States, affords the clearest proof of the superior efficacy of such an assembled force to any cordon, however skilfully disposed, in arresting an invading enemy. No army will ever advance into an enemy's country, leaving sixty or eighty thousand men together in their rear; for, in such a case, they are exposed to the danger of losing their communications, and being compelled, as at Marengo, to peril all upon the issue of a single battle to regain them; but nothing is easier than to make double that force, dispersed over a long line, abandon a whole frontier, by striking decisive blows with a superior force at a part of its extent. In fifteen days, the Imperial cordon was driven back, by attacks on its centre, from the Rhine to the Danube; for six weeks its concentrated force in position at Ulm, not only arrested the victor, but covered the Imperial frontier, and gained time for the revival of the spirit of the monarchy.

IV. The successful stand which Kray, with a defeated army, made against the vast forces of Moreau for six weeks under the cannon of Ulm, demonstrates the wisdom and foresight of the Archduke Charles in fortifying, at the close of the preceding campaign, that important central position, and the justice of his remark, that it is in the valley of the Danube that the blows are to be struck which are decisive of the fate of France or Austria.¹ The long check which this single fortress gave to the powerful and victorious army of Moreau, suggests a doubt, whether central are not more serviceable than frontier fortifications; or, at least, whether a nation, in contemplation of invasion by a powerful and ambitious enemy, should not always be provided with some strongholds in the interior, to the shelter of which a defeated army may retire, and where it may both recruit its losses and recover its spirit. Certain it is, that it is the want of some such *points d'appui* that the sudden prostration of Austria, after the defeats of Ulm and Eckmühl; of Prussia, after that of Jena; and of France, after the disasters of 1814 and 1815, are mainly to be ascribed. But for the fortifica-

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104.
Great effect
of central
fortifica-
tions in a
state.

¹ Arch. Cha.
ii. 264.
Strategie,
1796.

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XXXI.

1800.

tions of Vienna, Austria, before the arrival of John Sobieski, would have been overwhelmed by the arms of Soliman; without those of Genoa, the conquest of Italy would have been complete, and the victorious Austrians grouped in irresistible strength in the plains of Piedmont before the Republican eagles appeared on the St Bernard; and but for those of Torres Vedras, the arms of England, instead of striking down the power of France on the field of Waterloo, would have sunk, with lustre for ever tarnished, upon the shores of Portugal.

105.
What is the
real fortifi-
cation re-
quired in
such a case?

V. A mere fortified position, like that of the Drissa, to which Barclay de Tolly retired in 1812, is not sufficient for this purpose; it is an intrenched camp, connected with a strong fortress, which forms the real formidable obstacle. The defeat of the Prussians, in the first attack on Warsaw in 1794, and the astonishing stand made by Shrynecki, with forty thousand regular troops, against the whole forces of the Russian empire in 1831, prove the inestimable effect of central fortresses, such as Warsaw and Modlin, in forming a nucleus to the national strength, and enabling an inconsiderable to withstand the forces of a powerful monarchy. The difference between central and frontier fortresses in this respect is great and important. The former constitute so many secure asylums, round which the national strength may be agglomerated, in the last struggle for national independence, and the retreating army finds itself strengthened in the heart of the empire by the garrisons of the interior fortresses and the new levies who are disciplined within their walls, while their fortifications form an imposing stronghold, to the siege of which the largest armies are hardly adequate. The latter prove an impassable barrier only to armies of inconsiderable magnitude; and if, by an overwhelming force, the protecting army is compelled to retire, it too often finds itself severely weakened by the great detachments doomed thereafter to useless inactivity in the frontier fortresses. When Napoleon was struck to the earth in 1814, he still held the fortresses on the Elbe and the Rhine: above a hundred thousand veteran troops were there immured, when he maintained an unequal conflict with fifty thousand in the plains of Champagne; and that which he boasted triple line of fortresses could

not do for France, would have been certainly effected by an intrenched camp, like that at Ulm, on Montmartre and Belleville. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, not that frontier fortresses are totally useless, and central ones are alone to be relied on, but that the combination of the two is requisite to lasting security: the former to cover the provinces and impede an inconsiderable enemy, the latter to repel those desperate strokes which are directed by a gigantic foe at the vitals of the state.

VI. The march of Napoleon across the St Bernard, and his consequent seizure of the Austrian line of communication, is one of the greatest conceptions of military genius, and was deservedly crowned by the triumph of Marengo; but, in the execution of this design, he incurred unnecessary hazard, and all but lost his crown by the dispersion of his troops before the final struggle.¹ The forces at his command, after he debouched on the plains of Piedmont, were, including Monecy's division, sixty thousand men; while the Imperialists by no exertions could have brought forty thousand into the field to meet them, so widely were their troops dispersed over the vast theatre of their conquests:² whereas, when the die came to be cast on the field of Marengo, the Austrians had thirty-one thousand, and the French only twenty-nine thousand in line. This but ill accords with the principle which he himself has laid down, that the essence of good generalship consists, with equal or inferior forces, in being always superior at the point of attack. The march to Milan was the cause of this weakness; while Lannes and Victor, with twenty thousand men, struggled with an overwhelming enemy on the banks of the Bormida, twenty-nine thousand were in position or observation on the Mincio and the Po. So great a dispersion of force to secure the rear was altogether unnecessary; for, in case of disaster, the French army, after the fort of Bard had capitulated on the 5th June, could have retreated as well by the St Bernard and Mont Cenis, as by the Simplon and St Gothard. A forward movement, in conjunction with Thureau, after the army, numbering forty thousand combatants, was concentrated at Ivrea on the 24th May, would have delivered Massena, who did not capitulate till the 4th June, and added his troops, ten thousand strong,

CHAP.
XXXI.

1800.

106.
Merits of
Napoleon in
the cam-
paign.

¹ Nap. i. 280.

² Rapport
Officiel
d'Autriche,
Gaz. Mil.
1823.

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XXXI.

1800.

to the invading army, while Moncey, with sixteen thousand, would have adequately protected the rear ; and the retreat of Melas, then far advanced in the defiles of the Maritime Alps, would have been equally cut off. The astonishing consequences which followed the battle of Marengo, afford no proof that the campaign in this particular was not based on wrong principles ; the same results might have been gained without the same risk ; and it is not the part of a prudent general to commit to chance what may be gained by combination. Had the torrent of the Scrivia not swollen, and stopped the march of the French army on the evening of June 13 ; had Desaix advanced an hour later on the 14th ; had Kellerman not opportunely charged an unsuspecting foe from the concealment of luxuriant vines ; had Melas not detached his cavalry to the rear to observe Suchet, the fate of the action would probably have been reversed, and Marengo been Pavia. No scruple need be felt at making these observations, even in reference to so great a commander. The military art, like every other branch of knowledge, is progressive ; the achievements of one age illuminate that which succeeds it, and mediocrity can, in the end, judge of what genius only could at first conceive. A school-boy can now solve a problem, to which the minds of Thales and Archimedes alone were adequate in the commencement of geometry.

107.
And of the
Austrian
commander.

VII. If the conduct of the Austrian commander is examined, it will be found to be no less open to exception, previous to the battle of Marengo, than that of the First Consul. The desire to retain every thing, to guard at once all the points which had been gained, was the cause of a dispersion, on his part so much the more reprehensible than that of Napoleon, as, being in a conquered country, with all the fortresses in his possession, it was the less necessary. Two thousand men would have sufficed for the garrison of Tortona, as many for that of Coni. The surplus troops thus acquired, with the cavalry detached to observe Suchet, would have formed a force considerably superior to the reserve of Desaix, which would have ensured the victory. Of what avail were the four thousand men in either of these fortresses the next morning, when all the strong places of Piedmont were surrendered to the enemy ?¹

¹ *Jom. xiii.*
303, 304.

Thrown into the scale when the beam quivered after the repulse of Desaix, they would have hurled Napoleon from the consular throne.

VIII. The conduct of the Austrian commander, during and after the battle, has been the subject of much severe animadversion from the German writers. Bulow, in particular, has charged him with having unnecessarily surrendered the fortresses of Piedmont on the following day, when he had still at command a force capable of breaking through the enemy, and regaining his communications with Mantua.¹ Certain it is that Melas, whose conduct in the outset of the action is worthy of the highest praise, did not follow up his first successes so vigorously as seems to have been possible; that his detachment of cavalry to the rear was unnecessary and eminently hurtful; and it is more than probable that, if Napoleon had been in his place, Marengo would have been the theatre of as great a reverse to the Republicans as Salamanca or Vittoria. But, in agreeing to the armistice on the following day, his conduct appears less liable to exception. He had then only twenty thousand men on whom he could rely in the field, and these, with the garrisons in the Piedmontese fortresses, formed the chief defence of the Austrian possessions in Italy. His chief duty was to preserve this nucleus of veteran troops for the monarchy, and transport them from a situation where they were cut off from their communications and could be of little service to their country, to one in which they were restored to both. Perched on the Apennines, or shut up in the walls of Genoa, they would have been exposed to the whole weight of the army of reserve, which might thus have been raised, by the concentration of its forces from the rear, to forty-five thousand men, besides the victorious troops of Suchet, with the garrison of Genoa, nearly twenty-five thousand more. It is doubtful whether the whole force of Melas, aided, as it would have been by the expedition of Abercromby and the English fleet, could have successfully withstood such a concentration of seventy thousand combatants, flushed with victory, and headed by Napoleon; and if they failed, disasters tenfold greater awaited the monarchy.² Thirty thousand men might have been made

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108.

Propriety of
of the con-
vention of
Alexandria
considered.

¹ Bul. Feld-
zug, Maren-
go, 292.

² Rap. Off.
d'Autriche,
1823. Mém.
du Dep de
la Guerre,
iv. 337, 339.

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XXXI.

1800.

109.

Inexpedi-
ence of re-
ceiving
battle in the
oblique
order.

prisoners at once, and the walls of Genoa witnessed as great a catastrophe as the heights of Ulm.

IX. The oblique *attack*, or the attack by column coming up after column by *echelon*, has frequently achieved the most decisive success in war; and the victories of Leuthen by Frederic, and Salamanca by Wellington, were chiefly owing to the skilful use of that method of action. But to *receive* battle in that position is a very different matter. To do so is to expose the successive columns to be overwhelmed by a superior enemy, who, by the defeat of the first, acquires a superiority which it becomes afterwards a matter of extreme difficulty to counterbalance. The action of Montebello was an instance of the successful application and great effect of an attack in this order; the narrow escape from a catastrophe at Marengo, an example of the peril to which troops themselves attacked in such a situation are exposed. The difference between the two is important and obvious. When the attacking army advances in *echelon*, if it can overthrow the first column of the enemy, it throws it back upon the one in rear, which soon finds itself overpowered by a torrent of fugitives, or shaken by the sight of its comrades in disorder; while, if it is stubbornly resisted, it is soon supported by fresh troops advancing on its flank, in perfect order, to the attack. But when the troops in *echelon* stand still, all these advantages are reversed; the disorder created in front speedily spreads to the rear, and the successive columns, instead of coming up to the aid of an advancing, too often find themselves overwhelmed by the confusion of a retreating army.¹ Napoleon was perfectly aware of these principles; he never intentionally received an attack in *echelon*; at Marengo, as at Eylau, he was assailed unawares in that position by the enemy, and his ultimate extrication from destruction in both battles was owing to the opportune arrival of troops, whom his first orders had removed far from the scene of action, or upon events upon which no human foresight could have calculated at the commencement of the struggle.

X. When it is recollected that Abercromby's corps, twelve thousand strong, lay inactive at Port Mahon in Minorca during this interesting and important crisis, big,

¹Tom. xiii.
271, 272.

as the event proved, with the fate not only with the campaign but of the war, it is impossible not to feel the most poignant regret at its absence from the scene of action ; or to avoid the reflection, that England at that period partook too much of the tardiness of her Saxon ancestors ; and that, like Athelstane the Unready, she was never prepared to strike till the period for successful action had passed. What would have been the result if this gallant force had been added to the Imperialists during their desperate strife round Genoa, or thrown into the scale, when victory was so doubtful, to meet the troops of Kellerman and Desaix at Marengo ! When it is recollected what these very men accomplished in the following year, when opposed to an equal force of Napoleon's veterans on the sands of Alexandria, it is impossible to doubt that their addition to the Allied forces in Italy at this juncture would in all probability have been attended with decisive effects. But, notwithstanding all this, it is impossible to say that the British Government were to blame for the apparently inexcusable inactivity of so important a reserve. The equality of force at Marengo, it must always be recollected, was not only unforeseen, but could not have been calculated upon by any degree of foresight. At the outset of the campaign the Imperialists were not only victorious, but greatly superior to their antagonists in Italy ; and even after Napoleon and the formidable army of reserve were thrown into the balance, their advantage was so marked, that, but for a ruinous and unnecessary dispersion of force, they must have crushed him on that well-contested field. In these circumstances, no crisis in which their co-operation was likely to be attended with important consequences was to be anticipated in the north of Italy ; there was no apparent call upon the government to alter the direction of a force destined for important operations either on the shores of Provence or on the banks of the Nile ; and the British historian must therefore absolve them from any serious blame in this matter, however much he may lament the absence of a band of veterans stationed so near the scene of action, which was adequate, as the event proved, to have turned the scales of fortune and altered the destinies of the world.

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1800.

110.

Deplorable
effects of the
English ab-
sence from
the scene of
action.



CHAPTER XXXII.

CAMPAIGN OF HOHENLINDEN. FROM THE ARMISTICE OF
ALEXANDRIA TO THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE. JUNE 1800
—FEB. 1801.

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XXXII.

1800.

1.

Universal
joy in France
at the vic-
tory of
Marengo.

FRANCE soon experienced the beneficial results of the triumphs in Italy and the successes in Germany. More passionately desirous than any other people in Europe of military glory, its citizens received with the utmost enthusiasm the accounts of their victories; and the angry passions of the Revolution, worn out by suffering, willingly turned to joyful comparison of their present triumphs with the disasters which had preceded the return of the First Consul. The battle of Marengo fixed Napoleon on the consular throne. The Jacobins of Paris, the Royalists of the west, were alike overwhelmed by that auspicious event; and two English expeditions, which appeared, as usual, too late, on the coast of Brittany and La Vendée, under Sir Edward Pellew and Sir James Pulteney, were unable to rouse the inhabitants to resistance against the triumphant authority of the capital.¹

August.

¹ Ann. Reg.
212, 213.
Jom. xiv. 4,
5.

2.

Treaty
previously
signed
between
Austria and
England.
Good faith
of the Im-
perial go-
vernment in
adhering
to it.
June 20.

Two days before intelligence was received of the battle of Marengo, a treaty for the further prosecution of the war had been signed at Vienna, between the Imperial Cabinet and Great Britain. By this convention it was provided, that within three months England was to pay to Austria a loan of £2,000,000 sterling, to bear no interest during the continuance of the war, and that neither of the high contracting parties should make any separate peace with the enemy, during the period of one year from its date. The disastrous intelligence of the defeat at Marengo,

and the armistice of Alexandria, followed up as it soon was by similar and still more pressing calamities in Germany, could not shake the firmness or good faith of the Austrian cabinet. The inflexible Thugut, who then presided over its councils, opposed to all the representations with which he was assailed, as to the perils of the monarchy, the treaty recently concluded with Great Britain, and the disgrace which would attach to the Imperial government if, on the first appearance of danger, engagements of such long endurance and so solemnly entered into were to be abandoned. Nor did the situation of affairs justify any such desponding measures. If the battle of Marengo had lost Piedmont to the Allied powers, the strength of the Imperial army was still unbroken; it had exchanged a disadvantageous offensive position in the Ligurian mountains for an advantageous defensive one on the frontiers of Lombardy; the cannon of Mantua, so formidable to France in 1796, still remained to arrest the progress of the victor, and the English forces of Abercromby, joined to the Neapolitan troops and the Imperial divisions in Ancona and Tuscany, would prove too formidable a body on the right flank of the Republicans to permit any considerable advance towards the Hereditary States.¹

Nor were affairs by any means desperate in Germany. The advance of Moreau into Bavaria, while Ulm and Ingolstadt were unreduced, was a perilous measure; the line of the Inn furnished a defensive frontier not surpassed by any in Europe, flanked on one side by the mountains of Tyrol, and on the other by the provinces of Bohemia, both in the possession of the Imperial forces; the strength of the monarchy would be more strongly felt, and reinforcements more readily obtained, when the enemy approached its frontiers, and the ancient patriotism of the inhabitants was called forth by the near approach of danger; and the disastrous issue of the campaign of 1796 to the Republican forces proved how easy was the transition from an unsupported advance to a ruinous retreat. Finally, the treaty of Campo Formio had only been signed after a whole campaign of disasters, and when the standards of France were almost within sight of Vienna;² and it would be disgraceful to subscribe the

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¹ Martens, vii. 61. Jom. xiv. 7.

3.
State of
affairs in
Germany.

² Ann Reg. 241. State Papers. Jom. xiv 7, 8.

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1800.

4.
Count St
Julien ar-
rives at
Paris, and
signs pre-
liminaries
which are
disavowed
by the Im-
perial
cabinet.

July 28.

same conditions when the Imperial banners were still on the Mincio, or lose the fruits of a long series of triumphs in the terror produced by a single misfortune.

Influenced by these considerations, the Austrian cabinet resolved to gain time; and if they could not obtain tolerable terms of peace, run all the hazards of a renewal of the war. Count St Julien arrived at Paris on the 21st July, as plenipotentiary on the part of Austria, bearing a letter from the Emperor, in which he stated: "You will give credit to every thing which Count St Julien shall say on my part, and I will ratify whatever he shall do." In virtue of these powers, preliminaries of peace were signed at Paris in a few days by the French and Austrian ministers. The "treaty of Campo Formio was taken as the basis of the definitive pacification, unless where changes had become necessary; it was provided that the frontier of the Rhine should belong to France, and the indemnities stipulated for Austria by the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio were to be given in Italy instead of Germany." As this treaty was signed by Count St Julien in virtue of the letter from the Emperor only, and without an exchange of full powers, it was provided that "these preliminary articles shall be ratified, and that they shall not bind their respective governments till after the ratification." The cabinet of Vienna availed themselves of this clause to avoid the ratification of these preliminary articles, in subscribing which their plenipotentiary had not entered into the views of the government. He was accordingly recalled, and the refusal to ratify notified on the 15th August, the appointed time, by Count Lehrbach, accompanied, however, by an intimation of the wish of the imperial cabinet to make peace, of the treaty which bound them not to do so without the concurrence of Great Britain, and of the readiness of the latter power to enter into negotiations, on authority of a letter from Lord Minto, the British ambassador at Vienna, to Baron Thugut.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
278, 280.
State
Papers.
Dum. v. 8, 9.
Nap. ii. 2, 3.

Napoleon either was, or affected to be, highly indignant at the refusal by Austria to ratify the preliminaries, and he immediately gave notice of the termination of the armistice on the 10th September, sent orders for the second army of reserve, which was organising at Dijon, to enter

Switzerland on the 5th of that month, and ordered Augereau, with eighteen thousand men from Holland, to take a position on the Lahn, in order to co-operate with the extreme left of Moreau's army. But he soon returned to more moderate sentiments, and dispatched full powers to M. Ott, who resided at London as agent for the exchange of prisoners, to conclude a *naval armistice* with Great Britain. The object of this proposal, hitherto unknown in European diplomacy, was to obtain the means, during the negotiations, of throwing supplies into Egypt and Malta, the first of which stood greatly in need of assistance, while the latter was at the last extremity, from the vigilant blockade maintained for nearly two years by the British cruisers. No sooner was this proposal received by the English government, than they proceeded to signify their anxious desire to be included in the general pacification; and proposed, for this purpose, that passports should be forwarded for Lord Grenville's brother to proceed in the character of plenipotentiary of Great Britain, to the congress at Luneville; but they declined to agree to a naval armistice, as a thing totally unknown, till the preliminaries of peace had been signed. Napoleon, however, resolutely bent on saving Malta and Egypt, continued to insist on the immediate adoption of a naval armistice as a *sine qua non*, and signified that, unless it was agreed to before the 11th September, he would recommence hostilities both in Italy and Germany.¹

The urgency of the case, and the imminent danger which Austria would run, if the war were renewed on the continent at so early a period, induced the cabinet of London to forego the advantages which a declination of the proposals of the First Consul promised to afford to the maritime interests of Great Britain. On the 7th September, therefore, they presented to M. Ott, a counter-project for the general suspension of hostilities between the belligerent powers. By this it was proposed that an armistice should take place by sea and land, during which the ocean was to be open to the navigation of trading vessels of both nations; Malta and the harbours of Egypt was to be put on the same footing as were Ulm, Philipsburg, and Ingolstadt, by the armistice of Parsdorf; that is to say, they were to be provisioned for fourteen days, from time to time, during

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5.
Negotiations
with Eng-
land for an
armistice. *

1 Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 540.
550. Duin.
v. 9, 10, 11.
Ann. Reg.
214.
Sept 5.

6.
Proposals
of Great
Britain for
an armis-
tice.

• CHAP.
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1800.

the dependence of the negotiation. The blockade of Brest and the maritime ports was to be raised; but the British squadrons were to remain on their stations off their mouths, and ships of war were not to be permitted to sail. Nothing could be more equitable towards France, or generous towards Austria, than these propositions. They compensated the recent disasters of the Imperialists by land with concessions by the British at sea, where England had constantly been victorious, and had nothing to fear; they placed the blockaded fortresses which the French retained on the ocean, on the same footing with those which the Imperialists still held in the centre of Germany, and abandoned to the vanquished on one element those advantages of a free navigation, which they could not obtain by force of arms, in consideration of the benefits accruing from a prolongation of the armistice to their allies on another.¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxv. p. 551,
555. Dum.
v. 11, 12.
Ann. Reg.
215.

7.
Which fail,
from the un-
reasonable
demands of
France.

Sept. 20.

Napoleon, however, insisted upon a condition which ultimately proved fatal to the negotiation. This was, that the French ships of the line only should be confined to their ports; but that frigates should have free liberty of egress; and that six vessels of that description should be allowed to go from Toulon to Alexandria without being visited by the English cruisers. He has told us in his "Memoirs" what he intended to have done with those frigates. They were to be armed *en flute*, and to have carried out three thousand six hundred troops, besides great military stores, to Alexandria. What rendered this condition peculiarly unreasonable was, that at the moment (20th September) when M. Ott declared to the British government that the condition as to these frigates was a *sine qua non* for the continuation of the negotiation, he addressed to Moreau a telegraphic despatch, "not to agree to a prolongation of the armistice but on condition that Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, were placed in the hands of the French as a guarantee." Thus, at the very time when the First Consul made a condition for the *preservation* of the maritime blockaded fortresses a *sine qua non* with the British government, he made the immediate *cession* of the corresponding blockaded ones on the continent an indispensable condition of a continuation of the armistice with the Austrian cabinet.² In these simul-

2 Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 566,
583. Nap. ii.
8, 9. Dum.
v. 12, 14.
Ann. Reg.
215.

taneous propositions is to be seen little of that spirit of moderation which he so loudly professed, but much of that inflexible desire for aggrandisement, which so long was attended with success, but ultimately occasioned his ruin.

The Imperialists, with the dagger at their throats, were in no condition to resist the demands of the victor. A new convention was therefore concluded at Hohenlinden, on the 28th September, by which the cession of the three German fortresses was agreed to, and the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days. A similar convention, signed at Castiglione a few days afterwards, extended the armistice for the same period to the Italian peninsula. The English government, however, was under no such necessity; and as Napoleon peremptorily refused to abandon his condition as to dispatching six frigates to Egypt, the negotiation was broken off, the cabinet of the Tuileries having declared that they would treat only with each of the two courts separately. This was equivalent to its total abandonment, as both the allied powers had intimated to France that they were bound by the recent convention to treat only in concert with each other. No sooner was it evident that Great Britain would not consent to the demands of the First Consul, than he resolved to prosecute the war with vigour against Austria. On the 8th October, accordingly, the portfolio of the war office was put into the hands of Carnot, with instructions to redouble his exertions to put all the armies immediately on a footing to resume hostilities. On the same day on which this took place, a plot to assassinate Napoleon at the opera was discovered by the police; Cerachi and Demerville, the leaders of the conspiracy, and both determined Jacobins, were arrested and executed. It originated in the remains of the democratic faction, and served to increase the already formed exasperation of the First Consul at that party.¹

During the interval of hostilities, both parties made the most indefatigable efforts to put their armies on a respectable footing, and prepare for a vigorous prosecution of the war. A corps of fifteen thousand men was formed at Dijon, under the name of the second army of reserve, the command of which was entrusted to General Macdonald,

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8
Armistice
with the
Austrians,
and Jacobin
conspira-
cy to
assassinate
Napoleon.
Sept. 28.

Oct. 9.

Oct. 8.

1 Dum. v.
13, 14. Na
ii 9. Jom
xiv. 15, 21.

9.
Prepara-
tions of
France for
a renewal of
hostilities.

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already well known by his campaigns in Naples, and by the battle of the Trebbia. The official reports gave out that it was to consist of thirty thousand, and even Macdonald himself was led to believe it amounted to that force. The object in spreading this delusion was to augment the troops, which the Austrians, recollecting what the first army of reserve had effected, would deem necessary to watch his operations. It was destined to penetrate through the Grisons into the Tyrol, and threaten the flank of the Imperialists either in Italy or Germany, as circumstances might render advisable. Another army, 20,000 strong, was assembled, under Augereau, on the Maine; it was intended to advance along the course of that river to Wurzburg, and menace Bohemia, so as to prevent the troops in that province from undertaking any thing against the flanks or rear of the grand army under Moreau in Bavaria. That army was raised to above 110,000 men, all in the highest state of discipline and equipment; the soldiers were all newly clothed, the artillery and cavalry remounted, and all the *matériel* in the finest possible state. The Republic had never, since the commencement of the war, had on foot an army so perfect in its composition, so admirably organised, and so completely furnished with all the appointments requisite for carrying on a campaign. The army of Italy was reinforced to 80,000 men; its cavalry and artillery were in an especial manner augmented; and, besides these great forces, a reserve of 10,000 chosen troops was formed at Amiens, to watch the movements of the English expeditions; and which, as soon as they proceeded to the coast of Spain, was moved to the south to support the army of Italy on the Grisons. In all, the Republic had 240,000 men in the field, ready for active operations; and besides this, there was nearly an equal force in Egypt, Malta, in the dépôts of the interior, or stationed along the coasts.¹

¹ Nap. ii. 20,
21. Dum. v.
16, 17. Jom.
xiv. 63, 65.

Austria, on her part, had made good use, during the four months of the armistice, of the resources of the monarchy, and the subsidies of England. Never on any former occasion had the patriotic spirit of her inhabitants shone forth with more lustre, nor all ranks co-operated with more enthusiastic zeal, in the measures for the common defence. No sooner was it announced, by the refusal

10.
And of Aus-
tria. Noble
efforts of her
people.

of Napoleon to treat with either court separately, that peace was no longer to be hoped for, than the generous flame, like an electric shock, burst forth at once in every part of the monarchy. The Archduke Palatine repaired to Hungary, decreed the formation of a levy *en masse*, and threw himself on those generous feelings which, in the days of Maria Theresa, had saved the empire. The Emperor announced his resolution to put himself at the head of the army, and actually repaired to the Inn for that purpose. His presence excited to the highest degree the spirit of the people and the soldiers. The Archduke Charles, in his government of Bohemia, pressed the organisation of twelve thousand men, destined to co-operate with the army on the Inn in resisting the menaced invasion; and the Empress sent to that accomplished prince a helmet set with magnificent jewels. These warlike measures excited the utmost enthusiasm among all classes: the peasantry every where flew to arms; the nobles vied with each other in the equipment of regiments of horse, or the contribution of large sums of money; every town and village resounded with the note of military preparation. But unfortunately the jealousy, or erroneous views of the Aulic Council, were but ill calculated to turn to the best account this general burst of patriotic spirit. The Archduke Charles, indeed, in accordance with the unanimous wishes of the army, was declared generalissimo; but instead of being sent to head the forces on the Inn, he was retained in his subordinate situation of the government of Bohemia. Kray, whose talents at Ulm had so long arrested the progress of disaster, was dismissed to his estates in Hungary, while the command of his army was given to the Archduke John, a young man of considerable promise and thorough military education; but whose inexperience, even though aided by the councils of Lauer, the grand-master of artillery, was but ill calculated to contend with the scientific abilities of Moreau.¹

¹ Dum. v.
21, 27, 80, 81.
Jom. xiv. 13,
14.

Before the renewal of hostilities, Austria had greatly augmented her forces in all quarters. Five thousand additional troops in the English pay had been obtained from Bavaria; the cession of Philippsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, had rendered disposable 18,000 more; and the recruits from the interior amounted to 15,000 men. These

^{11.}
Austrian
forces.

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¹ Nap. ii. 19,
20. Jom.
xiv. 72, 73.
Dum. v. 20,
21.

additions had so far counterbalanced the heavy losses sustained during the campaign by sickness, fatigue, and the sword, that the Imperialists could reckon upon 110,000 effective men on the Inn, to defend the frontiers of the Hereditary States. But this great force, after the usual system of the Austrians, was weakened by the vast extent of country over which it was spread. The right, 27,000 strong, occupied Ratisbon and the Palatinate; the left, consisting of 18,000 men, under Hiller, was stationed in the German Tyrol: so that not more than 60,000 combatants could be relied on to maintain the important line of the Inn. In Italy, Field-marshal Bellegarde had 100,000 under his command, but they too were weakened by the immense line they had to defend; 15,000 were in the Italian Tyrol, under Davidowich; 10,000 in Ancona and Tuscany; 20,000 were formed of the Neapolitan troops, who could be little relied on: so that, for the decisive shock on the Mincio, not more than 60,000 effective men could be assembled.¹

12.
But Russia
and Prussia
keep aloof.

Nor was the Imperial cabinet less active in its endeavours to awaken the northern powers to a sense of the dangers which menaced them, from the great abilities and evident ambition of the First Consul. Special envoys were dispatched to St Petersburg and Berlin to endeavour to rouse the Russian and Prussian cabinets into activity, but in vain. Frederick William persisted in the system of neutrality which he had so long pursued, and which he was destined so bitterly to expiate; and the Emperor Paul, intent upon his newly acquired ideas of the freedom of the seas, refused to embroil himself with France, and in the pursuit of the imaginary vision of maritime independence fixed upon Europe the real evils of territorial slavery. He retained a hundred and twenty thousand men inactive under Kutusoff, and Count Pahlen, both reserved for great destinies, on the frontiers of Lithuania, who, if thrown into the scale at this critical moment, might have righted the balance when it was beginning to decline, and saved Russia from the rout of Austerlitz and the conflagration of Moscow.²

² Dum. v.
21, 22. Jom.
xiv. 23, 24.

It is painful to be obliged to add, that the military efforts of England, though intended to follow out the true spirit of the alliance, were not better calculated to aid the

common cause. On the 4th June an attack was made on the forts in Quiberon bay, by the squadron under the command of Sir Edward Pellew; but after gaining a trifling success, and dismantling the fortifications, they embarked without making any permanent impression. Early in July a secret expedition, under the command of Sir James Pulteney, consisting of eight thousand men, sailed for the coast of France. It first appeared off Belle-
 isle; but as the strong works on that island rendered any attack a difficult enterprise, it shortly made sail for the coast of Spain, and landed in the neighbourhood of Ferrol. After two skirmishes, in which the Spaniards were defeated, the British took possession of the heights which overlook the harbour, and every thing promised the immediate reduction of that important fortress, with the fleet within its walls, when the English commander, intimidated by the rumour of reinforcements having reached the town, withdrew his forces without any apparent reason, but in pursuance of secret instructions, and made sail for Gibraltar, where Abercromby, with the expedition which had so long lain inactive at Port Mahon, awaited his arrival.¹

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13.

English expedition of
 Sir James
 Pulteney
 sails at
 Ferrol.
 June 4.

July 8.

Sept. 18.

1 Ann. Reg.
 212, 213
 Jom. xiv. 46,
 47. Dum. v.
 42.

The union of two squadrons, having on board above twenty thousand English troops, in the straits of Gibraltar, excited the utmost alarm through the whole Peninsula. This armament, the greatest which had yet sailed from the British shores during the whole war, menaced alike Carthagen, Seville, and Cadiz. Reinforcements from all quarters were hastily directed to the lines of St Roch in front of Gibraltar; vessels were sunk at the entrance of the harbour of Cadiz, and all the means adopted which could be thought of to repel the threatened attack. The British commanders, instead of making sail, the moment they arrived, for the isle of St Leon, lay above a fortnight inactive in the straits of Gibraltar, and at length appeared off Cadiz on the 5th October. Seldom was a more formidable armament assembled; the naval forces consisted of twenty sail of the line, twenty-seven frigates, and eighty-four transports, having on board above twenty thousand foot soldiers. As far as the eye could reach, the ocean was covered by the innumerable sails of the British armada, which seemed destined to revenge upon Spain the terrors

14.

And from
 dread of the
 plague,
 he declines
 to attack
 Cadiz.

Oct. 5.

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¹ Ann. Reg.
216. Jom.
xiv. 47, 48.
Dum. iv.
342, 347.

15.
Surrender
of Malta to
the British
blockading
squadron.

² Ann. Reg.
215. Jom.
xiv. 13, 14.
Bot. iv 49,
50.

16.
Affairs of
Italy
Election of
Pius VII. at
Venice, and
hostilities of
the Nea-
politans.

of the celebrated armament which had been baffled by the firmness of Elizabeth. Noways intimidated by the formidable spectacle, the Spanish governor wrote a touching letter to the British commanders, in which he adjured them not to add to the calamities which already overwhelmed the inhabitants, from an epidemic which carried off several hundreds of persons daily. They replied, that the town would not be attacked if the ships of war were delivered up ; and as this was not acceded to, preparations were made for landing the troops. But before they could debark, the accounts received of the yellow fever within its walls were so serious, that the British commanders justly apprehended that if the city were taken, the ulterior objects of the expedition might be frustrated by the effect of the contagion among the troops, and withdrew from the infected isle to the straits of Gibraltar.¹

But while the honour of the British arms was tarnished by the failure of such mighty forces on the western coast of Europe, an event of the utmost importance to the future progress of the maritime war occurred in the Mediterranean. Malta, which for above two years had been closely blockaded by the British forces by land and sea, began, in the course of this summer, to experience the pangs of hunger. Two frigates sailed from the harbour in the end of August with part of the garrison, one of which was speedily taken by the British cruisers. At length all their means of subsistence having been exhausted, a capitulation was entered into in the middle of September, in virtue of which the French were to be conveyed as prisoners of war, not to serve till regularly exchanged, to Marseilles ; and this noble fortress, embracing the finest harbour in the world within its impregnable walls, long the bulwark of Christendom against the Turks, and now the undisputed key to the Mediterranean, was permanently annexed to the British dominions.²

The hopes of the Imperial cabinet, in the event of a renewal of the war, were not a little founded on the hostile attitude of the south of Italy, to which, it was hoped, the arrival of the English expedition under Abercromby would give a certain degree of consistency. Pope Pius VI. had sunk under the hardships of his captivity in France, and died in March of this year. The choice of the

Roman Conclave, assembled, under the Imperial influence, at Venice, fell on the Cardinal Chiaramonte, who assumed the tiara, under the title of Pius VII. At the time when he ascended the Papal throne, the inhabitants of Rome were suffering severely under the exactions of the Neapolitans, and he wisely resolved to do his utmost to alleviate their misfortunes. Without, therefore, engaging openly in the war, he lent a willing ear to the propositions which the First Consul, who was extremely desirous of the support of the supreme pontiff, instantly made to him. But the other parts of Italy were in the most hostile state. A body of ten thousand Neapolitans had taken a position on the Tronto between the Upper Abruzzes and the March of Ancona; a Neapolitan division, under Count Roger de Damas, was in the Roman states; Piedmont, in consternation at the recent annexation of the Novarese territory to the Cisalpine republic, and the intolerable oppressions of the French armies, was in so agitated a state, that a spark might blow it into open combustion; while the peasants of Tuscany, in open insurrection to support the Imperial cause, presented a tumultuary array of seven or eight thousand men. These bands, it is true, were little formidable to regular troops in the field; but as long as they continued in arms, they required to be watched by detachments, which diminished the strength of the army; and it was one of the motives which induced Napoleon to accede to the prolongation of the armistice with Austria, that it would give him time, during its continuance, to clear his flank of these troublesome irregulars.¹

As the armistice, by a strange oversight, did not extend to the Italian powers, and the English expedition was detained in useless demonstrations on the coast of Spain, it was no difficult matter for the French troops to effect this object. General Sommariva, to whom the Grand Duke of Tuscany had entrusted the military forces of his estates, was rapidly proceeding with the organisation of the peasants in the Apennines, when Dupont, early in October, intimated to him, that unless the insurrection was forthwith disbanded, he would move against Tuscany with a formidable force. As this summons met with no attention, the French troops advanced in great strength,

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¹ Bot. iv. 40,
50. Dum v.
62, 63. Nap.
ii. 11. Jour.
xiv. 141, 142.

17.
The French
crush the
Tuscan
insurgents
with great
cruelty.

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Oct. 15.
Oct. 18.

in three columns. After a vain attempt to defend the Apennines, Florence was occupied on the 15th. The Austrians, under Sommariva, retreated towards Ancona, and the greater part of the insurgents retired to Arezzo, where they resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity. An attempt to force open the gates having failed, the French general Mounier made preparations for a general assault, which took place on the following morning at five o'clock. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of the French columns; the grenadiers mounted the scaling ladders amidst a shower of balls; quickly they made themselves masters of the ramparts, and chasing the unhappy peasants from house to house, and street to street, soon filled the town with conflagration and carnage. The slaughter was dreadful; a few escaped by subterraneous passages, and made good their flight into the country; others retired into the citadel, which was soon obliged to surrender at discretion, and was razed to the ground; but by far the greater number perished in the town, under the sword of an irritated and relentless victor.¹

¹ Bot. iv. 50,
55. Dum. v.
67, 68. Jom.
xiv. 144,
145. Nap.
ii. 18, 19.

18.
Leghorn is
seized, and
the English
merchan-
dise confis-
cated.

This bloody stroke proved fatal to the Tuscan insurrection. The fugitives, who escaped the carnage, spread far and wide the most dismal accounts of the fate of their unhappy comrades, and the peasants, thunderstruck by the rapidity and severity of the blow, lost no time in deprecating the wrath of an enemy who appeared irresistible. Sommariva, fettered by the armistice with Austria, retired entirely from the Tuscan states, and the inhabitants, left to their own means of defence, had no resource but in immediate submission. A strong division was immediately dispatched to Leghorn, which entered the place without opposition, and after the barbarous method of carrying on war now adopted by the First Consul, instantly confiscated the whole English property in the harbour and town. Forty-six vessels, with their cargoes, besides 750,000 quintals of wheat and barley, and 90,000 quintals of dried vegetables, were thus obtained for the use of the army, an acquisition of great importance to its future operations;² but one which, like all other ill-gotten gains, in the end recoiled upon the heads of those who acquired them, and contributed to rouse that deep and universal hatred at

² Dum. v. 69.
Nap. ii. 18.
Jom. xiv.
145, 146.

the French domination, which at length precipitated Napoleon from the throne.

At the same period the Swiss, whose divisions and democratic transports had exposed their country to the severities of Republican conquest, were doomed to drain to the dregs the cup of misery and humiliation. The shadow even of their independence vanished before the armed intervention of the First Consul. The numerous insurrections of the peasants against the enormous requisitions of the Republican agents; the obstinate resistance of the partisans of the ancient institutions; the general anarchy and dissolution of government which prevailed, loudly called for a remedy. Napoleon applied it, by causing his minister Reinhard to declare to the democratic despots who ruled the country, that he would recognise no authority but that of the executive commission to whom he transmitted his orders; a declaration which at once brought the whole country under the immediate sway of the central government at the Tuileries. The English in the course of this year made themselves masters of Surinam, Berbice, St Eustache, and Demerara, Dutch settlements on the mainland and in the islands of the West Indies. At the same time Napoleon published an edict, permanently incorporating the provinces acquired by the Republic on the left bank of the Rhine, and extending the French laws and institutions to these valuable acquisitions. Thus, while England was extending its mighty arms over both hemispheres, France was laying its iron grasp on the richest and most important provinces of Europe. The strife could not be other than for life or death, between two such powers.¹

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19.

Last remnant of Swiss independence destroyed. Incorporation of the Netherlands with France, and capture of Surinam and Demerara by the English.

¹ Dum. v.
24, 25, 71.

Such was the state of Europe when the armistice of Hoheulinden was denounced by the First Consul, and hostilities recommenced at all points in the end of November. Had the Aulic Council determined to remain on the defensive, no line was more capable of opposing an obstinate resistance to the invader than that of the Inn. That river, which does not yield to the Rhine either in the impetuosity or the volume of waters which it rolls towards the Danube, meanders in the Tyrol, as far as Kufstein, between inaccessible ridges of mountains, whose sides,

20.
Description of the line of the Inn
Nov. 28.

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darkened with pine forests, are surmounted by bare peaks occasionally streaked, even in the height of summer, with snow. From thence to Muhlendorf it flows in a deep bed, cut by the vehemence of the torrent through solid rock, whose sides present a series of perpendicular precipices on either bank, excepting only in a few well-known points, which were strongly guarded, and armed with cannon. This powerful line, supported on the left by the fortress of Kufstein, and on the right by that of Braunau, both of which were in a formidable state of defence, was flanked on either side by two immense bastions, equally menacing to an invading enemy; the one formed by the Tyrol, with its warlike and devoted population and inaccessible mountains, the other by Bohemia and the chain of the Bohmerwald, which skirts the Danube from Lintz to Straubing, where the Archduke Charles was organising a numerous body of forces.¹

¹ Personal observation. *Jom.* xiv. 73, 74. *Dum.* v. 82. *Nap.* ii. 27.

21.
Advantages of this position, and offensive movement of the Imperialists, with its object.

Had the Austrians, headed by the Archduke Charles, remained on the defensive in this strong position, it is probable that all the disasters of the campaign would have been avoided. It was next to impossible to force such a central line, defended by eighty thousand men, under the direction of that great commander; while to attempt to turn it, either by the Tyrol or Bohemia, would have been equally perilous. To detach thirty thousand men into the defiles leading into Bohemia would have been imminently hazardous, when so large a force threatened the centre of the invader; while a similar movement into the Tyrol, besides being attended with the same danger, would have incurred the hazard of being defeated by the Prince of Reuss, who occupied the impregnable passes and fortresses which guarded the entrance into that difficult country. But from these difficulties the French were relieved by the resolution of the Imperialists to cross the Inn, and carry the war vigorously into the heart of Bavaria; a project which might have led to victory if conducted by the experience and ability of the Archduke Charles, but which terminated in nothing but disaster in the hands of his brave but inexperienced successor. Although, however, the offensive movement of the Imperialists led to such calamitous results, it was skilfully combined, and promised in the outset the most brilliant

success. The Republican right, under Lecourbe, stretched through the Vorarlberg mountains to Feldkirch in the Tyrol; the centre, under Moreau in person, was in position at Ebersberg, on the high road leading from Munich to Haag; the left, commanded by Grenier, was stationed at Hohenlinden on the road to Muhldorf. The project of the Austrian general was to detach Klenau from Ratisbon towards Landshut, where he was to be joined by Keimayer with twenty thousand men; meanwhile the centre was to advance by *echelons* towards Hohenlinden, and throw the weight of their forces on the Republican left, where the least resistance might be expected.¹

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1. *Jom.* xiv.
78, 79.
Dum. v. 96,
97.

Hostilities were commenced by Augereau, who was at the head of the Gallo-Batavian army. He denounced the armistice four days before his colleagues, and advanced, at the head of twenty thousand men, from Frankfort by the course of the Maine towards Wurzburg. Though the Imperial forces in that quarter were nearly equal to his own, they opposed but a feeble resistance, from being composed chiefly of the troops recently levied in Bohemia and the states of Mayence, little calculated to resist the French veterans. After a slight combat, the Imperialists were repulsed at all points; the Baron Albini, after an ephemeral success at Aschaffenburg, was driven with loss out of that town and forced back to Schweinfurth, while Dumouçeau pushed on to Wurzburg, and summoned the garrison, which shut itself up in the citadel. The first effect of these disasters was to dissolve the insurrectionary troops of Mayence, under Albini, who never appeared again during the campaign. The Austrian general Simbschen, his forces being reduced by this defection to thirteen thousand men, took a position at Bourg-Eberach to cover Bamberg; he was there attacked on the following day by Augereau, and after an obstinate conflict, driven back to Pommersfeld. Satisfied with this success, the French general established his troops behind the Regnitz to await the fall of the citadel of Wurzburg, which Dumouçeau was beginning to besiege in regular form. These advantages were much more important upon the issue of the campaign than might have been supposed from the quality and numbers of the troops engaged;² for by clearing the extreme left of Moreau, they permitted him to draw his left

22.
Operations
on the
Lower
Rhine.
Nov. 24.

Dec. 3.

² Dum v 86,
95. Nap. ii.
23, 24.
Jom. xiv.
81, 85.

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23.

The Austrians advance into Bavaria, and Moreau at the same time pushes forward.
Nov. 27.

wing, under Sainte Suzanne, nearer to his centre, and reinforce the grand army on the Inn, in the precise quarter where it was menaced by the Imperialists.

Meanwhile, operations of the most decisive importance had taken place on the Inn. On the 27th November the Imperialists broke up to execute their intended concentration on the right towards Landshut; but the heavy rains which fell at that time retarded considerably the march of their columns; and it was not till the 29th that their advanced guard reached that place. At the same time Moreau concentrated his forces in the centre, and advanced by Haag towards Ampfing and Muhldorf. Fearful of continuing his flank movement in presence of a powerful enemy, who threatened to fall perpendicularly on his line of march, the Archduke John arrested his columns, and ran the hazard of a general battle on the direct road to Munich. They accordingly, on the 30th, retraced their steps, and moved through cross roads towards Ampfing and Dorfen. This lateral movement, performed amidst torrents of rain, and in dreadful roads, completed the exhaustion of the Austrian troops; but it led, in the first instance, to the most promising results. By a singular accident, Moreau had heard nothing of the advance of the Imperialists towards Landshut, far less of their cross movement to Ampfing; but some confused accounts had merely reached the Republican headquarters of considerable assemblages of the enemy towards Muhldorf; and the French general, desirous to explore his way, pushed forward strong reconnoitring parties in that direction. His right occupied Rosenheim, his left and centre were gradually approaching the Austrian columns by Haag and Wasserburg. The effect of this movement was to bring the Imperial army, sixty thousand strong, and massed together, perpendicularly against the left of the French, who, ignorant of their danger, were advancing in straggling and detached columns to discover where they were.¹

¹ Nap. ii. 30.
Jom. xiv. 85,
90. Dum. v.
100, 104, 105.

The effect of this state of things, and of the able manœuvre of the Archduke, speedily showed itself. The French army, turned and surprised, was exposed to be cut up in detail, while separated in a line of march, by an enemy drawn up in battle array on one of its flanks. Grenier, who was the first in advance, was leisurely

approaching Ampfing, when he was suddenly assailed by vast masses of the enemy, in admirable order and battle array. He was speedily thrown into confusion, and put to the rout. In vain Ney exerted all his talent and resolution to sustain the weight of the Imperial columns: his troops, after a brave resistance, were broken and driven back upon the division of Grandjean, and soon after that of Hardy, which advanced to its support, shared the same fate. At the same time Legrand, after a sharp conflict in the valley of the Issen, was constrained to retire to the neighbourhood of Dorfen. The Imperialists were every where successful. They had attacked, in compact and regular masses, the enemy's divisions while in march and separated, and spread alarm and discouragement from the general's tent to the sentinels' outposts. So far the most brilliant success had attended the Austrian advance, and if it had been vigorously followed up by a general capable of appreciating the immense advantages which it offered, and forcing back the enemy's retreating columns without intermission upon those which came up to their support, it might have led to the total defeat of the French army, and changed the whole fortune of the campaign. But the Archduke John, satisfied with this first advantage, allowed the enemy to recover from their consternation. On the following day no forward movement was made, and Moreau, skilfully availing himself of that respite, retired through the forest of HOHENLINDEN to the ground which he had originally occupied, and carefully studied as the probable theatre of a decisive conflict.¹

The space which lies between the Inn and the Iser, which is from twelve to fifteen leagues in breadth, is intersected in its centre by this forest, now celebrated not less in poetry than history.* Parallel to the course of the two rivers, its woods form a natural barrier or stockade, six or seven leagues long, and from a league to a league and a half broad. Two great roads only, that from Munich to Wasserburg and from Munich to Muhlendorf, traverse that thick and gloomy forest, where the pine-trees approach each other so closely, as in most places to render the passage of cavalry, or artillery, excepting on the great roads, impossible. The village of Hohenlinden is at the

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24.

Great success of the Austrians in the outset, and French retire to Hohenlinden.
Dec. 1.

Dec. 2.
1 Nap. ii. 39,
31. Dum. v.
104, 107, 108.
Jom. xiv. 90,
92.

25.
Description of the field of battle.

* The reader will recollect Mr Campbell's noble Ode to Hohenlinden.

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¹ Dum. v.
109, 110.
Personal ob-
servation.

entrance on the Munich side of the one defile, that of Matenpot at the mouth of that leading to Muhldorf. The village of Ebersberg forms the entrance of the other defile leading to Wasserburg. Between these two roads the broken and uneven surface of the forest is traversed only by country paths, almost impracticable during the storms of winter even to foot soldiers.¹

26.
Able plan
of Moreau.

Moreau with his staff had carefully reconnoitred this ground; and as soon as it became evident that the Archduke was to advance through its dangerous defiles, he prepared, with the art of a consummate general, to turn it to the best account. Rapidly concentrating his forces in the plain at the entrance of the defiles on the Munich side, he at the same time gave orders to Richepanse, with his division, to advance by the country roads across the forest, so as to fall, early on the morning of the 3d, perpendicularly on the line of the great chaussée from Hohenlinden to Muhldorf. He naturally anticipated that this movement would bring him on the flank of the Austrian centre, when entangled in the defile, with its long train of artillery and chariots; and that if the Republican force at the entrance of the pass could only maintain its ground till this side attack took place, the ruin of the whole column, or at least the capture of all its cannon, would be the result. To effect this object, he concentrated all the forces he could command at the mouth of the defile; but so unforeseen was the attack, that not above two-thirds of his army could take a part in the action; neither the right wing under Lecourbe, nor the half of the left, under Sainte Suzanne, could be expected to arrive so as to render any assistance.²

² Nap. ii. 31,
32. Jom.
xiv. 94, 96.
Dum. v. 111,
112. Mém.
du dépôt de
la Guerre,
v. 242.

27.
Battle of
Hohenlin-
den.
Dec. 3.

The Imperialists had committed the great error of allowing the surprised Republicans all the 2d to concentrate their scattered forces; but they did not on the following day repeat their mistake. Early on the morning of the 3d, a day ever memorable in the military annals of France, all their troops were in motion, and they plunged, in three great columns, into the forest to approach the enemy. The centre, forty thousand strong, advanced by the great road from Muhldorf to Munich, the only road which was practicable, in the dreadful state of the weather, for artillery; above a hundred pieces of cannon, and five

hundred chariots encumbered its movements. The infantry marched first; then came the long train of artillery and caissons; the cavalry closed the procession. The right wing, under the command of General Latour, consisting of twenty-five thousand men, followed the inferior road leading from Wasserburg to Munich; Keinmayer moved on the flank of that column, with his light troops, through the forest: while the left wing, under Riesch, was directed to proceed by a cross path by Albichen to St Christophe. The Imperial columns, animated by their success on the preceding days, joyfully commenced their march over the yet unstained snow two hours before it was daylight, deeming the enemy in full retreat, and little anticipating any resistance before their forces were united and disposed in battle array, in the open plain, on the Munich side of the forest.¹

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¹ Nap. ii. 33.
Mém. v. 251.
Dum. v. 114,
116. Jom.
xiv. 95, 97.

From the outset, however, the most sinister presages attended their steps. During the night the wind had changed; the heavy rain of the preceding days turned into snow, which fell, as at Eylau, in such thick flakes as to render it impossible to see twenty yards before the head of the column, while the dreary expanse of the forest presented, under the trees, a uniform white surface, on which it was impossible to distinguish the beaten track.* The cross-paths between the roads which the troops followed, bad at any time, were almost impassable in such a storm; and each body, isolated in the snowy wilderness, was left to its own resources, without either receiving intelligence or deriving assistance from the other. The central column, which advanced along the only good road, outstripped the others; and its head had traversed the forest, and approached Hohenlinden about nine o'clock. It was there met by the division of Grouchy, and a furious conflict immediately commenced; the Austrians endeavoured to debouche from the defile and extend themselves along the front of the wood, the French to coerce their movements and drive them back into the forest. Both parties made the most incredible efforts; the snow, which fell without interruption, prevented the opposing lines

28.
Dreadful
struggle at
the outlet
of the forest.

* "On Linden, when the sun was low,
All bloodless lay the untrodden snow;
And dark as winter was the flow
Of Iser rolling rapidly."

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

¹ Dum. v.
117, 118.
Jom. xiv. 96,
97. Mém. v.
260, 267.
Nap. ii. 32,
33.

Decisive
flank move-
ment of
Richepanse.

from seeing each other ; but they aimed at the flash which appeared through the gloom, and rushed forward with blind fury to the deadly charge of the bayonet. Insensibly, however, the Austrians gained ground ; their ranks were gradually extending in front of the wood, when Generals Grouchy and Grandjean put themselves at the head of fresh battalions, and by a decisive charge drove them back into the forest. The Imperial lines were broken by the trees, but still they resisted bravely in the entangled thickets ; posted behind the trunks, they kept up a murderous fire on the enemy ; and the contending armies, broken into single file, fought, man to man, with invincible resolution.¹*

While this desperate conflict was going on in front of Hohenlinden, the leading ranks of the Austrian right began to appear at the entrance of the forest on the other road. Ney instantly repaired with his division to the scene of danger, and by a vigorous charge on the flank of the enemy's column, which was in the act of deploying, not only drove it back into the wood, but captured eight pieces of cannon, and a thousand prisoners. The effect of these vigorous efforts on the part of Moreau, in preventing the deploying of the heads of the Imperial columns from the forest, was to introduce vacillation and confusion into the long train in their centre, which, unable to advance from the combat in its front, and pressed on by the crowd in its rear, soon began to fall into confusion. They were in this state, jammed up amidst long files of cannon and waggons, when the division of Richepanse, which had broken up early in the morning from Ebersberg, on the Munich side of the one defile, and struggled on with invincible resolution through dreadful roads across the forest, arrived in the neighbourhood of Matenpot, on the Muhldorf side of the other, directly in the rear of the centre of the Austrian army, and at the close of its protracted array. But just as it was approaching this decisive point, and slowly advancing in open column through the forest, this division was itself pierced through the centre, near St Christophe, by the Austrian left wing under

* " 'Tis morn;—but scarce yon level sun
Can pierce the war-clouds, rolling dun,
Where fiery Frank and furious Hun
Shout in their sulphurous canopy!"

Riesch, which, moving up by the valley of Albichen, to gain the chaussée of Wasserburg, by which it was destined to pierce through the forest, fell perpendicularly on its line of march. Thus Richepanse, with half his division, found himself irretrievably separated from the remainder; the manœuvre which he was destined to have performed on the centre of the Imperialists was turned against himself, and with a single brigade he was placed between that immense body and their left wing. An ordinary general, in such alarming circumstances, would have sought safety in flight, and thus, by allowing the Imperial centre to continue its advance, endangered the victory; but Richepanse, whose able mind was penetrated with the importance of his mission, bravely resolved to push on with the single brigade which remained under his command, and fall on the rear of the grand column of the enemy. He sent orders, therefore, to his separated brigade to maintain itself to the last extremity at St Christophe, and advanced himself with half his men, with the utmost intrepidity, towards Matenpot and the line of march of the grand Austrian column.¹

¹ Nap. ii. 34,
35. ~~Don.~~
xiv. 97, 99.
Dum. v. 118,
120. Mém.
v. 270, 274.
Ney, ii. 48,
57.

When the French troops approached the great road, they came upon the cuirassiers of Lichtenstein who formed part of that vast body, who had dismounted, and were reposing leisurely under the trees until the great park of artillery and the reserves of Kollowarth had passed the defile. It may easily be imagined with what astonishment they beheld this new enemy on their flank, who was the more unexpected, as they knew that their left wing, under Riesch, had passed through the forest, and they deemed themselves perfectly secure on that side. They made, in consequence, little resistance, and were speedily driven off the chaussée. Not content with this success, Richepanse left to his cavalry the charge of keeping off the Imperial cuirassiers, and advanced himself with the two remaining regiments of infantry to attack the rear of the Imperial centre in the forest of Hohenlinden. The appearance of this force, amounting to nearly three thousand men, behind them, excited the utmost alarm in the Austrian column. The troops of that nation are proverbially more sensitive than any in Europe to the danger of being turned when in a line of march. A brigade of the Bavarian reserve

30.
The Austrian line of communication is intercepted.

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

¹ Nap. ii. 35,
36. Jom.
xiv. 99, 100.
Dum. v. 121,
122.

31.
Able mea-
sures of
Moreau to
profit by it.

was speedily directed to the menaced point, but it was overwhelmed in its advance by the crowds of fugitives, and thrown into such disorder by the overturned cannon and caissons which blocked up the road, that it never reached the enemy. Three Hungarian battalions were next brought up; but after resisting bravely, amidst the general consternation around them, they too at length were broken and fled. This little action decided the victory; the whole Austrian artillery lay exposed to the attacks of the victor in a situation where, from being jammed together in a thick forest, it was incapable of making any resistance.¹

Moreau, at the entrance of the defile in front of Hohenlinden, was still maintaining an anxious conflict, when the sound of cannon in the direction of Matenpot, and the appearance of hesitation and confusion in the enemy's columns, announced that the decisive attack in the chaussée behind them, by Richepanse, had taken place. He instantly directed Grouchy and Ney to make a combined charge in front on the enemy. The French battalions, which had so long maintained an obstinate defence, now commenced a furious onset, and the Austrian centre, shaken by the alarm in its rear, was violently assailed in front. The combined effort was irresistible. Ney, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, pressed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, along the chaussée, until the loud shouts of the troops announced that they had come into co-operation with the victorious Richepanse, who was advancing along the same road to meet him, as fast as its innumerable encumbrances would permit. No words can paint the confusion which now ensued in the Austrian columns. The artillery-drivers cut their traces, and galloped in all directions into the forest; the infantry disbanded and fled; the cavalry rushed in tumultuous squadrons to the rear, trampling under foot whatever opposed their passage; the waggons were abandoned to their fate, and, amidst the universal wreck, 97 pieces of cannon, 300 caissons, and 7000 prisoners fell into the enemy's hands.²

² Jom. xiv.
99, 101.
Mém. v. 272,
284 Dum.
v. 121, 124.
Nap. ii. 36,
37.

While this decisive success was gained in the centre, the columns of Latour and Keimayer, who had succeeded in debouching from the forest and united in the plain on its other side, violently assailed the Republican left, where

Grenier, with inferior forces, defended the other road to Munich. Notwithstanding all his efforts, and the assistance of a part of the division of Ney, he was sensibly losing ground, when the intelligence of the defeat of the centre compelled the enemy to abandon his advantages, and retire precipitately into the forest. Grenier instantly resumed the offensive, and by a general charge of all his forces, succeeded in overwhelming the Austrians while struggling through the defile, and taking six pieces of cannon and fifteen hundred prisoners. At the same time, General Decaen, with a fresh brigade, disengaged the half of Richepanse's division, cut off during his advance, which was hard pressed between General Riesch's corps, and the retiring columns of the centre, who still preserved their ranks. Before night, the Republicans, at all points, had passed the forest. Four of their divisions were assembled at Matenpot, and the headquarters were advanced to Haag, while the Imperialists, weakened by the loss of above an hundred pieces of cannon and fourteen thousand soldiers, took advantage of the night to withdraw their shattered forces across the Inn.¹

Such was the great and memorable battle of Hohenlinden, the most decisive, with the exception of that of Rivoli, which had yet been gained by either party during the war, and superior even to that renowned conflict in the trophies by which it was graced, and the immense consequences by which it was followed. The loss of the French on that and the preceding days was nine thousand men; but that of the Imperialists was nearly twice as great when the deserters and missing were taken into account: they lost two-thirds of their artillery, and the moral consequences of the defeat were fatal to the campaign. The victory of Marengo itself was less momentous in its military consequences. It merely gave the Republicans possession of the Sardinian fortresses and the Cisalpine republic; but the disaster of Hohenlinden threw the army of Germany without resource on the Hereditary States, and at once prostrated the strength of the monarchy. Common justice must award to Moreau the merit of skilful combination, and admirable use of the advantages of ground in this great victory; but it is at the same time manifest that he owed much to chance, and that fortune converted a well-

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32.
Great victory gained by the French.

1 Nap. ii. 36,
37. Dum. v.
127, 128.
Journ. xiv.
101, 105.
Mém. v. 280,
285.

33.
Its prodigious consequences, and merit of Moreau in gaining it.

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XXXII.
1800.

conceived plan of defence into a decisive offensive movement. The whole arrangements of the French general were defensive ; he merely wished to gain time, in order to enable his right and left wings, under Lecourbe and Sainte Suzanne, to arrive and take a part in the action. By the movements on the previous days, he was so far out-generaled, that, though his army on the whole was greatly superior to that of his opponents, he was obliged to fight at Ampfing with an inferiority of one to two, and at Hohenlinden on equal terms. The movement of General Richepanse, however well conceived to retard or prevent the passage of the forest by the Austrian army, could not have been reckoned upon as likely to produce decisive success ; for if he had advanced half an hour later, or if Riesch's column, which it should have done according to the Austrian disposition, had arrived half an hour sooner, he would have fallen into the midst of superior forces, and both his division and that of Decaen, which followed his footsteps, would probably have perished. The imprudence of the Austrians in engaging in these perilous defiles in presence of the enemy's army, and not arranging matters so that all their columns might reach the enemy at the same time, undoubtedly was the principal cause of the disaster which followed ; but although Moreau's arrangements were such as would probably at all events have secured for him the victory, it was the fortunate accidents which occurred during the action which rendered it so decisive.¹*

¹ Jom. xiv.
106, 107.
Dum. v. 129.
Nap. ii. 52,
54, 131.

34. .
The Austrians retire behind the Inn.

Thunderstruck by this great disaster, the whole Imperial army retired behind the Inn, and made a show of maintaining itself on that formidable line of defence. But it was but a show. From the first the disposition of its columns, disposed in part in *echelon* along the road to Salzburg, indicated an intention of retreating in that direction. After maturely weighing all the circumstances of the case, Moreau resolved to force the passage of the Upper Inn,

* Napoleon's observations on this battle, and the whole campaign of Moreau, have been here adopted only in so far as they appear to be consonant to reason and justice. They are distinguished by his usual ability, but strongly tinged by that envenomed feeling towards his great rival which formed so marked a feature of his character. Jealousy towards every one who had either essentially injured or rivalled his reputation, and a total disregard of truth when recounting their operations, are two of the defects in so great a man, upon which it is at once the most necessary and the most painful duty of the historian to dwell.

on the road to Salzburg; but in order to deceive the enemy, he caused all the boats on the Iser to be assembled at Munich, collected the bulk of his forces in that direction, and gave out that he was about to cross the lower part of the river. By adopting this line of advance, the French general had the prospect of cutting off the Imperialists from their left wing, hitherto untouched, in the Tyrol; menacing upper Austria and Vienna, and endangering the retreat of Bellegarde from the plains of Italy. These advantages were so important, that they overbalanced the obvious difficulties of the advance in that direction, arising from the necessity of crossing three mountain streams, the Inn, the Alza, and the Salza, and the obstacles that might be thrown in his way from the strength of the mountain ridges in the neighbourhood of Salzburg.¹

While the boats of the Iser were publicly conducted, with the utmost possible *éclat*, to the lower Inn, Lecourbe caused a bridge equipage to be secretly transported in the night to Rosenheim, on the road to Salzburg, and having collected thirty-five thousand men in the neighbourhood, established a battery of twenty-eight pieces during the night of the 8th December at Neuperen, where the Inn flows in a narrow channel, and which is the only point in that quarter where the right bank is commanded by the left. At six o'clock on the following morning, while it was still pitch-dark, the French cannon, whose arrival was wholly unknown to the Austrian videttes, opened a furious fire, so well directed that the Imperialists were obliged to retire; and the Republicans instantly constructed a bridge, and threw across so strong a body of troops as gave them a solid footing on the left bank. At the same time a battery was placed in front of the bridge at Rosenheim, in order to prevent the burning of the remaining arches of that wooden structure, of which one only had been destroyed; but the corps of the Prince of Condé, which was stationed on the opposite bank, faithfully discharged its duty, and the whole was soon consumed. In consequence of this circumstance, Lecourbe's troops were obliged to make a circuit by the passage at Neuperen, but so dilatory were the movements of the Imperialists, that no sufficient force could be collected to oppose their progress; a second bridge of boats was constructed near Rosenheim, by which

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¹ *Jom.* xiv.
111, 112.
Dum. v. 133,
134, 135.

35.
Skillful
manœuvre
by which the
passage of
that river
was effected
by Moreau.

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Richepanse's division was passed over, and the Austrians, abandoning the whole line of the Upper Inn, retired behind the Salza. Thus was one of the most formidable military lines in Europe broken through in the space of a few hours, without the loss of a single man. This extraordinary success was chiefly owing to the Imperialists having been led, by the demonstrations of Moreau against the Lower Inn, to concentrate the right wing of their army, which had suffered least in the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden, in that quarter, which removed it three or four marches from the scene where the real attack was made. No sooner did they receive intelligence of the passage of Lecourbe over the Upper Inn, than they hastily moved all their disposable troops towards the menaced point; but finding that the enemy were established on the right bank in too great force to be dislodged, they fell back on all sides, and abandoning the whole line of the Inn, concentrated their army behind the Alza, between Altenmarkt and the lake of Sine, to cover the roads to Salzburg and Vienna.

¹ Jom. xiv.
112, 116.
Dum. v. 134,
141, 143
Nap. ii. 38.
39.

36.
Rapid ad-
vance of the
French to-
wards Salz-
burg.

Dec. 12.

Moreau, conceiving with reason that the spirit of the Austrian army must be severely weakened by such a succession of disasters, resolved to push his advantages to the utmost. The Austrians now experienced the ruinous consequences attending the system of extending themselves over a vast line in equal force throughout, which, since the commencement of the war, they had so obstinately followed. They found themselves unable to arrest the march of the victor at any point, and by the rapid advance of Lecourbe were irrecoverably separated from their left wing in the Tyrol. Moreau having resolved not to allow them to establish themselves in a solid manner behind the Salza, pushed rapidly forward across the Achen and the Traun to Salzburg. He experienced no considerable opposition till he reached the neighbourhood of that town, but when Lecourbe, with the advanced guard, approached the Saal, he found the bulk of the Austrian army, thirty thousand strong, including ten thousand cavalry, posted in a strong position covering the approach to Salzburg. Its front was covered by the Saal, the rapid course of which offered no inconsiderable obstacle to an attacking force; its right rested on inaccessible rocks, and its left was protected by the confluence of the Saal and the Salza.² But this position,

² Jom. xiv.
115, 116.
Dum. v. 195,
197. Nap.
ii. 30, 40.

how strong soever, had its dangers ; it was liable to be turned by a passage of the Salza, effected below the town between Lauffen and Salzburg, in which case the army ran the risk of being cut off from Vienna, or thrown back in disorder upon the two bridges of boats which preserved its communication with the right bank of the river.

Lecourbe commenced the attack with his accustomed vigour ; Gudin carried the village of Salzburghoffen, and made six hundred prisoners ; but Montrichard was so

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rudely handled by the Imperial cavalry, that he was driven back in disorder, with the loss of five hundred men. This success, however, was of little avail, for Moreau ordered Decaen to cross the Salza at Lauffen, an operation which was most successfully performed. While the attention of the Imperialists was drawn to the broken arches of the bridge by a violent cannonade, this able general directed four hundred chosen troops to a point a little lower down, who, undeterred by the violence and cold of the winter torrent, threw themselves into the stream, swam across, and made themselves masters of some boats on the opposite side, by the aid of which the passage was speedily effected. Moreau was no sooner informed of this success, than he pushed Richepanse, with two fresh divisions, across at this place, and advanced against Salzburg by the right bank. Encouraged by this support, Lecourbe, on the day following, renewed his attack on the Austrian

37.
Defeat of
the French
at Salzburg.
Dec. 13.

rearguard, commanded by the Archduke John in person, posted in front of Salzburg. His troops advanced in two columns, one by the road of Reichenthal, the other formed in front of Vaul ; a thick fog covered the ground, and the French tirailleurs advanced inconsiderately to the attack, deeming the Austrians in full retreat, and desirous of having the honour of first reaching Salzburg. They were received by the fire of thirty pieces of cannon, whose discharges soon dissipated the mist, and discovered two formidable lines of cavalry drawn up in battle array. Lecourbe brought up his horse ; but they were overwhelmed by the first line of the Imperial cavalry, which broke into a splendid charge when the Republicans approached their position.¹ Lecourbe, finding himself unequal to the task of opposing such formidable forces, drew back his wings behind the Saal, and posted his infantry in the rear of the

Dec. 14.

¹ Nap. ii. 40,
41. Jom.
xiv. 116, 120.
Dum. v. 193,
206.

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village of Vaal. He there maintained himself with difficulty till the approach of night, glad to purchase his safety by the loss of two thousand men left on the field of battle.

38.
But the Imperialists are nevertheless obliged to retire, and Moreau pushes on towards Vienna.

Had it not been for the passage of the river at Lauffen, this brilliant achievement might have been attended with important consequences; but that disastrous circumstance rendered the position at Salzburg no longer tenable. Moreau, at the head of twenty thousand men, was rapidly advancing up the right bank, and the Archduke John, unable to oppose such superior forces, was compelled to retire during the night, leaving that important town to its fate. Decaen, with the advanced guard of Moreau, took possession of Salzburg, without opposition, on the following morning, and the Republican standards for the first time waved on the picturesque towers of that romantic city. The occupation of Salzburg, and the abandonment of the line of the Salza, decided the fate of the monarchy. The shattered remains of the grand army, which had failed to maintain the formidable lines of two such rivers, broken in numbers, subdued in spirit, were unable thereafter to make any head against a numerous enemy, flushed with victory, and conducted with consummate military skill. Emboldened by the unexpected facility with which he had passed these considerable rivers, Moreau resolved to give the enemy no time to recover from his consternation, but to push on at once towards Vienna, and decide the war in the centre of the Hereditary States, before the other French armies had begun seriously to skirmish on the frontier. He disquieted himself little about the forces in the Tyrol, deeming the troops in that province sufficiently occupied with the invasion of Lombardy by Brune, and the march of Macdonald through the Grisons, which shall immediately be noticed. Satisfied with the precautions, therefore, of leaving on the right small bodies as he advanced, to mask the principal passes into that mountainous region, and on the left of detaching Sainte Suzanne with his wing to watch the motions of Klenau, who was threatening the Gallo-Batavian army at Wurzburg, he himself pushed on with his whole centre and right wing in pursuit of the enemy.¹

Richepanse, who conducted his advanced guard, marched

¹ Jom. xiv.
121, 123.
Dum. v. 200,
207, 208.
Nap. ii. 40.

with so much expedition, that he came up with the Austrian rear at Herdorf. Notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, who the day before had marched twelve leagues, he attacked the enemy at daybreak, routed them, and made a thousand prisoners. The two following days were a continued running fight; the Austrians retired, combating all the way, to Schwanstadt. This indefatigable leader was closely followed by Decaen and Grouchy, who came up to his support the moment that any serious resistance arrested his column; while Lecourbe, at the head of the other wing of the invading army, advanced by the mountain road, in order to turn the streams where they were easily fordable, and constantly menace the left flank of the enemy. In front of Schwanstadt the Imperialists made an effort to arrest this terrible advanced guard. Three thousand cavalry, supported by rocky thickets, lined with tirailleurs on either flank, stood firm, and awaited the onset of the Republicans; but these were now in a state of exultation which nothing could resist. The infantry advanced to within three hundred paces of that formidable mass of cavalry, without noticing the tirailleurs, who rattled incessantly on either flank, and then, breaking into a charge, approached the horse with levelled bayonets with so much resolution, that the Austrian dragoons broke and fled, and nearly a thousand men were killed or made prisoners. On the following day, a scene of dreadful confusion ensued, when the Imperial rearguard crossed the Traun. A column of twelve hundred men, under Prince Lichtenstein, stationed in front of the town of Lambach, where the passage was going forward, made such a heroic resistance as gave time to the greater part of the cannon and baggage to defile over the bridge; but at length they fell a victim to their devotion, and were almost all slain or made prisoners. Immediately the whole remaining Imperialists who had not passed fled towards the defile: they were rapidly followed by the Republicans. A scene of indescribable horror ensued: in the *mêlée* of fugitives, carriages, and trampling squadrons, the arches were fired, and multitudes threw themselves into the stream; but such was the resolution of the French grenadiers, that, regardless alike of the flames and the discharges of grape from the opposite bank, they rushed across;¹ by

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39.

Great suc-
cesses
gained by
his advanc-
ed guard.
Dec. 16.
Dec. 17 and
18.

Dec. 19.

¹ Nap. ii. 40,
41. Dum. v.
208, 214.
Jom. xiv.
125, 128.

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40.

The Arch-
duke
Charles
joins the
army, but
cannot
arrest the
disasters.
Dec. 19.

their exertions the bridge was preserved from destruction, and was speedily passed by the triumphant French battalions.

Affairs were in this disastrous state when the Archduke Charles, whom the unanimous cries of the nation had called to the post of danger, as the only means left of saving the monarchy, arrived and took the command of the army. The presence of that distinguished leader, who brought with him a few battalions, for a little revived the spirits of the soldiers; but that gleam was of short duration. He had flattered himself that he would be able to arrest the progress of the enemy in Upper Austria while Klenau made a diversion on the side of Bohemia, and Hiller on that of the Tyrol, so as to menace his communications in Bavaria and Swabia. But the appearance of the army, as it crossed the Traun, rendered it evident to his experienced eye that it was too late to calculate on the success of these movements. Instead of the proud battalions whom he had led to victory at Stockach and Zurich, the Archduke beheld only a confused mass of infantry, cavalry, and artillery covering the roads; the bands of discipline were broken; the soldiers neither grouped round their colours nor listened to the voice of their officers; dejection and despair were painted in every countenance. Even the sight of their beloved chief, the saviour of Germany, could hardly induce the attenuated veterans to lift their eyes from the ground. He saw that it was too late to remedy the disorder, but still he bravely resolved to do his utmost to arrest it, and rather give battle under the walls of Vienna, than purchase, by an ignominious peace, the retreat of the conqueror.¹

The spirits of the troops, revived for a moment by the arrival of their favourite leader, were irretrievably damped by the continuance of the retreat, after the passage of the Traun, to Steyer. The Archduke gave the most pressing orders to hasten the advance of the Hungarian insurrection, and urge forward the armaments in the capital; but in the midst of these energetic measures, the rout of the rearguard under Prince Schwartzemberg, who was overwhelmed at Kremsmunster on the Steyer, with the loss of twelve hundred men, gave him melancholy proof that the troops were so completely dejected,² that no reliance could

¹ Jom. xiv.
129. Dum.
v 217, 218.

41
An armis-
tice is
agreed to.
Dec. 20.

Dec. 21.
² Dum. v.
221, 222.
Nap. ii. 41,
42. Jom.
xiv. 130, 131.

be placed on their exertions. Penetrated with grief at this disaster, he dispatched a messenger to Moreau, soliciting an armistice, which, after some hesitation, was signed on the 25th by the French general, and repose given to the troops, worn out by a month's incessant marching and misfortunes.

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To complete the picture of the memorable campaign of 1800 in Germany, it only remains to notice the concluding operations of the Gallo-Batavian army on the Maine. After the action at Bourg-Eberach and the investment of the citadel of Wurzburg, Augereau endeavoured to put himself in communication with the grand army under Moreau. His situation became critical, when the advance of that army after the battle of Hohenlinden left him entirely to his own resources; and it was rendered doubly so by the approach of Klenau with ten thousand regular Austrian troops on his right flank, while Simbschen with twelve thousand troops menaced his left. The danger soon became pressing; a division of his troops was attacked on the 18th in front of Nuremberg by Klenau, and after a gallant resistance, forced to retreat; while his left with difficulty maintained itself against Simbschen. Disconcerted by these simultaneous attacks, the French general on the two following days retired behind the Rednitz. On the 21st he was again attacked and defeated at Neu-kerchen by the united Imperial generals; but they were unable to follow up their advantages, from having received orders on the night of their victory to retire to Bohemia, in order to succour the heart of the monarchy, now violently assailed by the enemy. They were in the course of executing these orders, when the armistice of Steyer put a period to their operations. Thus the Republican army, in a short campaign of little more than three weeks, in the middle of winter, and in the most severe weather, marched ninety leagues; crossed three considerable rivers in presence of the enemy; made twenty thousand prisoners; killed, wounded, or dispersed as many; captured 150 pieces of cannon, 400 caissons, and 4000 carriages; and never halted till its advanced guard, arrested by an armistice, was within twenty leagues of Vienna.¹ Such results require no eulogium; the annals of war have few such triumphs

42.
Operations
of the army
on the
Maine.

Dec. 18.

Dec. 21.

¹ Jom. xiv.
137, 139.
Nap. ii 25,
26. Dum. v.
229, 241.

CHAP. to recount, and they deservedly placed Moreau in the very
XXXII. highest rank of the captains of the eighteenth century.

1800.

43.
Operations
in the Gri-
sons, and
designs of
Napoleon
there.

While these great events were in progress in Germany, operations, inferior, indeed, in magnitude, but equal in the heroism with which they were conducted, and superior in the romantic interest with which they were attended, took place in the snowy amphitheatre of the Alps. It has been already noticed, that the second army of reserve, consisting of fifteen thousand men, was moved forward in October to the valley of the Rhine in the Grisons; and that it was destined to menace the rear of the Imperial army on the *Mincio*, while Brune attacked it in front. This auxiliary corps would probably have rendered more essential service, if it had been directed to the grand army of Moreau, which was destined to operate in the valley of the Danube, the true avenue to the Austrian states; but such a disposition would ill have accorded with the views of the First Consul, who was little anxious to put a preponderating force, so near their frontier, into the hands of a dreaded rival, and destined for himself the principal part in the campaign, with the troops which he was to lead by the *Noric Alps* to Vienna. Independently of this secret feeling, which undoubtedly had its weight, Napoleon was misled by the great results of the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, and the paralysing effect of the march of the army of reserve across the *St Bernard* in the present year. He conceived that Italy was the theatre where the decisive events were to take place, and had yet to learn the superior importance of the valley of the Danube, in which he himself on future occasions was destined to strike such redoubtable blows. It is fortunate for the historian that this destination of *Macdonald's* corps took place, as it brought to light the intrepidity and heroism of that gallant officer, of whose descent Scotland has so much reason to be proud; while it led to the interesting episode of the passage of the *Splugen*, perhaps the most wonderful achievement of modern war, and which has been portrayed by one of its ablest leaders, with the fidelity of *Xenophon*, and the pencil of *Livy*.^{1*}

¹ *Jom.* xiv.
64. *Arch.* i.
264. *Nap.*
ii. 61.

* Count *Mathieu Dumas*, author of the great military history of France,

The army of Macdonald, which was announced to consist of forty thousand men, and was furnished with staff and other appointments adequate to that number, in reality amounted only to fifteen thousand troops. Macdonald no sooner discovered this great deficiency, than he made the most urgent representations to the First Consul, and requested that the chosen reserve of ten thousand men, which Murat was leading from the camp at Amiens to the plains of Italy, should be put under his orders. But Napoleon, who intended this corps in the Alps to operate on the campaign, more by the apprehensions it excited among the Imperialists than by its actual achievements in the field, refused to change the destination of Murat's division, and it continued its route for the banks of the Mincio. He still believed that the frontier of the Inn would sufficiently cover the Hereditary States on that side, and that it was by accumulating ninety thousand men in the Southern Tyrol and Italy, that the decisive blow against the Austrian power was to be struck. The command of this great army, destined to dictate peace under the walls of Vienna, he ultimately designed for himself.¹

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

44.
Macdonald's
army there.

¹ Dum. v.
148, 149.
Nap. ii. 61.

Of all the passages from Switzerland to Italy, there was none which presented more serious natural obstacles, and was more carefully guarded by the enemy, than that which leads over the Splügen into the Italian Tyrol. It is first necessary to pass from the valley of the Rhine, near its source, over the Splügen into that of the Adda, which descends in a rapid course from the Julian Alps to Chiavenna and the lake of Como; from thence, if an advance to the eastward is required, the Col Apriga, a steep ridge entangled with wood and lofty chestnuts, must be surmounted, which brings the traveller into the valley of the Oglio; between which and the stream of the Adige there is interposed the rugged ridge of the Monte Tonal, the snowy summit of which was occupied and had been carefully fortified by the Austrian troops. Macdonald no sooner was made acquainted with these obstacles, than he dispatched his chief of the staff, General Mathieu Dumas,

45.
Description
of the road
over the
Splügen.

from 1799 to the peace of Tilsit, to which this work has been so largely indebted.

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

¹ Dum. v.
153, 154.
Personal ob-
servation.

46.
Napoleon's
design for
the passage
of that
mountain.

² Dum. v.
153, 154.

47.
Prepara-
tions of
Macdonald
for crossing
the Splugen.

to lay before the First Consul an account of the almost insuperable difficulties which opposed his progress. No man could be better qualified than the officer whose graphic pencil has so well described, the passage to discharge this delicate mission; for he was equally competent to appreciate the military projects of the general-in-chief, and to portray the physical obstructions which opposed their execution.¹

Napoleon listened attentively to his statement; interrogated him minutely on the force and positions of Hiller's corps, and the divisions of Laudon, Davidowich, and Wukassowich, which were stationed near the head of the valleys which in that part of the Alps separate Italy from Germany; and then replied, "We will wrest from them without a combat that immense fortress of the Tyrol; we must manœuvre on their flanks: menace their last line of retreat, and they will immediately evacuate all the upper valleys. I will make no change in my dispositions. Return quickly; tell Macdonald that an army can always pass, in every season, *where two men can place their feet*. It is indispensable that, in fifteen days after the commencement of hostilities, the army of the Grisons should have seen the sources of the Adda, the Oglio, and the Adige; that it should have opened its fire on the Monte Tonal which separates them; and that, having descended to Trent, it should form the left wing of the army of Italy, and threaten, in concert with the troops on the Mincio, the rear of Bellegarde's army. I shall take care to forward to it the necessary reinforcements; it is not by the numerical force of an army, but by its destination and the importance of its operations, that I estimate the merit due to its commander."²

Having received these verbal instructions, Macdonald prepared, with the devotion of a good soldier, to obey his commands. His troops advanced the moment the armistice was denounced, into the upper Rheinthal, and concentrated between Coire and Tosis, at the entrance of the celebrated defile of the Via Mala, which is the commencement of the ascent of the Splugen, while, at the same time, to distract the enemy, and conceal his real designs, demonstrations were made towards Feldkirch, as if it was intend-

ed to break into the Tyrol in that quarter. A few days were spent at Tüsis in organising the army, and making the necessary preparations for the formidable undertaking which awaited them, of crossing in the depth of winter the snowy summits of the mountains. All the artillery was dismounted and placed on sledges constructed in the country, to which oxen were harnessed; the artillery ammunition was divided, and placed on the backs of mules, and in addition to his ordinary arms, ball cartridge and knapsack, every soldier received five days' provisions, and five packets of cartridges to bear on his shoulders over the rugged ascent. Had he lived to see the French infantry preparing, in the middle of December, under the weight of these enormous burdens, to cross the snow-clad ridges of the Rhetian Alps, by paths hardly accessible at that season to the mountaineers of the country, the eloquent historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire would have expunged from his immortal work the reflection on the comparative hardihood of ancient and modern times.¹

Tüsis is situated at the confluence of the Albula and the Rhine, at the foot of a range of pine-clad cliffs of great elevation, which run across the valley, and in former times had formed a barrier, creating a lake in the valley of Schams, a few miles further up its course. Through this enormous mass, three or four miles broad, the Rhine has, in the course of ages, forced its way in a narrow bed, seldom more than thirty or forty, sometimes not more than eight or ten yards broad, shut in on either side by stupendous cliffs which rise to the height of two or three thousand feet above its rocky channel. The road conducted along the side of these perpendicular precipices, repeatedly crosses the stream by stone bridges, of a single arch, thrown from one cliff to the other, at the height of three or four hundred feet above the raging torrent. Innumerable cascades descend from these lofty precipices, and are conducted in subterraneous channels under the road, or lost in the sable forests of pine which clothe their feet. Impetuous as the Rhine is in this extraordinary channel, the roar of its waters is scarcely heard at the immense elevation above it at which the bridges are placed.² The darkness of the

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

¹ Dum. v.
154, 161.
See Gibbon,
chap. i.
Jom. xiv.
146, 147.

48.
Description
of the pas-
sage of the
Via Mala.

² Personal
observation.
Dum. v. 151.
Ebel. Art.
Via Mala.

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

road, overshadowed by primeval pines of gigantic stature, conducted through galleries cut out of the solid rock, or on arches thrown over the awful abyss; the solitude and solemnity of the impenetrable forests around, the stupendous precipices above and beneath, which make the passenger feel as if he were suspended in middle air, conspire to render this pass the most extraordinary and sublime in the whole amphitheatre of the central Alps.*

49.
And of the
Splügen
mountain.

Emerging from this gloomy defile, the road traverses for two leagues the open and smiling valley of Schams; it next ascends by a winding course the pine-clad cliffs of La Rofia, and at length reaches in a narrow and desolate pastoral valley the village of Splügen, situated at the foot of the ascent of the mountain of the same name. Here the road, leaving the waters of the Rhine, which descend cold and clear from the glaciers of the Hinter Rhin, turns sharp to the left hand, and ascends a lateral valley as far as its upper extremity, when it emerges upon the bare face of the mountain above the region of wood, and by a painful ascent, often of forty-five degrees elevation reaches the summit in an hour and a half. This description applies to the old road as it stood in 1800. The new road, over the same ground, is wound gradually up the ascent, with that admirable skill which has rendered the works of the French and Italian engineers in the Alps the object of deserved admiration to the whole civilised world. The wearied traveller then beholds with joy the waters flowing towards the Italian streams, in a narrow plain about four hundred yards broad, situated between two glaciers at the base of overhanging mountains of snow. From thence to Isola, on the Italian side of the declivity, is a descent of two leagues, conducted in many places down zig-zag slopes, attended with great danger.¹ On the right, for several miles, is a continued precipice, or rocky descent, in many places three

¹ Dum. v.
164, 165.
Personal ob-
servation.

* The defile of the Via Malais not so celebrated as its matchless features deserve; but the admirable road which is now conducted through its romantic cliffs, and over the Splügen, must ultimately bring it into more general notice. It exceeds in sublimity and horror any scene in the Alps. There is no single pass in the Simplon, Mont Cenis, the Great St Bernard, the Little St Bernard, the St Gothard, the Bernhardt, the Brenner, or the Col di Tende, which can stand in comparison with it. It approaches more nearly to the savage character of the Breach of Roland, or the Circle of Gabarnie in the Pyrenees, but exceeds in stupendous features either of these extraordinary scenes.

or four hundred feet deep, which bears the name of the slopes of the Cardinal, while, on the left, the road is cut out of the solid rock, on the bare face of the mountain, exposing the traveller to be overwhelmed by the avalanches, which, loosened on the heights above by the warmth of the southern sun, often sweep with irresistible violence to the bottom of the declivity.

In summer, when the road is well cleared, it is possible to go in three hours from the village of Splugen to the hospice on the summit : but when the newly fallen snow has effaced all traces of the path in those elevated regions, above the zone of the arbutus and rhododendron ; when the avalanches or the violence of the winds have carried off the black poles which mark the course of the road, it is not possible to ascend with safety to the higher parts of the mountain. The traveller must advance with cautious steps, sounding, as he proceeds, as in an unknown sea beset with shoals ; the most experienced guides hesitate as to the direction which they should take ; for in that snowy wilderness the horizon is bounded by icy peaks, affording few landmarks to direct their steps, even if they should be perceived for a few minutes from amidst the mantle of clouds which usually envelope their summits. It may easily be conceived, from this description, what labours are requisite during the winter season to open this passage. It is necessary for an extent of five leagues, from the village of Splugen, to that of Isola, either to clear away the snow, so as to come to the earth, or to form a passable road over its top ; and the most indefatigable efforts cannot always secure success in such an enterprise. The frequent variations of the atmosphere, the clouds which suddenly rise up from the valleys beneath, the terrible storms of wind which arise in these elevated regions, the avalanches which descend with irresistible force from the overhanging glaciers, in an instant destroy the labour of weeks, and obliterate under a mountain of snow the greatest efforts of human industry.¹

Such were the difficulties which awaited Macdonald in the first mountain ridge which lay before him in the passage of the Alps. He arrived with the advanced guard, on the evening of the 26th, at the village of Splugen, the point where the mountain passage, properly

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

50.
Precautions
necessary in
crossing
during
winter.

¹ Dum. v.
164, 165.

CHAP.

XXXII.

1800.

51.

Extreme difficulties experienced by the French troops in the passage.
Nov. 26.

Nov. 27.

¹ Jom. xiv. 154, 155.
Dum. v. 168, 169.

52.

Macdonald still perseveres, and his preparations for the passage.
Dec. 1.

speaking, begins, with a company of sappers, and the first sledges conveying the artillery. The country guides placed poles along the ascent ; the labourers followed and cleared away the snow : the strongest dragoons next marched to beat down the road by their horses' feet ; they had already, after incredible fatigue, nearly reached the summit, when the wind suddenly rose, an avalanche fell from the mountain, and, sweeping across the road, cut right through the column, and precipitated thirty dragoons near its head into the gulf beneath, where they were dashed to pieces between the ice and the rocks, and never more heard of. General Laboissière, who led the van, was ahead of the cataract of snow, and reached the hospice ; but the remainder of the column, thunderstruck by the catastrophe, returned to Splügen ; and the wind, which continued for the three succeeding days to blow with great violence, detached so many avalanches, that the road was entirely blocked up in the upper regions, and the guides declared that no possible efforts could render it passable in less than fifteen days.¹

Macdonald, however, was not to be daunted by any such obstacles. Independent of his anxiety to fulfil his destined part in the campaign, necessity forced him on ; for the unwonted accumulation of men and horses in those elevated Alpine regions, promised very soon to consume the whole subsistence of the country, and expose the troops to the greatest dangers from actual want. He instantly made the best arrangement which circumstances would admit for re-opening the passage. First marched four of the strongest oxen that could be found in the Grisons, led by the most experienced guides ; they were followed by forty robust peasants, who cleared or beat down the snow ; two companies of sappers succeeded and improved the track ; behind them marched the remnant of the squadron of dragoons, which had suffered so much on the first ascent, and who bravely demanded the post of danger in renewing the attempt. After them came a convoy of artillery and a hundred beasts of burden, and a strong rearguard closed the party. By incredible efforts the heads of the column, before night, reached the hospice, and although many men and horses were swallowed up by the avalanches in the ascent, the order and discipline

so necessary to the success of the enterprise were maintained throughout. They here joined General Laboissière, who continued the same efforts on the Italian side; and led this adventurous advanced guard in safety to the sunny fields of Campo Dolcino at the southern base of the mountain. Two other columns, arrayed in the same order, followed on the 2d and 3d December, in clear frosty weather, with much less difficulty, because the road was beaten down by the footsteps of those who had preceded them; but several men died from the excessive cold on the higher parts of the mountain.¹

Encouraged by this success, Macdonald advanced with the remainder of his army to Splügen on the 4th December, and leaving only a slight rearguard on the northern side of the mountain, commenced his march on the morning of the 5th, at the head of seven thousand men. Though no tempest had been felt in the deep valley of the Rhine, the snow had fallen during the night in such quantities, that from the very outset the traces of the track were lost, and the road required to be made anew, as at the commencement of the ascent. The guides refused to proceed; but Macdonald insisted upon making the attempt, and after six hours of unheard-of fatigues, the head of his column succeeded in reaching the summit. In the narrow plain between the glaciers, however, they found the road blocked up by an immense mass of snow, formed by an avalanche newly fallen, upon which the guides refused to enter, and in consequence the soldiers returned, unanimously exclaiming that the passage was closed. Macdonald instantly hastened to the front, revived the sinking spirits of his men, encouraged the faltering courage of the guides, and advancing himself at the head of the column, plunged into the perilous mass, sounding every step as he advanced with a long staff, which often sank deep into the abyss. "Soldiers," said he, "the army of reserve has surmounted the St Bernard; you must overcome the Splügen; your glory requires that you should rise victorious over difficulties to appearance insuperable. Your destinies call you into Italy; advance and conquer, first the mountains and the snow, then the plains and the armies."* Put to shame by such an

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

¹ Dum. v.
170, 171.
Jom. xiv.
156. Bot.
iv. 58, 59.

53.
Increased
difficulties,
and heroism
of Mac-
donald in
persisting
notwith-
standing.

* A parallel incident occurred in ancient times, and, what is very extra-

CHAP.

XXXII.

1800.

example, the troops and the peasants redoubled their efforts; the vast walls of ice and snow were cut through, and although the hurricane increased with frightful rapidity, and repeatedly filled up their excavations, they at length succeeded in rendering the passage practicable. The tempest continued to blow with dreadful violence during the passage to the hospice and the descent of the Cardinal; the columns were repeatedly cut through by avalanches, which fell across the road, and more than one regiment was entirely dispersed in the icy wilderness. At length, by the heroic exertions of the officers, whom the example of their general had inspired with extraordinary ardour, the headquarters reached Isola, and rested there during the two succeeding days, to rally the regiments, which the hardships of the passage had broken into a confused mass of insulated men: but above one hundred soldiers, and as many horses and mules, were swallowed up in the abysses of the mountains, and never more heard of.¹*

1 Bot. iv. 59.
Jom. xiv.
156, 157.
Dum. v. 171.
171.

Late on the evening of the 6th December, the greater part of the troops and a large part of the artillery had passed the mountain, and headquarters were advanced to the smiling fields of Chiavenna, at the upper extremity of

ordinary, during the decay of Roman virtue. "The Emperor Majorian," says Gibbon, "led his troops over the Alps in a severe winter. The Emperor led the way on foot, and in complete armour, sounding with his long staff the depth of the ice or snow, and encouraging the Scythians, who complained of the extreme cold, by the cheerful assurance that they should be satisfied with the heat of Africa."—*Decline and Fall*, c. xxxvi. vol. iv. 343.

* The passage of the Splügen by Macdonald is the most memorable and extraordinary undertaking of the kind recorded in modern war, so far as the obstacles of nature are concerned. It yields only to the march of Suwarroff over the St Gothard, the Schächenthal, and the Engiberg, where, in addition to similar natural difficulties, the efforts of an able and indefatigable enemy were to be overcome. The passage of the St Bernard by Napoleon in fine weather, and without opposition, will bear no comparison with either the one or the other. That he himself was conscious of this, is obvious from the striking terms of disparagement in which he speaks of Macdonald's exertions in this passage; an instance of that jealousy of every rival in any of his great achievements, which is almost inconceivable in so great a man. "The passage of the Splügen," says he, "presented, without doubt, some difficulties; but winter is by no means the season of the year in which such operations are conducted with most difficulty; the snow is then firm, the weather settled, and there is nothing to fear from the avalanches, which constitute the true and only danger to be apprehended in the Alps. In December, you often meet with the finest weather, on these elevated mountains, of dry frost, during which the air is perfectly calm."—*NAPOLEON*, ii. 61, 62. Recollecting that this was written after the First Consul had received the full details from Macdonald of the extraordinary difficulties of the passage, it is inexcusable, and clearly betrays a consciousness of the inferiority of his own passage over the St Bernard. In his

Unworthy
jealousy of
this passage,
displayed by
Napoleon.

the lake of Como. No sooner did Hiller hear of this advance, than he moved forward his columns towards the head of the valley of the Inn to assail him; but the intelligence of the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden arrived that very day, and by rendering it evident that all the forces of the monarchy would be required to defend the capital, precluded the possibility of following up any distant enterprises. The Austrians, therefore, wisely determined to act only on the defensive, took post on the summits of the Albula, the Julierberg, and the Broglio, the three ridges which separate the Italian from the German side of the mountains in that quarter, and strongly reinforced the division on the Tonai, the only pass between the valley of the Oglio, to which Macdonald was hastening, and that of the Adige, which was the ultimate object of his efforts.¹

While still on the banks of the Adda, the French general had the misfortune to receive intelligence of the capture of a battalion of dismounted hussars, which negligently lay in the elevated valley at its upper extremity, by a well-concerted surprise from the Imperial forces in the Engadine. At the same time, he received orders from the First Consul to place himself under the command of

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

54.

He arrives
at Chia-
venna, on
the Lake of
Como.
Dec. 7.

¹ *Jom. xiv.*
159, 159.
Dum. v. 174,
175.

55.

He is placed
under the
orders of
Brune, and
passes the
Col Apriga.

official despatch, by order of the First Consul, to Macdonald, Berthier says, "I have received the relation which the chief of your staff has transmitted to me relative to the passage of the Splügen by the army which you command. I have communicated the details to the consuls, and they have enjoined me to make known to you their high satisfaction at the intrepidity and heroic constancy which the officers, and soldiers, and generals, have evinced in this passage, which will form a memorable epoch in our military annals. The consuls, confident in your talents, behold with interest the new position of the army of the Grisons. I impatiently expect the details of the celebrated passage of the Splügen, and the losses which it occasioned, to enable them to appreciate the admiration and gratitude which is due to the chiefs and soldiers of your army."²

² *Dec. 14.*
Sec. Dnm. vi.
255. *Pieces*
Just.

It was equally unworthy of Napoleon to say in his *Memoirs*:—"The march of Macdonald produced no good effect, and contributed in no respect to the success of the campaign; for the corps of Baraguay d'Hilliers, detached into the Upper Engadine, was too weak to effect any thing of importance. Macdonald arrived at Trieste on the 7th January, when the enemy was already chased from it by the left of the army of Italy, by the corps under the orders of Moncey and Rochambeau."³ Had Napoleon forgotten that Macdonald's advance, by paralysing Laudon and Wukassowich, enabled Brune to achieve the passage of the Mincio; and that, if it had not been for the credulity of Moncey, he would have compelled the surrender of the former at La Pietra with 7,000 men? The great truth, "*Magna est veritas et prævalebit*," does not seem ever to have crossed Napoleon's mind; he never contemplated the minute examination to which his account of transactions would be exposed by posterity, and thought he could deceive future ages, as he did his own, by means of sycophantish writers and an enslaved press.

³ *Nap. ii. 62, 63.*

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XXXII.

1800.

General Brune, of whose army he was to form the left wing; a mortifying circumstance to a general who had just achieved so important a service in a separate command as the passage of the Splugen, but which abated nothing of his zeal in the public cause. He suggested to Brune that two divisions should be detached from the army of Italy to reinforce his corps, and thus, with a body of twenty-four thousand men, he would advance across the mountains to Trieste, and effect a decisive operation on the rear of the Imperial army. But the general-in-chief refused to comply with this request, which was evidently hazardous, as exposing to overwhelming attacks in detail two separate armies, too far severed from each other to be able to render any effectual assistance in case of need. Napoleon's orders had directed Macdonald to penetrate as soon as possible into the valley of the Adige, in order to threaten the flank and rear of the Imperialists on the Mincio. For this purpose it was necessary to cross the Col Apriga, which lay between the valley of the Adda and that of the Oglio, and afterwards surmount the icy summit of Monte Tonal, between the latter stream and that of the Adige. The passage of the Monte Apriga, though considerably less elevated than the Splugen, was, in some respects, even more difficult by reason of the extreme steepness of the ascents, the entangled wood which encumbered its lower region, and the dreadful nature of the road, which in many places is little better than the bed of a torrent; but it was much shorter and did not lead into the regions of snow or ice. In seven hours, all these difficulties were overcome; the army found itself on the banks of the Oglio, and extended its outposts as far as Bormio at the upper extremity of the valley.¹

¹ *Jom.* xiv.
158, 159.
Dum. v. 176,
180, 182, 185.
Bot. iv. 61.

56.
Attack on
the Monte
Tonal, in
which the
French are
repulsed.

Dec. 22.

There still remained, however, the Herculean task of surmounting the Tonal, a mountain ridge of great elevation, which could be reached at that rude season only by a path through the snow, in which the troops were confined to single files. The summit, as usual in these elevated regions, consisted of a small plain three hundred yards abroad, situated between two enormous and inaccessible glaciers. Across this narrow space the Austrians had drawn a triple line of intrenchments, faced for the most

part by enormous blocks of ice, cut in the form of regular masonry, and even more difficult to scale than walls of granite. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the French grenadiers, after a painful ascent by the narrow and slippery path, reached the front of the intrenchments. Though received by a shower of balls, they succeeded in forcing the external palisades; but all their efforts were ineffectual against the walls of ice which formed the inner strength of the works. They were in consequence obliged to retreat, and brought back the disheartening report that this important position was impregnable. Sensible, however, of the vital importance of forcing this passage, Macdonald resolved to make another attempt. Eight days afterwards, another column was formed, under the command of Vandamme, and approached the terrible intrenchments. The Austrians had in the interval added much to the strength of the works; but they were assaulted with so much vigour, that the two external forts were carried. Still, however, when they approached the principal intrenchment, the fire from its summit, and from a blockhouse on an elevated position in its rear, was so violent that all the efforts of the Republicans were again ineffectual, and they were forced to retire, after staining with their bravest blood the cold and icy summit of the mountain. Macdonald was in some degree consoled for this disaster by the success of his left wing, which spread itself into the Engadine, driving the Imperialists before it, and made itself master of the well-known stations of Glurens and Martinsbruck, on the Tyrolean side of the mountains.¹

CHAP.
XXXII.
1800.

Dec. 31.

¹ *Jom. xiv.*
161, 162, 163.
Dum. v. 186,
188, 191.
Bot. iv. 61.
Personal observation.

The importance of these operations, and the obstinacy with which the attack and defence of the inhospitable Alpine ridges were conducted at this inclement season, will be best understood by casting a glance over the positions and movements of the contending armies in the Italian plains at this period. When hostilities were recommenced to the south of the Alps, by the denunciation of the armistice, the Imperial army, sixty-five thousand strong, of which fifteen thousand were cavalry, occupied the formidable line of the Mincio, covered by a hundred pieces of cannon, flanked on the one extremity by the Po, on the other by the lake of Guarda, and supported by the strong

57.
Positions
and forces of
the French
and Austrians
in Italy.

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

¹ Dum. v.
243, 244.
Jom. xiv.
166, 167.
Bot. iv. 63.

58.
French
forces in
Italy.

fortress of Mantua, and the inferior fortifications of Peschiera and Borghetto, which gave them the immense advantage of being able to debouche at pleasure on either side of the river. The Imperialists had received orders to remain on the defensive in this excellent position until their flanks were secured, and the prospect of an advantageous attack was afforded by the advance of the Neapolitan troops over the hills of Tuscany, and the descent of Laudon and Wukassowich from the mountains of Tyrol.¹

The French forces in Italy were immense. In the Peninsula altogether there were ninety-five thousand men, besides twenty-seven thousand who encumbered the hospitals. Of this great body, sixty-one thousand infantry, nine thousand cavalry, and one hundred and seventy-eight pieces of cannon, were ready for active operations on the Mincio, while the remainder occupied Tuscany, Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria. During the five months that these troops had occupied the fertile plains of the Po, they had profited to an extraordinary degree by the resources of the country. The soldiers had been completely new clothed, the artillery horses renewed, the cavalry was admirably mounted, the magazines were full, the troops in the highest state of discipline, spirits, and equipment. But the vast supplies which had produced this improvement, wrung by the terrors of military execution from an unhappy and impoverished people, had excited the utmost discontent in the Peninsula. The inhabitants compared the high-sounding proclamations of the invaders with the sad consequences which had followed their footsteps; and, rendered more sullen by the disappointment of their hopes than even by the serious injuries they had undergone, were ready upon any reverse to have risen unanimously upon their oppressors. This state of things was well known to the French commanders, and to secure their flanks and rear they were obliged to detach twenty-five thousand men from the grand army on the Mincio, how well soever they were aware that it was there that the fate of Italy was to be decided.²

² Bot. iv. 62,
63. Jom.
xiv. 164, 166.
Nap. ii. 64,
65.

Hostilities were first commenced by Brune, who found the spirit of his troops so much elevated by the intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, and the passage of the Splügen by Macdonald, that their ardour could no longer

be restrained. The firing commenced on the 16th, but nothing except inconsiderable skirmishes ensued before the 28th. The Mincio, in its course of twenty miles from the lake of Guarda to Mantua, though fordable in many places in summer, was absolutely impassable in winter; and the five bridges which were thrown over its current at Peschiera, Salconzo, Valleggio, Volta, and Goito, were either within the walls of fortifications, or strongly intrenched and barricaded. The left bank, in the hands of the Austrians, was generally more elevated than the right, in the possession of the Republicans; but at Mozambano and Molino, near Pozzuolo, the right had the advantage, which evidently pointed out these stations as the most advantageous for forcing a passage. For these reasons they had been fortified with care by the Imperial engineers, who had pushed their intrenchments, which were occupied by twenty thousand combatants under Hohenzollern, to a considerable distance from the right bank of the river; and against these advanced works it first behaved Brune to direct his efforts.¹

On the 20th, the whole French army approached the Mincio in four columns. The right, under Dupont, moved towards the shores of the Mantuan lake; the centre, under Suchët, advanced direct upon Volta; the third column, destined to mask Peschiera, was ordered to take post near Ponti; the left and the reserve were directed against Mozambano. The French general had intended to have made feigned attacks only on the centre and right, and to have attempted to force the passage in good earnest near the lake of Guarda, and at the foot of the mountains; but the course of events fell out otherwise. As the Republicans approached the Mincio, the Imperialists, who had orders not to engage in any serious affair on the right bank, seeing they had the whole French army on their hands, successively abandoned all the positions they had fortified with so much care, and withdrew to the other side, leaving only detachments to occupy Valleggio and the *tête-du-pont* of Borghetto, on the Republican side. The French patroles, in consequence, every where approached the river; and Dupont, ignorant that the attack on his side was intended only to be a feint, and that the left was the real point of attack, made the most active

CHAP.
XXXII.

1800.

59.
First opera-
tions of
Brune.
Dec. 16.

¹ Nap. ii. 66,
67. Bot. iv.
62, 63. Jom.
xiv. 174, 175.
Dum. v. 243,
244.

60.
Passage of
the Mincio.
Dec. 20.

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Dec. 25.

preparations for effecting a passage. He succeeded so well, that, early on the morning of the 25th, he had thrown a battalion over, near Molino, which speedily established a bridge, and soon enabled a whole division to obtain a firm footing on the left bank. Hardly was the passage completed, when orders arrived from the commander-in-chief to cover, by a fire of cannon, merely the bridge which had been established, and allow no troops to pass over to the other side. But this despatch arrived too late; the division of Watrin was already over; the enemy's troops opposed to it were hourly and rapidly increasing, and any attempt to fall back to the bridge would have exposed it to certain and irremediable ruin. In these trying circumstances, Dupont conceived that the execution of his orders had become impossible, and resolved to retain the advantage he had gained, by aiding Watrin with his remaining troops. In this resolution he was confirmed by Suchet,

¹ Nap. ii. 67, who was no sooner informed that the passage was irrevocably engaged on the right, than he resolved to support it with all his forces, and, hastening to the bridge at Molino, crossed over with his whole corps.¹

61.
Desperate
conflict of
the troops
who had
crossed
over.

On their side, the Imperialists, who had judiciously placed the bulk of their army in mass, a little in the rear of the centre of the line, no sooner heard of the passage at Molino than they directed an overwhelming force to assail the advanced guard of the enemy. But for the timely assistance afforded by Suchet, Dupont's troops would have been totally destroyed; as it was, a furious combat ensued, which continued with various success till night, in which the Republicans only maintained their ground by the sacrifice of the bravest of their men. For long the French infantry repulsed with invincible firmness the repeated and vehement charges of the Austrian cavalry; but at length they were driven, by a desperate effort of the Hungarian grenadiers, out of the village of Pozzuolo, and forced in disorder to the water's edge. All seemed lost; when the Imperialists, checked by a terrible discharge of grape from the batteries on the French side, hesitated in their advance; and Dupont took advantage of their irresolution to animate his men, and lead them back to the charge, which was executed with such vigour, that Pozzuolo was regained, and the Imperialists repulsed with the loss of

seven hundred prisoners and five pieces of cannon. The Austrians, however, brought up fresh troops; Pozzuolo was again carried at the point of the bayonet; Suchet advanced with his division and retook it; it was a third time carried by the Imperialists, and continued to be alternately conquered and reconquered till nightfall, when it finally remained in the hands of the Austrians.* Even the darkness of a winter night could not suspend this terrible combat: between eleven and twelve the fitful gleams of the moon, through a tempestuous and cloudy sky, enabled the Republicans to perceive two deep masses of grenadiers who silently approached their intrenchments. They were received with a general discharge of fire-arms of all sorts; the batteries thundered from the opposite bank; for a few minutes a volcano seemed to have burst forth on the shores of the Mincio, but all the efforts of the Imperialists were unavailing; and, after a gallant struggle, they were obliged to retire, leaving the French in possession of their blood-stained intrenchments.¹

Brune, during this desperate conflict, remained in a state of the greatest irresolution, hesitating between his original design of effecting a passage at Mozambano, and the new project to which he was urged, of holding the ground, won at so dear a price, in the lower part of the stream. He thus ran the risk of losing his whole right wing, which was in truth only saved by the resolute valour of the troops of whom it was composed.† At length he resolved to pursue his original design, and force a passage at Mozambano. For this purpose, Marmont, at daybreak, on the 26th December, established a battery of forty pieces of cannon on the heights above that place, which commanded the left bank, and dispatched orders to Dupont and Suchet to keep themselves within their intrenchments until they heard the firing warmly engaged on the left. Under cover of a thick fog, the passage was speedily effected, and the French advanced guard soon after came to blows with the enemy. It was evident, however, that they fought only

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¹ Nap. ii. 67,
75. Bot. iv.
63. 64.
Dum. v. 251,
266. Jom.
xiv. 175, 185.

62.
Brune at
length re-
lieves them,
and the
passage is
completed.

Dec. 26.

* Bellegarde says it remained in the hands of the Austrians. Oudinot affirms it was ultimately carried by the French. The well-known veracity of the German character makes it probable that the former was the true account.

† For this he incurred the just and merited censure of the First Consul.
—See NAPOLEON, ii. 75, 76.

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¹ Jom. xiv.
188, 192.
Dum. v. 268,
275. Nap. ii.
76, 78. Bot.
iv. 64, 65.

63.
Great losses
of the Im-
perialists.

² Dum. v.
275, 276.
Jom. xiv.
192, 193. •
Nap. ii. 80.

64.
Bellegarde
retires to
Caldiero.

Jan. 1.

to cover their retreat. Oudinot, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, bravely resisted till sufficient reinforcements passed over to enable them to resume the offensive, which they did with such vigour, that the Imperialists were driven back to Valleggio, from whence they continued their retreat in the night, leaving Borghetto to its fate, which, next day, after repulsing an assault with great loss, surrendered with its garrison of eight hundred men. In effect, Bellegarde, conceiving the passage of the river effected by the bridge established at Molino, had resolved upon a general retreat; his troops fell back in all quarters towards the Adige, leaving garrisons in Mantua, Verona, Legnago, and Peschiera, which reduced his effective force to forty thousand combatants.¹

In the passage of the Mincio, the Austrians lost above seven thousand men, of whom one-half were prisoners, and forty pieces of cannon. Its moral consequences, as is generally the case with a first decisive success, determined the fate of the campaign. The French resumed the career of victory with their wonted alacrity; the Imperialists fell into the despondency which is the sure prelude to defeat; and the disastrous intelligence they received from the Bavarian frontier contributed to spread the disheartening impression that the Republicans were invincible under their new leader, and that no chance of safety remained to the monarchy, but in a speedy submission to the conqueror.²

Brune, however, advanced cautiously after his victory. Leaving detachments to mask Mantua, Verona, and Peschiera, he approached the Adige in the end of December. To effect the passage of that river, the French general made use of the same stratagem which had been attempted for the passage of the Mincio, viz. to make demonstrations both against the lower and upper part of the stream; and, while the enemy were distracted in their attention by a multiplicity of attacks, the artillery and bridge equipage were secretly conducted to Bassolengo. Sixty pieces of cannon were established there in battery, on the heights of the right bank, on the morning of the 1st January, which opened their fire at daybreak, under cover of which a bridge was speedily constructed without opposition from the enemy. The troops passed over, and established them-

selves on the left bank without firing a shot ; the Imperialists were much less solicitous about interrupting their operations than effecting a junction with the corps of Wukassowich and Laudon, which were hastening by the defiles of the Brenta towards the plain of Bassano. Bellegarde withdrew his forces on all sides, and concentrated them in the strong position of Caldiero, already signalised by a victory over Napoleon, while the Republicans closely followed his footsteps, and extending their left up the rocky gorge of the Adige, made themselves masters, after severe combats, of the narrow defile of Corona and the memorable plateau of Rivoli.¹

The Republicans, under Moncey, pursued their advantages ; the Imperialists, under Laudon, long and obstinately defended the town of Alta, in the valley of the Adige, but were driven from it with the loss of five hundred prisoners. They again held firm in the intrenchments of St Marco, but were at length forced to retreat, and took refuge in the defile of Calliano, already celebrated by so many combats. At the same time, the Italian division of Count Theodore Lecchi ascended the valley of the Oglio, and entered into communication with Macdonald's corps immediately after its repulse from the icy ramparts of Monte Tonal ; while detachments in the rear formed the blockades of Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago. Laudon retired with six thousand men to Roveredo, from whence he was soon after driven, and fell back, disputing every inch of ground, to the foot of the fort of Pietra, overhanging the deep and rapid stream of the Adige between that town and Trent.²

Bellegarde, finding his force so materially weakened by the garrisons which he was obliged to throw into the fortified towns on the Mincio, and the losses sustained in the passage of that river, had given orders to Wukassowich and Laudon, whose united forces exceeded twenty thousand men, to fall back from the Italian Tyrol, through the defiles of the Brenta, and join him in the plains of Bassano, in the rear of Calliano ; and it was to give them time to accomplish this junction that he took post on the almost impregnable heights of Calliano. Laudon was commencing this movement when he was rudely assailed by the division of Moncey, and harassed in his retreat up the

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¹ Jom. xiv.
196, 197.
Dum. v. 276,
290. Nap.
ii. 78, 79.
Bot. iv. 66.

65.
Advance of
the Republi-
cans into the
valley of the
Adige.

Jan. 2.

² Jom. xiv.
198, 199.
Dum. v. 288,
290.

66.
Alarming
situation of
Laudon on
the Upper
Adige.

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¹ Bot. iv. 66,
67. Jom.
xiv. 198, 199.
Dum. v. 284,
285.

67.
Macdonald
makes his
way into the
Italian
Tyrol.

valley of the Adige in the manner which has been mentioned. But a greater danger awaited him. On the very day on which he retired to the castellated defile of La Pietra, he received the alarming intelligence that Trent, directly in his rear, and by which he required to pass to gain the upper extremity of the Brenta, was occupied by Macdonald, at the head of nine thousand men.¹

To understand how this happened, it is necessary to resume the narrative of the army of the Grisons, after its repulse from the glaciers of Monte Tonal. After that check, Macdonald had collected in the Val Camonica, including the Italian division of Lecchi, above nine thousand men; and with them he eagerly sought for some defile or mountain-path by which to penetrate across the rocky chain which separates that valley from that of the Sarca, from whence he could reach Trent and the banks of the Adige. But these rugged cliffs, which push out, with hardly any fall, almost to Brescia, in the plain of Lombardy, defeated all his efforts; and it became necessary to turn their southern extremity by Pisogno, at the head of the lake of Isea, from thence to cross the Col di San Zeno, into the valley of Sabia, and again surmount another ridge into the Val Trompia, in order to ascend by the beautiful sides of the Chiesa into the valley of Sarca. This long circuit, which would have been completely avoided by forcing the passage of Monte Tonal, irritated to the highest degree the French troops, who had expected at once, after surmounting the Splugen, to take a part in the glories of the campaign. Their impatience increased when, on their arrival at Pisogno, Macdonald received and published the account of the passage of the Mincio, and the retreat of the Imperial army towards the Adige.²

² Bot. iv. 67.
Dum. v. 285,
287. Jom.
xiv. 198, 199.

68.
And at
length
reaches the
Upper
Adige.

He was there joined by General Rochambeau with three thousand men from Brune's army, who had at length become sensible of the importance of the operations in the Alps on the flanks and rear of the retreating army, and received the most pressing invitations to accelerate his march, so as to cut off some of its detached columns. The difficulties of the ridge of San Zeno, however, had almost arrested the soldiers whom the snows of the Splugen had been unable to overcome; a few horses only could be got over by cutting through blocks of ice as hard

as rock on the summit, and the greater part of the cavalry and artillery required to descend by the smiling shores of the Lago Isea to Brescia, and ascend again the vine-clad banks of the Chiesa. Such, however, was the vigour of the Republican troops, that they overcame all these obstacles; on the 6th January they arrived at Storo in the Italian Tyrol; while the left wing, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, surmounted the higher ridges at the sources of the Adige, and, following the retreating Austrian columns, descended by Glarens and Schlanders upon Meran on the banks of the Upper Adige. Thus, after surmounting incredible difficulties, the object of the First Consul was at length gained; the whole mountain ridges were crossed, and the Imperialists turned by the upper extremity of all the valleys where their forces in the Italian Tyrol were situated.¹

The approach of these different columns, amounting in all to twenty-five thousand men, and conducted with equal skill and vigour, from the north, south, and west, convinced the Austrian generals that they had not a moment to lose in concentrating their troops at Trent, and regaining, by the defile of the Brenta, the army of Bellegarde at Bassano. If Wukassowich ascended towards Bolzano to aid in repelling Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was descending the Adige, he ran the risk of leaving Laudon to be overwhelmed by Moncey; if he moved towards Roveredo to the support of the latter general, he abandoned the avenues of Trent and the line of communication in his rear to Macdonald. In these critical circumstances he rapidly withdrew his right to Trent, ordered the troops who covered La Sarca to defend that city against Macdonald as long as possible, and enjoined Laudon to maintain himself till the last extremity in the important defile of La Pietra. But the French general, who was now fully aware of the situation of Laudon, made incredible exertions: in one day he marched forty miles; crossed the Col Vezzano; forced the passage of the Adige, and entered Trent. Wukassowich hastily retired by the great road to the defiles of the Brenta;² but Laudon with seven thousand men, who was still posted at La Pietra, was left to his fate, with a superior enemy in his front, and the

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¹ Dum. v.
285, 287.
Jom. xiv.
198, 199.
Bot. iv. 67.

69.
Laudon is
surrounded
at Trent.

Jan. 7.
² Dum. v.
285, 292.
Jom. xiv.
201, 202.
Bot. iv. 67.

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1801.

70.

He escapes
by a lateral
path to
Bassano.

army of the Grisons, under Macdonald; in his rear, occupying the only road by which he could retreat.

The only remaining chance of safety to Laudon was by a rugged path, which leads over the mountains from Pietra to Levico on the Brenta. It was impossible that his corps could retire by this defile, passable only by single file, if they were attacked either by Moncey or Macdonald; and Laudon was well aware that the former, with fifteen thousand men, was preparing to assail him on the following morning, and that the latter, notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, had already pushed a patrol beyond Trent, on the road to Roveredo, and would advance to the support of his comrade the moment that the combat was seriously engaged. In this extremity he made use of a *ruse de guerre*, if that name can properly be applied to a fabrication inconsistent with the proverbial German faith. He sent an officer of his staff to Moncey, announcing the conclusion of an armistice between Brune and Bellegarde, similar to that already concluded in Germany, and proposing a suspension of arms. The honourable Moncey, suspecting no deceit, fell into the snare; he agreed to the proposal, upon condition that the pass of La Pietra and the town of Trent should be placed in his hands, which being agreed to, and its execution prepared for the following day, Laudon in the meantime, during the night, withdrew his troops, man by man, through the narrow straits of Caldognazzo by paths among the rocks, where two file could not pass abreast, to Levico on the shores of the Brenta, in the Val Sugana. The French advanced guard, proceeding next day to take possession of Trent, was astonished to find it already in the hands of Macdonald, and to discover the extent of the danger from which their unsuspecting honesty had delivered the Imperial general.¹

¹ Bot. iv. 67,
Dum. v. 292,
295. Jom.
xiv. 202, 203.

71.
Bellegarde
retreats to
Treviso.
Armistice
there.
Jan. 10.

Bellegarde, finding that Wukassowich and Laudon had effected their junction in the valley of the Brenta, deemed it no longer necessary to retain his position on the heights of Calliano, but retired leisurely, and facing about at every halt, to Bassano, where he effected his junction with the divisions which had descended from the Tyrol. This great reinforcement gave him a marked superiority over his adversary; and though he fell back to the neighbourhood

of Treviso, he was making preparations to give battle in front of that town, when operations on both sides were concluded by the armistice of Treviso, which at length put a period to this murderous contest. By this convention, the Austrians agreed to give up Peschiera, Verona, Legnago, Ancona, and Ferrara, which gave Brune an excellent base for future operations; but they retained possession of Mantua, the key of Lombardy, and the great object of the First Consul's desires. This was the more irritating to Napoleon, as Murat's corps, twelve thousand strong, had already reached the Italian plains, and Brune himself had written to government, only three days before, that he would agree to no armistice, unless Mantua, as well as the other fortresses, were put into his hands. The truth is, that in the interval circumstances had changed; the Imperialists were concentrated in the immense plains of Treviso, where their cavalry could act with peculiar effect; the divisions from the Tyrol had joined their ranks; while Brune, whose army was severely weakened by the numerous blockading divisions left in his rear, could not oppose to them an equal force. But Napoleon, whose impatient spirit, fed by repeated victories, could brook no obstacle, was indignant at this concession to the Imperialists; he manifested his high displeasure at Brune, whom he never again employed in an important command, and announced to his ministers at Luneville that he would instantly resume hostilities, both in Germany and Italy, unless Mantua were abandoned. The disastrous state of affairs in the former country had taken away from the Austrians all power of resistance; they yielded to his desires, and a few days afterwards the peace of LUNEVILLE put an end to the disastrous war of the second coalition.¹

Before proceeding to the conditions of this celebrated treaty, it is necessary to resume the narrative of the events in the southern part of the Italian peninsula, previous to the general pacification.

At the moment when this double armistice consolidated the French power in Italy and Germany, a dangerous insurrection broke out in Piedmont. The people of that country were exasperated to the highest degree by the endless and vexatious requisitions of the French troops. The most ardent democrats were thunderstruck by the annex-

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¹ Nap. II. 80.
82. Bot. iv.
68, 69. Jom.
xiv. 209, 210.
Dum. v. 300,
303.

73.
Insurrection
breaks out in
Piedmont,
Jan. 15.

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tion of the territory of Vercelli to the Cisalpine Republic, and the clergy and nobles justly apprehensive of the extinction of their rights and properties, from the continued ascendancy of France. Fed by so many sources, the flame of discontent, though long smothered, at length broke out. The peasants of the Valley of Aosta took up arms, expelled the French detachments, and shut up their depôt of conscripts in the fortresses of Ivrea, while symptoms of insurrection appeared at Turin. But the vigour of Soult overcame the danger; he speedily surrounded and disarmed the insurgent quarter of the capital, and the appearance of Murat, who at that moment descended from the mountains in their rear, extinguished the revolt in the Alpine valleys. The revolutionary party of Piedmont found themselves inextricably enveloped in a despotic net from which it was impossible to escape.¹

1 *Jom.* xiv.
210, 211.
Hot. iv. 62.
Dum. v. 321,
323.

73.
The Neapolitans invade the Roman states, and are totally defeated.

The cannon of Marengo had shaken the throne of the Two Sicilies; the court of Naples was conscious that the sanguinary executions which had disgraced its return to the shores of Campania, had exposed it to the utmost danger from the vengeance of the popular party; and that it had little to hope from the mercy of the First Consul, if the Imperial standards were finally chased from Italy. Finding its very existence thus endangered, the cabinet of Ferdinand IV. had made exertions disproportioned to the strength of the kingdom. An army, sixteen thousand strong, splendid in appearance, and formidable, if numerical strength only were considered, under the command of Count Roger de Damas, had advanced through the Roman states, and taken post on the confines of Tuscany, ready to foment the discontent of its inhabitants, which the enormous requisitions of the French authorities had exasperated to the greatest degree, and act in conjunction with the Imperialists under Sommariva, whose headquarters were at Ancona. The weakness of Miollis, the French commander in Tuscany, whose forces had been reduced, by the garrisons left in Lucca, Leghorn, and Florence, to four thousand men, encouraged them to attempt an offensive movement. They advanced to Sienna, the inhabitants of which rose in insurrection against the French, while Arezzo, supported by detachments from Ancona, again displayed the standard of revolt. But on this, as on

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every other occasion during the war, the utter loss of military character by the Neapolitans was painfully conspicuous. Miollis collected six thousand veterans from the neighbouring garrisons, and advanced against the invaders. The vanguard of Ferdinand turned about at the bare sight of the enemy. In vain the infantry were formed into squares and encouraged to stand; they broke at the first charge of the Piedmontese columns, supported by a single squadron and three companies of French grenadiers: the superb hussars fled in confusion, trampling under foot their own flying regiments; and the whole army soon became a useless crowd of fugitives, which hastened, like a flock of sheep, towards the Roman frontier, without having sustained any serious loss. On this occasion the French hardly fired a shot, and the Neapolitans were discomfited by the mere sight of the Piedmontese levies; a striking proof how much more rapidly military virtue had declined in the south than in the north of the peninsula.¹

Even, however, if the Neapolitan troops had combated with the valour of the ancient Samnites, the result would have been the same. Sommariva no sooner heard of this disaster at Sienna than he retraced his steps towards Ancona; the insurgents at Arezzo made haste to offer their submission to the conqueror; Murat's corps, ten thousand strong, was approaching Parma; and the armistice of Treviso, a few days after, put a final period to the co-operation of the Imperialists. Ancona was delivered up agreeably to the convention; Ferrara passed into the hands of the Republicans; southern Italy lay open to the invader; and the unwarlike Neapolitans were left alone to combat a power before which the veteran bands of Austria and Russia had succumbed. Napoleon openly expressed his determination to overturn the throne of the Two Sicilies, and Murat, at the head of an army of twenty-eight thousand men, composed of his own corps, that of Miollis, and two divisions of veterans from the Mincio, soon after crossed the Apennines, to carry into execution the mandates of Republican vengeance.²

But the Court of Naples had not trusted merely to its military preparations; the address of the queen extricated the throne from the imminent danger to which

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¹ Bot. iv. 70.
Dum. v. 314,
329. Jom.
xiv. 214, 215.
Nap. ii. 84,
85.

74.
The contest
was plainly
hopeless.

Jan. 16.

Jan. 20.

² Nap. ii. 84,
85. Dum. v.
328, 331.
Jom. xiv.
215, 217.
Bot. iv. 70,
71.

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75.

The Queen
of Naples
flies to St
Petersburg
to implore
the aid of
Paul.

it was exposed, and gave it a few years longer of precarious existence. No sooner had the battle of Marengo and the armistice of Alexandria opened the eyes of this able and enterprising, though vehement and impassioned woman, to the imminence of the danger which threatened the Neapolitan throne, if it were left alone to resist the redoubtable forces of France, than she adopted the only resolution which could ward off the impending calamities. Setting off in person from Palermo, shortly before the winter campaign commenced, she undertook a journey to St Petersburg to implore the powerful intercession of the Czar, should events prove adverse, to appease the wrath of the conqueror. It soon appeared how prophetic had been her anticipations. The Emperor Paul, whose chivalrous character and early hostility to the principles of the Revolution had been by no means extinguished by his admiration for Napoleon, was highly flattered by this adventurous step. The prospect of a queen setting out in the depth of winter, and undertaking the arduous journey from Palermo to St Petersburg to implore his aid, was as flattering to his vanity, as the renown of upholding a tottering throne was agreeable to his romantic ideas of government. He warmly espoused the cause of the unfortunate princess, and not only promised to intercede with all his influence in her favour with the First Consul, but forthwith dispatched M. Lowascheff, an officer high in his household, and who enjoyed his intimate confidence, to give additional weight to his mediation with the Cabinet of the Tuileries.¹

¹ Bot. iv. 71.
Dum. v. 317,
319. Jom.
xiv. 211, 212.

76.
Napoleon
willingly
yields to his
intercession.

Napoleon had many reasons for yielding to the efforts of the northern emperor. A conqueror, who had recently usurped the oldest throne in Europe, was naturally desirous to appear on confidential terms with its greatest potentate; and the sovereign who had just placed himself at the head of the northern maritime coalition against England, could hardly be expected to intercede in vain at the court of its inveterate enemy. For these reasons, M. Lowascheff was received with extraordinary distinction at Paris. On the road to Italy, he was treated with the honours usually reserved for crowned heads; and the Italians, who recollected the desperate strife between the Russians and Republicans, beheld with astonishment the new-born harmony

which had risen up between their envoys. He arrived at Florence at the same time that General Murat made his entry. The city was brilliantly illuminated in the evening; every where in public they appeared together, overshadowed by a tricolor and a Russian standard; and the Russian envoy declared to the bewildered Florentines, "that the two great nations should for ever be united for the repose of mankind."¹

Backed by such powerful influence, and the terrors of thirty thousand French soldiers on the Tiber, the negotiation was not long of being brought to a termination. Napoleon had directed that the affairs of Naples should be altogether excluded from the articles of the armistice at Treviso, in order that he might alone regulate the destinies of a kingdom, the old ally of England, and the impassioned enemy of the Revolution. The terms prescribed to Murat, and embodied in the armistice of Foligno, were less distinguished by severity towards the Neapolitans than hostility to the English; and this treaty is remarkable as containing the first official enunciation of the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, to which, through the whole remainder of his career, he so inflexibly adhered, and which had so large a share, through the misery which it occasioned, in bringing about his ultimate overthrow. By the armistice of Foligno it was provided that the Neapolitan troops should forthwith evacuate the Roman States, but that, even after their retreat, the Republicans should continue to occupy Narni and the line of the Nera, to its junction with the Tiber; that "all the ports of Naples and Sicily should instantly be closed against English vessels of merchandise as well as war, and remain shut till the conclusion of a general peace; that all prosecutions on account of political offences should cease, and the scientific men, unworthily detained at Naples on their return from Egypt, should be instantly set at liberty."²

By the treaty of Foligno, which was signed soon afterwards, the ambitious projects of the First Consul were more completely developed, and the first indications were manifested of that resolution to envelop the continent in an iron net, which was afterwards so completely carried into effect. By this treaty it was provided, that "all the harbours of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily should be

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¹ Jom. xiv.
217, 218.
Dum. v. 323,
334. Bot. iv.
71.

77.
Peace between
France and
Naples at
Foligno,
Feb. 9.
Its conditions.

² Dum. v.
341, 342.
Jom. xiv.
219, 220.
Bot. iv. 72,
73.

78.
French take
possession
of the whole
Neapolitan
territories.
March 28.

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closed to all English or Turkish vessels until the conclusion of a general peace; that Porto Longone in the island of Elba, Piombino in Tuscany, and a small territory on the sea-coast of that duchy, should be ceded to France; that all political persecutions should cease, and the sum of 50,000 francs be paid by the Neapolitan Government to the victims of former disorders on the return of the court of Sicily; that the statues and paintings taken from Rome by the Neapolitan troops should be restored; and that, in case of a menaced attack from the troops of Turkey or England, a French corps, equal to what should be sent by the Emperor of Russia, should be placed at its disposal." Under these last words was veiled the most important article in the treaty, which was speedily carried into effect, and revealed the resolution of the French Government to take military possession of the whole peninsula. On the 1st April, only three days after the signature of this treaty, and before either any requisition had been made by the Neapolitan Government or any danger menaced their dominions, a corps of twelve thousand men, under the command of General Soult, set out from the French lines, and before the end of the same month took possession of the fortresses of Tarentum, Otranto, Brindisi, and all the harbours in the extremity of Calabria.¹

¹ Martens,
vii. 345.

79.
Secret arti-
cles of this
treaty.

By a secret article in the treaty, the Neapolitan Government were to pay 500,000 francs (£20,000) a-month for the pay and equipment of this corps, besides furnishing gratis all the provisions it might require. The object of this occupation was to facilitate the establishment of a communication with the army in Egypt, and it excited the utmost solicitude in the breast of Napoleon. His instructions to Soult are extremely curious, as proving how early he had embraced the new political principles on which his government was thereafter founded. Among other things, he directed that the general "should engage in no revolution, but, on the contrary, severely repress any appearance of it which might break out; that he should communicate to all his officers that the French government had no desire to revolutionise Naples; that with all his staff he should go to mass on every festival with military music, and always endeavour to conciliate the priests and Neapolitan authorities;² that he should

² Dum. vi.
264, 270, 280.
Pièces Just.
Nap. ii. 89.

maintain his army at the expense of Tuscany and Naples, as the Republic was so overwhelmed by the return of its armies to the territory of France, that he could not send them a single farthing." Finally, he gave minute directions for the reduction of Porto Ferrajo and the island of Elba, little anticipating that he was seeking to acquire for the Republic his own future place of exile.

This little island, which has since acquired such interest from the residence of Napoleon in 1814, was at first deemed an easy conquest by the French general. But he soon found that he had a very different enemy to deal with from the pusillanimous troops of Naples. The English garrison of Porto Ferrajo consisted merely of three hundred British soldiers, of eight hundred Tuscan troops, and four hundred Corsicans in the pay of Great Britain; but into this motley assemblage, the governor, Colonel Airley, had infused his own undaunted resolution. At first the French commenced the siege with fifteen hundred men only; but finding that number totally inadequate, they gradually augmented their force to six thousand men, while three frigates maintained a strict blockade, which soon reduced the garrison to great straits from want of provisions. But in the end of July, Sir John Borlase Warren hove in sight with an English squadron; the French cruisers instantly took refuge in the harbour of Leghorn; and the Republicans, in their turn, began to experience the hardships of a blockade. Three French frigates were captured in endeavouring to convey supplies across the straits of Piombino to the besiegers, but as in spite of these disasters the labours of the siege advanced, a general effort was made on the 13th September to destroy the works.¹

80.
Siege of
Elba.
July.

1 Dum. v.
353, 359.
Jom. xiv.
371.

Two thousand men, consisting of the Swiss regiment of Watteville and detachments from the marines of the fleet, were landed, and attacked the Republicans in rear, while Airley, by a vigorous sortie, assailed them in front. The attack was at first successful, and some of the batteries which commanded the entrance of the harbour were taken and spiked; but the Republicans having returned in greater force, the besieged were obliged to retire, and the troops who had landed were again embarked. Notwithstanding this, however, the most vigorous defence was

81.
Its gallant
defence by
the English
garrison.

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¹ Article 7,
Treaty of
Amiens.

¹ Dum. v.
353, 359.
Ann. Reg.
p. 179. Jom.
xiv. 371, 374.

82.
Treaty of
Luneville.
Feb. 9.

² See the
Treaty in
Dumas, vi.
282, et seq.
Pièces Just.;
and in Mar-
tens, vii. 286.

made, the means of a bombardment were tried in vain to shake the resolution of the garrison; and after a siege of five months, the governor had the glory of surrendering the fortress intrusted to his charge only in consequence of an express condition in the treaty of Amiens.¹ This successful resistance by a handful of men to the troops who had vanquished the greatest military monarchies of Europe, excited a great sensation both in England and on the continent, and served as a presage of that desperate struggle which awaited them, when, after trampling under foot the southern hosts, they encountered the stubborn valour of northern freedom. "It was," says the impartial French historian, "an extraordinary spectacle in the midst of the triumphal songs, and in the bosom of a continental peace, so long desired, so painfully acquired, to see an island, of easy access and almost touching the continent, the scene of a long-continued and doubtful strife; and Europe beheld with amazement, in that island, a single fortress arrest the arms which the forces of the coalition had been unable to subdue."¹

By the treaty of Luneville, which the Emperor Francis was obliged to subscribe, "not only as Emperor of Austria, but in the name of the German empire," Belgium and all the left bank of the Rhine were again formally ceded to France; Lombardy was erected into an independent state, and the Adige declared the boundary betwixt it and the dominions of Austria; Venice, with all its territorial possessions as far as the Adige, was guaranteed to Austria; the Duke of Modena received the Brisgau in exchange for his duchy, which was annexed to the Cisalpine republic; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the emperor's brother, gave up his dominions to the infant Duke of Parma, a branch of the Spanish family, on the promise of an indemnity in Germany; France abandoned Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein, on condition that these forts should remain in the situation in which they were when given up; the princes dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine were promised an indemnity in the bosom of the Empire; the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics was guaranteed, and their inhabitants declared "to have the power of choosing whatever form of government they preferred."² These

conditions did not differ materially from those contained in the treaty of Campo Formio, or from those offered by Napoleon previous to the renewal of the war; a remarkable circumstance, when it is recollected how vast an addition the victories of Marengo, Hohenlinden, and the Mincio, had since made to the preponderance of the French arms.

The article which compelled the Emperor to subscribe this treaty, as head of the empire as well as Emperor of Austria, gave rise in the sequel, as shall be shown, to the most painful internal divisions in Germany. By a fundamental law of the empire, the Emperor could not bind the electors and states of which he was the head, without either their concurrence or express powers to that effect previously conferred. The want of such powers had rendered inextricable the separate interests referred to the Congress at Rastadt; but Napoleon, whose impatient disposition could not brook such formalities, cut the matter short at Luneville, by throwing his sword into the scale, and insisting that the emperor should sign for the empire as well as himself; leaving him to vindicate such a step as he best could to the princes and states of the Imperial Confederacy. The Emperor hesitated long before he subscribed such a condition, which left the seeds of interminable discord in the Germanic body; but the conqueror was inexorable, and no means of evasion could be found.¹

He vindicated himself to the electors in a dignified letter, dated 8th February 1801, the day before that when the treaty was signed, in which, after premising that his Imperial authority was restrained by the Germanic constitutions on that point in a precise manner, and therefore that he had been compelled to sign, as head of the empire, without any title so to do, he added, "But, on the other hand, the consideration of the melancholy situation in which, at that period, a large part of Germany was placed, the prospect of the still more calamitous fate with which the superiority of the French menaced the empire if the peace was any longer deferred; in fine, the general wish, which was loudly expressed, in favour of an instant accommodation, were so many powerful motives which forbade me to refuse the concurrence of my minister to this demand of the French plenipotentiary."² The electors

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83.
The Emperor subscribes for the empire as well as Austria.

¹ Dum. vi.
29, 30.
Hard. viii.
52.

84.
His apology to the Electors of Germany.

² See the original, Dum. vi. 298. Pièces Just.

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1801.

and princes of the empire felt the force of this touching appeal; they commiserated the situation of the first monarch in Christendom, compelled to throw himself on his subjects for forgiveness of a step which he could not avoid; and one of the first steps of the Diet of the empire, assembled after the treaty of Luneville was signed, was to give it their solemn ratification, grounded on the extraordinary situation in which the Emperor was then placed. But the question of indemnities to the dispossessed princes was long and warmly agitated. It continued for above two years to distract the Germanic body; the intervention both of France and Russia was required to prevent the sword being drawn in these internal disputes; and by the magnitude of the changes which were ultimately made, and the habit of looking to foreign protection which was acquired, the foundation was laid of that league to support separate interests which afterwards, under the name of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, so well served the purposes of French ambition, and broke up the venerable fabric of the German empire.¹

¹ Dum. vi.
29, 30.
Hard. viii.
52.

85.

Extravagant
joy at this
peace in
Paris.
March 20.

This glorious peace excited, as might well have been expected, the most enthusiastic joy in Paris. It was announced in these terms to the inhabitants by Napoleon:—"A glorious pence has terminated the continental war. Your frontiers are extended to the limits assigned to them by nature; nations long separated from you rejoin their brethren, and increase by a sixth your numbers, your territory, and your resources. This success you owe chiefly to the courage of your soldiers, to their patience in fatigue, their passion for liberty and glory: but you owe it not less to the happy restoration of concord, and that union of feelings and interests, which has more than once saved France from ruin. As long as you were divided, your enemies never lost the hope of subjugating you; they trusted that you would be vanquished by yourselves, and that the power which had triumphed over all their efforts would crumble away in the convulsions of discord and anarchy. Their hope has been disappointed; may it never revive! Remain for ever united by the recollection of your domestic misfortunes, by the sentiment of your present grandeur and force. Beware of lowering by base passions a name which so many exploits have consecrated

to glory and immortality. Let a generous emulation second our arts and our industry ; let useful labours embellish that France which external nations will never mention but with admiration and respect ; let the stranger who hastens to visit it, find among you the gentle and hospitable virtues which distinguished your ancestors. Let all professions raise themselves to the dignity of the French name ; let commerce, while it reforms its relations with other people, acquire the consistency which fixes its enterprises, not on hazardous speculations, but constant relations. Thus our mercantile industry will resume the rank which is due to it ; thus will be strengthened the bonds which unite us to the most enlightened people on the continent ; thus will that nation, even, which has armed itself against France, be taught to abjure its excessive pretensions, and at length learn the great truth, that, for people as individuals, there can be no security for real prosperity but in the happiness of all." It is curious to observe how early amidst his continental triumphs, the ambition of the First Consul was directed to commercial and maritime greatness, in the effort to attain which he was led to indulge in such implacable hostility to this country.¹

¹ Dum. vi.
296. Pièces
Just. Moni-
teur, March
20.

The winter campaign of 1800 demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the justice of the observation by the Archduke Charles, that the valley of the Danube is the quarter where vital blows against the Austrian monarchy are to be struck, and the importance of frontier or central fortifications to arrest the march of a victorious invader. The disaster of Marengo was soon repaired, and did not prevent the Austrians again taking the field at the head of an army which almost balanced the Republican forces ; but the battle of Hohenlinden at once laid open the vitals of the monarchy. The reason is to be found in the numerous fortresses which covered the Imperial frontiers in Lombardy, and the total want of any such barrier between Austria and Bavaria. After the passage of the Mincio, the army of Brune was so severely weakened, by the detachments left in the rear to blockade the fortresses on that river, that he was unequal to any further offensive movements, and if the war had continued, he would probably have been compelled to retreat ; but, after the battle of Hohenlinden, the undiminished battalions of Moreau poured in

86.
Reflections
on this cam-
paign.

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87.

The real
object of the
war was
already
gained by
the Allies.

resistless strength into the undefended Hereditary States. The Archduke Charles had long before foreseen this ; by the fortifications of Ulm he enabled Kray for six weeks to arrest the victor in the middle of his career ; and so sensible was Napoleon of their importance, that his first measure, when they fell into his hands, was to level them with the ground.

The peace of Luneville was the first considerable pause in the continental strife ; and already it had become manifest that the objects of the war had been changed, and that hostilities were now to be carried on, for the subjugation of a different power from that which was at first contemplated. The extinction of the revolutionary spirit, the stoppage of the insidious system of propagandism, by which the French democracy were shaking all the thrones, and endangering all the institutions and liberties of Europe, was the real object of the war. The restoration of the Bourbons was never considered of importance, further than as affording a guarantee, and what at first appeared the best guarantee, against that tremendous danger. By the result of a struggle of nine years' duration, this object had been gained, not indeed in the way which at first would have been deemed most likely to effect it, but in a manner which experience soon proved was far more efficacious. The restoration of an amiable and honourable, but weak and unwarlike race of monarchs, would have been but a feeble barrier against the turbulent spirit of French democracy ; but the elevation of an energetic and resolute conqueror to the throne, who guided the army by his authority and dazzled the people by his victories, proved perfectly sufficient to coerce its excesses. Napoleon said truly, "that he was the best friend which the cause of order in Europe ever had, and that he did more for its sovereigns, by the spirit which he repressed in France, than evil by the victories which he gained in Germany." The conquests which he achieved affected only the external power or present liberty of nations ; they did not change the internal frame of government, or prevent the future resurrection of freedom : and when his military despotism was subverted, the face of European society reappeared from under the mask of slavery without any material alteration. But the innovations of the National Assembly totally sub-

verted the fabric of a constitutional monarchy, and by destroying all the intermediate classes between the throne and the peasantry, left to the people of France no alternative for the remainder of their history but American equality or Asiatic despotism. The cause of order and freedom, therefore, gained immensely by the accession of Napoleon to the throne. Great as were the dangers to the independence of the surrounding states from the military power which he wielded, they were trifling in comparison of the perils to the very existence of liberty which arose from the democratic innovations of his predecessors.

But though the cause of liberty was thus relieved from its most pressing dangers, the moment that the First Consul seized the helm, the peril to the independence of the surrounding states, and of England in particular, became extreme. His conduct soon showed what his memoirs have since confessed, that he had formed, from the very commencement, a resolution to make France the first of European powers, and turn all the energies of their combined forces against the existence of Great Britain. Already his measures were all directed to this end. He made it the first condition of peace to all the vanquished nations, that they should exclude English ships from their harbours, and he had contrived, by flattering the vanity of the Emperor of Russia, and skilfully fomenting the jealousy of the neutral states, to combine a formidable maritime league against England in the north of Europe. Thus, as time rolled on, the war totally altered its object; and the danger of subjugation changed sides. Commenced to stop the revolutionary propagandism of France, it terminated by being directed against the maritime preponderance of Great Britain; and England, which set out with heading the confederacy, ended by finding herself compelled to combat for her existence against the power of combined Europe.

In the progress of the conflict, also, a change not less important in the mode of carrying on the war had arisen; and the Revolutionary armies, in consequence of the penury of their domestic resources, had adopted a system of extorting supplies from the vanquished states, hitherto unknown in modern warfare. It had been the boast of the philosophic historian that civilisation had softened

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1801.

88.
Evidence of
Napoleon's
implacable
hostility to
England.

89.
Increasing
and system-
atic pillage
by the Re-
publican
armies.

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1891.

¹ Gibbon.

even the rude features of war in modern Europe; that industry securely reaped its harvest amidst hostile squadrons, and the invaded territory felt the enemy's presence rather by the quickened sale for its produce than by the ruthless hand of the spoiler.¹ But though this was often true when Gibbon wrote, the French Revolution had introduced a very different system, and made war retrograde to the rapine and spoliation of barbarous times. The Revolutionary armies issued from the Republic as the Goths had in former days from the regions of the north, powerful in numbers, destitute of resources, starving from want, but ferocious in spirit, energetic in will, reckless of crime. Determined to seek for plenty, at the sword's point, from the countries through which they passed, the principle on which they uniformly acted was to make war maintain war, and levy in its theatre, whether a hostile or neutral territory, the means of carrying on the contest. They formed no magazines; brought with them no money; paid for nothing; but by the terrors of military execution wrung from the wretched inhabitants the most ample supplies. "The army of Moreau," says General Mathieu Dumas, himself not the least distinguished of the Republican commanders, "ransacked the country between the Rhine and the Inn, devoured its subsistence, and reduced the inhabitants to despair, while it maintained the strictest discipline. The devastation of war for centuries before, even that of the Thirty Years, was nothing in comparison. Since the period when regular armies had been formed, the losses occasioned by the marches and combats of armies were passing evils; the conquest of a country did not draw after it its ruin. If a few districts, or some towns carried by assault, were abandoned to the fury of the soldiers, the inexorable pen of history loaded with reproaches the captains who permitted, or the sovereigns who did not punish such outrages. But Moreau's army levied, in a few months, above twenty millions of francs (£800,000) in requisitions; enormous contributions were unceasingly exacted; the people were overwhelmed; the governments of the oppressed states entirely exhausted. It was reserved for our age to witness, in the midst of the rapid progress of civilisation, and after so many eloquent declamations in favour of humanity,² the scourge of war

¹ Dumas, v.
72, 73.

immeasurably extended; the art of government becomes in the hands of the conqueror an instrument of extortion, and systematic robbery, he styled, by the leaders of regeneration, the right of conquest.

Even in this gloomy state of the political horizon, however, the streaks of light were becoming visible which were destined to expand into all the lustre of day. The invasion of the French troops, their continued residence in the states, had already gone far to dispel those illusions in their favour, to which, even more than the terror of their arms, their astonishing successes had been owing. Their standards were no longer hailed with enthusiasm by the people who had experienced their presence; the declaration of war to the palace and peace to the cottage had ceased to deceive mankind. The consequences of their conquests had been felt. Requisitions and taxes—merciless requisitions, grievous taxes—had been found to follow rapidly in the footsteps of these alluring pretensions; penury, want, and starvation were seen to stalk in the rear of the tricolor flag. Already the symptoms of POPULAR RESISTANCE were to be seen; the peasantry even of the unwarlike Italian peninsula had repeatedly and spontaneously flown to arms; the patriotic efforts of Austria had recalled the glorious days of Maria Theresa; the heroic sacrifices of the Forest Cantons had emulated the virtues, if not the triumphs, of Sempach and Morgarten. Unmarked as it was amidst the blaze of military glory, the sacred flame was beginning to spread which was destined to set free mankind; banished from the court and the castle, the stern resolution to resist was gathering strength among the cottages of the poor. It is in such reflections that the philosophic mind best derives consolation for the many evils arising from the ambition of the rulers, and the wickedness of the agitators of mankind; and by observing how uniformly, when oppression becomes intolerable, an under current begins to flow, destined ultimately to correct it, that the surest foundation is laid for confidence in the final arrangements of Supreme Wisdom, amidst the misfortunes or the vices of the world.

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* 90.
Symptoms
of patriotic
and general
resistance
springing
up.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

FROM THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE TO THE DISSOLUTION OF
THE NORTHERN MARITIME CONFEDERACY. NOVEMBER
1792—MAY 1801.

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1801.

1.

Origin of the
difference of
the laws of
war at sea
and land.

THERE arises, from the very nature of the elements on which they are respectively exercised, an essential difference between the laws of war at sea and at land. Territorial conquests are attended by immediate and important advantages to the victorious power. It gains possession of a fruitful country, of opulent cities, of spacious harbours, and costly fortresses; it steps at once into the authority of the ruling government over the subject state, and all its resources in money, provisions, men, and implements of war, are at its command. But the victor at sea finds himself in a very different situation. The most decisive naval victories draw after them no acquisition of inhabitants, wealth, or resources; the ocean is unproductive alike of taxes or tribute, and among the solitary recesses of the deep you will search in vain for the populous cities or fertile fields which reward the valour of terrestrial ambition. The more a power extends itself at land, the more formidable does it become, because it unites to its own the forces of the vanquished state; the more it extends itself at sea, the more it is weakened, if it trusts to the deep alone for its resources, because the surface which it must protect is augmented, without any proportional addition being made to the means by which its empire is to be maintained.

In the infancy of mankind the usages of war are the same on both elements. Alike at sea as on shore the persons and property of the vanquished are at the disposal of

the conquerors; and from the sack of cities and the sale of captives the vast sums are obtained which constitute the object and the reward of their inhuman hostility. The liberty for which the Greeks and Romans contended was not mere national independence or civil privileges, but liberation from domestic or predial servitude, from the degradation of helots, or the lash of patricians. Such is to this day the custom in all the uncivilised portions of the globe, in Asia, Africa, and among the savages of America; and such, till comparatively recent times, was the practice even among the Christian monarchies and chivalrous nobility of modern Europe. But with the growth of opulence, and the extension of more humane ideas, these rigid usages have been universally softened among the European nations. As agriculture and commerce improved, and population augmented, it was found to be as impossible as it was inhuman to carry off all the property of the vanquished people, the growth, perhaps, of centuries of industry, or attempt to reduce millions of men at once to a state of slavery. The revenue and public possessions of the state furnished an ample fund to reward the conquering power, while the regular pay and fixed maintenance at the public expense of the soldiers, took away the pretext for private pillage as a measure of necessity. All nations, subject in their turn to the vicissitudes of fortune, found it for their interest to adopt this lenient system, which so materially diminished the horrors of war; and hence the practice became general, excepting in the storming of towns, and other extreme cases, where the vehemence of passion bade defiance to the restraints of discipline, to respect private property in the course of hostilities, and look for remuneration only to the public revenue, or property of the state. It is the disgrace of the leaders of the French Revolution, that amidst all their declamations in favour of humanity, they were the first who have departed from these beneficent usages, and, under the specious names of contributions, and of making war support war, have restored at the opening of the nineteenth, the rapacious oppression of the ninth century.

Humanity would have just reason to rejoice, if it were practicable to establish a similar system of restrained hostility at sea; if the principle of confining the right of

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3.
Original
usages still
kept up at
sea.

capture to public property could be introduced on the one element as well as the other, and the private merchant were in safety to navigate the deep amidst hostile fleets, in the same manner as the carrier at land securely traverses opposing armies. But it has never been found practicable to introduce such a limitation, nor has it ever been attempted, even by the most civilised nations, as a restraint upon their own hostility, however loudly they may sometimes have demanded it as a bridle upon that of their enemies. And when the utter sterility of the ocean, except as forming a highway for the intercourse of mankind, is considered, it does not appear probable that, until the human heart is essentially changed, such an alteration, how desirable soever by the weaker states, ever can be adopted. It may become general when ambition and national rivalry cease to sway the human heart, but not till then. Certain it is, that of all nations upon earth revolutionary France had the least title to contend for such a change; she having not only introduced new usages of unprecedented rigour in modern times into her warfare at land, but issued and acted upon edicts for her maritime hostility on principles worthy of Turkish barbarity.*

4.
Common
maritime
law of
Europe as
to neutral
vessels.

But it is not merely with the subjects of nations in a state of hostility that belligerents are brought in contact during modern warfare; they find themselves continually in collision also with NEUTRAL VESSELS trading with their enemies, and endeavouring, from the prospect of high profits, to furnish them with those articles which they are prevented from receiving directly from the trade of their own subjects. Here new and important interests arise, and some limitation of the rigour of maritime usage evidently becomes indispensable. If the superior power at sea can at pleasure declare any enemy's territory in a state of blockade, and make prize of all neutral vessels navigating to any of its harbours, it will not only speedily find itself involved in hostilities with all maritime states, but

* The decree of the Directory, 18th January 1798, declares, that all vessels found on the high seas with any English goods whatever on board, to whomsoever belonging, shall be good prize; that neutral sailors found on board English vessels shall be put to death, and that the harbours of France shall be shut against all vessels which had touched at an English harbour; and it requires certificates of origin, under the hands of French consuls, exactly as the Berlin and Milan decrees afterwards did.—*Robinson's Admiralty Reports*, i. 341.

engaged in a species of warfare from which itself at some future period may derive essential injury. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to maintain that the vessels of other states are to be entirely exempted from restraint in such cases; or that a belligerent power, whose warlike operations are dependent perhaps upon intercepting the supplies in progress towards its antagonist, is patiently to see all its enterprises defeated, merely because they are conveyed under the cover of a neutral flag instead of on its enemy's bottoms. Such a pretension would render maritime success of no avail, and wars interminable, by enabling the weaker power, under fictitious cover, securely to repair all its losses. These considerations are so obvious, and are brought so frequently into collision in maritime warfare, that they early caused the introduction of a system of international law, which for centuries has been recognised by all the states of Europe, and is summed up in the following propositions by the greatest masters of that important branch of jurisprudence that ever appeared in this or any other country.

1. That it is not lawful for neutral nations to carry on, in time of war, for the advantage or on the behalf of one of the belligerent powers, those branches of their commerce from which they are excluded in time of peace.

* 5.
Principles
of that law.

2. That every belligerent power may capture the property of its enemies wherever it shall meet with it on the high seas, and may for that purpose detain and bring into port neutral vessels laden wholly or in part with any such property.

3. That under the description of contraband of war, which neutrals are prohibited from carrying to the belligerent powers, the law of nations, if not restrained by special treaty, includes all naval as well as military stores, and generally all articles serving principally to afford to one belligerent power the instrument and means of annoyance to be used against the other.

4. That it is lawful for naval powers, when engaged in war, to blockade the ports of their enemies by cruising squadrons *bona fide* allotted to that service, and duly competent to its execution. That such blockade is valid and legitimate, although there be no design to attack or reduce by force the port, or arsenal to which it is applied; and

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1801.

that the fact of the blockade, with due notice given thereof to neutral powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with, and shall be found to have been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the blockade.

5. That the right of visiting and searching neutral vessels is a necessary consequence of these principles; and that, by the law of nations, (when unrestrained by particular treaty,) this right is not in any manner affected by the presence of a neutral ship of war, having under its convoy merchant ships, either of its own nation or of any other country.¹

In these propositions are contained the general principles of the maritime code of the whole European nations, as it has been exercised by all states towards each other, and laid down by all authorities on the subject from the dawn of civilisation. The special application of these principles to the question immediately at issue between the contending powers in 1801 is contained in the following propositions, laid down as incontestable law by that great master of maritime and international law, Sir William Scott:—

1. "That the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be the destinations, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation.*

2. "That the authority of the sovereign of the neutral country being interposed in any matter of mere force, cannot legally vary the rights of a legally commissioned belligerent cruiser, or deprive him of his right to search at common law.†

* "This right of search," says Sir William Scott, "is clear in practice, which is uniform and universal upon the subject. The many European treaties which refer to this right refer to it as pre-existing, and merely regulate the exercise of it. All writers upon the law of nations unanimously acknowledge it, without the exception even of Hubner himself, the great champion of neutral privileges. In short, no man, in the least conversant with subjects of this kind, has ever, that I know of, breathed a doubt upon it."—*Robinson's Admiralty Reports*, i. 60: *The Maria*.

† Two sovereigns may agree, as in some instances they have agreed by special covenant, that the presence of one of their armed ships along with their merchant ships, is to be held as a sufficient guarantee that nothing is to be found in that convoy of merchant ships inconsistent with amity or neutrality; but no sovereign can, by the common law of nations, legally

¹ Lord Grenville's speech, 13th Nov., on the convention with Russia. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 211, 212.

6. Sir William Scott's exposition of the maritime law.

3. "That the penalty for the violent contravention of this right, is the confiscation of the property so withheld from visitation and search.¹

4. "That nothing further is necessary to constitute blockade, than that there should be a force stationed to prevent communication, and a due notice or prohibition given to the party.²

5. "That articles tending probably to aid the hostilities of one of the belligerents, as arms, ammunition, stores, and, in some cases, provisions, are contraband of war, and as such liable to seizure by the vessels of the other party, with the vessel in which they are conveyed."³*

These rights had never formed any peculiar or exclusive privilege, which the English claimed alone of all other nations. On the contrary, under the equitable modifications introduced by the common maritime law, they had, from the dawn of European civilisation, been universally acknowledged and maintained equally by the courts and

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¹ Sir William Scott in the *Maria Robinson's Admiralty Reports*, i. 359, 363.

² *Ibid.* i. 86.

³ The *Jouge Margareta*, *Ibid.* i. 190, 191.

7.
This law universal in Europe prior to 1780.

compel the acceptance of such a security by mere force, or compel the belligerent to forego the only security known in the law of nations upon this subject, independent of special covenant—the right of personal visitation.

* The judgments of Sir William Scott are here referred to with perfect confidence, as explaining not merely the English understanding of the maritime law, but that which for centuries has been recognised and admitted by all the European states. "In forming my judgments," says that great authority, "I trust it has not for one moment escaped my anxious recollection that the duty of my station calls me to consider myself not as stationed here to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out, *without distinction*, to independent states—some happening to be neutral and some belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine the question exactly as he would determine it if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretension on the part of Great Britain, which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to impose no duties on Sweden as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character."⁴ And of the impartiality with which this great duty at this period was exercised by this distinguished judge, we have the best evidence in the testimony of another eminent statesman, the warm advocate of neutral rights, and certainly no conceder of undeserved praise to his political opponents. "Nothing," says Lord Chancellor Brougham, "can be more instructive than the decisions of our prize courts on this point, (the right of search,) and nothing can give us more gratifying views of the purity with which those tribunals administer the law of nations, and their impartiality in trying the delicate questions which come before them, between their own sovereign or their own countrymen, and the rulers or the people of other states. It is with pleasure, therefore, that we have to consider how anxiously and rigorously at this period (1799—1800) the principles for which we are contending have been enforced in the High Court of Admiralty under the presidency of Sir William Scott."—*Edin. Review*, vol. xix. 298, 299.

⁴ Robinson's Reports, i. 350.

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¹ Sir William Scott.
Robinson, i.
360. Lord
Eldon.
Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 886.

² Per Sir
W. Grant.
Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 922.

³ See Sir
William
Grant. Parl.
Hist. xxxv.
922; and Dr
Lawrence,
919, 920.

the lawyers of Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and England.¹ Authors there were, indeed, who contended in their studies for a different principle, and strenuously asserted that the flag should cover the merchandise; but these novel speculations had never received any sanction from the maritime law of Europe, or the practice, independent of express treaty, of belligerent states; and accordingly, various treaties had been entered into among different powers, restraining or limiting the right of search between their respective subjects,² precisely because they knew that but for that special stipulation the common maritime law would admit it. So strongly was this felt by the English lawyers who, in the House of Commons, espoused the cause of the neutral powers previous to the maritime confederacy in 1800, that they admitted the right of Great Britain to search neutral ships for the goods of an enemy, and that the northern confederacy contended for a principle which militated against the established law of nations, as laid down with universal assent by that great master of the maritime law, Lord Mansfield; and maintained merely that it would be prudent to abate somewhat of former pretensions in the present disastrous crisis of public affairs.³*

- * The hardihood with which it is constantly asserted by the foreign diplomatists and historians, that the principles of maritime law for which England contends, are a usurpation on her part, founded on mere power, and unsanctioned, either by the usage of other states, or the principles of maritime jurisprudence, renders it important to lay before the reader a few of the authorities of foreign legal writers on the subject.

Elneccius says, "Idem statuendum arbitramur, si res hostiles in navibus amicorum reperiantur. *Illas capi posse nemo dubitat, quia hosti in res hostiles omnia licent, eatenus ut eas ubicunque repertas, sibi possit vindicari.*"—*De Navibus ob. vict. c. ii. sec. 9.*

- "I believe it cannot be doubted," says President Jefferson, "that by the general law of nations, the goods of a friend found in the vessels of an enemy are free; and the goods of an enemy found in the vessels of a friend are good prize."—JEFFERSON'S *Letter to GENET, 24th July 1797.*

"The ordinances of the old French marine, under the monarchy, direct that not only shall the enemy's property, found on board a neutral vessel, be confiscated, but the neutral ship itself be declared lawful prize." The practice of England has always been to release all neutral property found on board an enemy's ship; but France always considered it as lawful prize.—*Ordonnance de Marine. Art. 7. Valin. 284.*

"Les choses qui sont d'un usage particulier pour la guerre, et dont on empêche le transport chez un ennemi, s'appellent marchandises de contrebande. Telles sont les armes, les munitions de guerre, les bois, et tout ce qui sert à la construction et à l'armement des vaisseaux de guerre."—VATTELL, c. 7, sec. 112.

In their letter to M. Pinckney, January 16, 1797, the American Government expressly declare that, "by the law of nations, timber and other naval stores are contraband of war."—*See Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 213, note.*

"On ne peut empêcher le transport des effets de contrebande, si l'on

From motives of policy, indeed, England had repeatedly waived or abated this right of search in favour of particular states by special agreement. This was done towards Holland in 1674, to detach that power from France, and in the belief that the United States would never be neutral when England was at war; and to France, by the commercial treaty of 1787, under the influence of the same idea that she would never be neutral when Great Britain was in a state of hostility. But in the absence of such express stipulation, these rights had been invariably exercised both by England towards other nations, and other nations towards England; particularly by Lord Chatham during the whole course of the Seven Years' war, and the ministers of Anne during the long war of the Succession, without any complaint whatever from neutral states. And of the disposition of England to submit in her turn to the maritime law which she requires from others, no better instance can be desired than occurred during the Duke of Wellington's administration in 1829, when the English Government declined to interfere in the capture of a British merchantman trying to elude the blockade of Terceira, though a few English frigates would have sent the whole Portuguese navy to the bottom.¹

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XXXIII.

1601.

B.

But these rights were sometimes abated by special treaty. Dec. 11, 1674.

¹ Per Sir W. Grant. Parl. Hist. xxv. 922.

ne visite pas les vaisseaux neutres que l'on rencontre en mer: on est donc en droit de les visiter."—VATTEAU, c. 3. sec. 114.

"Tout vaisseau qui refusera d'amener ses voiles après la sommation qui lui en aura été faite par nos vaisseaux ou ceux de nos sujets, armés en guerre, pourra y être contraint par artillerie ou autrement, et en cas de résistance et de combat, il sera de bonne prise."—*Ordonnance de la Marine de France*.—Tit. Procès, Art. 12. The Spanish ordinance of 1718 has an article to the same effect.

"Other nations," says Heeren, "advanced similar claims in maritime affairs to the English; but as they had not the same naval power to support them, this was of little consequence."—*European States System*, ii. 41.

The claims of neutrals for the security of their commerce are stated by Bynkerschoek as limited to this, that they may continue to trade in war as they did in peace. But this claim, he adds, is limited by the rights of a belligerent. "*Quæritur quid facere aut non facere possunt inter duos hostes: omnia forte iniqua quæ potuerunt si pax esset inter eos, quos inter nunc est bellum.*"—BYNKERSCHOEK, *Quæst. Juris*. Pub. i. 9.

These principles were fully recognised in various treaties between England and other maritime states. In article 12 of the treaty 1661, between Sweden and England, it was provided, "But lest such freedom of navigation and passage of the one confederate should be of detriment to the other while engaged in war, by sea or land, with other nations, and lest the goods or merchandise of the enemy should be concealed under the name of a friend and ally, for the avoiding all suspicion and fraud of such sort, it is agreed, that all ships, carriages, wares, and men, belonging to either of the confederates, shall be furnished in their voyage with certificates, specifying the names of the ships, carriages, goods, and masters of the vessels, together with such other descriptions as are expressed in the

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1801.

9.
Origin of
resistance to
these rights.
Armed neu-
trality.

The obvious disadvantage, however, to which such a maritime code must occasionally expose neutral states, by sometimes depriving them of a trade at the very time when it is likely to be most lucrative; and the natural jealousy at the exercise of so invidious a right as that of search, especially when put in force by the stronger against the weaker power, had long led to complaints against belligerent states. In 1740, the King of Prussia disputed the right of England to search neutral vessels, though without following up his protest with actual resistance; and in 1762 the Dutch contended, that it could not be admitted by their vessels when sailing under convoy. But nothing serious was done to support these novel pretensions till the year 1780, when the Northern Powers, seeing England hard pressed by the fleets of France and Spain at the close of the American war, deemed the opportunity favourable to establish by force of arms a new code of maritime laws; and accordingly entered into the famous confederacy known by the name of the ARMED NEUTRALITY, which was the first open declaration of war by neutral powers against Great Britain and the old system of maritime rights. By this treaty, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark proclaimed the principles, that free ships make free goods, that the flag covers the merchandise, and that a blockaded port is to be understood only when such a force is stationed at its entrance as renders it dangerous to enter.¹*

1 Ann. Reg.
1780, 206,
348.

So undisguised an attack upon the ancient code of European law, which England had so decided an interest to

following form, &c., and if the goods of an enemy are found in such ship of the confederate, that part only which belongs to the enemy shall be made prize, and what belongs to the confederate shall be immediately restored." There is a similar clause in article 20 of the treaty between England and Denmark in 1760.—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 228.

* The words of the proclamation are, 1. That all neutral ships may freely navigate from port to port, and on the coasts of nations at war. 2. That the effects belonging to the subjects of the said warring powers shall be free in all neutral vessels, except contraband merchandise. 3. That the articles are to be deemed contraband which are mentioned in the 10th and 11th articles of Russia's treaty of commerce with Great Britain. 4. That to determine what is meant by a blockaded port, this only is to be understood of one, which is so well kept in by the ships of the power which attacks it, and which keep their places, that it is dangerous to enter into it. See *Declaration of Russia*, 23d April 1780. *Ann. Reg.* xxxv. 348, *State Papers*. It is worthy of observation, as Sir William Scott observes, that even in this manifesto no denial of the right of search is to be found, at least to the effect of determining whether or not the neutral has contraband articles on board.—See *Robinson's Reports*, i. 360; *The Maria*.

1801.

10.

Subsequently abandoned by the Northern Powers in their own case.

maintain, because its abandonment placed the defeated in as advantageous circumstances as the victorious power, in fact amounted to a declaration of war against Great Britain. But her Cabinet were compelled to dissemble their resentment at, that time, in consequence of the disastrous state of public affairs at the close of the American contest. They contented themselves, therefore, with protesting against these novel doctrines at the northern capitals, and had influence enough at the court of the Hague, soon after, to procure their abandonment by the Dutch United States. The Baltic Powers, however, during the continuance of the American war, adhered to the principles thus laid down; although no allusion was made to them in the peace which followed. But they soon found that it introduced rules so much at variance with the practice of European warfare, that they were immediately obliged, when they in their turn became belligerents, to revert to the old system.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1780, 206,
207.

In particular, when Sweden went to war with Russia in 1787, she totally abandoned the principles of the armed neutrality, and acted invariably upon the ancient maritime code. Russia, in the same year, reverted to the old principles in her war with the Turks, and in 1793 entered into a maritime treaty with Great Britain, in which she expressly gave up the principles of the year 1780, and engaged to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the high seas, or in the harbours of that country. Both Denmark and Sweden were bound by the treaties of 1661 and 1670, with England, to admit the right of search, and give up the pretension to carry enemy's property; and by a convention entered into between these two powers in 1794, which was communicated by them to the British government, they bound themselves "to claim no advantage which is not clearly and unexceptionably founded on their respective treaties with the powers at war, and not to claim, in cases not specified in their treaties, any advantage which is not founded on the universal law of nations, hitherto acknowledged and respected by all the powers and all the sovereigns of Europe, and from which they can as little suppose that any of them will depart, as they are incapable

11.
Treaties with Russia, Sweden, and America, recognising this right to England.

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1 Conven-
tion, March
27, 1794.
Ann. Reg.
1794, 238.

of departing from it themselves." Further, both Russia* and Denmark had issued edicts, at the commencement of the war, in which they prohibited their subjects from taking on board contraband articles;† while America, in the same year, had entered into a maritime treaty with England, in which the right of search was expressly admitted.‡ Both by the common maritime law, and by the force of recent and subsisting treaties, therefore, the right of search,¹

* In 1793, the Empress of Russia herself proposed and concluded a treaty with Great Britain, in which she expressly engaged to unite with his Britannic Majesty "all her efforts to prevent other powers not implicated in this war from giving any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, in consequence of their neutrality, to the commerce and property of the French on the sea, or in the ports of France;" and, in execution of this treaty, she sent a fleet into the Baltic and North Seas, with express orders "to seize and capture all the ships bearing the pretended French flag, or any other flags which they may dare to hoist; and to stop also and to compel all neutral vessels bound to or freighted for France, according as they shall deem it most expedient, either to sail back or enter some neutral harbour."—*Note, 30th July 1793, by the Russian ambassador to the High Chancellor of Sweden, Ann. Reg. 1793, p. 175, State Papers.* A similar note was presented to the Court of Denmark at the same time, and both Denmark and Sweden, in their treaty with each other, on July 6, 1794, Prussia in her treaty with America in 1797, Russia in her war with the Turks in 1787, and Sweden in her war with Russia in 1789, promulgated and acted upon these principles, diametrically opposed to the doctrines of the armed neutrality.² With such ardour was this system acted upon by the Emperor Paul, that he threatened the Danes with immediate hostilities in 1799, on account "of their supplying assistance and protection to the trade of France, under the neutral colours of the Danish flag; and he was only prevented from carrying these threats into immediate execution by the amicable interference of Great Britain; a seasonable interposition, which Denmark repeatedly acknowledged with becoming gratitude.—*Ann. Reg. 1800, p. 91.* In the following year the same system was further acted on. In 1794 the Empress notified to the Swedish Court, that "the Empress of Russia has thought proper to fit out a fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, with frigates proportional, to cruise in the North Seas, for the purpose (in conjunction with the English maritime forces) of preventing the sending of any provisions or ammunition to France; the Empress therefore requests the King of Sweden not to permit his ships of war to take any Swedish merchantmen laden with any such commodities under their convoy. Her Imperial Majesty further orders all merchant ships which her squadron may meet in those seas to be searched, to see if their cargoes consist of any such goods." A similar declaration was made by the Court of Russia to that of Denmark, both dated August 6, 1794.—*Ann. Reg. 1794, p. 241, State Papers.*

† We, Christian VII., King of Denmark, order, that "should any vessel bound to a neutral harbour take in such goods or merchandise as, if they were consigned to any harbour of the belligerent powers, would be contraband, and as such stipulated in the treaties between those powers and us, and mentioned in our orders and proclamations of 22d and 25th February 1793, besides the oath of the master and freighter of the ships, there shall be made a special declaration conformable to the invoice and bills of lading," to show the destination of the said ship.—*Ibid. p. 240-241.*

‡ "In the event of vessels being captured, or detained on suspicion of having enemy's property on board, such property alone is to be taken out, and the vessels are to be permitted to proceed to sea with the remainder of their cargo."—*Art. 17, Treaty between Great Britain and America, 18th May 1795.*—*Art. 18, specifies what articles are to be deemed contraband.*—*Ann. Reg. 1795, p. 296-297, State Papers.*

2 Parl. Hist.
xxvii. 208.

claimed by Great Britain, was founded on an unquestionable basis.

But this specific state of matters was totally altered by the result of the maritime war, and especially by the decisive battle of the Nile. These great events, by entirely sweeping the French flag from the ocean, left them dependent on other powers for the supplies necessary for their navy; and the Republican government saw the necessity of relaxing the rigour of their former proceedings against neutrals, in order, through their intervention, to acquire the means of restoring their marine. The intemperate conduct of the Directory, and the arbitrary doctrines which they enforced in regard to neutrals, had all but involved the Republic in open hostilities with America, Denmark, and Sweden; and on the accession of the First Consul, he found an embargo laid on all the ships of these powers in the French harbours. The *arrets* of the Directory of the 18th January, and 29th October 1798, were to the last degree injurious to neutral commerce, for they declared every vessel good prize which had on board any quantity, however small, of British merchandise; and in virtue of that law, numbers of American vessels had been seized and condemned in the French harbours. Adding insult to injury, the Directory, in the midst of these piratical proceedings, gravely proposed to the Americans that they should lend them 48,900,000 francs; insinuating at the same time, that the loan should be accompanied by the sum of 1,200,000 francs, (£48,000,) to be divided, as a private *douceur*, between Barras and Talleyrand.¹

These extravagances so irritated the Americans, that, by an act of the Legislature, they declared the United States "liberated from the stipulations in the treaty of 1778 with France, and authorised the President to arm vessels of war to defend their commerce against the French cruisers;" grounding these extreme measures upon the statement that the French had confiscated the cargoes of great numbers of American vessels having enemy's property on board, while it was expressly stipulated, by the treaty of 1778, that the flag should cover the cargo; had equipped privateers in the ports of the Union contrary to the rights of neutrality, and treated American seamen found on board enemy's ship, as pirates.² This led, in its turn, to

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12.

But the neutrals suffered severely in the close of the war.

¹ Bign. i. 280.

13.

Excessive violence of the Directory against America July 7, 1796.

² Nap. i. 109, ii. 110, 111. iii. 112. Bign. i. 280, 275, 276.

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14.
Napoleon
terminates
the differ-
ences of
France with
America.

an embargo in the French harbours, on all American vessels; and nothing but the Atlantic which rolled between them, and the British cruisers which prevented them reaching each other, prevented these two democratic states from engaging in fierce hostility with each other.

But this state of mutual exasperation was soon terminated after the accession of the First Consul to the helm. He at once perceived the extreme impolicy of irritating, by additional acts of spoliation, a power recently at war with Great Britain, and still labouring under a strong feeling of hostility towards that state; the firm ally in better times of France, and one of the most important in the maritime league which he already contemplated against the English naval power. He received, therefore, with distinguished honour the American envoys who were dispatched from New York, in the end of 1799, to make a last effort to adjust the difference between the two countries; and published a warm eulogium on the great Washington, when intelligence arrived in France, early in the spring following, of the death of that spotless patriot. At the same time, the embargo on American vessels was taken off in the French harbours, and every possible facility was given to the commencement of negotiations between the two powers. Prospective arrangements were readily agreed on, both parties having an equal interest in establishing the new maritime code of the armed neutrality; but it was not found so easy a matter to adjust the injuries that were past, or reconcile the consular government to those indemnities which the Americans so loudly demanded for the acts of piracy long exercised upon their commerce. At length it was agreed to leave these difficult points to ulterior arrangement in a separate convention, and conclude a treaty for the regulation of neutral rights in future times.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1800, 288,
289. Bign.
i. 277.

15.
Maritime
treaty with
America.
Sept. 30,
1800.

By this treaty, signed at Morfontaine on the 30th September 1800, the new code was fully established. It was stipulated, 1st, That the flag should cover the merchandise. 2d, That contraband of war should be understood only of warlike stores, cannon, muskets, and other arms. 3d, That the right of search to ascertain the flag and examine whether there were any contraband articles on board should be carried into effect, out of cannon-shot of the

visiting vessel, by a boat containing two or three men only; that every neutral ship should have on board a certificate, setting forth to what country it belonged, and that that certificate should be held as good evidence of its contents; that if contraband articles were found on board they only should be confiscated, and not the ship or remainder of the cargo: that no vessels under convoy should be subject to search, but the declaration of the commander of the convoy be received instead: that those harbours only should be understood to be blockaded, where a sufficient force was stationed at their mouth to render it evidently dangerous to attempt to enter; and that enemy's property on board neutral vessels should be covered by their flag, in the same manner as neutral goods found on board enemy's vessels.¹ So far the French influence prevailed in this convention; but they failed in their attempt to get the Americans openly to renounce the treaty concluded in 1794 with Great Britain, which could not have been done without at once embroiling them with the British cabinet. A similar convention had previously been entered into on the same principles between the United States and the Prussian government.²

Circumstances at this period were singularly favourable to the revival of the principles of the armed neutrality. A recurrence of the same political relations had restored both the grievances and the ambition which, at the close of the American war, had led to that formidable confederacy. Neutral vessels, endeavouring to slide into the lucrative trade which the destruction of the French marine opened up with that country, found themselves perpetually exposed to inquisition from the British cruisers; and numerous condemnations had taken place in the English courts, which, though perfectly agreeable to the law of nations, and to existing treaties between Great Britain and the governments of the neutral states, were naturally felt as exceedingly hard by the sufferers under them, and all contributed to renew the ancient and inextinguishable jealousy of their respective cabinets at the British naval power. In December 1799, an altercation took place in the straits of Gibraltar between some English frigates and a Danish ship, the *Hausenan*, in which the Dane refused to submit to a search of the con-

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XXXII.
1801.

¹ Treaty, Articles 18, 19. Ann. Reg. 1800, 238, 239. Nap. ii. 122, 123. Bign. i. 277, 278. Dum. vi. 96. Martens, vii. 304.

² On July 11, 1799. See State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1800, 294, 295. Articles 13, 14, 15.

16.
Revival of the principles of the armed neutrality.

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XXXIII.

1801.

voy under his command; but the conduct of the captain in this instance was formally disavowed by his government, and the amicable relations of the two countries continued unchanged. The next collision of the same kind which took place, however, occasioned more serious consequences. On 25th July 1800, the commander of the Danish frigate, *Freya*, refused to allow his convoy to be searched, but, agreeably to the recent stipulations in the treaties between France and America, offered to show his certificates to the British officer: intimating, at the same time, that if a boat was sent to make a search it would be fired upon. The British captain upon this laid his vessel alongside the Dane, and resistance being still persisted in, gave her a broadside, and, after a short action, brought her into the Downs.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1800, 94, 95.
Nap. ii. 117,
118. Bign. i.
292. Hard.
vii. 444, 445.

17.
Lord Whitworth is sent to Copenhagen, and enters into an accommodation. Aug. 23, 1800.

The English cabinet at this time had received intelligence of the hostile negotiations which were going on in the northern courts relative to neutral rights, and deeming it probable that this event would be made the signal for openly declaring their intentions, they wisely resolved to anticipate an attack. For this purpose Lord Whitworth was sent on a special message to Copenhagen; and, to give the greater weight to his representations, a squadron of nine sail of the line, four bombs, and five frigates, was dispatched to the Sound, under the command of Admiral Dickson. They found four Danish line-of-battle ships moored across that strait, from Cromberg castle to the Swedish shore; but the English fleet passed without any hostilities being committed on either side, and cast anchor off the harbour of Copenhagen. The Danes were busily employed in strengthening their fortifications; batteries were erected on advantageous situations near the coast, and three floating bulwarks moored across the mouth of the harbour; but their preparations were not yet complete, and the strength of the British squadron precluded the hope of successful resistance. An accommodation was therefore entered into, the principal conditions of which were, "that the frigate and convoy carried into the Downs should be repaired at the expense of the British government; and that the question as to the right of search should be adjourned for further consideration to London."² Until this point was settled, the Danish ships were to sail

Aug. 29.
² Ann. Reg.
1800, 93, 97.
Nap. ii. 117,
116. Bign. i.
292.

with convoy only in the Mediterranean, for the purpose of protection from the Barbary cruisers, and in the mean time their other vessels were to be liable to be searched as heretofore."

Situated as Great Britain was, this treaty was a real triumph to her arms, and reflected no small credit on the vigour and ability of the government by which so delicate a matter had been brought to so favourable a conclusion. It might have been adjusted without any further effusion of blood, had it not been for a train of circumstances which, about the same time, alienated the vehement and capricious Emperor of Russia from the British alliance. The northern Autocrat had been exceedingly irritated at the bad success of the combined operations both in Switzerland and Holland; the first of which he ascribed to the ill conduct of the German, the latter of the British auxiliaries. This feeling was increased by the impolitic refusal of the British government to include Russian prisoners with English in the exchange with French; a proposal which, considering that they had fought side by side in the Dutch campaign, in which English interests were mainly involved, it was perhaps imprudent to have declined, although the dubious conduct of Paul, in having withdrawn his troops from the German alliance, and broken with Austria, gave him no title to demand it as a right. Napoleon, as already observed, instantly and adroitly availed himself of this circumstance to appease the Czar. He professed the utmost indignation that the gallant Russians should remain in captivity from the refusal of the British government to agree to their liberation for French prisoners; set them at liberty without exchange, and not only sent them back to their own country, but restored to them the arms and standards which they had lost, and clothed them anew from head to foot in the uniform of their respective regiments. These courteous proceedings made the greatest impression on the impetuous Czar, the more so as they were contrasted with the imprudent refusal of his ally, the English government, to include them in their exchange. They led to an interchange of good offices between the two courts, which was soon ripened into an alliance of the strictest kind, in consequence of the vehement character of the Emperor,¹ and

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1801.

18.
Growing
irritation of
the Empe-
ror Paul at
the Allies.
Politie con-
duct of Na-
poleon.

¹ Bign. l.
287, 289.
Jom. xiv.
234. Nap.
ii. 128.

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XXVIII.

the unbounded admiration which he had conceived for the First Consul.

1801.

19.
Differences
about Malta.

Another circumstance at the same time occurred, which contributed not a little to widen the breach between the cabinets of St Petersburg and London. Disengaged from his war with France, and ardently desirous of warlike renown, the Emperor had revived the idea of the armed neutrality of 1780, and made proposals, in May and June 1800, to the cabinets of Stockholm and Copenhagen to that effect, which had produced the sudden change in the Danish instructions to their armed vessels to resist the search of the British cruisers. The island of Malta, it was foreseen, would soon surrender to the British squadron, and it was easy to anticipate that the English cabinet would not readily part with that important fortress; while the Emperor conceived that, as Grand Master of the order of St John of Jerusalem, to which it had formerly belonged, he was bound to stipulate its restoration to that celebrated order.¹

¹ Bign. i.
287, 290.
Hard. vi.
446.

90.
Violent pro-
ceedings of
Paul against
England,
Aug. 28,
1800, and
surrender of
Malta to
England.
Nov. 5, 1800.

Matters were in this uncertain state at the court of St Petersburg, when the arrival of the British squadron in the Sound brought them to a crisis. The Czar, with that impetuosity which formed the leading feature of his character, instantly ordered an embargo on all the British ships in the Russian harbours; and in consequence nearly three hundred vessels, most of them with valuable cargoes on board, were forcibly detained till the frost had set in, and the Baltic had become impassable. Nor was this all. Their crews were, with Asiatic barbarity, in defiance of all the usages of civilised states, marched off into prisons in the interior, many of them above a thousand miles from the coast; while the whole English property on shore was put under sequestration. Several British vessels at Narva weighed anchor and escaped the embargo; this so enraged the autocrat, that he ordered the remaining ships in the harbour to be burnt; and in the official gazette, published a declaration that the embargo should not be taken off till Malta was given up to Russia. The demand was rested on the allegation, that the restitution of that island to the order of Jerusalem was agreed upon in the convention, December 1798, between Great Britain and Russia, whereas that treaty contained no such stipulation.

Nov. 21

Sept. 15,
1800.

These proceedings on the part of the Emperor Paul were in a peculiar manner arbitrary and oppressive, not merely as contrary to the general practice of civilised states, which never authorises such severity against the crews of merchant ships or goods on shore, but as directly in the face of an express article in the existing treaty of 1793, between Great Britain and Russia, in which it was stipulated that "in the event of a rupture between the two powers, there should be no embargo laid on vessels in the harbours of either, but the merchants on both sides have a year to convey away or dispose of their effects."¹

Nothing more than the support of Russia was necessary to make the northern powers, who derived such benefits from the lucrative neutral trade which had recently fallen into their hands, combine for the purpose of enforcing a new maritime code, which might extend its advantages to the whole commerce of the belligerent states. The King of Sweden, young and high-spirited, entered, from the very first, warmly and readily into the views of the Emperor; but Denmark, which, during the long continuance of the war, had obtained a large share of the carrying trade, and the capital of whom lay exposed to the first strokes of the English navy, was more reserved in her movements. The arrogance with which an immediate accession to their views was urged upon the court of Copenhagen by the cabinets of St Petersburg and Stockholm, for some time defeated its own object, and Denmark even hesitated whether she should not throw herself into the arms of England, to resist the dictation of her imperious neighbours, and preserve the lucrative trade from which her subjects were deriving such immense advantages. But the Russians soon found means to assail her in the most vulnerable quarter. Prussia had lately become a considerable maritime power, and from regard to the same interests, she had warmly embraced the views of the northern confederacy. Her influence with Denmark was paramount, for the most valuable continental possessions of that power lay exposed, without defence, to the Prussian troops. In the beginning of October, a Prussian vessel, the Triton, belonging to Emden, laden with naval stores, and bound for the Texel, was taken and carried into Cuxhaven, a port belonging to Hamburg, by a British

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1801.
¹ Bign. i.
296, 297.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 237,
and 99.
State
Papers.
Dum. vi.
127.

21.
He is joined
by Sweden,
Denmark,
and Prussia.

Oct. 4.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1801.

Sept. 4.
1 Dum. vi.
88. Bign. i.
298.

22.
His warm
advances to
Napoleon.

* Nap. ii.
129.

cruiser. The Prussian government eagerly took advantage of that circumstance to manifest their resolution; they marched a body of two thousand men into the neutral territory, and took possession of Cuxhaven; and although the senate of Hamburg purchased the vessel from the English captain and restored it to the owners, and Lord Carysfort, the British ambassador at Berlin, warmly protested against the occupation of the neutral territory after that restitution, the Prussian troops were not withdrawn. A month before, a more unjustifiable act had been committed by the British cruisers off Barcelona, who took possession of a Swedish brig, and under its neutral colours sailed into the harbour of that town, and captured by that means two frigates which the King of Spain had built for the Batavian republic.¹

Though every thing was thus conspiring to forward the views of France, and augment the jealousy of the maritime powers toward Great Britain, the course of events by no means kept pace with the impatient disposition of the Czar. He suspected Prussia of insincerity, and openly charged the cabinet of Denmark with irresolution, because they did not embark headlong in the projects which he himself had so recently adopted. Impatient of delay, he wrote in person to the First Consul in these terms:—"Citizen First Consul—I do not write to you to open any discussion on the rights of men or of citizens; every country chooses what form of government it thinks fit. Wherever I see at the head of affairs a man who knows how to conquer and rule mankind, my heart warms towards him. I write to you to let you know the displeasure which I feel towards England, which violates the law of nations, and is never governed except by selfish considerations. I wish to unite with you to put bounds to the injustice of that government."² At the same time, with that mixture of candour and vehemence which distinguished his character, he published a declaration in the *St Petersburg Gazette*, in which he stated:—"Being disappointed in his expectations of the protection of commerce by the perfidious enterprises of a great power, which had sought to enchain the liberty of the seas by capturing Danish convoys, the independence of the northern powers appeared to him to be openly menaced; he consequently considered it to be a measure

of necessity to have recourse to an armed neutrality, the success of which was acknowledged in the time of the American war." And shortly after he published a ukase, in which he directed, that all the English effects seized in his states, either by the sequestration of goods on land or the embargo on goods afloat, should be *sold*, and their produce divided among all Russians having claims on English subjects! Napoleon was not slow in turning to the best account such an unlooked-for turn of fortune in his favour, and redoubled his efforts with the neutral powers to induce them to join the maritime confederacy against Great Britain. To give the greater *éclat* to the union of France and Russia, an ambassador, Count Kalitcheff, was dispatched from St Petersburg to Paris, and received there with a degree of magnificence well calculated to captivate the Oriental ideas of the Scythian Autocrat.¹

Pressed by Russia on the one side and France on the other, and sufficiently disposed already to regard with a jealous eye the maritime preponderance of Great Britain, the fears and irresolution of the northern powers at length gave way. On the 16th December a maritime confederacy was signed by Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, and on the 19th of the same month by Prussia as an acceding party. The principles of this league were in substance the same as those of the armed neutrality of 1780, with a slight variation in favour of belligerent powers. A minute specification was given of what should be deemed contraband articles, which included only arms of all sorts, with saddles and bridles, "all other articles not herein enumerated shall not be considered as war or naval stores, and shall not be subject to confiscation, but shall pass free and without restraint." It was stipulated, "that the effects which belong to the subjects of belligerent powers in neutral ships, with the exception of contraband goods, shall be free;" that no harbour shall be deemed blockaded unless the disposition and number of ships of the power by which it is invested shall be such as to render it apparently hazardous to enter; that the declaration of the captains of ships of war having convoy, that the convoy has no contraband goods, shall be deemed sufficient;² that "the contracting parties, if disquieted or attacked for this convention, shall make common cause to defend each

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1801.
Oct. 29,
1800.
Nov. 17,
1800.
Dec. 4, 1800.

¹ *Dan. vi.*
121, 123.
Ann. Reg.
1801, 98;
1800, 260.
State
Papers.

23.
General
maritime
confederacy,
signed on
Dec. 16,
1800.

² *Conven-*
tion, Dec.
16, 1800.
Ann. Reg.
1800, 266,
270. *State*
Papers.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1801.

24.
Its threaten-
ing conse-
quences to
England.

other," and that "these principles shall apply to every maritime war by which Europe may unhappily be disquieted."

This convention was naturally regarded with the utmost jealousy by the British government. Under cover of a regard for the rights of humanity and the principles of justice, it went to introduce a system hitherto unheard of in naval warfare, eminently favourable to the weaker maritime power, and calculated to render naval success to any state of little avail, by enabling the vanquished party, under neutral colours, securely to repair all its losses. It was evident that, if this new code of maritime law were introduced, all the victories of the British navy would go for nothing. France, in neutral vessels, would securely regain her whole commerce; under neutral flags she would import all the materials for the construction of a navy, and in neutral ships safely exercise the seamen requisite to navigate them. At the close of a long and bloody war, waged for her very existence, and attended with unexampled naval success, England would see all the fruits of her exertions torn from her, and witness the restoration of her antagonist's maritime strength, by the intervention of the very powers for whose behoof, as well as her own, she had taken up arms.

25.
Measures of
retaliation of
Mr Pitt.

England at this period was not, as at the close of the American war, obliged to dissemble her indignation at a proceeding which was evidently prejudicial to her national interests, and the first stroke levelled by continental jealousy at her national independence. The statesman who still held the helm was a man who disdained all temporary shifts or momentary expedients; who, fully appreciating the measure of national danger, boldly looked it in the face; who knew that from humiliation to subjugation in nations is but a step; and that the more perilous a struggle is, the more necessary is it to engage in it while yet the public resources are undiminished, and the popular spirit is not depressed by the appearances of vacillation on the part of government. On these prudent not less than resolute principles, Mr Pitt was no sooner informed of the signature of the armed neutrality, than he took the most decisive steps for letting the northern powers feel the disposition of the nation

they had thought fit to provoke. On the 14th January 1801, the British government issued an order for a general embargo on all vessels belonging to any of the confederated powers, Prussia alone excepted, of whose accession to the league intelligence had not as yet been received. Letters of marque were at the same time issued for the capture of the numerous vessels belonging to these states who were working to the Baltic; and with such vigour were these proceedings followed up, that ere long nearly the one-half of the merchant ships belonging to the northern powers at sea found their way into the British harbours. These hostile proceedings led to a warm debate between the British ambassadors and those of the neutral powers, which was conducted with great ability on both sides. That between Lord Carysfort, the English ambassador at Berlin, and Count Haugwitz, the minister for foreign affairs at that capital, embraced the principal arguments urged in this important controversy.¹

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XXXIII.

1801.
Jan. 14.

1 Ann. Reg.
103.

It was stated by the British government, "That a solemn treaty had been entered into between Russia and Great Britain, calculated completely to secure their trade, in which it was stipulated that, in case of a rupture, not only no embargo should be laid on, but the subjects on both sides should have a year to carry away their effects; that in violation of these sacred stipulations the ships of British merchants had been seized, their crews sent to prison in the interior, and their property sequestrated and sold by Russia; that these acts of violence, as well as the conclusion of a hostile confederacy, which the Emperor of Russia has formed for the express and avowed purpose of introducing those innovations into the maritime code which England has ever opposed, have led to an open war between Great Britain and Russia; that these measures openly disclose an intention to prescribe to the British empire, on a subject of the greatest importance, a new code of laws to which she never will submit; that the confederacy recently signed by the Baltic powers, had for its object the establishment of these novel principles of maritime law, which never had been recognised by the tribunals of Europe, which the Russian court, since 1780, had not only abandoned, but, by a treaty still in force, had become bound to oppose, and which were equally repug-

• 26.
Diplomatic
debates with
the neutral
powers.
Argument
of England.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1801.

nant to the express stipulations of the treaties which subsist between the courts of Stockholm and Denmark and the British empire; that in addition to this, the parties to the confederacy were pursuing warlike preparations with the utmost activity, and one of them had engaged in actual hostilities with Great Britain. In these circumstances, nothing remained to the British government but to secure some pledge against the hostile attacks which were meditated against their rights, and therefore they have laid an embargo on the vessels of the Baltic powers, but under such restraints as would guard to the utmost against loss and injury to individuals; that the King of Great Britain would never submit to pretensions which were irreconcilable with the true principles of maritime law, and strike at the foundation of the greatness and maritime power of his kingdom; and that, being perfectly convinced that his conduct towards neutral states was conformable to the recognised principles of law and justice, and the decisions of the admiralty courts of all the powers of Europe, he would allow of no measures which had for their object to introduce innovations on the maritime law now in force, but defend that system in every event, and maintain its entire execution as it subsisted in all the courts of Europe before the confederacy of 1780.”¹

¹ Lord Carysfort's notes, Jan. 27, and Feb. 1. Ann. Reg. 229, 237. State papers.

^{27.}
Answer of Prussia and the neutral powers.

On the other hand, it was answered by Prussia and the neutral powers—“the British government has in the present, more than any former war, usurped the sovereignty of the seas, and by arbitrarily framing a naval code, which it would be difficult to unite with the true principles of the law of nations, it exercises over the other friendly and neutral powers a usurped jurisdiction, the legality of which it maintains, and which it considers as an imprescriptible right, sanctioned by all the tribunals of Europe. The neutral sovereigns have never conceded to England the privilege of calling their subjects before its tribunals, and of subjecting them to its laws, but in cases in which the abuse of power has got the better of equity—which, alas! are but too frequent. The neutral powers have always taken the precaution to address to its cabinet the most energetic remonstrances and protests; but experience has ever proved them to be entirely fruitless; and it is not surprising if, after so many repeated acts of oppression, they

have resolved to find a remedy against it, and for that purpose to establish a well-arranged convention, which fixes their rights, and places them on a proper level with the powers at war. The naval alliance, in the manner in which it has just been consolidated, was intended to lead to this salutary end ; and the King hesitates not to declare, that he recognises in it his own principles ; that he is fully convinced of its necessity and utility ; that he has formally acceded to the convention of the 16th December, and has bound himself not only to take a direct share in all the events which interest the cause of the neutral powers, but, in virtue of his engagements, to maintain that connexion by such powerful measures as the impulse of circumstances may require. It is not true that the confederated powers have for their object to introduce a new code of maritime rights hostile to the interests of Great Britain ; the measures of the Danish government are purely defensive, and it cannot be considered as surprising that they should have adopted them, when it is recollected what menacing demonstrations that court had experienced from Great Britain, on occasion of the affair of the Freya frigate.¹ The Prussian government concluded by urging the English government to take off the embargo on the Danish and Swedish vessels, as the first and necessary step to an amicable settlement of the difficult question, without making any such stipulation in regard to that laid on Russian ships, and thereby in effect admitting the justice of the measure of retaliation adopted in regard to the latter power.²

These hostile declarations were soon followed up by measures which demonstrated that Prussia was not inclined to be merely a passive spectator of this great debate. On the 30th March a declaration was issued by the King of Prussia to the government of Hanover, in which he stated that he was to take possession provisionally of the English dominions in Germany ; and the Hanoverian States being in no condition to resist such an invasion, they submitted, and the Prussian troops entered the country, laid an embargo on British shipping, and closed the Elbe and the Weser against the English flag. At the same time a body of Danish troops made themselves masters of Hamburg, and extended the embargo to that great commercial emporium, while Denmark and Swe-

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1801.

¹ Baron
Haugwitz's
answer.
Ann. Reg.
241. State
papers.

² Nap. II.
133.

28.
Hanover is
invaded by
Prussia.

April 3.

CHAP.

XXXIII.

1801.

March 25:

1 Ann. Reg.
1800, 107.

29.
Meeting of
Parliament.
Perilous
situation of
England.

2 Ann. Reg.
117.

3 Dum. vi. 107.
Ann. Reg.
1800, 107.

den had a short time before done the same, on all the ports of their dominions. Thus the British flag was excluded from every harbour, from the North Cape to the straits of Gibraltar; and England, which a year before led on the coalition against France, found herself compelled to make head against the hostility of combined Europe, with an exhausted treasury and a population suffering under the accumulated pressure of famine and pestilence.^{1*}

Never did a British Parliament meet under more depressing circumstances than that which commenced its sittings in February 1801. After ten years of a war, costly and burdensome beyond example, the power of France was so far from being weakened, that she had extended her sway over all the south of Europe. The strength of Austria was, to appearance at least, irrecoverably broken; Italy and Switzerland crouched beneath her yoke, Spain openly followed her banners, and Holland was indissolubly united with her fortunes. Great Britain, it is true, had been uniformly, and to an unparalleled extent, victorious at sea, and the naval forces of her adversary were almost destroyed. But the northern confederation had suddenly and alarmingly altered this auspicious state of things, and not only were all the harbours of Europe closed against her merchant vessels, but a fleet of above a hundred ships of the line in the Baltic was preparing to assert principles subversive of her naval power. To crown the whole, the excessive rains of the preceding autumn had essentially injured two successive crops;² the price of all sorts of grain had reached an unprecedented height,[†] and the people, at the time when their industry

* It deserves to be recorded to the credit of Prussia in this transaction, that, being well aware how severely Great Britain was suffering at this time under an uncommon scarcity of provisions, she permitted the vessels having grain on board to proceed to the places of their destination, notwithstanding the embargo; a humane indulgence which forms a striking contrast to the violent and cruel proceedings of the Emperor Paul on the same occasion. The conduct of the neutrals, with the exception of Russia, in this distressing contest, was distinguished by a moderation and firmness worthy of states contending for the introduction of a great general principle. That of the Cabinet of St Petersburg was widely different; but it would be unjust to visit upon that gallant people the sins of their chief, who about that period began to give symptoms of that irritability of disposition and mental alienation, which so soon brought about the bloody catastrophe which terminated his reign.³

† In the winter 1800-1801, wheat rose to L.1, 4s. the bushel, being more than quadruple what it had been at the commencement of the war, when it

was checked by the cessation of commercial intercourse with all Europe, were compelled to struggle with a famine of unusual severity.

This subject of the northern coalition was fully discussed in the parliamentary debates which took place on the King's speech at the opening of the session. It was urged by Mr Grey and the Opposition, "That although without doubt the Emperor of Russia had been guilty of the grossest violence and injustice towards Great Britain in the confiscation of the property of its merchants, yet it did not follow that ministers were free of blame. He accuses them of having violated a convention in regard to the surrender of Malta to him as a reward for his co-operation against France: did such a convention exist? The northern powers have, along with Russia, subscribed a covenant, the professed object of which is to secure their commerce against the vexations to which it has hitherto been subject; and it is impossible to discover, either in the law of nations or practice of states, any law or practice universally acknowledged, the denial of which is tantamount to a declaration of war against this country. It is a mistake to assert that the principles of the armed neutrality were never heard of till they were advanced in the American war. In 1740 the King of Prussia disputed the pretensions of this country on the same grounds as the armed neutrality; and in 1762 the Dutch resisted the claim of right to search vessels under convoy. In 1780, these objections assumed a greater degree of consistency, from their principles being publicly announced by all the powers in Europe.

"There is one principle which should ever be considered as the leading rule by which all questions of this sort should be determined, and that is the maxim of *justice*. Can, then, the pretensions of Great Britain bear the test of this criterion? Our naval ascendancy, indeed, should ever be carefully preserved, as the source of our glory and the bulwark of our safety; but sorry should I be, if, to preserve the rights and interests of the British nation, we should be compelled to abandon the rules and

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XXXIII.

1801.

30.
Arguments
on the sub-
ject in Par-
liament by
Mr Grey
and the
Opposition.

31.
Alleged in-
justice of
the preten-
sions of
England.

was 5s. 6d. a bushel, or 44s. a quarter; and all other species of food were high in proportion. Large quantities of maize and rice were imported, and contributed essentially to relieve the public distress.

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XXXIII.

1801.

32.
And their
inexpedi-
ency.

maxims of justice, in which alone are to be found true and permanent greatness, true and permanent security.

"Even supposing the pretensions of England to be just, are they expedient? Its maritime superiority is of inestimable value, but is this claim, so odious to our neighbours, essential to its existence? Let the advantage, nay the necessity, of the privilege be clearly demonstrated before we engage in a universal war for its defence, and purchase it at the price of blood. Admitting even that the right were just and useful, circumstances may occur which would justify and warrant a relaxation in its rigour. Supposing even the concession of the claim of the northern powers would have enabled them to supply France with many articles necessary for her navy, what would have been the inconvenience thence arising? France, destitute of seamen, her fleets without discipline, what the better would she be of all the naval stores of the north of Europe? What, on the other hand, is the consequence of our dispute with the northern powers? Do we not in a moment double her marine, and supply her with experienced sailors? Do not the navies of Europe now outflank us on every side; and has not France, therefore, gained the inestimable advantage of acquiring the seamen from the Baltic, which could not otherwise be obtained, and is not that the real object which she requires? And if our commerce is excluded from every harbour in Europe, if every market is shut against us, what is to become of the invaluable sources of our splendour and security? Independently of naval stores, can we forget how important it is, in the present distressed and starving situation of the country, that the supplies from the Baltic should not be lost? A little moderation in the instructions to our naval officers would have avoided all these dangers. Lord North was never arraigned as a traitor to his country, because he did not drive matters to extremities in 1780; and in the peace of 1783 the question of the armed neutrality was wholly passed by. In subsequent commercial treaties with different countries, the question of neutral rights has been settled on the principles of the armed neutrality; and there is at least as much reason for moderation now as there was at the close of the American war."

To these arguments Mr Pitt and Sir William Grant

replied : " It has only been stated as doubtful whether the maritime code contended for by Great Britain is founded in justice ; but can there be the smallest hesitation as to the justice of a principle which has been acknowledged and acted upon by the whole courts, not only of this country, but of Europe, and on which all the wars, not of this island merely, but of every belligerent state in Europe, have been constantly conducted ? The advocates for the neutral powers constantly fall into the error of supposing that every exception from the general law by a particular treaty proves the law to be as stated in that treaty ; whereas the very circumstance of making an exception by treaty, proves that the general law of nations would be the reverse but for that exception. We made a concession of this description to France, in the commercial treaty of 1787, because it was supposed that that power would never be neutral when we were at war ; but was it ever for one moment imagined, ~~that~~ by so doing, we could be understood to have relinquished our maritime rights with reference to other states ?

" With respect to the Baltic powers, the case of the neutral advocates is peculiarly untenable. Nobody here has to learn, that the treaties of 1661 and 1670 are in full force with respect to Sweden and Denmark, and in those treaties the right of carrying enemy's property is expressly given up. With respect to Russia, the right of search was never abandoned. On the contrary, in the convention signed between this country and that power, at the commencement of the present war, the latter bound herself not merely to observe this principle herself, but to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the seas or in its harbours. Even, therefore, if the general principles of the maritime law were as adverse, as in reality they are favourable to Great Britain, still the treaties with the Baltic powers are in full force, and how can they now contend for a code of laws against England, in opposition to that to which they are expressly bound with her ? Denmark, in August last, with her fleets and her arsenals at our mercy, entered into a solemn pledge, not again to send vessels with convoy until the principle was settled ; and yet she has recently bound herself by another treaty, founded upon the prin-

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XXXIII.

1801.

33.
Arguments
in reply by
Mr Pitt.

34.
Rights of
England
conceded by
existing
treaties.

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XXXIII.

1801.

35.
Inexpe-
dience of
succumb-
ing before
the coal-
ition.

ciples of 1780, one of the engagements of which treaty is, that its stipulations are to be maintained by force of arms. Is this, or is it not, war? When all these circumstances are accompanied by armaments, prepared at a period of the year when they think they have time for preparation without being exposed to our navy, can there be the slightest doubt that in justice we are bound to take up arms in our own defence?

"As to the question of expenditure, the matter is, if possible, still less doubtful. The question is, whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to be supplied and recruited; whether we are to suffer blockaded forts to be furnished with warlike stores and provisions; whether we are to allow neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing-boat, to convey the treasures of South America to the harbours of Spain, or the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest or Toulon? The honourable gentleman talks of the destruction of the naval power of France; but does he imagine that her marine would have decreased to the degree which it actually has, if, during the whole of the war, this very principle had not been acted upon? And if the commerce of France had not been destroyed, does he believe that, if the fraudulent system of neutrals had not been prevented, her navy would not now have been in a very different situation from what it actually is? Does he not know, that the naval preponderance which we have by this means acquired, has since given security to this country amidst the wreck of all our hopes on the Continent? If it were once gone, the spirit of the country would go with it. If, in 1780, we were not in a condition to assert the right of this country to a code of maritime law, which for centuries has been acted upon indiscriminately by all the European states, we have not now, happily, the same reason for not persisting in maintaining our rights; and the question now is, whether, with increased proofs of the necessity of acting upon that principle, and increased means of supporting it, we are for ever to give it up?"¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 895,
915.

² Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 934.

The House of Commons supported ministers, by a majority of 245 to 63.²

The union of Ireland with England, from which such important results were anticipated, proved a source of

weakness rather than strength to the empire at this important crisis. By a series of concessions, which commenced soon after, and continued through the whole reign of George III., the Irish Catholics had been nearly placed on a level with their Protestant fellow-subjects, and they were now excluded only from sitting in Parliament, and holding about thirty of the principal offices of the state. When Mr Pitt, however, carried through the great measure of the Union, he gave the Catholics reason to expect that a complete removal of all disabilities would follow the Union, not indeed as a matter of right, but of grace and favour. This understood pledge, when the time arrived, he found himself unable to redeem. The complete removal of Catholic disabilities, it was soon found, involved many fundamental questions in the constitution; in particular, the Bill of Rights, the Test and Corporation Acts, and, in general, the stability of the whole Protestant Church establishment; and for that reason it might be expected to meet with a formidable opposition from the aristocratic party in both houses. In addition to this, it was discovered, when the measure was brought forward in the cabinet, that the King entertained scruples of conscience on the subject, in consequence of his oath at the coronation "to maintain the Protestant religion established by law," which the known firmness and integrity of his character rendered it extremely improbable he would ever be brought to abandon. In these circumstances, Mr Pitt stated that he had no alternative but to resign his official situations. On the 10th February, it was announced in Parliament Feb. 10. that ministers only held the seals till their successors were appointed, and shortly after Mr Pitt, Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, Mr Dundas, and Mr Windham resigned, and were succeeded by Mr Addington, then Speaker of the House of Commons, as First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Hawkesbury, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a new Ministry, taken, however, entirely from the Tory party.¹*

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XXXIII.

1801.

36.

Mr Pitt
resigns in
consequence
of the Cath-
olic
claims.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 966.
Ann. Reg.
117, 121.

* In a paper circulated at this period, in Mr Pitt's name, it was stated, "The leading part of his Majesty's ministers finding innumerable obstacles to the bringing forward measures of concession to the Catholic body while in office, have felt it impossible to continue in office under their inability to propose it, with the circumstances necessary to carry the measure with all its advantages; and they have retired from his Majesty's service, considering this line of conduct as most likely to contribute to its ultimate success. The Catholic body may with confidence rely on the zealous support of all

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XXXIII.

1801.

37.

But this was
only the
ostensible
ground.

It has long been the practice of the Administration of Great Britain, not to resign upon the real question which occasions their retirement, but to select some minor point, which is held forth to the public as the ostensible ground of the change; and this custom is attended with the great advantage of not implicating the Crown or the Government openly in a collision with either House of Parliament. From the circumstance of Mr Pitt having so prominently held forth the Catholic question as the reason for his retirement, it is more than probable that this was not the real ground of the change; or that, if it was, he readily caught at the impossibility of carrying through any further concessions to the Catholics of Ireland as a motive for resignation, to prevent the approach to other and more important questions which remained behind. There was no necessity for bringing forward the Catholic claims at that moment, nor any reason for breaking up an Administration at a period of unparalleled public difficulty, merely because the scruples in the Royal breast prevented them from being at that time conceded. But the question of peace or war stood in a very different position. Mr Pitt could not disguise from himself that the country was now involved in a contest apparently endless, if the principles on which it had so long been conducted were rigidly adhered to; that the dissolution of the continental coalition, and the formation of the northern confederacy, had immensely diminished the chances, not merely of success, but of salvation, during its future continuance. As it was possible, therefore, perhaps probable, that England might be driven to an accommodation at no distant period, and the principles he had so long maintained might prove an obstacle to such a necessary measure, Mr Pitt took the part of

those who retire, and of many who remain in office, where it can be given with a prospect of success. They may be assured that Mr Pitt will do his utmost to establish their cause in the public favour, and prepare the way for their finally attaining their objects." In his place in the House of Commons on February 16, Mr Pitt said, "With respect to the resignation of myself and some of my friends, I have no wish to disguise from the House that we did feel it an incumbent duty upon us to propose a measure on the part of government, which, under the circumstances of the Union so happily effected between the two countries, we thought of great public importance, and necessary to complete the benefits likely to result from that measure; we felt this opinion so strongly, that when we met with circumstances which rendered it impossible for us to propose it as a measure of government, we equally felt it inconsistent with our duty and our honour any longer to remain a part of that government."—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 966, 970.

retiring with the leading members of his Cabinet, and was succeeded by other inferior adherents of his party, who, without departing from his principles altogether, might feel themselves more at liberty to mould them according to the pressure of external circumstances. In doing this, the English minister acted the part of a true patriot. "He sacrificed himself," says the chosen historian of Napoleon, "to the good of his country and a general peace. He showed himself more than a great statesman, a good citizen."¹

CHAP.
XXIII.
1801.

¹ Bign. i.
406. Ann.
Reg. 1800,
119, 120.

But though Mr Pitt retired, he left his mantle to his successors; neither timidity nor vacillation appeared in the measures of government towards foreign states. For both the land and sea forces, a larger allowance was provided than in any previous year since the commencement of the war. For the navy, there were voted 139,000 seamen and marines, and 120 ships of the line were put in commission. The land troops altogether amounted to 300,000 men;* and the navy, in service and ordinary, amounted to the prodigious force of above 200 ships of the line and 250 frigates.† Mr Pitt, on February 18th, brought forward the budget immediately before he surrendered the seals to his successors. The charges of the army and navy were each of them above L.15,000,000, and the total expenditure to be provided for by the United Kingdom amounted to L.42,000,000, besides above L.20,000,000 as the interest of the debt. To provide for these prodigious charges, war-supplies to the amount of L.17,000,000 existed; and to make up the difference he contracted a loan

38.
Vigorous
measures of
his succe-
sors to pro-
secute the
war.

• Viz.—Regular Forces,	193,000
Militia,	78,000
Fencibles,	31,000

Total, 302,000

The expense of maintaining which was estimated at L.12,940,000. The total forces, both of land and sea, in 1792. were not 120,000: a signal proof how much greater efforts than she was generally supposed capable of, England could really make, and of the overwhelming force with which, at the commencement of the war, she might, by a proper exertion of her strength, have overwhelmed the revolutionary volcano.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, p. 142, and JOMINI, xiv. 251.

† Ships of the line, in commission and ordinary,	205
Building,	36
Fifty-gun ships,	27
Frigates,	257
Brigs and sloops,	312

Total, 837

—See JAMES's *Naval Hist.* iii. Table ix.; and JOMINI, xiv. 252.

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1 Parl. Deb.
xxxv. 974,
978.

39.
Prosperous
state of
Great Bri-
tain at this
period.

of L.25,500,000 for Great Britain; while Ireland, according to the agreement at the Union, was to provide 2-17ths of the whole expense, or L.4,300,000. To provide for the interest of the loan, and the sinking fund applicable to its reduction, new taxes, chiefly in the excise and customs, were imposed to the amount of L.1,794,000. These additional taxes, according to the admirable system of that great financier, were almost all laid on in the indirect form, being intended to be a permanent burden on the nation till the principal was paid off; and a sinking fund of L.100,000 a-year was provided for this purpose in the excess of the additional taxes above the interest of the debt.^{1*}

Notwithstanding the unexampled difficulties which had beset the British empire in the years 1799 and 1800, from the extreme severity of the scarcity during that period, and the vast expenditure which the campaigns of these two years had occasioned, the condition of the empire in 1801 was, to an unprecedented degree, wealthy and prosperous. The great loan of twenty-five millions of that year was borrowed at a rate of interest under six per cent, although loans to the amount of above two hundred mil-

* Mr Pitt stated the War Revenue of the nation for the year 1801, exclusive of the permanent income, which was L.27,400,000, as follows:—

Sugar, Malt and Tobacco,	-	-	-	-	L.2,750,000
Lottery,	-	-	-	-	300,000
Income-Tax,	-	-	-	-	4,260,000
Duty on Exports and Imports,	-	-	-	-	1,250,000
Surplus of the Consolidated Fund,	-	-	-	-	3,300,000
Irish Taxes and Loan,	-	-	-	-	4,324,000
Balance not issued for Subsidies,	-	-	-	-	500,000
Surplus of Grants,	-	-	-	-	60,000

L.16,744,000

Loan, - - - - - 25,500,000

Ways and Means, - 42,244,000

Charges.

Navy,	-	-	-	-	L.15,800,000
Army and extraordinary,	-	-	-	-	15,902,000
Ordnance,	-	-	-	-	1,938,000
Miscellaneous,	-	-	-	-	757,000
Unforeseen Emergencies,	-	-	-	-	800,000
Permanent Charges of Ireland,	-	-	-	-	390,000
Deficiency of Income-Tax,	-	-	-	-	1,000,000
Discount on Loan,	-	-	-	-	200,000
Deficiency of Malt Duty,	-	-	-	-	400,000
Deficiency of Assessed Taxes,	-	-	-	-	350,000
Deficiency of Consolidated Fund,	-	-	-	-	150,000
Exchequer Bills of 1799,	-	-	-	-	3,800,000
Sinking Fund,	-	-	-	-	200,000
Interest of Exchequer Bills,	-	-	-	-	460,000

Charges, - L.42,147,000

lions had been contracted in the eight preceding years ; the exports, as compared with what they were at the commencement of the war, had tripled, and the imports more than tripled, in addition to the vast sums of money which the nation required for its loans to foreign powers, and payments on account of its own forces in foreign parts. Nearly a fourth had been added to the tonnage of the shipping, and the seamen employed in it, during the same period ; while the national expenditure had risen to above sixty-eight millions, of which nearly forty millions were provided from permanent or war-taxes.* Contrary to all former precedent, the country had eminently prospered during this long and arduous struggle. Notwithstanding the weight of its taxation, and the immense sums which had been squandered in foreign loans or services, and of course lost to the productive powers of Great Britain, the industry of the nation in all its branches had prodigiously increased, and capital was to be had in abundance for all the innumerable undertakings, both public and private, which were going forward.

Agriculture had advanced in a still greater degree than population ; the dependence of the nation on foreign supplies was rapidly diminishing ; and yet the united kingdom, which had added nearly a sixth to its inhabitants since 1791, numbered above fifteen millions of souls in the British isles.† The divisions and disaffection which prevailed during the earlier years of the war had almost entirely disappeared ; the atrocities of the French Revolution had weaned all but a few inveterate democrats from Jacobinical principles ; the imminence of the public danger had united the great body of the people in a strong attachment to the national colours ; the young and active part of the population had risen into manhood since the commencement of the contest, and imbibed with their mother's milk the enthusiastic feelings it was calculated

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40.
Its income,
expendi-
ture, ex-
ports, and
imports.

* See Appendix A. Chap. xxxiii.

† Population in 1801 :—

England,	-	-	8,331,000
Wales,	-	-	541,000
Scotland,	-	-	1,599,000
Ireland,	-	-	4,500,000
Army and Navy,	-	-	470,000

Total,

15,441,000

Population Returns, 1801.

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to awaken; while the incessant progress and alarming conquests of France had generally diffused the belief, that no security for the national independence was to be found but in a steady resistance to its ambition. A nation animated with such feelings and possessed of such resources, was not unreasonably confident in itself when it bade defiance to Europe in arms.

England, however, had need of all its energies, for the forces of the maritime league were extremely formidable.

41.
Naval forces
of the con-
federacy.

Russia had eighty-two sail of the line and forty frigates in her harbours, of which forty-seven line-of-battle ships were in the Baltic and at Archangel, but of these not more than fifteen were in a state ready for active service; and the crews were extremely deficient in nautical skill. Sweden had eighteen ships of the line and fourteen frigates, besides a great quantity of small craft, in much better condition, and far better served, than the Russian navy; while a numerous flotilla, with ten thousand men on board, was prepared to defend its shores, and twenty thousand troops, stationed in camps in the interior, were ready to fly to any menaced point. Denmark had twenty-three ships of the line and fourteen large frigates, which the brave and energetic population of Zealand had made the utmost efforts to equip and man, to resist the attack which was shortly anticipated from the British arms. Could the three powers have united their forces, they had twenty-four ships of the line ready for sea, which might in a few months have been raised with ease to fifty, besides twenty-five frigates, a force which, combined with the fleet of Holland, might have raised the blockade of the French harbours, and enabled the confederated powers to ride triumphant in the British Channel.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
109. Dum.
vi. 169, 172.
Nap. ii. 137,
138.
Southey's
Life of
Nelson, ii.
94.

42.
Energetic
measures of
the British
Govern-
ment. Nel-
son ap-
pointed
second in
command
of the fleet
destined for
the Baltic.

In these circumstances, every thing depended on England striking a decisive blow in the outset, and anticipating, by the celerity of her movements, that combination of force which otherwise might prove so threatening to her national independence. Fortunately the government were fully aware of the necessity of acting vigorously at the commencement, and by great exertions a powerful squadron was assembled at Yarmouth in the beginning of March. It consisted of eighteen ships of the line, four frigates, and a number of bomb-vessels, in all fifty-two sail. This

powerful force was placed under the command of Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson for his second in command. The hero of the Nile had good reason to be dissatisfied at finding himself placed in an inferior situation to an officer who, though respectable, and his superior in rank, was comparatively unknown in the annals of naval glory; but he was not a man to allow any personal feelings to interfere with his duty to his country. Though sensible of the slight, therefore, he cheerfully accepted the subordinate command. When he arrived at Yarmouth he "found the admiral a little nervous about dark nights and fields of ice; but we must brace up," said he, "these are not times for nervous systems. I hope we shall give our northern enemies that hail-storm of bullets which gives our dear country the dominion of the sea. All the devils in the north cannot take it from us, if our wooden walls have fair play."¹

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The British fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th March; but soon after putting to sea it sustained a serious loss in the wreck of the *Invincible*, which struck on one of the sand-banks on that dangerous coast, and shortly sunk with a large part of the crew. Mr Vansittart accompanied the squadron in the capacity of plenipotentiary, to endeavour to arrange the differences by negotiation, which unfortunately proved totally impossible. It arrived on the 27th off Zealand, and Sir Hyde immediately dispatched a letter to the governor of Cronenberg castle, to enquire whether the fleet would be allowed without molestation to pass the Sound. The governor having replied that he could not allow a force, whose intentions were unknown, to approach the guns of his fortress, the British admiral declared that he took this as a declaration of war. By the earnest advice of Nelson it was determined immediately to attempt the passage; a resolution which, in the state of the northern powers, was not only the most gallant, but the most prudent that could have been adopted.^{2*} On the

¹ Southey,
ii. 95.

43.
British fleet
sails from
the Downs.
March 12.

² Southey,
ii. 100, 104
Ann. Reg.
109, 110.

* Nelson on this occasion addressed Sir Hyde as follows:—"The more I have reflected, the more I am confirmed in my opinion, that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy. They will every day be stronger and stronger; we shall never be so good a match for them as at the present moment. Here you are with almost all the safety, certainly all the honour of England, more entrusted to you than ever yet fell to the lot of a British officer. On your decision depends whether our country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or rear her head higher than ever."—See SOUTHEY, ii. 98, 99.

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44.
Splendid
appearance
of the
Sound.

30th March the British fleet entered the Sound, with a fair wind from the north-west; and spreading all sail, proudly and gallantly bore up towards the harbour of Copenhagen.

The scene which opened upon the British fleet when it entered this celebrated passage was every way worthy of the cause in which it was engaged, and the memorable events of which it was soon to become the theatre. Nothing in the north of Europe can be compared to the prospect afforded by the channel which lies between the opposite shores of Sweden and Denmark. On the left, the coast of Scandinavia exhibits a beautiful assemblage of corn lands, pastures and copses, rising into picturesque and varied hills; while on the right, the shores of Zealand present a continued succession of rich plains, woods, meadows, orchards, villas, and all the accompaniments of long established civilisation. The isles of Huen, Saltholm, and Amack appear in the widening channel; the former celebrated as bearing the observatory of the great Tycho Brahe, and the spot where most of his discoveries were made, the latter nearly opposite to Copenhagen. At the foot of the slope, on the Swedish side, is situated the old city of Helsingborg, with its picturesque battlements and mouldering towers; while on the south, the castle of Cronenberg and city of Elsinore rise in frowning majesty to assert the dominion of Denmark over the straits. Both are associated with poetic and historical recollections. Elsinore is familiar to every reader of Hamlet, and has recently been celebrated in thrilling strains by the greatest of modern lyric poets;* while Cronenberg castle was the scene of a still deeper tragedy. There Queen Matilda was confined, the victim of a base court intrigue, and enlivened the dreary hours of captivity with nursing her infant;¹ there she was separated from that, the last link that bound her to existence; and on these towers her eyes were

* Southey,
i. 108, 109.
Ann. Reg.
111.

* " Now joy, old England, raise!
For the tidings of thy might,
By the festal cities' blaze,
While the wine-cup shines in light;
And yet amidst that joy and uproar,
Let us think of them that sleep,
Full many a fathom deep,
By thy wild and stormy steep,
Elsinore!"

CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltic*.

fixed, as the vessel bore her from her country, till their highest pinnacle had sunk beneath the waves, and her aching sight rested on the waste of waters.

To one approaching from the German ocean, the fortresses of Helsingborg, Elsinore, and Cronenberg seem to unite and form a vast castellated barrier on the north-east of an inland lake; but as he advances the vista opens, the Baltic is seen, and the city of Copenhagen, with its Gothic spires and stately edifices, appears crowding down to the water's edge. Its harbour studded with masts; its arsenals, bulwarks, and batteries; its lofty towers and decorated buildings, render it one of the most striking cities in the north of Europe. During summer, the Sound exhibits an unusually gay and animated spectacle; hardly a day elapses in which a hundred vessels do not pass the straits, and pay toll to Denmark at Elsinore; and in the course of the season, upwards of ten thousand ships, of different nations, yield a willing tribute in this manner to the keeper of the beacons which warn the mariner from the dangerous shoals of the Cattegat. But never had so busy or brilliant a spectacle been exhibited there as on this day, when the British fleet prepared to force a passage where till now all ships had lowered their topsails to the flag of Denmark.

Fifty vessels, of which seventeen were of the line, spread their sails before a favourable wind, and pressing forward under a brilliant sun, soon came abreast of Cronenberg castle. The splendour of the scene, the undefined nature of the danger which awaited them, the honour and safety of their country entrusted to their arms, the multitudes who crowded every headland on the opposite shores, conspired to awaken the most thrilling emotions in the minds of the British seamen. Fear had no place in those dauntless breasts; yet was their patriotic ardour not altogether unmixed with painful feelings. The Danes were of the same lineage, and once spoke the same language as the English; the two nations had for centuries been united in the bonds of friendship; and numbers who now appeared in arms against them were sprung from the same ancestors as their gallant opponents. The effect of this common descent has survived all the divisions of kingdoms and political interest; alone of all the

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45.
Gay scene
which the
Sound
usually pre-
sents.

46.
Splendid
appearance
of the
British fleet
as it ap-
proached
the Straits.

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¹ Clarke's
Travels, i.
284.² Ann. Reg.
111.
Southey, ii.
108.

continental states, an Englishman finds himself at home in that part of Jutland from whence the Angles originally sprung;¹ and the British historian, in recounting the events in this melancholy contest, feels himself distracted by emotions akin to those with which he narrates the tale of civil warfare, and dwells with nearly the same exultation on the heroism of the vanquished as on the prowess of the victors.²

47.
Undaunted
spirit of the
Danes.

Though they had enjoyed profound peace for nearly a century, and during that time had been ruled by a government in form absolute, the Danes had lost none of the courage or patriotism by which their ancestors, in the days of Canute and the Sea-kings, had been distinguished. Never was the public spirit of the country evinced with more lustre than in the preparations for, and during the perils of, this sanguinary struggle. All classes made the utmost exertions to put their marine in a respectable condition; the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants vied with each other in their endeavours to complete the preparations for defence. The Prince Royal set the example by presiding at the labours of his subjects; workmen presented themselves in crowds to take a share in the undertaking; children even concealed their age in order to be permitted to join in the patriotic exertions; the university furnished a corps of twelve hundred youths, the flower of Denmark. The merchants, including those whose fortunes were at stake from the English embargo, came forward with liberal offers; the peasants flocked from the country to man the arsenals; the workmen in the dock-yards refused to leave their stations, and continued labouring by torch-light during the whole night, with relays merely of rest, as in a man-of-war. Battalions were hastily formed; batteries manned by inexperienced hands; muskets made, and all kinds of warlike stores provided with astonishing celerity. History has not a more touching example of patriotic ardour to commemorate, nor one in which a more perfect harmony prevailed between a sovereign and his subjects for the defence of rights naturally dear to them all.³

³ Dum. vi.
172.² Jom.
xiv. 252,
253.
Southey, ii.
115, 130.

From a praiseworthy, but ill-timed desire to avoid coming to extremities, the British armament had given a long delay to the Danes, which was turned to good

count by the indefatigable citizens, and occasioned in the end an unnecessary effusion of blood. They had arrived in the Cattegat the 20th March, and on the same day, Mr Vansittart proceeded ashore, with a view to settle matters without having recourse to extremities; but nevertheless it was not till the 30th that the passage of the Sound was attempted. In the interval the Danes had powerfully strengthened their means of defence; the shore was lined with batteries, and Cronenberg castle opened a heavy fire, from above a hundred pieces of cannon, upon the leading ships of the squadron when they came within range. Nelson's division led the van, Sir Hyde's followed in the centre, while Admiral Graves brought up the rear. At first, they steered through the middle of the channel, expecting to be assailed by a destructive fire from both sides; but, finding as they advanced, that the batteries of Helsingborg did not open upon the squadron, they inclined to the Swedish shore, and were thus enabled to pass almost without the reach of the Danish guns. The cannon-balls and shells fell short of the line-of-battle ships, and did little injury even to the smaller craft, which were placed nearer the Danish coast, affording no small merriment to the sailors, whose minds were in an unusual state of excitement, from the novel and perilous enterprise on which they had entered. The passage lasted four hours, and about noonday the fleet came to anchor opposite the harbour of Copenhagen.¹

The garrison of this city consisted of ten thousand men, besides the battalions of volunteers, who were still more numerous. All possible precautions had been taken to strengthen the sea defences; and the array of forts, ramparts, ships of the line, fire-ships, gun-boats, and floating batteries, was such as would have deterred any other assailant but the hero of the Nile. Six line-of-battle ships, and eleven floating batteries, besides a great number of smaller vessels, were moored in an external line to protect the entrance to the harbour, flanked on either side by two islands, called the Crowns, on the smaller of which fifty-six, while on the larger, sixty-eight heavy cannon were mounted. To support these, four other sail of the line were moored within, across the harbour mouth; and

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48

Passage of
the Sound
by the Eng-
lish fleet.

1 Ann. Reg.

110.

Southey, ii.

109, 111.

Dum. vi.

183, 184.

Jom. xiv.

252, 253.

49.

Prepara-
tions of the
Danes.

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a fort, mounting thirty-six heavy cannon, had been constructed in a shoal, supported on piles. The fire of these formidable works crossed with that of the batteries on the island of Amak and the citadel of Copenhagen; it seemed hardly possible that any ships could endure, for a length of time, so heavy and concentric a discharge. But, tremendous as these dangers appeared, they were neither the only nor the greatest with which the British fleet had to contend. The channel by which alone the harbour could be approached, was little known, and extremely intricate; all the buoys had been removed, and the sea on either side abounded with shoals and sand-banks, on which, if any of the vessels grounded, they would instantly be torn to pieces by the fire from the Danish batteries. The Danes considered this obstacle insurmountable, deeming the narrow and winding navigation impracticable for a large fleet in such circumstances. Nelson was fully aware of the difficulty of the attempt; and a day and a night were occupied by the boats of the fleet in making the necessary soundings, and laying down new buoys in lieu of those which had been taken away. He himself personally assisted in the whole of this laborious and important duty, taking no rest night or day till it was accomplished. "It had worn him down," he said, "and was infinitely more grievous than any resistance he could experience from the enemy."¹

¹ Southey, ii. 112, 113. Ann. Reg. 112, 113. • Dum. vi. 186, 187. Journ. xiv. 256, 257.

50.
Nelson's
plan of
attack.

No sooner were the soundings completed, than Nelson, in a council of war, suggested the plan of operations, which was, to approach from the south and make the attack on the right flank of the enemy. The approach of the Danish exterior line was covered by a large shoal, called the Middle Ground, exactly in front of the harbour, at about three quarters of a mile distant, which extended along the whole sea in front of the town. As this sand-bank was impassable for ships of any magnitude, he proposed to follow what is called the King's channel, lying between it and the town, and thus interpose, as at Aboukir, between the Danish line and the entrance of the harbour. On the morning of the 1st April the whole fleet anchored within two leagues of the town, off the north-west end of the Middle Ground, and Nelson, having completed his last examination, hoisted the signal to weigh anchor. It was

received with a loud shout from his whole division of the fleet, which consisted of twelve sail of the line, besides some smaller vessels. The remainder, under Sir Hyde Parker, were to menace the Crown batteries on the other side, threaten the four ships of the line at the entrance of the harbour, and lend their aid to such of the attacking squadron as might come disabled out of action. The small craft, headed by Captain Riou, led the way, most accurately threading the dangerous and winding course between the island of Saltholm and the Middle Ground; the whole squadron followed with a fair wind, coasting along the outer edge of the shoal, doubled its further extremity, and cast anchor, just as darkness closed, off Draco Point, not more than two miles from the right of the enemy's line. The signal to prepare for action had been made early in the evening, and the seamen passed the night in anxious expectation of the dawn which was to usher in the eventful morrow.¹

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¹ Southey,
ii. 113, 115.
Ann. Reg.
112. Dum.
vi. 187.
Jom. xiv
257, 258.
James. iii.
99, 100.

This was a night of anxiety and trepidation, but not of unmanly alarm, in Copenhagen. The citizens saw evidently that the attack would be made on the following day, and, amidst the tears of their mothers and children, bravely repaired to their appointed stations. Few eyelids were closed, save among those about to combat, in all its peopled quarters, so strongly was the solemnity of the occasion, and the coming dangers to all they held dear, impressed on the minds of the citizens. Nelson sat down to supper with a large party of his officers. He was, as he was ever wont to be on the eve of battle, in high spirits; the mortal fatigue of the preceding days seemed forgotten, and he drank to a leading wind, and the success of the morrow. After supper, Captain Hardy went forward in a boat to examine the channel between them and the enemy. He approached so near as to sound round their leading ship with a pole, lest the noise of throwing the lead should alarm its crew, and returned about four with a valuable report to the admiral. Meanwhile Nelson, though he lay down, was too anxious to sleep. He dictated his orders till past one, and during the remainder of the night incessantly enquired whether the wind was south.² At daybreak it was announced that it had become perfectly fair; the order was given for all the captains to come on board, and when

^{51.}
Prepara-
tions on
both sides
for the
battle.

² Southey,
ii. 117, 119.
Ann. Reg. .
112. James,
iii. 99, 100.

CHAP. they had received their final instructions, he made the signal for action.
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52.

Great difficulty experienced by the pilots.

The pilots who were to conduct the fleet soon showed by their indecision, that, in absence of the buoys to which they had been accustomed to look, they hardly knew what course to follow; and Nelson experienced the utmost agony of mind from their failure, as the wind was fair, and there was not a moment to lose. At length the master of the *Bellona* declared he was prepared to lead the fleet, and put himself at its head accordingly. Captain Murray in the *Edgar* led the line-of-battle ships. The *Agamemnon* was next in order; but, in attempting to weather the shoal, she struck aground, and became immovable, at the time her services were most required. The *Bellona* and *Russell* soon after grounded also, but in a situation which enabled them to take a part, though not the one assigned them, in the battle. The want of these three ships at their appointed stations was severely felt in the action, as they were intended to have silenced the Crown batteries, and would have thereby prevented a heavy loss on board the *Defiance* and *Monarch*, which were exposed to their fire without the possibility of making any return. In advancing to take up its ground, each ship had been ordered to pass her leader on the starboard, because the water was supposed to get shallower on that side. Nelson, while advancing in the *Elephant* after those two ships which had struck on the sand-bank, made a signal to them to close with the enemy, not knowing that they were aground; but when he perceived they did not obey the signal, he ordered the *Elephant's* helm to starboard, and passed within these ill-fated vessels. By this happy act of presence of mind he saved the whole fleet from destruction, for the other ships followed the admiral's track, and, thereby keeping in deep water, arrived opposite to their appointed stations, anchored by the stern, and presented their broadsides, at the distance of half a cable's length from the Danes.¹

¹ Southey, ii. 119, 123. Ann Reg. 112. Dum. vi. 189. James, iii. 101.

The action began at five minutes past ten, and was general by eleven. Nine only of the line-of-battle ships could reach the stations allotted to them; only one of the gun-brigs could stem the current so as to get into action; and only two of the bomb-vessels were enabled to take up their appointed position on the Middle Ground. Captain Ridg,

with his squadron of frigates, undertook the perilous task of fronting the Crown batteries—a duty to which the three ships of the line which had been lost by grounding, would have been hardly adequate—and in the discharge of which that gallant and lamented officer lost his life. Nelson's agitation was extreme when, at the commencement of the action, he found himself deprived of three of his best ships of the line; but no sooner had he reached the scene of danger, where his squadron was assailed by the fire of above a thousand guns, than his countenance brightened, and he appeared animated and joyous. The cannonade soon became tremendous; nearly two thousand pieces of cannon on the two sides poured forth death within a space not exceeding a mile and a half in breadth; from the city on the one side, and the remainder of the squadron, under Sir Hyde, on the other, the hostile fleets seemed wrapped in one dazzling conflagration. For three hours the fire continued without any appearance of diminution on either side; and Sir Hyde, seeing three ships aground under the iron tempest of the Crown batteries, and being unable, from the wind and current, to render any assistance, made the signal of recall: generously supposing that, if Nelson was in a situation to continue the contest, he would disobey the order; but that if he was not, his reputation would be saved by the signal for retreat having been made by his superior officer.^{1*}

In the midst of this terrific cannonade Nelson was rapidly walking the quarter-deck. A shot through the mainmast scattered splinters around; he observed to one of his officers with a smile, "This is warm work; and this day may be the last to any of us in a moment: but mark me, I would not be elsewhere for thousands." About this time the signal-lieutenant called out that the signal for discontinuing the action had been thrown out by the commander-in-chief, and asked if he should repeat it. "No," he replied; "acknowledge it." He then continued walking about in great emotion; and meeting Captain Foley, said, "What think you, Foley, the admiral has

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53.
Battle of
Copen-
hagen.
Great dan-
ger of the
British fleet.

¹ Southey,
ii. 125.
Ann. Reg.
112. Dum.
vi. 189, 190.
Jom. xiv.
259. James,
iii. 101, 101.

54.
Coolness
and determi-
nation of
Nelson, who
disobeys
orders and
continues
the action.

* "The fire," he said, "is too hot for Nelson to oppose; a retreat must be made. I am aware of the consequences to my own personal reputation, but it would be cowardly in me to leave Nelson to bear the whole shame of the failure, if shame it should be deemed."—See Southey, ii. 125.

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hung out No. 39.* You know I have only one eye; I have a right to be blind sometimes:" and then putting the glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, "I really don't see the signal. Keep mine for closer battle still flying. That's the way I answer such signals. Nail mine to the mast." Admiral Graves and the other ships, looking only to Nelson, continued the combat with unabated vigour; but the order to retire was seen in time to save Riou's little squadron, though not to preserve its gallant commander. "What will Nelson think of us?" was that brave man's mournful exclamation, as with a heavy heart he gave orders to draw off. His clerk, was soon after killed by his side, and several marines swept away, by a discharge from the Crown batteries. "Come then, my boys, let us all die together," said Riou; and just as the words were uttered, he was cut in two by a chain-shot.^{1†}

¹ Southey,
ii. 126, 129.
Jom. xiv.
259. Ann.
Reg. 112.
James. iii.
104, 107.

54.
Heroic
deeds on
both sides.

But it was not on the English side alone that heroic deeds were performed; the Danes in that trying hour sustained the ancient reputation of the conquerors of the north. From the Prince-Royal, who, placed on one of the principal batteries, was the witness of the glorious resistance of his subjects, to the humblest citizen, one heroic mind and purpose seemed to animate the whole population. As fast as the crews of the guard-ships were mown down by the English fire, fresh bands of undaunted citizens crowded on board, and, unappalled by the dreadful spectacle, calmly took their station on decks choked by the dying and flooded with blood. Captain Lassen, in the Provesteen, continued to fight till he had only two pieces standing on their carriages, and a few men to work them; he then spiked these guns, and throwing himself into the sea, swam at the head of his brave followers towards the isle of Amak. Captain Thura, in the Indosforethen, fell early in the action; her colours were shot away; and a boat was dispatched to the Prince-Royal to inform him of her situation. "Gentlemen," said he, "Thura is killed, which of you will take the command?"

* The signal for discontinuing action.

† It is needless to say from whom the chief incidents in the action of Copenhagen are taken. Mr Southey's incomparable Life of Nelson is so deservedly popular, that his descriptions have become almost as firmly rooted in the public memory as the events they describe, and deviation from the one is as unpardonable as from the other.

—"I will," exclaimed Schroedersee, a captain who had recently resigned on account of extreme ill health, and instantly hastened on board. No sooner had he arrived on the deck than he was struck on the breast by a ball and perished; a lieutenant who had accompanied him then took the command, and fought the ship to the last extremity. The *Dannebrog* sustained for two hours with great constancy the terrible fire of Nelson's ship; at length, after two successive captains and three-fourths of the crew had been swept away, she took fire, and the gallant survivors, precipitating themselves into the sea, left the vessel to its fate, which soon after blew up with a tremendous explosion.* But all these efforts, how heroic soever, were of no avail; the rapidity and precision of the British fire were irresistible; at one o'clock the cannonade of the Danish fleet began to slacken; loud cheers from the English sailors announced every successive vessel which struck; and before two the whole front line, consisting of six sail of the line and eleven huge floating batteries, was all either taken, sunk, burnt, or destroyed.¹

In this desperate battle the loss on board the British fleet was very severe, amounting to no less than 1200; a greater proportion to the number of seamen engaged than in any other general action during the whole war. On board the *Monarch* there were 220 killed and wounded; she had to support the united fire of the *Holstein* and *Zealand*, besides being raked by the Crown battery.† But the situation of the crews of the Danish vessels was still more deplorable. Their loss in killed and wounded had been above double that of the British; including the prisoners, it amounted to 6000; and the line had completely ceased firing; but the shot from the Crown batteries and the isle of *Amak* still continued to fall upon both fleets,

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1 *Jom.* xiv.
259, 260.
Southey, ii.
130, 134.
Dum. vi.
190. *Ann.*
Reg. 112.
James, iii.
105, 111.

55.
Loss on
either side,
and Nelson's
proposal for
an armistice.

* The gallant *Welmoe*, a stripling of seventeen, stationed himself on a small raft, carrying six guns, with twenty-four men, right under the bows of Nelson's ship; and though severely galled by the musketry of the English marines, continued, knee-deep in dead, to keep up his fire to the close of the heroic conflict. Nelson embraced him at the repast which followed in the palace ashore; and said to the Crown Prince he should make him an admiral. "If, my lord," replied the prince, "I were to make all my brave officers admirals, I should have no captains or lieutenants in my service."—*Naval Chronicle*, xiv. 308

† "A singular example of coolness occurred on board this vessel. A four-and-twenty pounder from the Crown battery struck the kettle and dashed the peas and pork about; the sailors picked up the fragments and ate while they were working the guns."—*Southey*, ii. 130.

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doing as much injury to their friends as enemies ; while the English boats sent to take possession of the prizes were fired on by the Danish batteries, and were unable to extricate them from destruction. In this extremity, Nelson retired into the stern gallery, and wrote to the Crown Prince in these terms : " Lord Nelson has been commanded to spare Denmark when she no longer resists. The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag ; but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he must set fire to all the prizes he has taken, without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brothers, and should never be the enemies, of the English." A wafer was brought him ; he ordered a candle from the cockpit, and sealed the letter deliberately with wax. " This is no time," said he, " to appear hurried and informal." At the same time the Ramilies and Defence from Sir Hyde's squadron, worked up near enough to silence the remainder of the Danish line to the eastward of the Trekroner battery ; but that tremendous bulwark was comparatively uninjured, and to the close of the action continued to exert with unabated vigour its giant strength.¹

¹ Southey, ii. 135, 137. Ann. Reg. 113. Jom. xiv. 260. Dum. vi. 191, 192. James, liii. 109, 111.

56. Which the Danes agree to.

In half an hour the flag of truce returned ; the Crown batteries ceased to fire ; and the action closed after four hours' continuance. The Crown Prince enquired what was the English admiral's motive for proposing a suspension of hostilities. Lord Nelson replied, " Lord Nelson's object in sending the flag of truce was humanity ; he therefore consents that hostilities shall cease, and that the wounded Danes may be taken ashore. And Lord Nelson will take his prisoners out of the vessels, and burn or carry off the prizes as he shall think fit. Lord Nelson will consider this the greatest victory he has ever gained, if it shall be the means of re-establishing a good understanding between his own Sovereign and the King of Denmark." The Danish prince made a reply, which was forwarded to the commander-in-chief ; and Nelson, skilfully availing himself of the breathing time thus afforded, made the signal for the squadron to weigh anchor in succession. The Monarch led the way, and touched in rounding the shoal, but was got off by being taken in tow by two other ships ; but Nelson's own ship, the Elephant, and the

Defiance, grounded about a mile from the Crown batteries, and remained fast, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of their wearied crews. With these two exceptions, however, the whole fleet got clear off from the perilous shoals, and rejoined Sir Hyde's squadron in the middle of the straits; a fact which demonstrates that, though some of the British ships might have been lost if the action had continued, it could have made no difference on the ultimate result after the Danish line of defence had been destroyed.¹

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1 Ann. Reg.

113.

Sothey, ii.

140, 141.

Jom. xiv.

261. James,

iii. 115.

The scene which now presented itself was heart-rending in the highest degree. The sky, heretofore so brilliant, became suddenly overcast; white flags were flying from the mast-heads of the Danes; guns of distress were occasionally discharged from those scenes of woe; while the burning vessels which had floated to a distance threw an awful and lurid light over the melancholy scene.* The English boats, with generous but not undeserved humanity, covered the sea, rendering all the assistance in their power to the Danes who had escaped from the flaming wrecks; and the wounded men, as fast as the ships could be evacuated, were sent ashore; but great numbers perished, for such had been the unprepared ardour of the enemy, that hardly any surgeons were provided to staunch the wounds of the numerous victims to patriotic duty. At daybreak on the following morning, the Elephant, to the infinite joy of Nelson, was got afloat; and the boats of the fleet being all manned, the prizes were brought away, including the Zealand of seventy-four guns, from under the cannon of the redoubted Trekroner battery. Thus terminated this murderous battle, one of the most obstinately contested ever fought by the British navy. Nelson said, "he had been in above a hundred engagements, but that of Copenhagen was the most terrible of them all."²

57.
Melancholy
appearance
of the Danes
after the
battle.

² Southey,
ii. 143, 147.
Ann. Reg.
113.

Next day was Good Friday; but all distinctions were forgotten in the universal grief which prevailed in the capital

* " Again, again, again,
And the havoc did not slack
Till a feeble cheer the Dane
To our cheering sent us back:
Their shots along the deep slowly boom:—
Then ceased and all is wail,
As they strike the shatter'd sail,
Or, in conflagration pale,
Light the gloom."

CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltic*.

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58.

Impressive
scene at
Copenhagen
on Good
Friday.

of Denmark. Every house was filled with mourners; the streets were occupied with the weeping crowds which attended the dead to their long home or the still more distracted bands, which bore the wounded back to the hearths which they had so nobly defended. At mid-day, Nelson landed, attended by Captains Hardy and Freemantle; he walked slowly up from the quay through the crowded and agitated streets. The behaviour of the people was such as became a gallant nation, depressed, but not subdued by misfortune. "They did not," says the Danish chronicler, "either disgrace themselves by acclamations, or degrade themselves by murmurs; the admiral was received as one brave enemy ever should receive another; he was received with respect." During the repast which followed, the particulars of the convention, which ultimately took place, were arranged. Nelson told the prince the French fought bravely, but they could not have stood for one hour the fight which the Danes had supported for four. Melancholy tributes were paid by the people of Copenhagen to the brave men who had fallen in the conflict; a public mausoleum was erected on the spot where the slain had been interred; a monument raised in the principal church, surmounted by the Danish colours; young maidens, clothed in white, stood round its base, with the widows or the orphans of those who had fallen; while a funeral sermon was delivered, and suitable patriotic strains were heard. The people were in that state of mingled grief and exultation, when the bitterness of individual loss is almost forgotten in the sympathy of general distress, or the pride of heroic achievement.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
114.
Southey, ii.
146, 147.

59.
Armistice
agreed on
for fourteen
weeks.

Of all the vessels taken, the Holstein, of sixty-four guns, was alone brought to England; the remainder, being rendered unserviceable by the fire, were sunk or burnt in the roads of Copenhagen. The negotiation which followed was attended with considerable difficulty, and Nelson was obliged to threaten to renew hostilities that very night unless the armistice was concluded. The Danes candidly stated their fears of Russia; and the English admiral avowed that his object in wishing to make the armistice as long as possible, was, that he might have time to go to Cronstadt before returning to Copenhagen. At length it was agreed that it should last for fourteen

weeks, and not be broken without a fortnight's previous notice; that the armed ships of Denmark should remain, during its continuance, in *status quo*; that the principles of the armed neutrality should, in the mean time, be suspended as to Danish vessels; that the British fleet should obtain supplies of every sort from the island of Zealand; and that the prisoners and wounded should be sent ashore, to be carried to the credit of England, in the event of hostilities being renewed.¹

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¹ Ann. Reg.
114.
Southey, ii.
149, 153.
Dum. vi.
193, 194.

On the same day on which the English fleet forced the passage of the Sound, the Prussian cabinet, as already mentioned, made a formal demand on the regency of Hanover, to permit the occupation of the electorate, and disband a part of their forces, and supported the proposition by an army of twenty thousand men. The Hanoverian government, being in no condition to withstand an invasion from such a force, was compelled to submit, and Hanover, Bremen, and Hameln were immediately occupied by the Prussian troops. At the same time, the Danes took possession of Hamburg and Lubeck, so as to close the mouth of the Elbe against the English commerce, while, on the other hand, a British squadron, under Admiral Duckworth, reduced all the Swedish and Danish islands in the West Indies.²

80.
Hanover
overrun by
Prussia.
March 25.

² Jom. xiv.
251, 262.
Ann. Reg.
114.
Southey, ii.
151, 153.

During the brief period the alliance between Paul and Napoleon lasted, they had made great progress in maturing the favourite project of both these powers for the overthrow of the British power in India. A formal agreement for this purpose had been made between the two cabinets; thirty-five thousand French, under Massena, were to have embarked at Ulm, on the Danube, and to have been joined by twenty-five thousand Russian troops, and fifty thousand Cossacks. The King of Persia had agreed to give them a passage through his dominions; and they were to have proceeded by land, or embarked in the Persian Gulf, according to circumstances. Whether this plan would have succeeded, if attempted entirely with land forces, must always be considered extremely doubtful; when it is recollected what formidable deserts and mountains must have been overcome, which have never been attempted by an army encumbered with the artillery and caissons necessary for modern warfare;³ but that it was perfectly practicable, if accomplished by embarking in the

61.
Designs of
Paul and
Napoleon
against
British
India.

³ Nap. in
O'Meara, i.
381. Hard.
vii. 47.

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62.
Death of
Paul. Cause
of that
event.

Persian Gulf, is self-evident; and it is extremely doubtful whether, if the northern confederacy had not been dissolved, Great Britain could have relied upon maintaining a permanent naval superiority in the Indian seas.*

But while every thing thus announced the commencement of a desperate and bloody war between England and the northern powers, an event took place within the palace of St Petersburg, which at once dissolved the northern confederacy, defeated the sanguine hopes of Napoleon, and changed the face of the world. This was the death of the Emperor Paul, which took place on the night of the 23d March, and led immediately to the accession of his son ALEXANDER, and a total change of policy on the part of the cabinet of St Petersburg. Napoleon announced this important event to the French in these words, "Paul I. died on the night of the 23d March. The English fleet passed the Sound on the 30th. History will unveil the connexion which may have existed between these events." In truth there was a connexion, and an intimate one between them, though not of the kind insinuated by the First Consul. The connexion was that between flagrant misgovernment and Oriental revolution. In every country, how despotic soever, there is some restraint on the power of government. When oppression or tyranny has reached a certain height, a spirit of

* The plan agreed on was in these terms:—

Feb. 28.

"A French army, 33,000 strong, with light artillery, under the command of Massena, shall be moved from France to Ulm, from whence, with the consent of Austria, it shall descend the Danube to the Black Sea.

"Arrived there, a Russian fleet will transport it to Taganrok, from whence it shall move to Taritzin, on the Volga, where it shall find boats to convey it to Astrakan.

"There it will find a Russian army of 35,000 men, composed of 15,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 10,000 Cossacks, amply provided with artillery and the horses necessary for its conveyance.

"The combined army shall be transported by the Caspian Sea, from Astrakan to Astrabat, where magazines of all sorts shall be established for its use.

"This march from the frontiers of France to Astrabat will be made in eighty days; fifty more will be requisite to bring the army to the banks of the Indus, by the rout of Herat, Ferah, and Candahar." Paul afterwards agreed to increase the Cossacks to 50,000.—See HARDENBERG, vii. 497.

In forming an opinion on the probable result of such an expedition, no conclusion can be drawn from the successful irruptions of Alexander, Timour, Gengis Khan, or Nadir Shah, because their armies were unencumbered with the artillery and ammunition waggons indispensable to modern warfare. It appears from Colonel Conolly's Travels over this country, that for ten days' journey the army must subsist only on chopped straw, carried with itself, and that in that desert there is little or no water, and no road for wheel-carriages. Still the difficulties of the transit, according to him, are great rather than insuperable. The point is most ably discussed

resistance is inevitably generated, which leads to convulsion, and this is the case equally in Oriental as in European monarchies; in the age of Nero as in that of James II. It is the highest glory and chief benefit of representative governments, to have given a regular and constitutional direction to this necessary element in the social system, to have converted a casual and transitory burst of revenge into a regular and pacific organ of improvement; and instead of the revolutions of the seraglio, introduced the steady Opposition of the British Parliament.¹

In Russia, this important element was unknown. No regular or useful check upon the authority of government existed; the will of the Czar was omnipotent. Measures the most hurtful might emanate from the palace without any constitutional means of redress existing; and if the conduct of the Emperor had risen to a certain degree of extravagance, no means of arresting it existed but his destruction. Many concurring causes had conspired to irritate the Russian noblesse at the Emperor Paul, and yet the vehemence of his character precluded all hope of a return on his part to more rational principles of administration. The suspension of the commercial intercourse with England, by cutting off the great market for their rude produce, had injured the vital interests of the Russian landed proprietors; the embargo on English

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1 Dum. vi.
193. Jom.
xiv. 283.
Ann. Reg.
115.
Sign. i. 47.

63.
General
irritation at
the Czar.

in a learned article in the *United Service Journal*, where all the authorities and historical facts bearing on the subject are accumulated, and the conclusions drawn apparently equally just and irresistible.² If any doubt could exist on the subject, it has been removed by the successful march of the British to Candahar and Cabul in 1839, for if England in the face of enemies could march up, unquestionably Russia supported by allies could march down. In considering the probable success of Russia in such an undertaking, it is worthy of notice, that she never brought more than 35,000 men into the field at any one point in the late war with Turkey, nor so many as 10,000 in that with Persia: facts singularly illustrative of the difficulty of pushing forward any considerable force to such distant regions by overland passage. On the other hand, the red-coats, natives and Europeans, assembled for the siege of Bhurtpore, were as numerous as those which fought at Waterloo (36,000 men,) and 180 cannons were planted in the trenches, and that too during the hottest of the struggle in the Burmese empire. Still, as the population of Russia is doubling every half century, and she will soon have the force of Persia at her command, the British government cannot too soon take measures, by alliance and otherwise, to guard against such a danger. Perhaps, however, the real peril lies nearer home, and our splendid Indian empire is destined to be dissolved by domestic rather than foreign causes. Considering the slender tenure which we have of that magnificent dominion, and its direct exposure, since the dissolution of the India Company, to British legislation, in an assembly where its interests are neither directly nor indirectly represented, it is impossible to contemplate without alarm the probable effect upon its future destinies of the democratic influence which has recently received so great an increase.

2 *United Service Journal*.
No. 52.

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shipping, laid on in defiance of all the laws of war as well as the usages of humanity, had inflicted as deep a wound on their mercantile classes. The aristocracy of the country beheld with undisguised apprehension all the fixed principles of Russian policy abandoned, and a close alliance formed with a formidable revolutionary continental state, to the exclusion of the maritime power on whom they depended for the sale of almost all the produce which constituted their wealth; while the merchants felt it to be impossible to enter into any safe speculation, when the conduct of the Czar was so variable, and equal vehemence was exhibited in conducting war against an old ally, as in forming peace with a deadly foe. The internal administration of the empire was, in many respects, tyrannical and capricious; and although that might not by itself have led to a revolt in a country so habituated to submission as Muscovy, yet, combined with other and deeper causes of irritation, it produced a powerful effect. The French dress had been rigidly proscribed at the capital; the form of a coat might bring the wearer into peril of a visit to Siberia; and the Czar had renewed the ancient custom, which the good sense of preceding sovereigns had suffered to fall into desuetude, of compelling the noblesse, of whatever rank or sex, to stop their carriages and alight when they met any of the Imperial family. These causes, affecting equally the interests, the habits, and the vanity of the most powerful classes, had produced that general feeling of irritation at the government which in free states leads to a change of ministers, in despotic, to a dethronement of the sovereign.¹

Latterly, the conduct of the Emperor had been so extravagant, as to have given rise to a very general belief that he laboured under a certain degree of insanity. This was confirmed, not less by his private than his public conduct. The state papers and articles in the St Petersburg Gazette, which avowedly issued from his hand, or were prepared under his direction, bore evident marks of aberration. When despatches of importance were presented to him from the British government, containing terms of conciliation, he returned them unopened, after piercing them with his penknife. In the Court Gazette of December 30, 1800, he published an invitation to all the sovereigns of

¹ Bign. i.
430, 433.
Nap. ii. 152,
153.

64.
Symptoms
of insanity
in his con-
duct.

Europe to come to St Petersburg, and settle their disputes by a combat in a *champ-clos*, with their ministers, Pitt, Thugut, Bernstorff, and Talleyrand, for esquires.* He was so much enraged at Prussia for not instantly falling in with his vehement hostility towards Great Britain, that he threatened some months before to put a stop to all intercourse between his subjects and the north of Germany, and immediately before his death entertained seriously the project of closing all the harbours in Europe against the British commerce, and overwhelming her Indian possessions by a cloud of Tartars and Kalmucks.¹

Alarmed at this perilous crisis of public affairs, several of the leading nobles in Russia entered into a conspiracy; the object of which, at first, was to dethrone the Czar merely, without depriving him of life; but experience in every age has confirmed the adage, that from the prison to the grave of princes is but a step. The governor of St Petersburg, Count Pahlen, a minister high in the confidence of the Emperor, was deeply implicated in the conspiracy; and General Benningsen, who afterwards bore a distinguished part in the war against France, is supposed to have taken a leading share in carrying it into execution. The plot was communicated to Paul's two sons, the Grand-Duke Alexander, and Constantine, though without any insinuation that it would be attended with danger to their father's life, it being merely held out that the safety of the empire indispensably required that the Emperor's insanity should be prevented from doing any further detriment to the public interests. The apprehension of private danger induced the young princes to lend a more willing ear than they might otherwise have done to these proposals; for, independent of the natural violence of their father's temperament, with which they were well acquainted, they were aware that he had become lately prejudiced against his nearest relations, and had dropped hints to the Princess Gargarin, the object of his chivalrous devotion, of his intention of sending Alexander to Siberia, immuring Constantine in a fortress, and the empress-mother in a cloister.² But, notwithstanding this danger, it was with great difficulty that the young princes could be brought to give their

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¹ Ann. Reg.
114, 115.
Jom. xiv.
265. Hard.
vii. 41.

65.
Conspiracy
among the
nobles for
his de-
thronement.

² Bign. 1.
434, 435.
Hard. viii.
83, 84.

* "Lastly," said Napoleon, "I think Paul was mad."—O'MEARA, 380.

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66.
His assassination.
Its particulars.

consent to the conspiracy; and Alexander in particular, the eldest son, only yielded on condition that his father's life should be spared.

On the evening before his death, Paul received a note, when at supper with his mistress, warning him of the danger with which he was threatened. He put it in his pocket, saying he would read it on the morrow.* He retired to bed at twelve. At two in the morning Prince Suboff, whose situation and credit in the palace gave him access at all times to the Imperial chambers, presented himself with the other conspirators at the door. A hussar, who refused admission, was cut down on the spot, and the whole party entered, and found the royal apartments empty. Paul, hearing the noise, had got up, and hid himself in a closet. "He has escaped," said some of the conspirators. "That he has not," returned Benningsen. "No weakness, or I will put you all to death." At the same time Pahlen, who never lost his presence of mind, put his hand on the bed-clothes, and feeling them warm, observed that the Emperor could not be far off, and he was soon discovered, and dragged from his retreat. They presented to the Emperor his abdication to sign. Paul refused. A contest arose, and in the struggle an officer's sash was passed round the neck of the unhappy monarch, and he was strangled after a desperate resistance.† The two grand-dukes were in the room below. Alexander eagerly enquired, the moment it was over, whether they had saved his father's life. Pahlen's silence told too plainly the melancholy tale, and the young prince tore his hair in an agony of grief, and broke out into sincere and passionate exclamations of sorrow at the catastrophe which had prepared the way for his ascent to the throne.¹ The despair of the Empress and the Grand-Duke Constantine was equally vehement; but Pahlen, calm and

¹ Bign. i. 438, 439.
O'Mea. i. 380. Hard. viii. 86, 87.

* Prince Mecheréki wrote a letter to Paul in the early part of that day to warn him of his danger, and revealed the names of the conspirators. He delivered the letter into the hands of Koutaltsoff, another courtier, who put it in his coat pocket, and forgot it there when he changed his dress to dine with the Emperor. He returned to get it; but Paul growing impatient, sent for him in a hurry, and the trembling courtier came back without the epistle on which so much depended.—HARD. viii. 6.

† The dress of Ouzaroff, one of the conspirators, caused him to be mistaken by the Emperor for his son Constantine; and the last words which the unhappy monarch uttered were, "And you too, my Constantine!"—BIGNON, i. 438.

collected, represented that the empire indispensably required a change of policy, and that nothing now remained but for Alexander to assume the reins of government.

The evident symptoms of insanity which this ill-fated monarch evinced towards the close of his reign, his fickleness of conduct, tyrannical usage of British seamen, and general extravagance of demeanour, must not throw into the shade the good qualities which at an earlier period he displayed, and the important ameliorations which he effected in his country. He first established the hereditary succession to the crown; a matter of infinite importance in a government partaking so largely of the Oriental character. His improvements in the administration of the army were immense, and laid the foundation of the rapid strides which it made under his more fortunate successor. His prodigalities even contributed to the circulation of wealth, and sensibly augmented the public improvement. He was vehement, inconstant, and capricious, but not without a large intermixture of generous feeling, and occasionally capable of heroic actions.¹

The influence of the causes which had occasioned this violent and frightful revolution speedily appeared in the measures which the young Emperor pursued on his accession to the throne. The conspirators were invested with the chief offices of state, and the Czar was compelled to take counsel from those whose hands had recently been imbrued in his father's blood, in every thing connected with the government of the empire.* The new Emperor, on the day succeeding his elevation to the throne, issued a proclamation declaring his resolution to govern according to the maxims and system of his august grandmother, Catherine; and one of the first acts of his reign was to give orders that the British sailors and captains, who had been taken from the ships laid under sequestration, and marched into the interior, should be set at liberty, and carefully conducted, at the public expense, to the ports from which they had been severally taken. At the same

CHAR.
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67.

His mixture
of good and
bad quali-
ties.

¹ Hard. viii.
91.

68.

Accession of
Alexander,
and imme-
diate ap-
proach to an
accommoda-
tion with
England.

* A lady of rank and wit wrote to Fouché, on occasion of a public ceremony at which the Emperor was present soon after his accession—"The young Emperor walked, preceded by the assassins of his grandfather, followed by those of his father, and surrounded by his own"—"There," said Fouché, "is a woman who speaks Tacitus."—See BREN. I. 445. HARD. VII. 193.

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1 *Jom. xiv.*
268, 269.
Ann. Reg.
116.

69.
His charac-
ter.

time all prohibitions against the export of corn were removed; a measure of no small importance to the famishing population of the British isles, and hardly less material to the gorged proprietors of Russian produce. The young Emperor shortly after wrote a letter with his own hand to the King of England, expressing in the warmest terms his desire to re-establish the amicable relations of the two empires; a declaration which was received with equal shouts of joy in London as St Petersburg.¹*

Perhaps no sovereign since the days of the Antonines ever was called to higher destinies, or more worthily filled an important place in the theatre of the world, than the Emperor Alexander. Placed at the head of the most powerful and rising empire in existence, stationed midway between ancient civilisation and barbaric vigour, he was called to take the lead in the great struggle for European freedom; to combat with the energy and enthusiasm of the desert the superiority of advanced information, and meet the condensed military force of a revolution, which had beat down all the strength of continental power, with the dauntless resolution and enduring fortitude which arise in the earlier ages of social existence. Well and nobly he fulfilled his destiny.—Repeatedly defeated, never subdued, he took counsel, like his great predecessor, Peter, from misfortune, and prepared in silence those invincible bands which, in the day of trial, hurled back the most terrible array which ambition had ever marshaled against the liberties of mankind. A majestic figure, a benevolent expression of countenance, gave him that sway over the multitude which ever belongs to physical advantages in youthful princes; while the qualities of his understanding and the feelings of his heart secured the admiration of all whose talents fitted them to judge of the affairs of nations.

* The empress-mother, a woman of heroic spirit and noble character, and who possessed the greatest influence through life over her son, openly and uniformly avowed her horror at Paul's murder; and shortly after that event, had a picture painted, representing her death scene, and publicly exposed at the Foundling Hospital, which was under her peculiar charge. Prodigious crowds having been attracted by the sight, Count Fahlen became alarmed at the consequences, and prevailed on Alexander to request his mother to have it removed. But the Princess was not to be shaken. "My son," said she, "you must choose between Fahlen and me." The painting remained, and the minister was soon after dismissed from his situations.—*D'Ann. vi. 342.*

Misunderstood by those who formed their opinion only from the ease and occasional levity of his manner, he was early formed to great determinations, and evinced in the most trying circumstances, during the French invasion and the Congress of Vienna, a solidity of judgment equalled only by the strength of his resolution. A disposition naturally generous and philanthropic, moulded by the precepts of La Harpe, had strongly imbued his mind with liberal principles, which shone forth in full and perhaps dangerous lustre when he was called on to act as the pacificator of the world after the fall of Paris. But subsequent experience convinced him of the extreme danger of prematurely transplanting the institutions of one country into another in a different stage of civilisation; and his latter years were chiefly directed to objects of practical improvement, and the preparation of his subjects, by the extension of knowledge and the firmness of government, for those privileges which, if suddenly conferred, would have involved in equal ruin his empire and himself.¹

The first measures of his administration were eminently calculated to win that popularity which, notwithstanding the proverbial fickleness of the multitude, never afterwards forsook him. By a ukase, published on the 14th April, he restored to the nobility their privileges and prerogatives, such as they had been in the time of the Empress Catherine; re-established the rights of municipalities; abolished secret proceedings in criminal cases; awarded a general amnesty, and stopped all the state prosecutions which had been commenced. Indulgences were at the same time granted to the clergy, and measures taken to re-open those outlets for the raw produce of the state, the closing of which had occasioned so much alarm. Independent of his letter to the King of England, the Emperor wrote to Sir Hyde Parker, expressing an anxious wish to close with the amicable propositions made by the British government to his predecessor, provided it could be done without violating his engagements to his allies, and entreating him in the meantime to suspend hostilities, and conveying the pleasing intelligence that orders had been given that the British seamen sent to prison by Paul were set at liberty.² At the time when this letter arrived at the British fleet, Sir Hyde had not been recalled by the English

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1801.

¹ Jom. xiv.
270. Hard.
viii. 96, 104.

70.

His early
pacific and
popular
measures.

² Ukase,
April 7,
State
Papers, 256.

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XXXIII.

1801.

April 18.

1 South ii.
162. Jom.
xiv. 272,
273. May 7.

71.
Nelson sails
for Cron-
stadt. His
conciliatory
measures
there.

ministry, and Nelson, wisely judging that the best way of forwarding a pacific negotiation was to support it by a hostile demonstration, made sail with all his squadron to Carlscrona, where, in answer to a message enquiring whether the Swedish government was willing to be included in the armistice concluded with Denmark, he received an answer that they "could not listen to separate proposals, but would close with any equitable offers made by Great Britain to the united northern powers." This reply, coupled with the well-known pacific inclinations of the court of Stockholm, led the English admiral to conclude that he would experience no difficulty in arranging an accommodation with the whole Baltic states, if the disputes with the cabinet of St Petersburg could be adjusted; and therefore he proposed instantly to sail for Revel, where a large portion of the Russian fleet lay in an open bay, exposed to his attacks, and unable from the ice to make their escape. But Sir Hyde, who trusted that the death of Paul would immediately lead to a settlement of all the differences, insisted upon returning to Kioge bay, where he cast anchor, and remained till the 5th May, when he was recalled by the British government, and Nelson appointed to the command in chief.¹

No sooner was Nelson the unfettered master of his own actions, than he set sail for the gulf of Finland. But when he arrived there, he found that in the interval the enemy had escaped; they had cut through the ice in the mole, six feet thick, on the 3d May, and were now safe under the cannon of Cronstadt. Thither they were followed by the indefatigable admiral, who saluted the forts when he approached, and wrote to the Emperor, congratulating him on his accession, and urging the immediate release of the British subjects and property. A friendly intercourse was immediately established between the British admiral and the Russian authorities; but, as the Emperor expressed great uneasiness at the presence of the English squadron, and it was evident that the negotiation would proceed more favourably if this cause of irritation was removed, Nelson stood out to sea, and proceeded down the Baltic, leaving only a brig to bring off the provisions which had been contracted for. This judicious and conciliatory conduct was met by a corresponding disposition on the part

of Russia. When at anchor off Rostock, he received an answer to his letter to the Emperor, couched in the most flattering terms, and containing the important intelligence, that the British vessels and crews which had been detained were ordered to be liberated. On his return to Copenhagen, he found that the conduct of Denmark during his absence had been actuated by very different principles; the most hostile preparations had been going forward, in defiance of the armistice, and ample grounds existed, if the English government had been so inclined, to renew hostilities, and utterly destroy the Danish naval power. But the death of Paul had dissolved the confederacy; conciliatory measures were now the most prudent course which could be adopted, and Nelson, wisely dissembling his resentment, proceeded to England to receive the thanks of a grateful nation, which his valour and skill had brought victorious out of a state of unprecedented danger.¹

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1801.

¹ Southey, ii.
162, 171.
Bign. i. 443,
446, Jom.
xiv. 272, 274.
Nap. ii. 154,
156.

The British cabinet immediately sent Lord St Helens to St Petersburg; and soon after his arrival at that capital, he signed a treaty as glorious to England as it was confirmatory of the correctness of the view she had taken of the law of nations in this great question. By this convention it was provided, "That the right of searching merchant-ships belonging to the subjects of one of the contracting powers, and navigating under a ship of war of the same power, shall only be exercised by ships of war of the belligerent party, and shall never extend to the fitters-out of privateers or other vessels which do not belong to the imperial or royal fleet of their majesties, but which their subjects shall have fitted out for war; that the effects on board neutral ships shall be free, with the exception of contraband of war and of enemy's property; and it is agreed not to comprise in the number of the latter the merchandise of the produce, growth, or manufacture of the countries at war, which should have been acquired by the subjects of the neutral power, and should be transported for their account." And the contraband articles between the two powers were declared to be the same as those specified in the treaty 10th February 1797; viz. "cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, balls, bullets, firelocks, flints, matches, sulphur, helmets, pikes, swords, sword-belts, pouches, saddles and bridles,

72.
Peace with
Russia, and
abandonment of the
principles of
the armed
neutrality.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1801.

1 Convention,
June 17.
Articles 3,
4. State
Papers, 213.
Ann. Reg.;
and Martens,
vii.
360.

excepting such quantity of the said articles as may be necessary for the defence of the ship and crew." It was further provided, "that, in order to determine what shall be deemed a blockaded port, that denomination only is given to such a one where there is, by the disposition of the power which attacks it, with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering." By this treaty the right of search was placed upon its true footing; it was divested of the circumstances most likely to occasion irritation in neutral vessels, and not stipulated in favour of either party as a new right, but merely recognised as a privilege already existing, necessarily inherent by the practice of maritime states in every belligerent power, and subjected to such restraints as the enlarged experience of mankind had proved to be expedient.¹

73.
Napoleon's
indignation
at it.

Napoleon has observed upon this agreement, "Europe beheld with astonishment this ignominious treaty signed by Russia, and which, by consequence, Denmark and Sweden were compelled to adopt. It was equivalent to an admission of the sovereignty of the seas in the British Parliament, and the slavery of all other states. This treaty was such that England could have desired nothing more, and a power of the third order would have been ashamed to have signed it." A stronger panegyric could not have been pronounced on this memorable convention, so far as England is concerned, or a more valuable eulogium on the firmness of the cabinet and the intrepidity of the seamen by whom these important advantages had been secured. The First Consul early dispatched Duroc to St Petersburg to endeavour to counterbalance the influence of Great Britain, and bring Alexander back to the footsteps of his predecessor; but though he received the most flattering reception, he could effect nothing against the ascendancy of Nelson; and the treaty was signed, to the universal joy of both nations.²

² Nap. ii.
159 Bign.
i. 451, 452.
Hard. viii.
62.

74.
Dissolution
of the naval
confederacy.
May 19.

Sweden and Denmark were not expressly included in the convention of the 17th June; but they were compelled to follow the example of Russia. Unable of themselves to contend with the naval power of England, the anticipated loss of all their colonies, and the certainty of being deprived of their whole commerce, if they continued the contest, ultimately overcame the influence of France, and

the recollection of their recent wounds at Copenhagen. On the 20th May, a convention was agreed to by the Danish government, in virtue of which the city of Hamburg was, three days afterwards, evacuated by the Danish troops, and the free navigation of the Elbe restored; and on the 19th, the embargo on British vessels was taken off both in Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. These measures were immediately met by corresponding steps on the part of the British government; the embargo on all the ships of the Baltic powers in the harbours of Great Britain was raised; and the expense both of putting it on and taking it off, so far as Danish vessels were concerned, defrayed by the English treasury. Prussia had been unwillingly drawn into the struggle, and took the first opportunity of escaping from its effects. Under the mediation of Russia, an arrangement was concluded, by which the Prussian troops were to evacuate Hanover, and restore the free navigation of the Weser.¹

Thus was dissolved, in less than six months after it had been formed, the most formidable confederacy ever arrayed against the English maritime power. Professedly contracted in order to secure the liberty of the seas, it was really directed against the grandeur and prosperity of Great Britain; breathing only the sentiments of freedom and justice, it was, in truth, intended to divide among the coalesced states the power and the ascendancy of a more fortunate rival. The rapidity with which this powerful alliance was broken up by England, at the conclusion of a long and burdensome war, and when her people were labouring under the combined pressure of severe want and diminished employment, is one of the most remarkable features of this memorable contest; and, perhaps more than any other, characteristic of the vast ascendancy, moral as well as political, which she has acquired among the other nations of the world. It is in vain to say, the dissolution of the confederacy was owing to the death of Paul. The revolution at St Petersburg was itself the result of the influence of Great Britain; of that vast commerce, which had made her intercourse essential to the very existence of the most haughty continental states; and that moral sway, which ranged under her banners the most powerful and important classes of distant nations.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1801.

1. *Jom.* xiv.
275, 276.
Bign. i. 451,
452. *Ann.*
Reg. 116.

75.
Reflections
on these
events.

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XXXIII.

1801.

76.

Glorious
conduct of
the British
Govern-
ment at this
crisis.

The conduct of the English government and people, during this trying crisis, was a model of firmness and moderation, and was deservedly crowned by one of the most glorious triumphs recorded in their history. Disdaining to submit to the menaces even of combined Europe, they boldly fronted the danger; anticipated by the rapidity of their movements the junction of their adversaries, paralysed by the thunder of their arms the first of their opponents, and at the same time holding out the olive branch, succeeded in detaching the greatest power from the confederacy, and ultimately dissolving it, without the abandonment of one principle for which the war had been undertaken. The convention of 17th June fixed the maritime question upon its true basis; it arrogated no peculiar privilege to Great Britain, subjected to no exclusive humiliation the neutral states, but, prescribing one equal rule for all belligerent powers, and imposing one equal obligation upon all neutrals, settled the right of search and blockade upon that equitable footing, which, alike obligatory upon England and inferior nations, must ever remain the law of the seas, while ambition and revenge continue to desolate the world.

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER XXX.

Note A, page 153.

THE Budget stood thus :—

RECEIPTS—WAYS AND MEANS.

Land and Malt Tax,	£2,750,000
Lottery,	200,000
Duties on Exports and Imports,	1,250,000
Income-Tax.	5,300,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund,	5,512,000
Loan by Exchequer Bills,	3,000,000
Lent by Bank without interest,	3,000,000
Loan for Great Britain,	18,500,000
	<hr/>
	£39,512,000

EXPENDITURE.

Navy,	£12,619,000
Army,	11,370,000
Miscellaneous,	750,000
Interest on Exchequer Bills,	816,000
Deficiencies of year 1799,	440,000
Deficiency of Malt Tax and Land do.,	350,000
Exchequer Bills,	2,500,000
Do. for 1798,	1,075,000
Vote of Credit,	3,000,000
Subsidies to Germans and Russians,	3,000,000
Annual grant for National Debt,	200,000
Unforeseen emergencies,	1,800,000
	<hr/>
Carry over,	£37,920,000

Brought forward, £37,920,000

To provide for the interest of this loan, amounting in all to £21,500,000, Mr Pitt laid on some trifling taxes on spirits and tea, amounting in all to £350,000, the interest on the bulk of the debt being laid as a charge on the income-tax. The interest paid on the loan was only 4½ per cent; a fact which he justly stated as extraordinary in the eighth year of the war. The interest on the public debt at this time was £19,700,000, and on Exchequer Bills, &c., £1,983,000, in all

	£21,683,000
Civil List,	898,000
Civil Expenses,	647,000
Charges of management,	1,779,000
Other charges on Consolidated Fund,	239,000
	<hr/> 25,246,000

Total National Expenditure in 1800, £63,166,000

—See *PARL. HIST.* xxxiv. 1515, and *ANN. REG. APP. TO CHRONICLE FOR 1800*, pp. 151, 152.

Note B, page 154.

From Mr Dundas's statement it appeared that the total revenue in 1798-9 was £8,610,000, the local charges £7,807,000, and the interest of debt and other charges £875,000, leaving a deficiency in territorial revenue of £71,000; to cover which there were the commercial profits, amounting to £630,000; leaving a general balance in favour of the company of £558,000 yearly.

The revenue and expenditure were thus divided:—

	Revenue.	Charges.
" Bengal,	£6,259,600	£3,952,847
Madras,	2,004,993	2,857,519
Bombay,	346,110	996,699
	<hr/> £8,610,703	<hr/> £7,807,065
	7,807,065	
Surplus,	£803,638	
Interest on Debt,	£758,135	
Other Charges,	117,160	
	<hr/> 875,295	
Deficiency,	£71,657	
Commercial Profits,		£629,657
Deduct territorial loss,		71,657
		<hr/> £558,000
	Annual Surplus,	

—See *PARL. HIST.* xxxv. 15.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Note A, page 369.

Mr Chancellor Addington, on June 29, 1810, brought forward a series of finance resolutions, which, as fully explaining the situation of the British empire at that period, are well deserving of attention. Their material parts are as follows:—

1. EXPENDITURE FOR 1801.

Interest of debt and sinking fund,	£20,144,000
Additional interest on loans of 1801,	1,812,000
Civil list, share of Great Britain,	1,376,000
Civil government pensions, charges, &c., in Scotland,	635,000
Charges of collection,	1,851,000
Great Britain's share of the war charges of 1801,	39,338,000
Advances to Ireland from England,	2,500,000
Interest on Imperial loans,	497,000
Total charges,	£68,153,000

2 INCOME FOR 1801.

Permanent Revenue, as in 1800,	£27,419,000
Produce of first quarter's taxes, 1801,	1,000,000
Income-tax,	5,622,000
Exports and Imports,	1,200,000
Repayments from Grenada,	800,000
Loan,	25,500,000
Loan for Ireland,	2,500,000
Exchequer bills charged on supplies of 1802,	2,000,000
Additional produce of taxes deficient in 1800,	1,100,000
Unpaid part of German loan,	560,000
Redeemed land-tax,	62,000
Total income,	£67,963,000

3. PUBLIC DEBT.

Public debt on the 5th January 1793,	£227,000,000
Annuities at same period,	1,292,000
Public debt created from 5th Jan. 1793 to 1st Feb. 1801,	214,661,000
Annuities created since the same period,	302,000
Debt redeemed from 1793 to 1801,	52,281,000
Drawn by land-tax redeemed,	16,083,000
Total public debt on 1st February 1801,	400,709,000
Annuities existing then,	1,540,000
Annual charge of debt incurred before 1793, with sinking fund,	10,325,000
Annual charge of debt incurred since 1793, with do.	10,395,000

4. SINKING FUND.

Amount of sinking fund in 1786,	£1,000,000, or 1-238 of debt.
... .. in 1793,	1,427,000, or 1-160 of do.
... .. in 1801,	5,300,000, or 1-76 of do.

5. PRODUCE OF TAXES.

Years.	Permanent Taxes.	Years.	Permanent Taxes.
Ending 5th Jan. 1793,	£14,284,000	1798,	£13,332,000
... .. 1794,	13,941,000	1799,	14,275,000
... .. 1795,	13,858,000	1800,	15,743,000
... .. 1796,	13,557,000	1801,	14,194,000
... .. 1797,	14,292,000		
War Taxes of 1801, £8,079,000.			

6. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS.

		Imports.
Average of six years ending 5th Jan.	1784,	£13,122,000
... .. 1793,	1793,	18,685,000
... .. 1801,	1801,	25,259,000
Real value of imports in 1801,		54,500,000

	Foreign Goods. Exported.	British Manufac- tures Exported.
Average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1784,	4,263,000	28,616,000
... .. 1796,	5,468,000	14,771,000
... .. 1801,	17,166,000	20,085,000
Real value of exports in 1801,	16,300,000	39,500,000

7. SHIPPING.

	Registered vessels	Tonnage.	Seamen.
1788,	13,827	1,363,000	107,500
1792,	16,079	1,540,000	118,000
1800,	18,877	1,905,000	143,000

The vast increase of exports, imports, and shipping, between 1793 and 1800, and especially since the Bank Restriction Act in 1797, is particularly worthy of observation.—See *P&L. Hist.* xxxv. 1561, 1567

END OF VOLUME VII.

